Soviet vs NATO tanks discussion in "International Security" magazine

[domfluff]

I'm still a little sad we'll never see Centurion bullying Panthers.

[BeondTheGrave]

45 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

And can we talk about the Centurion?  Is this thing the T55 of NATO in our timeframe?

This is my promise to you, if you guys add the Cent ill make a Yom Kippur campaign. I have it already planned out and everything. 

[The_Capt]

16 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

This is my promise to you, if you guys add the Cent ill make a Yom Kippur campaign. I have it already planned out and everything. 

"Next Year in the Holy Land!"

 

[A Canadian Cat]

On 2/9/2022 at 8:51 AM, domfluff said:

I've never wanted to leave a dismount in the BMP for spotting. This is not doctrinal, and it's also not a good idea, since you need to make the use of the limited squad that you have. BMPs shouldn't dismount at all in an ideal situation, and when they do dismount (close terrain, strong AT opposition) it's vitally important that the squad and BMP remain within close supporting distance of each other, within four action spots. The infantry are your eyes, and when the BMP is fighting in this supporting role, it's primarily going to be area-firing at partial contacts or suspected positions.

My bold.

This - so much this. If I am facing someone who is using their BMPs to fire at likely enemy locations and or directed by its infantry squad I am very very scarred. It is very effective.

[BeondTheGrave]

12 minutes ago, IanL said:

My bold.

This - so much this. If I am facing someone who is using their BMPs to fire at likely enemy locations and or directed by its infantry squad I am very very scarred. It is very effective.

I think its another difference between NATO and Soviet realities. Im not entirely convinced that doctrinally the US is all that different from the Soviets, from what I've read they were very keen on turning infantry squads into little panzergrenadier teams with their M113 or better yet the MICV/Bradley. But practically the M113 wasn't designed to do that and does a pisspoor job at it. In a recent PBEM match I tried the same thing with an M113 and a dismounted US squad and it just went disastrously. Against a solid contact the M2 can be devastating, but on 'spray and pray' mode its pretty underwhelming. I lit up the first floor of a building with heavy fire, just to realize that the Soviet squad had moved up to the second floor and was totally intact and prepared to fight. A single stray shot from the BMP-1's 73mm would have at least notched them decent suppression, and even the BMP-2s cannon could have done some extra damage. Plus the missiles, though I dont like to see them wasted on infantry contacts. 

[DMS]

On 2/10/2022 at 2:05 PM, domfluff said:

A clearer idea of how that works, and why the implementation in Black Sea and Cold War is what it is:


Leaving behind the Platoon Sergeant in one of three BMPs is a thing which is done, for coordination and especially to man the radio. It's not done for spotting, and doesn't need to be - that's a very different thing.

Yes. Here is image from BMP-1 manual. "ЗКВ" - PL assistant. By the way, in this TO&E squad had 2 machine gunners with PKM. ("П" on the picture) Soviet "heavy squad".

Well, in this manual is written that commander must observe the battlefield and find targets. For spotting also.

[BeondTheGrave]

On 2/8/2022 at 7:14 PM, The_Capt said:

Just to add/follow up to my first post on this whole Soviet/US force balance thing,

Was just thinking about this a little more, and about some of the things brought up in the T-64 thread about spotting. Doesn't a crew's soft factors all play a roll in their ability to spot the enemy? What about leadership & motivation values? I ask this because in game situations, I would think (and @TheCaptain could correct me if I'm wrong) but most scenarios have the Soviets set to their 'Typical' value in the editor, which tends to randomize their overall soft-quality to a lower point than NATO's. I see a lot of veteran and crack units in most of my typical NATO forces, whereas the Soviets tend to predominantly be regular or even green, and with lower leadership values as well. Could this also be an explanation for why the Soviets seem to feel worse in actual non-testing play? Because, well, they are. As I recall the soft factors stats tend to feed into a whole number of different aspects of BFC's combat model and so if one side average 1-2 levels lower on the scale than the other, well theyre just not going to do things as quickly or as well. More time, more casualties, more missed spots. 

If so the question would be 'is it an accurate depiction?' which we could spend in inordinate amount of time discussing to no real end. My own sense was that the Soviet forces were way more uneven in terms of quality than the US Army even in 1979, some units were quite good and a lot were middling or worse. But really how do you measure that, especially in an era as theoretical as Cold War. 

[The_Capt]

30 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Was just thinking about this a little more, and about some of the things brought up in the T-64 thread about spotting. Doesn't a crew's soft factors all play a roll in their ability to spot the enemy? What about leadership & motivation values? I ask this because in game situations, I would think (and @TheCaptain could correct me if I'm wrong) but most scenarios have the Soviets set to their 'Typical' value in the editor, which tends to randomize their overall soft-quality to a lower point than NATO's. I see a lot of veteran and crack units in most of my typical NATO forces, whereas the Soviets tend to predominantly be regular or even green, and with lower leadership values as well. Could this also be an explanation for why the Soviets seem to feel worse in actual non-testing play? Because, well, they are. As I recall the soft factors stats tend to feed into a whole number of different aspects of BFC's combat model and so if one side average 1-2 levels lower on the scale than the other, well theyre just not going to do things as quickly or as well. More time, more casualties, more missed spots. 

If so the question would be 'is it an accurate depiction?' which we could spend in inordinate amount of time discussing to no real end. My own sense was that the Soviet forces were way more uneven in terms of quality than the US Army even in 1979, some units were quite good and a lot were middling or worse. But really how do you measure that, especially in an era as theoretical as Cold War. 

As far as I can tell/know there is no "soft factor" pre-set that would place the Soviets behind the US forces modeled in game, if that is the question.  Regular = Regular when it comes to troop quality and then scales from there on an equal playing field.  In reality, and this is highly debatable, US forces would likely be Green-to-Reg (by game definitions) and Soviets would be Conscript-to-Green but again, debatable.  US forces had veterans from Vietnam (especially commanders) and were an all volunteer force by this point, better paid and better trained (per pound), while Soviets still had a largely Conscripted Army with a weaker NCO/junior Office Corp.  Even given our fictional narrative the effect of Veterans coming back from Afghanistan would not be really seen even as late as '82 (and both Vietnam and Afghanistan were very different wars).  However, as has been mentioned the Soviets also did highly realistic training, a lot of live fire and in some cases live agent(!), so there is that.

For the in-game content, here is where we probably played looser than anywhere else and that did have to do with gameplay.  For example, in the US Campaigns the Soviet forces are Veteran/Crack while US forces are regular, which not only reflects them being the "best" (equipped and trained) units in the Soviet Army but also the fact that no AI is ever going to be at the same standard as a human commander (at least not yet, maybe someone is working on a Deep Blue for CM) so we had to tweak things to aim for the right challenge levels.  Soviet Campaign we did the opposite, with Soviets being Regular for the player and US forces as Veteran/Crack.

But there are also scenarios where we just turned it up because highly trained forces tend to equal more intense fights.  In Valley of Ashes, both sides are Vet/Crack and I let the terrain and situation decide, and on this one the Soviets definitely have a steeper hill to climb.  

I suspect the Soviets "feel worse" for a number of factors:

- Not playing them right.  The player base looks like it tend to try and play them as western forces, while those that are successful fight them as they were intended.  And by this I mean "not mincing around looking for shooting advantage".  Soviet were designed to get in close fast and then chew hard, accepting 2-2 or even 3-1 losses.  

- Russian equipment is tough but as has been aptly demonstrated did not have the optics, targeting or C2 systems at the same level as the US.  They did have mass.  This takes a different mind set.

- Preconceptions.  A lot of plyers have been told for decades that Soviet forces were lower quality, so that might be what they "see".  But we get this the other way, in fact the first comments we got were how fragile the US forces were in-game and this is a modern preconception of US superiority, especially if one is coming from SF2 or BS.  

We are running some scenarios for upcoming tournaments right now and we are finding that Soviet players are winning more often so I am not sure how much of this is reality or just biases of many shapes and sizes.  

Edited February 13, 2022 by The_Capt

[BeondTheGrave]

55 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

We are running some scenarios for upcoming tournaments right now and we are finding that Soviet players are winning more often so I am not sure how much of this is reality or just biases of many shapes and sizes.  

I wonder what this says about Soviet doctrine more broadly. Perhaps that its the harder to execute, but stronger than we give it credit for when done well? The American technological advantage seems to also really evaporate up close. In some areas, like Thermals, its just an absolute advantage. But in many cases its really only an advantage at range. To be honest I would be interested to hear how your thoughts on this question after seeing how the game balance shapes up in that competitive environment. 

[MOS:96B2P]

On 2/9/2022 at 7:51 AM, domfluff said:

I've never wanted to leave a dismount in the BMP for spotting. This is not doctrinal, and it's also not a good idea, since you need to make the use of the limited squad that you have. BMPs shouldn't dismount at all in an ideal situation, and when they do dismount (close terrain, strong AT opposition) it's vitally important that the squad and BMP remain within close supporting distance of each other, within four action spots. The infantry are your eyes, and when the BMP is fighting in this supporting role, it's primarily going to be area-firing at partial contacts or suspected positions. "Fighting mounted" doesn't mean using the firing ports as a primary weapon, and nor is it primarily an NBC concern - dismounting takes time, and the one thing the Soviets really lack is time.

+1 Interesting stuff. 

When you say the squad should remain within four action spots of the BMP is this because of the horizontal information sharing distance?  Which makes sense. I just don't want to assume that's the reason. 

On 2/9/2022 at 7:51 AM, domfluff said:

"Fighting mounted" doesn't mean using the firing ports as a primary weapon, and nor is it primarily an NBC concern

I think I'm missing the point of what your attempting to convey here.  Are you simply saying the 73mm, up top, would be primary?  

Very interesting video with the three of you talking about the scenario.  I hope you make similar videos in the future. 

[domfluff]

1 hour ago, MOS:96B2P said:

+1 Interesting stuff. 

When you say the squad should remain within four action spots of the BMP is this because of the horizontal information sharing distance?  Which makes sense. I just don't want to assume that's the reason. 

Yeah, or more accurately close vocal C2 range, which is 6 spots. 4 is a good rule of thumb though, since stuff will vary in motion.

6 actually matches the manuals, because 6x8 = 48m, and the squad shouldn't be further than 50m from it's support.
 

1 hour ago, MOS:96B2P said:

I think I'm missing the point of what your attempting to convey here.  Are you simply saying the 73mm, up top, would be primary?  

Very interesting video with the three of you talking about the scenario.  I hope you make similar videos in the future. 

The point was that there's been quite a bit of discussion recently as to what the role and purpose of IFVs are.

In term of "fighting mounted" - one thing the Soviet campaign in particular makes extremely clear is that the Soviets can never afford to slow down, and dismounting is a huge expenditure of time. The reasons for that are twofold really - one is the speed of US artillery (you can adjust onto a position in two minutes), and the other is the absolute need to maintain tempo - you need to create situations where your opponent is trying to react to the thing you did two steps ago, so can never really catch up with you. It's all OODA loop stuff, really, but there's some great practical examples.

For one of those examples: 

This was Pete playing a randomised Quick Battle Map, with random forces, and an AI plan he had put together. Despite that giving the AI every disadvantage possible (QB AI is always going to be terrible) - the AI won this engagement, and Pete gained little to no information about what was happening. Now imagine his hypothetical response to that - does he commit reserves to the couple of spots he's managed to get? If so, there's a good chance that those forces just won't be there anymore, and that the Soviet army rumbles onto another similar engagement.

So "fighting mounted" - the main idea I was trying to get across is "not dismounting unless you absolutely have to". Firing ports are a supplement to that, but it's not like that's the main purpose of the infantry or the BMP - if you can avoid dismounting at all, you probably should, because the penalty for dismounting too early is often that you've wasted the asset.

(This specifically applies to BMPs in the Soviet context during CMCW, mind you - the other periods and especially other doctrine are vastly different things).

Edited February 13, 2022 by domfluff

[domfluff]

Now, in terms of the platoon sergeant - in CMCW, the HQ element is two men, and I suspect there's a good argument for making that a one man team, and giving the HQ BMP a fixed three man crew, with the third sitting in the commander's seat.

My statement about this "not being for spotting" - this will clearly help spotting and be a C2 link. The main thing I rankle at are the (historically very common on this forum) suggestions about splitting off a scout team to occupy these seats, or to buy Strela teams to do the same. This will let you use a BMP a bit more like a worse Bradley, but it won't help you use the BMP like a BMP.

Edited February 13, 2022 by domfluff

[Vanir Ausf B]

3 hours ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Doesn't a crew's soft factors all play a roll in their ability to spot the enemy? What about leadership & motivation values?

Experience rating has a substantial effect on a unit's spotting ability. I have it in my head that it is roughly a 10% difference per level although I don't remember where I got that from. Leadership and motivation ratings have no effect on spotting.

[Bud Backer]

Quote

 

Soviets "feel worse" for a number of factors:

- Not playing them right.  The player base looks like it tend to try and play them as western forces, while those that are successful fight them as they were intended.  And by this I mean "not mincing around looking for shooting advantage".  Soviet were designed to get in close fast and then chew hard, accepting 2-2 or even 3-1 losses.  

I think this is a problem I am facing. For context, I only play QB. Anything short of an Assault in QB will give numbers a lot closer to 1.5:1, maybe 2:1 but I believe even an assault is still well under 3:1 for the attacker in terms of points. So for both Modern and WW2 battles I’m having a very hard time having the mass of armour I need to fight in what I think is “Russian style.” If my enemy is almost at parity to me points wise, what am I to do? 

[dbsapp]

4 minutes ago, Bud Backer said:

I think this is a problem I am facing. For context, I only play QB. Anything short of an Assault in QB will give numbers a lot closer to 1.5:1, maybe 2:1 but I believe even an assault is still well under 3:1 for the attacker in terms of points. So for both Modern and WW2 battles I’m having a very hard time having the mass of armour I need to fight in what I think is “Russian style.” If my enemy is almost at parity to me points wise, what am I to do? 

Absolutely. The same goes for PBEM as well. 

M901 tow vehicle which in my opinion absolutely domintaes all types of armor is on par or even cheaper than T-64b. 

[domfluff]

19 minutes ago, Bud Backer said:

I think this is a problem I am facing. For context, I only play QB. Anything short of an Assault in QB will give numbers a lot closer to 1.5:1, maybe 2:1 but I believe even an assault is still well under 3:1 for the attacker in terms of points. So for both Modern and WW2 battles I’m having a very hard time having the mass of armour I need to fight in what I think is “Russian style.” If my enemy is almost at parity to me points wise, what am I to do? 

Attacker Force Ratios

Meeting Engagement: 1 : 1
Probe: 1.5 : 1
Attack: 1.65 : 1
Assault: 1.8 : 1

Worth mentioning that 3:1 force ratios are an ideal, not a reality. Engagements don't happen in a vacuum.

"What am I to do?" - you need to use the terrain and shape the situation to produce local superiority.

To use Hapless' Death Ride series as an example - if he'd followed the course I suggested in the aftermath, dividing the battlefield with his artillery, and sending everything on a push to the left, he'd have had an entire tank battalion of 31 T-62s and supporting BMPs coming up against an isolated platoon of 5 M60s and a single M901, who wouldn't have lasted long. That's a ratio of at least 6:1.



 

[BeondTheGrave]

4 hours ago, domfluff said:

Worth mentioning that 3:1 force ratios are an ideal, not a reality. Engagements don't happen in a vacuum.

Donn Starry himself argued that inside the 3:1 to 1:3 bracket engagements were essentially a toss up. Neither side's numerical advantage would be decisive. 

 

4 hours ago, domfluff said:

he'd have had an entire tank battalion of 31 T-62s and supporting BMPs coming up against an isolated platoon of 5 M60s and a single M901, who wouldn't have lasted long. That's a ratio of at least 6:1.

 and its for this reason. American doctrine told its soldiers to do exactly this kind of attack as well, isolate the battlefield and methodically destroy the enemy a platoon at a time. There is a threshold, Starry was fond of the 6:1 number, where weight of fire is just undeniable and overwhelming. Those M60s would do well to get 2:1 kills, but still lose potentially valuable ground. Inside of that range though there are just so many factors that could come into play that change the script. Maybe those five M60s just got off of a training rotation and are at peak efficiency. Maybe the commander is well liked. Maybe the Soviet commander is absolutely HATED. And maybe your opposition is Avigdor Khalahni and Zvika Greengold, and God himself whispers in their ear. 

My own personal saying is "Fair fights are for fools and suckers." Dont fight fair. Fight so that your enemy never gets a chance to reply. As true for the Soviets as it is for NATO. 

[domfluff]

18 minutes ago, BeondTheGrave said:

My own personal saying is "Fair fights are for fools and suckers." Dont fight fair. Fight so that your enemy never gets a chance to reply. As true for the Soviets as it is for NATO. 

Yup yup. The distinction is that the Soviet offensive doctrine appears to have been rather more developed and sophisticated, whilst NATO's offensive doctrine was rather more vague. The opposite is mostly true defensively, of course.

[BeondTheGrave]

1 hour ago, domfluff said:

Yup yup. The distinction is that the Soviet offensive doctrine appears to have been rather more developed and sophisticated, whilst NATO's offensive doctrine was rather more vague. The opposite is mostly true defensively, of course.

I will say while US doctrine seems to downplay the defense in writing, I have read a lot that suggests that defensive battles were drilled in practice almost as regularly as offensive. Through 1980 REALTRAIN and live battle drills became extremely popular fare, so youd have one battalion in the attack and the other in the defense. The NTC regularized that training in the US, but AFAIK it never really stopped in Europe either. MILES made it even more realistic as well. 

You might next say "how can you train well if the doctrine isn't there for it" and thats a great point! It seemed to be a sticky point between the TRADOC boys and USAREUR. The approach seemed to be to let common sense and command digression decide how to construct defenses, except that the whole thrust of TRADOC's work in those years was based around the concept that 'common sense isn't common' and things needed to be spelled out and practiced religiously in peacetime. Its a very strange dynamic.