How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[akd]

Longest range tank vs. tank kill ever? (Probably could argue this is more an artillery kill)

 

Edited August 31, 2022 by akd

[LongLeftFlank]

56 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Battle around Vysokopillia

• My previous diagram was correct UKR attacked Olhyne from the side and entered the village.
• Also, they are pushing from inside Vysokopillia
• And they made push to Arkhangelske. RU retreated but it is not clear if they retreaded toward outskirts or outside of the village.
• UKR seems to be unable to clear RU out of Olyne and Vysokopilla at the moment but Ru seems to be unable to counter-attack UKR as well.

https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#m:advanced;d:24hrs;l:noaa20-viirs,viirs,modis_a,modis_t,countries,landsat_human;@33.6,47.4,11z

Intense fires raging southeast of there, I know it isn't a perfect map of artillery bombardments.

****

Also, a few less infantry. Either a very precise first hit or someone planted a remotely detonated mine in that trench.

 

 

Edited August 31, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, akd said:

Russian take, interesting in both details and presentation:

 

Thats Rybar. His map make the wrong impressions because he manipulates details. Look at Bridgehead map and compare it to UKR DeepMap and Mashkovets post from week ago.

As you can see a before the offensive UKR already had nice bridgehead. RU tried to attack it but failed.  But on Rybar current map the old bridgehead completely disappeared, and the territory is suddenly under RU. 

 

[Grigb]

28 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

RU might have mobile reserves to reinforce any local breakthroughs, but w UKR attacking on a number of widely dispersed axes, with each axis having multiple threads those reserves would hopefully be too little too late.  

This is what I hope is happening.  The difficulty will be based on how well did RU position it's outposts & strongpoints?  how much redundancy?   

There is another aspect to it - previously RU used Mobiks to hold the line. But after Mobik ran away RU has to use mixed groups of VDV and other elite troop survivors to hold it. And holding they are suffering losses from UKR arty. Losses RU cannot replace. 

[Beleg85]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

They are not accustomed to Russia being on the brink of total collapse at the hands of üntermensch.  Context is critical here and you don't seem to be adjusting your viewpoint to match what is currently going on within Russia.  What has been normal for 20+ years of Putin's regime is not as relevant today as it was yesterday and the day before that.  The situation has fundamentally changed.  Logically, the structures based on the old order will change as well.  It's the way things work in all aspects of Human life and even physics.  Russia is not an exception.

No argument for sudden nationalistic agency here. You are still talking about stage for possible coup being set- which I generally agree with. It is much more probable than 20 years ago, yes. Does it mean it will happen?

Big "?".

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Relevant case in point is Ukrainians battled Stalin's NKVD for 10 years in open warfare, despite knowing exactly what the NKVD would do to them, their loved ones, and any innocents the state decided to target in retaliation.  As bad as Putin's security apparatus is, it's like a small town constabulary compared to the NKVD.  Fanaticism to a nationalist cause overcame those fears.

Not the best analogy to be frank, as it is about different nation which has very different measures and notions of freedom, dignity, power and value of sacrifice. But I get what you mean- that fanatism can very potent driver, and no disagreement here. It is still about setting the stage, though.

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

We have seen a significant change in how the RU Nats are behaving.  This is a tiny window on what they are doing offline.  They are plotting to overthrow Putin, you can count on that.  How well it is being planned, how broad the support is, we won't know until something happens that we can observe and draw conclusions from.  Until then, I do not expect to know much more than we already know.  Conspiracies against autocratic regimes don't tend to issue press releases before they act

Ok, perhaps they are. It doesn't mean they are not observed by several dozens of FSB, GRU and other services from inside and outside and Putin laughing at them in his minds. Perhaps Dugina murder was connected to something of this kind. Or perhaps not, we simply don't know.

We need to wait to see, that's sure (gosh, I hate this phrase! ).

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

You are trying to prove a negative, which doesn't work.  I am saying that the primary reason Putin's security apparatus has worked is because there's never been a serious challenge to it.  Just like Putin's military machine looked super duper huge awesome mega fearful right up until the moment it was tested.  I'm not saying that Putin's security services are as inept, but I think it's safe to assume they aren't as good as Putin would like everybody to think they are.

In history and social sciences it kinda does; and btw. it is not proving negative, if we use examples from the past when the same structures (military, security, economy etc.) did hold against pressure. Several pages ago you discussed yourself how early in the war possible "coup" was detected and dearmed; there were probably 2-3 times more such cases we have no idea about. Now that is institutional resiliance. But ok, we agree pressure now is enormous. In that case regime is not totally vulnerable as well.

Take for example this kind of "arms race" between conspirators and VIP security akin to rivalry netween tank armours and penetrators. Conspirations may be better connected and more convicted, but security does not sit and stair at the passing clouds as well. We have direct proofs of it actually, in Putin's borderline behaviours of last 2-3 years. I am also guilty of laughing at his comical tables and staged 10-m meetings (because who isn't? ), but being serious- he probably judged that risk of absolutely comical look domestically and internationally (a thing no despot ever liked) is small pay for improving his security even a little. So he cares and improve this issue. His own background give him great service here.

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

You are making assumptions I don't think you should be making.  There is an APPEARANCE that Putin's regime is better protected than 1917 or 1991.  We won't know until that theory has been put to the test.  It hasn't yet, but circumstances indicate it won't be long before it is.

Yup, we both don't know it (though I would argue that it was tested somehow before- in 2008, 2014 and in many encounters with opposition.military circles etc.); that is why we shouldn't make such very detailed predictions ("100% nats will try to rebell" )of the outcome. There are also numerous per analogiam inference we should also avoid, especially when descibing revolutions/coups from the past and different actors serving different causes. For example rather theoretical sloppy behaviour of several int. agencies in Albania (we don't know almost any details about, btw.) or killing Dugina(another example of very murky plot) does not mean other personal guards will not protect Putin effectively. Especially since they are run by different people than "wide" FSB, but rather FSO, SBP and similar agencies. And we talk only about passive VIP protection, not even about massive active penetration of possible opposition movements by state services.

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

t's not like I don't enjoy this excellent discussion. But this quote applies to your predictions as well as to @Beleg85s. Getting a bit philosophical here: The issue with applying historical examples to current situations in order to predict the future is always that you can never use them to derive any kind of probability. History only ever happens once and so you can't use statistics. And so, as long as you can't come up with a model that explains the basic mechanisms, which may or may not exist and are likely to change over time, the only thing you can derive from an event is that such an event can happen given a set of parameters. (Re: the implications of e.g. the 1917 revolution for the current situation)

Now, Gentlemen, please go on.

This.

Edited August 31, 2022 by Beleg85

[Grigb]

16 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#m:advanced;d:24hrs;l:noaa20-viirs,viirs,modis_a,modis_t,countries,landsat_human;@33.6,47.4,11z

Intense fires raging southeast of there, I know it isn't a perfect map of artillery bombardments.

I would say it is fire from UKR hitting RU reserves. Somewhere there RU kept reserves that should reinforce Vysokopillya in case of UKR attack. And UKR hit them (maybe even by HIMARS). That could be the reason RU cannot counter attack there so far.   

[danfrodo]

18 minutes ago, Grigb said:

There is another aspect to it - previously RU used Mobiks to hold the line. But after Mobik ran away RU has to use mixed groups of VDV and other elite troop survivors to hold it. And holding they are suffering losses from UKR arty. Losses RU cannot replace. 

Hey GrigB, what's a mobik?  

[Beleg85]

6 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Hey GrigB, what's a mobik?  

Mobilized, consripted soldier from LDPR, usually of low fighting qualities and motivation. If Wagner/VDV would be trolls or uruk-hai, contract Russian soldiers would be common orcs, these guys would go for small goblins.

Oh dear, another nerdish Tolkien reference...

Edited August 31, 2022 by Beleg85

[Grigb]

5 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Hey GrigB, what's a mobik?  

Common name for Mobilized L-DPR troops. The poorest untrained cannon fodder they grabbed from the streets and threw into battle. 

[LongLeftFlank]

On 8/29/2022 at 11:40 PM, Battlefront.com said:

UK is reporting that they believe Shoigu has been sidelined.  This seems to jibe with reports that Putin is directly communicating with the three military district leaders in the field.

https://thehill.com/policy/international/3619311-russian-defense-minister-possibly-sidelined-uk-intel/

The question to ask is if Putin has sidelined Shoigu, is it primarily due to dissatisfaction with the military's performance in Ukraine or is it mostly a precaution against a threat to regime stability?  Impossible for us to know the answer, or even guess, but either way... bypassing Shoigu instead of replacing him shows that Putin doesn't have faith in the military leadership.

Steve

MOD Defence Intelligence 'probably' showing some attitude....

 

Interesting backstory:

Since his father was one of Tyva’s major party bosses, Sergey Shoygu knew many important people. From 1987 to 1989 Boris Yeltsin held a similar position in the construction committee.

 

In 1991, Mr. Shoygu became the head of the Russian Rescue Corps, which, after a series of reorganizations and name changes, became today’s Ministry for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, internationally abbreviated as EMERCOM.... In the aftermath of the worst disasters, Mr. Shoygu was always sure to be seen managing the recovery efforts.

 

However, EMERCOM’s structure is peculiar in that it is heavily militarized, which prompts many questions. Why does it count over a hundred generals among its staff? ...President Yeltsin was proactive enough to create a trusted, alternate army – a personal guard that would be able to intervene in case of a political “emergency.”

Edited August 31, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Beleg85]

If anybody is interested, here is a thread about Arestovych ans value of his words (in pl, easy to autotranslate) by one of Polish Ukrainian specialists. Corroborate unfavourite view of him by UA members of this forum.

 

Edited August 31, 2022 by Beleg85

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Thomm said:

Quick spelling refresher:

It is:

• Untermensch
• Übermensch

with the relationship being:

        Untermensch < Übermensch

Best regards
Thomm

 

 

My bad!  In my defense, though, umlauts are kül

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

It's not like I don't enjoy this excellent discussion. But this quote applies to your predictions as well as to @Beleg85s.

Absolutely.  I can't prove there is a coup about to happen any more than Beleg85 can prove it is going to happen.  Either of us could be correct, neither of us, or both depending on how things play out.  My primary disagreement with his arguments is that he's all but ruled it out based on what I see are arguments that are less relevant each day the war goes on. 

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

Getting a bit philosophical here: The issue with applying historical examples to current situations in order to predict the future is always that you can never use them to derive any kind of probability. History only ever happens once and so you can't use statistics. And so, as long as you can't come up with a model that explains the basic mechanisms, which may or may not exist and are likely to change over time, the only thing you can derive from an event is that such an event can happen given a set of parameters. (Re: the implications of e.g. the 1917 revolution for the current situation)

Absolutely correct.  Which is why the core of my argument is that the RU Nats believe in Russia's greatness, they see it slipping away into ruin, they think there is still time to turn things around, and they see Putin as being the main impediment for success.  They are fanatics with supporters in all kinds of sensitive places within the Russian government, including the security apparatus.  Many of them are experienced murders and fighters.  They are not "liberal" pussycats who complain, but don't have the ability to affect change.  Add this in with other things we know about authoritarian states in crisis and I think there's a strong case to make that things are not going to remain stable in the Kremlin for much longer.

Steve

[danfrodo]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Absolutely.  I can't prove there is a coup about to happen any more than Beleg85 can prove it is going to happen.  Either of us could be correct, neither of us, or both depending on how things play out.  My primary disagreement with his arguments is that he's all but ruled it out based on what I see are arguments that are less relevant each day the war goes on. 

Absolutely correct.  Which is why the core of my argument is that the RU Nats believe in Russia's greatness, they see it slipping away into ruin, they think there is still time to turn things around, and they see Putin as being the main impediment for success.  They are fanatics with supporters in all kinds of sensitive places within the Russian government, including the security apparatus.  Many of them are experienced murders and fighters.  They are not "liberal" pussycats who complain, but don't have the ability to affect change.  Add this in with other things we know about authoritarian states in crisis and I think there's a strong case to make that things are not going to remain stable in the Kremlin for much longer.

Steve

I think the discussion from the start has been about "conditions being consistent w regime change, historically" and "conditions being consistent w military collapse at sector or front levels, historically".  And those conditions very very certainly exist relative to past experience.  But each situation is different and so those conditions might not quite be enough due to other factors.

[Grigb]

Update regarding Bridgeheads battle.

• There is info that UKR used two groups - one pushed to Kostromka other to Bruskinske
• RU is counter attacking now. What is interesting is if it is true they are counter-attacking from Davydiv Brid and not from the area where their reserves have been (down the road from Bruskinske)
• Was Davydiv Brid attacks distraction to attract RU reserves only to cut them with later? 

[Grigb]

Plot regarding the number of UKR crossings across Inhulets river is thickening. There is RU claim UKR made yet another crossing - near Davydiv Brid.

[Grigb]

Kherson West battle - RU claimed they moved forces from Oleksandrivka and pushed back to Zeleny Hay (from where they retreated earlier). Looks like somebody's reserves already disappeared. 

[pavel.k]

Polish folks have to be proud. 

 

[Grigb]

So, for now as usual RU claim they won and pushed UKR back from what UKR captured from the morning. We can say RU counterattacks stabilized situation for now at West and at Bridgheads. Vysokopillya most likely without significant changes. Sober RU assessment is that they suffered noticeable losses (means losses are big but not catastrophic), the situation is difficult and grouping is cut off from regular supplies. 

[Aragorn2002]

https://www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/281229/two-senior-german-officials-suspected-of-spying-for-russia

For those among us who still believe our institutions and organisations aren't infiltrated by Russian moles.

[Sojourner]

2 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

 

3 hours ago, Butschi said:

t's not like I don't enjoy this excellent discussion. But this quote applies to your predictions as well as to @Beleg85s. Getting a bit philosophical here: The issue with applying historical examples to current situations in order to predict the future is always that you can never use them to derive any kind of probability. History only ever happens once and so you can't use statistics. And so, as long as you can't come up with a model that explains the basic mechanisms, which may or may not exist and are likely to change over time, the only thing you can derive from an event is that such an event can happen given a set of parameters. (Re: the implications of e.g. the 1917 revolution for the current situation)

Now, Gentlemen, please go on.

This.

Another commentary that's appropriate here...

"The only thing certain about predictions is that they're going to be wrong. I think there are three things that are certain in life: death, taxes and every prediction we make about the future is going to be wrong. In the defense and intelligence business, one hopes that they're 20% wrong and not 80% wrong, but they're going to be wrong."

From remarks made by chairman Gil Klinger last Wednesday at a meeting of the Advisory Committee on Commercial Remote Sensing.

Making predictions has been my profession for the past 40 years and that sounds about right to me.

[hcrof]

https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1565021606316949504?s=20&t=f3tw1iEZOgiSuJwmkUbObA

Quote

Ukraine's forces established fire control over Kakhovskyi and Antonivskyi bridges, Operational Command "South" informs

 

In the south, UA forces continue to destroy RU logistics routes, command points, places of concentration of Russian forces and assets

 

Edited August 31, 2022 by hcrof

[FancyCat]

Thank you Grigb for your updates and mapping. For me, I follow pro-Ukrainian Twitter (the Russian ones are way too annoying or don't try and give any negative news)(English ones at least) and since the clampdown, they have basically gone completely quiet on the front. 

[Haiduk]

UKR crew limbers M777. 1 minute 16 seconds according to video, but obviously some small initial part was skipped, so , I think real time is about 1 minute 30 seconds 

 

[panzermartin]

The pro russian sources are talking about a UA waterloo with half the polish m1 fleet gone (60 tanks ko) and around 1. 200 Kia. There are quite a few videos to reinforce their claims and a rather silence from pro UKR accounts that makes this all more suspicious. Both sides sources are far from objective (understandable) but RU are lying a little more so I don't know what to believe.