How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

14 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

You look on the internet and every supposed picture of 'Phoenix Ghost' is another drone type. Its either Switchblade or GoPro or hand-launched observation drone! Half the pictures I found labeled 'Phoenix Ghost' were actually Switchblade 600.

Do we have any photos?  Every one seems pretty tight-lipped about the thing.

[Seedorf81]

WW2 comparisons have been made before, but since Putin's remarks on leaving Mariupol steel plant, "because it doesn't matter", Hitler's speech on victory in Stalingrad - November 8th, 1942 - https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Adolf_Hitler's_Stalingrad_Speech , keeps nagging me.

One quote in particular: "And do you know, we're modest: that is, we have it; there are only a couple of very small places left there."

Of course, sometimes history does not repeat itself, but it would be unbelievable if Putin makes the same mistake on Mariupol as Hitler did on Stalingrad. 

I know, there doesn't seem to be a chance in hell for the Ukranians to free Mariupol, but it seems to me that in November 1942 the situation for Chuikov and his men was as desperate then, as it is now for the AZOV-guys.

Wouldn't a new Operation Uranus be a thrill.. 

 

[dan/california]

The most interesting thing about this video is how disjointed the Russian response is. You can debate what the BEST response is in a situation like this. Milling around in circles when the other side obviously has this spot dialed in is not it. There is an argument for going forward and hoping is isn't a full up ambush withs mines and ATGM, there is an argument for going backwards like you mean it. There is an argument for going sideways if it isn't complete swamp on both sides of the road, I can't really tell from the video. There is NO argument beeleping around trying to figure it out when you are obviously on the TRP. I hope they don't have much ammo is not a plan.

[Battlefront.com]

Two indications that Russia is already experiencing internal problems, of which we're only seeing the tip of the iceberg.

1.  The oligarchs getting murdered is important, though it's still unclear why.  One theory I have is they were associated with, or supportive of, more powerful oligarchs that may be plotting against Putin.  The decision was made to murder some of the lesser important oligarchs to send a message to the more powerful ones to play nice.  It also possible the order is important with the most recent one deliberately being more wealthy/influential than the previous two?  Three is too small a sample to ID a pattern there.

Notice that 1 was in Russia, 2 were in different Western countries.  This sends a clear message of "you can run, but no matter where you go you can't hide".  We might see more of these murders, but it is also possible we might not if the message is received.

2.  Someone is targeting Russian infrastructure, though it is still unclear why.  Unlike the railroad bridge south of Belgorod collapsing, or the "Ukrainian shelling of border village", the latest bunch do not seem like incompetence or false flag causes.  These are deliberate and they are intending to send a clear message to Putin first and foremost.  That message is "you are not invulnerable".

There are two questions to ask here.  First, is this the work of a coordinated operation or an accidental alignment of different groups with similar mindsets?  The latter could include "copy cats" who saw someone else do something they felt productive and mimicked it themselves, or it could be total coincidence where one did X not even knowing about someone else having done Y.

Personally, I do not think this is Russian resistance forces at work per se, though it might be Russians working for foreign governments based on a belief they can make a difference.  I suspect it's Ukraine pulling some strings.  Their external security folks SHOULD have been planning for this sort of thing for years now.  It's an obvious way to respond to a Russian attack on Ukraine, so I would be shocked if there wasn't some plan and resources in place prior to February.  Even if there wasn't, they could put something together rather quickly. 

It is possible, though I don't know how likely, that a nation friendly to Ukraine has contact with groups within Russia and has put Ukraine in contact with them.  Again, pure speculation but this sort of stuff has been known to happen.  "As you know, my government can't get directly involved in matters of plumbing.  But it was good to see you again, old friend.  Oh, and if you need a good Russian plumber, I know of one and here's his contact info.  Tell him Jones spoke highly of him".

The dimensions of this war that we KNOW are there, but have no eyeballs on, are many.  We can count on that without being speculative.

Steve

[The_Capt]

52 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Regarding the Russian announcement of their "phase 2" war aims...

Do we have this anywhere but that one Russian GO?  I am not sold, could have a bargaining thing, could be an attempt to draw forces into other areas.  They tried that whole Odessa thing the first time and it failed, not sure why they are signalling another grab.  Whole thing smells fishy.

[sburke]

4 minutes ago, dan/california said:

The most interesting thing about this video is how disjointed the Russian response is. You can debate what the BEST response is in a situation like this. Milling around in circles when the other side obviously has this spot dialed in is not it. There is an argument for going forward and hoping is isn't a full up ambush withs mines and ATGM, there is an argument for going backwards like you mean it. There is an argument for going sideways if it isn't complete swamp on both sides of the road, I can't really tell from the video. There is NO argument beeleping around trying to figure it out when you are obviously on the TRP. I hope they don't have much ammo is not a plan.

Everyone knows serpentine is the correct maneuver.

GK - Serpentine Pattern - YouTube

[Seedorf81]

4 hours ago, DesertFox said:

 

 

Maybe a stupid question, but I really do not know: is this target worth the price of the missile?

It looks a bit of a waste of assets to me. 

[Vacillator]

1 minute ago, Seedorf81 said:

Maybe a stupid question, but I really do not know: is this target worth the price of the missile?

It looks a bit of a waste of assets to me. 

A sort of related question - we see lots of UA drone footage from steady positions.  Are these drones not being targeted by the RA somehow, or is it that we're just seeing the ones that weren't?

[akd]

Said to be 64th (now Guards) MRB (they of Bucha infamy) losses inflicted by UKR 93rd Mech Bde:

https://www.facebook.com/2376998539017818/posts/5188284504555860/?d=n

Did not realize this unit had T-80BVs.

Edited April 22, 2022 by akd

[The_MonkeyKing]

10 minutes ago, Seedorf81 said:

Maybe a stupid question, but I really do not know: is this target worth the price of the missile?

It looks a bit of a waste of assets to me. 

MARLET is made to down UAVs. So I presume yes.

Also depends on the situation. 100e drone in a position where the information it gains leads to a company being destroyed... It is worth shooting almost anything at it.

[akd]

10 minutes ago, Vacillator said:

A sort of related question - we see lots of UA drone footage from steady positions.  Are these drones not being targeted by the RA somehow, or is it that we're just seeing the ones that weren't?

Probably small Quadcopter UAVs

[Vacillator]

2 minutes ago, akd said:

Probably small Quadcopter UAVs

So you mean difficult to target for the average Russian unit?  Apologies but I'm rather ignorant of Russian capabilities in this respect...

[Battlefront.com]

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Do we have this anywhere but that one Russian GO?  I am not sold, could have a bargaining thing, could be an attempt to draw forces into other areas.  They tried that whole Odessa thing the first time and it failed, not sure why they are signalling another grab.  Whole thing smells fishy.

I don't think it smells all that fishy.  I touched on this in my previous post, but rethinking some I'm hesitantly putting forward the following premise:

• Take all of Donbas - this has been a consistent stated goal since before the war started.  Therefore, it is entirely consistent with everything we've seen since.  They are slowly working towards achieving this goal right now.
• Establish land Bridge and Water Access - this has not been a publicly stated goal, but for sure it is something Russia has wanted since 2014.  No questions about it.  They already have the land bridge save a tiny bit of Mariupol, so this is "in the bag" as of today.
• Establish land Bridge to Transnistria and cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea - this has not been a publicly stated goal, but obviously it has long been on Russia's want list and they did actively attempt to make it happen.  Unlike the other two, this is total fantasy at this point.

So what I see are two "realistic" war aims and one "fantasy".  I suspect the fantasy one is to be offered up as a "compromise" for future negotiations in order to help keep the other two.

The importance of this right now is that it contradicts my thinking that Russia will be satisfied with a limited win for the rest of Donbas.  It seems to reinforce the notion that this isn't something they are willing to back down on.  For example, taking Slovyansk and trying to call it a day right after.

Assuming this is correct, then I will posit another theory of what is going on with the "big offensive"

• Military made it clear that Kyiv attack was failure and that staying there would risk collapse
• Putin agreed to the pull back only by getting the military to agree that they could use those forces to take the rest of Donbas (which up to this point was going nowhere)
• Military might not have thought the Donbas objective was feasible, but telling him 'Da!' gave them what they needed to save the forces from the north from destruction.  Dealing with the difficulties of taking the rest of the Donbas could be dealt with in due time
• Military set up the attack to proceed as Putin had ordered.  Maybe they disagreed with Putin about the timeframe, maybe not?  In either case, the attack went forward before a proper setup could happen
• Attacks were launched and most were disappointingly ineffective
• Military cancelled the unproductive attacks, but kept the Izyum operation going
• Maybe the military argued that taking Slovyansk was all they could realistically do, maybe they did it on their own
• Putin made the announcement that the whole thing had to be taken to make it clear to the military that Sloyvansk was not enough
• Maybe the new plan is to take Slovyansk first and work southward from there.  Personally, this is what I "advised" the Russians should do from the start as it was more realistic, so it seems reasonable to think that is what they are up to

Steve

[c3k]

The need to counter drones and other low flying aircraft needs to be driven down to the platoon level, and no longer be a specialist unit that gets detachments sent about the battlefield as needed. Counter-drone/counter-air is needed for every unit.

Detection and then engagement with an appropriate weapon is something that will be open for research and development due to lessons from Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

All those videos of Ukrainian squads laden with NLAWs and whatnot? In the (near) future, they will have to be carrying advanced MANPADs as well.

[Vacillator]

2 minutes ago, c3k said:

Counter-drone/counter-air is needed for every unit.

I think that sums up what I was thinking.  Have the Russians not got this, in the same way Ukraine now seems to have?

[Taranis]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

How do you mean by fragile? Vulnerable in the dusty environment of Afghanistan, or in general?

And thank you for the additional postings a la Haiduk.

Sorry if the term I use is not very suitable. What I mean by "fragile" is that in itself, it's not really an armored vehicle.

French doctrine since the Cold War has always been oriented more towards "maneuver and mobility" than towards resistance (heavy armour, etc.). This explains the very mobile and powerful but relatively unarmored vehicles such as the AMX-10RC, the AMX-13/90, EBR, the Tiger helicopter or even the CAESAR.

In fact the vehicle is armored only at the level of the cabin in order to protect the crew. Additional armor kits are available to enhance this crew protection and are easy to install.
However, the gun being semi-automatic, the gun pivoting mechanism (hydraulic system), the storage of the ammunition and propellant charge, the system for locating the gun in space are not protected.

The vehicle is quite light (aerotransportable) and its purpose is really to shoot very far and precisely and then quickly set itself up in a new position. The vehicle is very quick to pack up (1 or 2 minutes for a trained crew). A well trained crew (4 crew at least for keeping the pace) can easily deploying the gun, shooting 2-3 rounds at 40km, pack-up and going away in less than 10 minutes. You don't need to have the traditional orientation phase because the vehicle had is own inertial navigation system and know always where it is and what is the orientation of the gun. To aim, you only need to press a button...

To sum up, shrapnel might be enough to render the artillery piece "non-functional" but will guarantee the protection of the crew (the most important). Repairs will not be too complicated but during this time, the part will not be available (damage to the inertial navigation system would be even more of a problem)

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, c3k said:

The need to counter drones and other low flying aircraft needs to be driven down to the platoon level, and no longer be a specialist unit that gets detachments sent about the battlefield as needed. Counter-drone/counter-air is needed for every unit.

Detection and then engagement with an appropriate weapon is something that will be open for research and development due to lessons from Putin's invasion of Ukraine.

All those videos of Ukrainian squads laden with NLAWs and whatnot? In the (near) future, they will have to be carrying advanced MANPADs as well.

Not so much advanced man pads, as drone optimized MANPADS. Drones are just a very different target than a SU-25

[c3k]

5 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Not so much advanced man pads, as drone optimized MANPADS. Drones are just a very different target than a SU-25

Agreed.

Again...detection...is the crucial element. You've gotta know a drone is up there, from a small quad, to LALE, to MALE.

[benpark]

Taking all of the southern coastal access to the Black Sea also opens the undersea oil fields to the Russians, and further cripples the Ukrainian economy.

The island location mentioned in this article should be familiar from the opening days of the war:

https://oil-gas.com.ua/news/The-Black-Seas-oil-and-gas-potential-the-reality-and-prospects-of-drilling-a-unique-ultra-deep-well-on-Zmiiny-Island

More grift for the grifting.

Edited April 22, 2022 by benpark

[The_Capt]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I don't think it smells all that fishy.  I touched on this in my previous post, but rethinking some I'm hesitantly putting forward the following premise:

• Take all of Donbas - this has been a consistent stated goal since before the war started.  Therefore, it is entirely consistent with everything we've seen since.  They are slowly working towards achieving this goal right now.
• Establish land Bridge and Water Access - this has not been a publicly stated goal, but for sure it is something Russia has wanted since 2014.  No questions about it.  They already have the land bridge save a tiny bit of Mariupol, so this is "in the bag" as of today.
• Establish land Bridge to Transnistria and cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea - this has not been a publicly stated goal, but obviously it has long been on Russia's want list and they did actively attempt to make it happen.  Unlike the other two, this is total fantasy at this point.

So what I see are two "realistic" war aims and one "fantasy".  I suspect the fantasy one is to be offered up as a "compromise" for future negotiations in order to help keep the other two.

The importance of this right now is that it contradicts my thinking that Russia will be satisfied with a limited win for the rest of Donbas.  It seems to reinforce the notion that this isn't something they are willing to back down on.  For example, taking Slovyansk and trying to call it a day right after.

Assuming this is correct, then I will posit another theory of what is going on with the "big offensive"

• Military made it clear that Kyiv attack was failure and that staying there would risk collapse
• Putin agreed to the pull back only by getting the military to agree that they could use those forces to take the rest of Donbas (which up to this point was going nowhere)
• Military might not have thought the Donbas objective was feasible, but telling him 'Da!' gave them what they needed to save the forces from the north from destruction.  Dealing with the difficulties of taking the rest of the Donbas could be dealt with in due time
• Military set up the attack to proceed as Putin had ordered.  Maybe they disagreed with Putin about the timeframe, maybe not?  In either case, the attack went forward before a proper setup could happen
• Attacks were launched and most were disappointingly ineffective
• Military cancelled the unproductive attacks, but kept the Izyum operation going
• Maybe the military argued that taking Slovyansk was all they could realistically do, maybe they did it on their own
• Putin made the announcement that the whole thing had to be taken to make it clear to the military that Sloyvansk was not enough
• Maybe the new plan is to take Slovyansk first and work southward from there.  Personally, this is what I "advised" the Russians should do from the start as it was more realistic, so it seems reasonable to think that is what they are up to

Steve

I agree that the first two are obvious and not much of a change, that third one of “deny Ukraine the Black Sea” is just plain nuts.  That is an over 200km advance that once again they have to take. And then hold while being attacked from both sides.  I mean maybe the RA staff sold it as a good idea but they cannot believe it.

The Russia “stated aims” in this war have shifted and turned on a dime.  I am not sure I believe this signal as anything more than posturing.  I still think this is all smoke at this point, at least until the RA demonstrates some real gains that it can take and hold.  One operationally decisive outcome in the RA’s favour would be a start.  Right now they appear to be fumbling around like a teenager on prom night striving for paradise by the dashboard lights.

As follow up: if Russia had started with this plan maybe we could be talking business but they spent that high ready force in the last two months. 

Edited April 22, 2022 by The_Capt

[Commanderski]

#Russian Navy deploys unique 110-year-old ship to investigate Moskva wreck. Likely carrying a DSRV minisub.

[Haiduk]

28 minutes ago, akd said:

Said to be 64th (now Guards) MRB (they of Bucha infamy) losses inflicted by UKR 93rd MRB:

https://www.facebook.com/2376998539017818/posts/5188284504555860/?d=n

Did not realize this unit had T-80BVs.

According to this: https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4289299.html they got T-80BVM in April 2021. Before this brigade had T-80BV. There is no info how much T-80BVM they received, maybe part of T-80BV remained. But I look on other photo and see trucks with O marking. If this was 64th brigade from Bucha, it should have V. 

[billbindc]

13 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I agree that the first two are obvious and not much of a change, that third one of “deny Ukraine the Black Sea” is just plain nuts.  That is an over 200km advance that once again they have to take. And then hold while being attacked from both sides.  I mean maybe the RA staff sold it as a good idea but they cannot believe it.

The Russia “stated aims” in this war have shifted and turned on a dime.  I am not sure I believe this signal as anything more than posturing.  I still think this is all smoke at this point, at least until the RA demonstrates some real gains that it can take and hold.  One operationally decisive outcome in the RA’s favour would be a start.  Right now they appear to be fumbling around like a teenager on prom night striving for paradise by the dashboard lights.

As follow up: if Russia had started with this plan maybe we could be talking business but they spent that high ready force in the last two months. 

It's worth noting that Russian message coordination is no more free of general ineptitude and freelancing than anything else within the regime. Putin is certainly the locus of power but that in and of itself means that off brand messaging can leak in wherever he isn't putting his personal attention onto a problem. Personally, I put little stock in what the Russian military is saying except insofar as it reveals what they think they need to tell Putin and themselves.

[Hapless]

14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

that third one of “deny Ukraine the Black Sea” is just plain nuts

Especially if they're denying Ukraine the Black Sea right now anyway. Why bother trying to grind all the wall to Moldova  when you can play sea-denial?

Mine up the ports, station some subs, supplement with anti-ship missiles and aircraft from Crimea... job's a good'un (with the caveat that the Black Sea Fleet should be able to pull that off). Hence, they could drop the goal of a land corridor to Moldova in negotiations and still retain important long term effects.

What's interesting about this batch of Russian aims is that they pretty much reflect the situation as it is right now, with the notable exception of the Donbass. So, the idea that this is endgame (or at least ceasefire) posturing or a sign of the Russians recognising their limited means seems pretty on the ball to me.

[BeondTheGrave]

14 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

According to this: https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4289299.html they got T-80BVM in April 2021. Before this brigade had T-80BV. There is no info how much T-80BVM they received, maybe part of T-80BV remained. But I look on other photo and see trucks with O marking. If this was 64th brigade from Bucha, it should have V. 

Was looking on Wikipedia, I was curios as to whether any model of T-80 had equipped a Thermal sight. As we learned in threads posted to the CMCW subforum, the Soviets never fielded real thermal sights. So none of the 1980s standard -80s have one. According to Wiki the -80BVM has the same suite of sights as the -90A? Not sure, it was unclear. But, more interestingly, this pushed me to check the -90 page just for a refresher on what the -90 was rolling:

Quote

 Early models of the T-90 were equipped with the TO1-KO1 BURAN sight but later models (T-90S) were upgraded to use the ESSA thermal imaging sight, which allows for accurate firing to a range of 5,000–8,000m using the CATHERINE-FC thermal camera produced by Thales Optronique. 

And then:

Quote

In 2010, Russia started licensed production of Thales-developed Catherine FC thermal imaging cameras for T-90M tanks, a Russian daily said.

If you wondering, Thales Optronique is a French company. The Wiki article (and who knows how accurate it is) suggests later that the Catherine FC incorporates a number of western made components, probably including chips. Now apparently Russia tested and green lit a domestic version (one wonders how different from the Catherine) called the IRBIS-K. This was done between 2016 and 2018, probably in response to western arms sanctions. BUT! one wonders what the yearly production rate on those domestic models are and how big of a priority its been to replace the French sights with Russian made, vs. just putting domestic production on new tanks. I would guess, just my own assumption here, that the reserve & non-elite units would still be running the French designed equipment. 

This has interesting implications for all those reserve tanks, even if someone didn't steal the thermal imager or cannibalize its parts after 2014, it ought to be very difficult to refurbish any of this equipment without fresh supplies of French components. More interestingly, to me, was that this deal would have went forward in the first place. It dovetails well with what some were posting this morning about the Iskander and US sourced components. What would have been the state of the Russian Army had the west not placed profits above security interests and refused to collaborate with Russia on arms designs....