How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, Butschi said:

this self regulation doesn't yield the desired results, especially during a crisis.

Exactly European Social Safety Nets are non-negotiable for Europeans. Apart from them they embrace capitalism. This concept is not always understood in the US.

[danfrodo]

12 minutes ago, Butschi said:

Indeed. After the last decade or so of crises, most governments but also economies figured out that a self regulating free market does not exist or at least that this self regulation doesn't yield the desired results, especially during a crisis.

unregulated free markets would quickly evolve to trusts and monopolies.  Free market requires competition, which companies all hate, of course, and would smash if they had the market power and capital to do so. 

Free market capitalism, like democracy, is the best system humans have.  But it's not a magic rainbow pony and requires some amount of regulation.  Too much and you stifle innovation.  Too little and the free market has no competition and consumers get fleeced w/o recourse.  People love to think they are 100% free market proponent -- until they need health care at age 65, where there is no free market solution simply because old people are so expensive to insure that no one could afford it except the very rich.  Then they wants that awful socialism.  None of this stuff is black & white, it's all a balance that is constantly being adjusted.

The big picture is that gov'ts intervene when for whatever reason the market gets wrecked in a way that hurts the people too much -- like now, w Putler.  The market will adjust to Putler's extortion racket but it can't do it instantly.  Meanwhile the gov't can't have thousands of old & children freezing to death because they can't afford heat.  So might be subsidy, might be price control, or any of a number of tricks, all of which would hopefully be temporary until a functioning market can return.

For this Ukraine discussion, what matters is that gov'ts do what they can to soften the economic damage so that support for Ukraine continues and we don't get pro-Putin demagogues elected due to angry populace. 

Having said all that, I must now leave for religious obligations.  The Ohio State Buckeyes Football Team, most beloved in The Creator's eyes, is on the telly!

[Huba]

RU is really scrapping the bottom of the barrel equipment-wise... 

 

[dan/california]

 

57 minutes ago, sburke said:

I think that is what happens when we have periods without really clear info as to what is happening.  OpSec can be such a pain at times!  

Steve could throw a bone....

[LongLeftFlank]

6 hours ago, sburke said:

I don't have a TWITter acct and can't see translated

Yeah, Twitter has turned the screws again: first they disabled the icon to shut the 'Sign Up Now' popups but you could still get around them by clicking through and then hitting Back. Not any more.

https://nitter.net/  seems to be the next best option, although it can be slow.

[dan/california]

 

1 minute ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yeah, Twitter has turned the screws again: first they disabled the icon to shut the 'Sign Up Now' popups but you could still get around them by clicking through and then hitting Back. Not any more.

https://nitter.net/  seems to be the next best option, although it can be slow.

Just open an account with a picture of a sunflower and some go Ukraine verbiage. You never have to post ANYTHING.

[sburke]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

 

Just open an account with a picture of a sunflower and some go Ukraine verbiage. You never have to post ANYTHING.

I avoid anything that starts with TWIT

 

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Grigb said:

It is gift that never stops giving - UK is silently taking over not just UKR but other countries as well, for example US.

I work with people in the British MoD.  I think they will find this theory that Britain is secretly taking over US weapons production hilariously off the mark.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, pavel.k said:

When i heard about FSB poor report about the state of Ukraine which probably give a green light for the Invasion, it came to my mind, what if it was poor report for purpose? To let bleed the army and create crisis. Could this terrible tragedy be just a high game of Patrushev or Bortnikov? It sounds very conspiracy/crazy, isn't it?

Also if i remember correctly there were some speculations after the beginning of invasion, that FSB provided some good intel to Ukraine. Like it was making sure the invasion will not succeed?

Ok, you can call me lunatic and i will shut up

I do not think you are a lunatic.  Some people early on in the war thought it could have been deliberate in order to create conditions for the removal of Putin.  I personally don't think that's the case, but this is Russia so it can't be completely ruled out until we have a definitive answer of what really happened.

The most likely scenario is that FSB reported what Putin wanted to hear, and since Putin wanted to hear that taking Ukraine would be easy that is what the FSB reported would happen when Russian tanks rolled in.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yeah, Twitter has turned the screws again: first they disabled the icon to shut the 'Sign Up Now' popups but you could still get around them by clicking through and then hitting Back. Not any more.

https://nitter.net/  seems to be the next best option, although it can be slow.

Oh, for a long time now I've got a neat work around.  Click on LOG IN, a second dialog comes up with a close "x" in the top left corner.  Click that and you're home free!

Steve

[chuckdyke]

Just subscribed to this channel. He pointed out five years ago how risky it is to bring cell phones once you're deployed. Either the Russians were ignorant or lacked discipline. Probably a combination of both. Western troops couldn't follow this simple order on an exercise.

 

Edited September 4, 2022 by chuckdyke

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Grigb said:

However, today Kadyrov announced over Telegram he needs - indefinite and long vacation from his post Head of Chechnya. Text of post:

Whoa boy.  That is something going for sure.

I agree that it would be quite odd for Putin to pressure Kadyrov out of power at this stage.  Like you said, he hasn't done anything obvious that would put him in bad graces with Putin.  Quite the opposite I think.  While I agree with your second possibility ("soft coup"), I'd like to offer a two more possibilities:

Working theories:

1. Putin got pissed off with Kadyrov
2. Somebody very close to Putin is making a soft coup
3. Kadyrov senses he can squeeze more out Putin because he knows Putin needs him now more than ever
4. Someone in the Kremlin (not necessarily Putin) put pressure on Kadyrov of some sort for some reason and Kadyrov called their bluff by announcing his retirement

My thought was inspired by this article:

https://www.rferl.org/a/chechnya-kadyrov-indefinite-break-speculation/32017103.html

Theory 3 Pro

Kadyrov is an opportunist and this wouldn't be the first time he's threatened to leave in order to get something new for staying.  It could be that he senses Putin is weak right now and will give him whatever he wants.   Power and/or money are the two obvious ones.  Could be push back against the court ruling you mentioned.  Certainly the timing is suspicious.  His highlighting of the inexperience and not knowing how to play the game could be some top notch sarcasm, because this move would clearly demonstrate neither are true.

Theory 3 Against

If Kadyrov wants to keep what he has he needs Putin to stay in power, and this seems to be more likely to weaken Putin.  This means the timing isn't as great as it might look, though of course this presupposes that Kadyrov is smart enough to be looking ahead.  I think he's smart enough to do that, but it's possible he isn't.

Theory 4 Pro

Things aren't great at the Kremlin and Chechnya is a significant complication for them.  It is entirely plausible that someone high up in the Kremlin (likely not Putin directly) wants Kadyrov to do something he doesn't want to do (e.g. send in 10,000 Chechens for frontline duty), accept a new power arrangement (e.g. less money), or something else that Kadyrov doesn't want to do,  We know quite well that ethnic Russians have a very low opinion of Chechens generally and Kadyrov specifically.  Someone pressuring him might have done so in a very insulting manner.  That could explain a sarcasm laced public announcement calling the Kremlin's bluff.

Theory 4 Against

While it is possible that a senior Kremlin type might approach Kadyrov about something this consequential without Putin's knowledge, it seems risky for the person if things don't work out well.  I'm not sure there is anybody in the Kremlin these days that would risk their necks like that, so it would be more likely for Putin to have made this happen.  And if he did, wouldn't he approach Kadyrov directly?  Regardless, while it is true Putin is weak he is also desperate enough that he could call Kadyrov's bluff.

 

Because I don't know Russian or nuances of Chechen behavior, I'm at a disadvantage in interpreting the announcement itself.

If this announcement were done by an American I'd have sensed it being dripping with sarcasm.  Especially if his chuckles and smiles are in the spots I think they are.  This makes me interpret the announcement more like "Yeah, you're right.  I don't know what I'm doing and don't know how to play the game.  So I'm going to retire and leave managing Chechnya in the middle of a massive crisis because you're obviously so much smarter than I am".

Additionally, we must always look at was not said as that is often as important, sometimes more important, than what was said.  Notice that he did not announce when he is going to leave.  He did not announce an appointment of a successor (even if interim), nor specify how a permanent successor will get appointed.  The latter is likely some sort of clan based process, but whatever it is he didn't mention it.  To me this shows less commitment to leave office than it otherwise could have.

 

Whatever is going on it is important and could have major impacts on the internal power dynamics within Russia.  If Kadyrov actually does leave power (for real, not like Putin did with Medvedev), then we can expect some pretty serious turmoil ahead.  On the other hand,, if this is some sort of power play by Kadyrov then we might not see anything happen, even though something dramatic likely happened behind closed doors.

What to look for:

• a more formal announcement of a transition of power in Chechnya
• Kadyrov going onto Telegram and "reluctantly" agreeing to stay in power
• an announcement by Putin acknowledging the video
• reversal of the recent book banning
• anybody connected to Kadyrov falling out a window
• strange assassinations in Moscow blamed on Chechens

I think we should see something happen fairly soon.  This is not the sort of thing either Putin or Kadyrov can afford to be hanging out there without being addresses.

Steve

[Kinophile]

I'm curious what's after  Kherson... I'm leery of saying something like Zaporizhia,  Iziyum, etc as those are territorial acquisitions,  where as UKR instead seems very focused on force attrition, as highlighted by Steve et al.

If we can solve/identify what follows  Kherson we'll probably have a better forwards read of the current operation. 

Kherson is a "perfect" target in that it provides both force attrition of a very large but isolated enemy force and politically significant territorial acquisition. Its also nicely sized and positioned to suit the UA -  a large but very do-able offensive, short GLOCs, rear areas fully within HIMARS range, and is logistically at the end of the RUS line (Kherson <-> Kharkov).

It's an unusual and somewhat unique situation, and very unlikely to be repeated elsewhere - unless you look at Crimea...

---

If UA can take Kherson, and let's assume also cross the Dnipr,  then Crimea is very much on the menu. 

Operationally:

- Situated at the far end of the RUS "line". 

- Isolate-able (drop the Kerch,  target ferry terminals and local ports on Crimea proper, A2AD the Crimean air space, intensive and widespread SOF campaign). 

- UKR has a direct, wide overland line of attack, but RUS defense is dependent on a single bridge and ferries, while the Dnior/Azov corridor is/would be fully within HIMARS range. 

- Crimea can be reduced/attrited in stages as UA advances south towards the isthmus, a controlled and careful advance that Serbs to suit UA mindset and forces. 

- UA left flank from Dnipr to Azov coast is short-ish in distance, albeit with flat-ish open terrain. But that flat land cuts both ways and I'm pretty confident of UKR ISR advantages. 

- A Crimea campaign absolutely guarantees a RUS military response, without fighting inside major cities, and let's UKR be offensive operationally while playing defensive/positional warfare, grinding through RUS force structures and operational reserves. 

-The attrition phase can grind through the winter,  constantly degrading RUS forces (Air, Land and Naval) and using weather to add extra friction to their logistical burden. 

- It can happen at UKRs pace, leading steadily to sense of inevitability,  UT without the dramatic, emotional moments that might spur a nuclear response. 

- UKR s GLOCs are extended,  to a degree, but only from Kherson. This would not be a  Mykolaiv based op. 

Strategically:

- Ukraine will never be safe while Russia holds Sebastapol. 

- Taking Kherson and Crimea is a death blow to any Russian Invasion 2.0,  as Crimea would require an amphibious/air assault, with a non-existent fleet against a very determined, NATO level defense. 

- Ukraine southern coast will be finally safe and the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet can be rebuilt. 

- The Donbass is irrelevant, strategically and operationally managable. 

- Control of Ukraines southern coast is a vital, nation state existence level,  geopolitical necessity. 

---

So, to this uneducated, non-veteran layman, the Kherson Offensive is itself a precursor operation for the true objective -  Crimea. 

Edited September 4, 2022 by Kinophile

[Battlefront.com]

Article summarizing Russian oil/gas exec deaths since January of this year:

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3627413-here-are-the-russian-oil-executives-who-have-died-in-the-past-nine-months/

It is interesting that there aren't similar related deaths of wealthy Russians in non-energy sector positions.  I know that Russia is heavily energy dependent, therefore there is no other group comparable to them, but you'd think there'd be more "suicides" by other wealthy Russians.  Therefore, it might be significant that it is energy execs being specifically "suicided" rather than wealthy Russians generally.

Steve

[kraze]

6 hours ago, pavel.k said:

When i heard about FSB poor report about the state of Ukraine which probably give a green light for the Invasion, it came to my mind, what if it was poor report for purpose? To let bleed the army and create crisis. Could this terrible tragedy be just a high game of Patrushev or Bortnikov? It sounds very conspiracy/crazy, isn't it?

Also if i remember correctly there were some speculations after the beginning of invasion, that FSB provided some good intel to Ukraine. Like it was making sure the invasion will not succeed?

Ok, you can call me lunatic and i will shut up

I don't think FSB is that smart. I think in this case it was just hubris.

After all remember - even US and UK were giving us 48 hours till Kyiv falls and those have a much much better intelligence (pun intended) than FSB.

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, kraze said:

US and UK were giving us 48 hours till Kyiv falls

It could be a game similar to SOE during WW2. After WW2 we could see which German got the right jobs during the cold war.

[dan/california]

41 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I'm curious what's after  Kherson... I'm leery of saying something like Zaporizhia,  Iziyum, etc as those are territorial acquisitions,  where as UKR instead seems very focused on force attrition, as highlighted by Steve et al.

If we can solve/identify that comes after Kherson we'll probably have a better forwards read of the current operation. 

Kherson is a "perfect" target in that it provides both force attrition of a very large but isolated enemy force and politically significant territorial acquisition. Its also nicely sized and positioned to suit the UA -  a large but very do-able offensive, short GLOCs, rear areas fully within HIMARS range, and is logistically at the end of the RUS line (Kherson <-> Kharkov).

It's an unusual and somewhat unique situation, and very unlikely to be repeated elsewhere - unless you look at Crimea...

---

If UA can take Kherson, and let's assume also cross the Dnipr,  then Crimea is very much on the menu. 

Operationally:

- Situated at the far end of the RUS "line". 

- Isolate-able (drop the Kerch,  target ferry terminals and local ports on Crimea proper, A2AD the Crimean air space, intensive and widespread SOF campaign). 

- UKR has a direct, wide overland line of attack, but RUS defense is dependent on a single bridge and ferries, while the Dnior/Azov corridor is/would be fully within HIMARS range. 

- Crimea can be reduced/attrited in stages as UA advances south towards the isthmus, a controlled and careful advance that Serbs to suit UA mindset and forces. 

- UA left flank from Dnipr to Azov coast is short-ish in distance, albeit with flat-ish open terrain. But that flat land cuts both ways and I'm pretty confident of UKR ISR advantages. 

- A Crimea campaign absolutely guarantees a RUS military response, without fighting inside major cities, and let's UKR be offensive operationally while playing defensive/positional warfare, grinding through RUS force structures and operational reserves. 

-The attrition phase can grind through the winter,  constantly degrading RUS forces (Air, Land and Naval) and using weather to add extra friction to their logistical burden. 

- It can happen at UKRs pace, leading steadily to sense of inevitability,  UT without the dramatic, emotional moments that might spur a nuclear response. 

- UKR s GLOCs are extended,  to a degree, but only from Kherson. This would not be a  Mykolaiv based op. 

Strategically:

- Ukraine will never be safe while Russia holds Sebastapol. 

- Taking Kherson and Crimea is a death blow to any Russian Invasion 2.0,  as Crimea would require an amphibious/air assault, with a non-existent fleet against a very determined, NATO level defense. 

- Ukraine southern coast will be finally safe and the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet can be rebuilt. 

- The Donbass is irrelevant, strategically and operationally managable. 

- Control of Ukraines southern coast is a vital, nation state existence level,  geopolitical necessity. 

---

So, to this uneducated, non-veteran layman, the Kherson Offensive is itself a precursor operation for the true objective -  Crimea. 

After Kherson, and that is going well but NOT done yet. Ukraine would have to clear out everything from Melitopol the The Dnipro to even attempt Crimea. It is my general assumption they are going to try that next, Ukraine has a significant interior lines advantage though. Once the forces that are taking back Kherson have that totally locked down, and that could take til thanksgiving or Christmas in the worst case scenario. Although the Russians could break and run tomorrow, too. The AFU can will be able to decide where the Russians are weakest and hit them there. It might make more sense to make a real push for the Kupiansk rail junction and completely unpin Russian logistics in the northern Donbas. Retaking Mariupol would be a huge propaganda victory. The only thing I am absolutely sure of is that the AFU general staff is smarter than I am and a LOT smarter than the Russians.

[Grigb]

7 hours ago, pavel.k said:

When i heard about FSB poor report about the state of Ukraine which probably give a green light for the Invasion, it came to my mind, what if it was poor report for purpose? To let bleed the army and create crisis. Could this terrible tragedy be just a high game of Patrushev or Bortnikov? It sounds very conspiracy/crazy, isn't it?

Also if i remember correctly there were some speculations after the beginning of invasion, that FSB provided some good intel to Ukraine. Like it was making sure the invasion will not succeed?

Ok, you can call me lunatic and i will shut up

I will not call you lunatic because I myself got a lesson from this war not to underestimate stupidity of RU ruling elite. 

However, the problem is FSB is not the only intelligence service in RU. GRU provides alternative assessment that FSB cannot do anything about. So, both FSB and GRU must be in it together. For me it is a bit too much.

However still not impossible scenario - there are groups of relatively young Nat officers in all military services of RU. They could come to conclusion that RU needs some sort of war for a shake up to get to a proper path toward Empire. That's plausible scenario.

[Grossman]

On theories on Kadyrov's extended vacation... he is aware Putin is in a weak position because of his conduct of the war, and is aware the Russians cannot "win" unless Putin orders general mobilisation or take other steps to radically escalate the conflict. Kadyrov has advised Putin to do so, but this is something Putin cannot do politically, he has played his best hand. Kadyrov then quits in a huff, saying "over to you mate, I'm off, I want nothing to do with this mess" 

[LongLeftFlank]

Nice on the ground reporting, though dated 18 August, from the battered Black Sea city of Mikolaiev and the nearby Kherson front.

https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v44/n16/james-meek/blast-effects

 

(I have no idea how to insert a quote box unless it's a quote from another post) 

4 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Ukraine has won a toehold on the hostile side of a smaller river, the Ingulets. But mainly the two sides remain a few miles apart, with more lines of artillery further back. In the flat, open landscape, with little cover except the trees along the roads, any attempt by one side to breach the other’s lines is subject to withering fire from anti-tank missiles and guns, or shelling. Both sides launch drones to spy out artillery targets; when the artillery fires, it becomes the target for the other side’s artillery....

Jack Watling, a British defence analyst with good access to the Ukrainian military at high level, argues that they have ‘massively expanded their force’. The key shortage, prosaically enough, is middle management. ‘They don’t have very many ... kind of middle level commanders, battalion and brigade staffs who know how to integrate machine guns, snipers, mortars, armour artillery, into the same battle space ... But if they want to conduct a major attack, they need to make sure that they’ve got enough people who are trained and prepared and have a clear plan down at the tactical level. If they don’t do that, there is a risk that they will take very heavy casualties. The main challenge at this point is ensuring that it’s not done prematurely....’

'The turning point in the war was getting HIMARS, giving us the ability to destroy munitions dumps behind the lines. Now the Russians are panicking. It’s much easier for our troops now. But as far as an actual counter-offensive is concerned – let’s be clear, their positions are so well fortified, any counter-offensive would have to break through the Russian front line to the rear, bypassing Russian strongpoints. The army’s ready to do this, but it needs better supplies and equipment, because right now they are far, far stronger than us in terms of the number of weapons they have.’

We swung by the volunteer fire brigade, often called out during the harvest to fight fires started by shells exploding in the fields. Sometimes, while they turn their hoses and flails on the flames, the combine harvester carries on. One of the firemen, Alexander, showed me the ‘cassette’ from a Russian Uragan artillery rocket, a heavy steel core to which a set of bomblets is fixed. Just before the rocket lands, the bomblets are scattered over a wide area, to kill as many soldiers – or civilians – as possible. 

 

[kraze]

4 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I will not call you lunatic because I myself got a lesson from this war not to underestimate stupidity of RU ruling elite. 

However, the problem is FSB is not the only intelligence service in RU. GRU provides alternative assessment that FSB cannot do anything about. So, both FSB and GRU must be in it together. For me it is a bit too much.

However still not impossible scenario - there are groups of relatively young Nat officers in all military services of RU. They could come to conclusion that RU needs some sort of war for a shake up to get to a proper path toward Empire. That's plausible scenario.

There were articles posted in this thread way back when about GRU not being assigned to Ukraine at all because russians do not consider Ukraine a separate country and treat it as a separatist region instead - hence FSB - which by its very own description is an internal affairs service.

So maximum hubris.

[sburke]

4 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

(I have no idea how to insert a quote box unless it's a quote from another post) 

highlight the text you want a quote box for then hit the icon above with the quote mark.  So easy even a caveman can do it.

example

Quote

highlight the text you want a quote box for then hit the icon above with the quote mark.  So easy even a caveman can do it.

[Grossman]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

I'm curious what's after  Kherson... I'm leery of saying something like Zaporizhia,  Iziyum, etc as those are territorial acquisitions,  where as UKR instead seems very focused on force attrition, as highlighted by Steve et al.

If we can solve/identify what follows  Kherson we'll probably have a better forwards read of the current operation. 

Kherson is a "perfect" target in that it provides both force attrition of a very large but isolated enemy force and politically significant territorial acquisition. Its also nicely sized and positioned to suit the UA -  a large but very do-able offensive, short GLOCs, rear areas fully within HIMARS range, and is logistically at the end of the RUS line (Kherson <-> Kharkov).

It's an unusual and somewhat unique situation, and very unlikely to be repeated elsewhere - unless you look at Crimea...

---

If UA can take Kherson, and let's assume also cross the Dnipr,  then Crimea is very much on the menu. 

Operationally:

- Situated at the far end of the RUS "line". 

- Isolate-able (drop the Kerch,  target ferry terminals and local ports on Crimea proper, A2AD the Crimean air space, intensive and widespread SOF campaign). 

- UKR has a direct, wide overland line of attack, but RUS defense is dependent on a single bridge and ferries, while the Dnior/Azov corridor is/would be fully within HIMARS range. 

- Crimea can be reduced/attrited in stages as UA advances south towards the isthmus, a controlled and careful advance that Serbs to suit UA mindset and forces. 

- UA left flank from Dnipr to Azov coast is short-ish in distance, albeit with flat-ish open terrain. But that flat land cuts both ways and I'm pretty confident of UKR ISR advantages. 

- A Crimea campaign absolutely guarantees a RUS military response, without fighting inside major cities, and let's UKR be offensive operationally while playing defensive/positional warfare, grinding through RUS force structures and operational reserves. 

-The attrition phase can grind through the winter,  constantly degrading RUS forces (Air, Land and Naval) and using weather to add extra friction to their logistical burden. 

- It can happen at UKRs pace, leading steadily to sense of inevitability,  UT without the dramatic, emotional moments that might spur a nuclear response. 

- UKR s GLOCs are extended,  to a degree, but only from Kherson. This would not be a  Mykolaiv based op. 

Strategically:

- Ukraine will never be safe while Russia holds Sebastapol. 

- Taking Kherson and Crimea is a death blow to any Russian Invasion 2.0,  as Crimea would require an amphibious/air assault, with a non-existent fleet against a very determined, NATO level defense. 

- Ukraine southern coast will be finally safe and the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet can be rebuilt. 

- The Donbass is irrelevant, strategically and operationally managable. 

- Control of Ukraines southern coast is a vital, nation state existence level,  geopolitical necessity. 

---

So, to this uneducated, non-veteran layman, the Kherson Offensive is itself a precursor operation for the true objective -  Crimea. 

Yes, I agree with this synopsis. With success in Kherson, the objective for next year would be an advance towards Melitopol, with the southern flank resting on the Black Sea, and the taking of the Crimea. UKR needs to throw the RU out of Crimea and Sevastopol to secure the Black Sea. If this were to happen one can expect political changes in Russia. Erdogan is on side. He has stated Crimea is Ukrainian. 

[Kinophile]

To clarify, I don't think UKR needs to push towards Melitopol, more keep the RUS at bay while they push south. 

 

[Kinophile]

https://medium.com/@x_TomCooper_x/ukraine-war-1-september-2022-manoeuvre-warfare-for-beginners-534edb28873d

I forget, is Tom Cooper a "Friend of The Thread"?