Why ShockForce 2 should stay in the desert.

[Sgt Joch]

On the effectiveness of U.S. airpower, you also have to remember that most operations have taken place against countries that have no effective air defences. When the U.S. goes up against a competent military, the effectiveness of air assets goes way down.

In Kosovo 1999, NATO conducted a 78 day campaign against Serbia. The Serbs had an integrated air defence system built around SA-3s and SA-6s. Despite an all out campaign to take out the Serbian air defenses, NATO only managed to take out a small chunk with the result that NATO air ops were limited during the entire campaign:

-NATO aircraft had to generally stay above 15,000 feet which limited their ability to spot ground units.

Yet, enough of the Serb IADS remained intact- mainly the persistent AAA and MANPADS threat- to require NATO fighters to operate above a 15,000-foot floor throughout most of the air effort. Although allied pilots could effectively counter the older SA-7 with flares if they saw it in time, the SA-9/13, SA-14, SA-16, and SA-18 presented a more formidable threat.

-high value recon/surveillance assets had to be placed well out of SAM range which limited their effectiveness:

However, NATO never fully succeeded in neutralizing the Serb IADS, and NATO aircraft operating over Serbia and Kosovo were always within the engagement envelopes of enemy SA-3 and SA-6 missiles—envelopes that extended as high as 50,000 feet. Because of that persistent threat, mission planners had to place such high-value surveillance-and-reconnaissance platforms as the U-2 and JSTARS in less-than-ideal orbits to keep them outside the lethal reach of enemy SAMs. Even during the operation’s final week, NATO spokesmen conceded that they could confirm the destruction of only three of Serbia’s approximately 25 known mobile SA-6 batteries.

-NATO aircraft stayed at least 5km away from roads which limited their ability to spot enemy vehicles. This also meant that the mobility of Serb army units was not seriously hampered (i.e. this is not Normandy 44;)):

Yugoslavia’s poorly developed road network outside urban areas also may have worked to the benefit of NATO attackers on more than a few occasions because the enemy’s SAM operators depended on road transportation for mobility, and towed AAA tended to bog down when it left prepared surfaces and moved into open terrain. NATO pilots, therefore, studiously avoided flying down roads and crossed them when necessary at 90-degree angles to minimize their exposure time. By remaining at least five kilometers from the nearest road, they often negated the AAA threat, albeit at the cost of making it harder to spot moving military vehicles.

-NATO had to allocate more aircraft to SEAD missions leaving less to carry out actual strikes:

The persistence of a credible SAM threat throughout the Kosovo air war meant that NATO had to dedicate a larger-than-usual number of strike sorties to the SEAD mission to ensure reasonable freedom to operate in enemy airspace. Thus, fewer sorties were available for NATO mission planners to allocate against enemy military and infrastructure targets- although the limited number of approved targets at any one time tended to minimize the practical effects of that consequence.

-NATO was never able to really spot, let alone strike at Serbian army units:

Interview with Lt Gen Michael Short, USAF, PBS Frontline, “War in Europe,” 22 February 2000. Serb IADS operators may have been able to trade short-term effectiveness for longer-term survivability because allied aircraft typically could not find and successfully attack fielded Serbian forces and other mobile ground targets. Had they been able to do so and kill enemy troops in large numbers, the Serb army’s leadership would have insisted on a more aggressive air defense effort. That would have enabled NATO to kill more SAMs but at the probable cost of losing additional friendly aircraft.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/sum02/lambeth.html

plus, the equipment used by the Serbs was not even top of the line for 1999, the current air defense assets of the Russians are much more potent.

Even in 1991, there is evidence that the claimed effectiveness of air against ground units was exaggerated. The Russians went to Iraq shortly after the war and found that most Iraqi AFVs were only destroyed after they came into contact with coalition ground forces, few seem to have been destroyed during the initial air offensive.

Dummy positions and dummy equipment should be incorporated in the defensive plan. The Russians studied the Persian Gulf War and understand that the Iraqi Army prepared 700 artillery firing positions and 750 antiaircraft artillery positions (and occupied 200 and 250 of them respectively). The Iraqi army built entire reserve and dummy positions in the strongpoints of their motorized infantry and tank units. Iraqi radar operated from dummy SAM positions. The Iraqis built fiberglass mockups of weapons systems. They coated these with metallic paint and equipped them with heat emitters. The Iraqis also deployed inflatable mockups which have radar and thermal signatures analogous to the real systems. The Iraqis claim that up to 90 percent of the air strikes in the first week of Desert Storm were delivered against dummy positions and that the coalition had to conduct special training for flight crews during the war to improve their ability to differentiate between real and dummy systems.

Interviews with U.S. officers and captured Iraqi officers indicate that the bulk of Iraqi ground combat vehicles were destroyed during the ground offensive. They were destroyed by helicopter-delivered PGMs, A-10 close air support aircraft and ground systems. The exception was the Iraqi 52d Armored Brigade which was caught on the move by A-10s on 12 January, before the ground offensive, during the attack on Khafji. There are solid indications that battle damage assessment (BDA) figures of aircraft kills against dug-in vehicles were exaggerated.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/deserted/deserted.htm

so, despite what the airpower advocates claim, it is a "fantasy" to believe that U.S. air assets would get a free ride against Russia.

[Vanir Ausf B]

The Russians studied the Persian Gulf War

Hey Russia, haven't you heard that there are no lessons to be learned from the Gulf Wars?

[Sublime]

<snipped> .."The Iraqis claim..."<snip>

I'd rate Iraqi claims as extremely low. We all remember the claims they were kicking US butt while we were in Baghdad itself. I do admit the source is credible - the Air War College at Maxwell AFB - my father was director of non-resident studies for most of the 2000's before he retired. They have a gigantic (perhaps biggest on base?) library there.

Still the original source - the Iraqis, are not really believable to me at all. I bet air power's effectiveness was overstated, especially in Gulf War I. However the airpower was a force multiplier on an unprecedented scale, with amazing accuracy that only improved in OIF 2. That cannot be denied as well.

Still, I think the Russians would stand and fight, and if you add that in with hordes of equipment on par at least, usually better than most say.. Iraqi equipment you have a tough battle. OIF 2 is unique also because of the beating we inflicted 12 years before, and the embargoes, no fly zones, etc. that seriously degraded and weakened Iraq until the climax in '03.

Also, the first hand experiences in dozens of accounts I read of say the Highway of Death is in direct odds to the Russian assertion that most equipment was only destroyed when the ground forces encountered it, which I still find fairly believable. I bet all too often equipment was simply left behind, or salvageable at least with determination.

[Alan8325]

I don't particularly mind any match up for CMSF 2 as long as its slightly more believable than the last one, which was, when all is said and done, a thinly veiled Iraq war game with a neighbouring participant.

So to CMSF 2. What is the most important thing in modern warfare between conventional forces?

The answer is always going to be airpower. Airpower decides battles and really has done since it was invented. Coming to the fore in ww2.

So in any war in the foreseeable future, the nation that controls the skies, essentially wins the battles. I cant see anyone but the US not doing this for the next 30 years and so any conflict that CMSF 2 will ever represent, no matter who the opponent is will only ever be the same as CMSF. To depict otherwise will be pure fantasy.

The last time that there was ever parity in a battles outcome may have been 1943.

Russians vs US will always result in a US victory in a conventional type conflict when you remember that the US spends more on war fighting than almost the whole world combined.

CMSF would be better off being 1975 Germany, Soviets Vs NATO pre Nuclear holocaust. This was probably a time when the outcome was stacked in favour of the Soviets and not the West.

Other than that, it's just fantasy land.

I disagree completely. In addition to what Sgt Joch said above, the conflict in CMSF2 will be in Ukraine, but the U.S. would have to establish air superiority over Ukraine AND Russia to effectively knock out Russian airpower. Good luck with that. Assuming that the U.S. even has the capability to do this, especially as easily as you think, you can be assured that Russia would begin using nuclear weapons before allowing their air power to be neutered. I know I would if I were in their shoes.

The result of this in the CMSF2 scenario is that the U.S. would adopt a strategy of trying to maintain air superiority over Ukraine only, and not penetrating very far into Russian territory, if at all. As Russian airpower could continue to come in at weak points over Ukraine as Russian commanders adapt to the situation, you would see pockets of Russian air superiority over Ukraine as well.

[Peter Cairns]

The key point about airpower stated in the First gulf war.

When the US Airforce commander was asked if he had air superiority he replied "No, but we can take control of the air where ever and when ever we want."

I think for the foreseeable future the US will be able to do the same.

Claims of equipment survival from Bosnia or Iraq miss the key point that in order to survive they were rendered to all intents and purposes inoperable.

There really is little point of bragging about all the kit you bring out of hiding after you have lost the war.

It's a bit like getting the hang of CMBN; at first you look at the casualty figures and can't figure why those .50 cals that were blasting away all scenario hardly caused a casualty while infantry squads did.

Then you realise that the reason the heavy stuff doesn't kill many people is that the enemy go to ground and stay their the minute it opens up.

Not only did the pinned unit not move it rarely fired either. In terms of the outcome when properly suppressed it might as well not have been there. Time and again having lost their mobility and ability to effectively spot because of suppression they become easy meat for someone else.

In the same way what airpower in the gulf didn't destroy was pinned isolated and identified for artillery and ground units to pummel and then roll over.

Peter.

[GSX]

Hi,

First apologies for not having read all of the preceding posts...

Do remember that the Gulf War one and two prove nothing. They were a “no shows...” on the part of the Iraqis. And armed with obsolete Soviet kit.

The closest comparison, and it is very close, is the 2006 Lebanon War/Second Lebanon War. The Israelis were whacked by what they describe as an infantry brigade of 3,000 men. The Israelis threw the tool in because in order to “win..” casualties would have been far too high.

All here have seen the casually rates that can result when US forces attack Syrians armies with the 1990s Soviet kit... massively high. Well that is what would happen in a war against Russia. NATOs professional arms would not even exist six months after its start. You could expect casualty rates of around 100% for front line battalions after three to six months tours.

If the Red forces are “up for the fight...” which the Iraqis never were, and armed with 1990s onwards Russian kit that can, and as the Lebanon war proved do inflict heavy enough casualties to hold their own against any NATO force. The attrition rate would be WWII standard which professional armies cannot accept.

The Gulf Wars have, or did until Lebanon ’06, give false lessons. BTW... it gets worse, think NATO air assets would be immune from WWII attrition rates...think again . If you read what the Israelis think of current Russian ground to air systems you would not wish to be in NATO air forces. They also work.... even against F35s.

All interesting stuff,

All the best,

Kip.

While I accept your points in theory, in practice the US and its allies have enough stand off weapons to degrade AA systems that are a major threat in the medium to high level areas.

The Israelis while no doubt capable operators, do not have the same quantity of weapons that the US does. I just cant envisage a situation where the US cant achieve at least Air Dominance, let alone Air Supremacy.

What you have to remember with a modern Air-Land battle is that there is a whole arsenal of air-power, ranging from satellites to small drones.

However. If your after a fun game with modern weapons systems dialled down to enable it to be some kind of even match, then CMSF 2 might just be that game.

[GSX]

I disagree completely. In addition to what Sgt Joch said above, the conflict in CMSF2 will be in Ukraine, but the U.S. would have to establish air superiority over Ukraine AND Russia to effectively knock out Russian airpower. Good luck with that. Assuming that the U.S. even has the capability to do this, especially as easily as you think, you can be assured that Russia would begin using nuclear weapons before allowing their air power to be neutered. I know I would if I were in their shoes.

The result of this in the CMSF2 scenario is that the U.S. would adopt a strategy of trying to maintain air superiority over Ukraine only, and not penetrating very far into Russian territory, if at all. As Russian airpower could continue to come in at weak points over Ukraine as Russian commanders adapt to the situation, you would see pockets of Russian air superiority over Ukraine as well.

Hmm, your argument is sort of self defeating. Why would any country risk Nuclear War over the Ukraine?

What you have to ask is if the Russians would go Nuclear after their airbases were degraded, then why would the US even be there?

So why is the Ukraine going to be so important that its worth getting into a Nuclear exchange over?

I get that CMSF is a game though (see my previous post) but surely it would be easier to arm a Ukrainian insurgency than risk Nuclear Winter?

Gamewise though, I see it no different than say Battlefield 3 or Call of Duty back stories. Its just something to hang a game on to sell it.

[Lethaface]

Many of the so called Arab armies have missed out on the influence Napoleon left in the West: competence and talent decide promotions, instead of ancestry. This has, IMO, much more effect upon the difference in potential projected combat power than for example the difference between an Abrams m1a2SEP vs T72 Turms-T.

Then also the Arab armies aren't supposed to be so powerful that they could exert a regime change, so normally the Republican guard units should be able to defeat the rest of the army if so is necessary.

Concluding: the leadership of arab armies is incompetent at best, where the bulk of their forces aren't meant to achieve highest possible combat power projection. Those are standing armies meant to impress the local civilian and generally not much more.

This is why, imo, Iraq/Syria armies are never comparable to Russia's armed forces, apart from significant hardware and training differences.

[Alan8325]

Hmm, your argument is sort of self defeating. Why would any country risk Nuclear War over the Ukraine?

What you have to ask is if the Russians would go Nuclear after their airbases were degraded, then why would the US even be there?

So why is the Ukraine going to be so important that its worth getting into a Nuclear exchange over?

I get that CMSF is a game though (see my previous post) but surely it would be easier to arm a Ukrainian insurgency than risk Nuclear Winter?

Gamewise though, I see it no different than say Battlefield 3 or Call of Duty back stories. Its just something to hang a game on to sell it.

The answer is that they wouldn't see a high risk of the war going nuclear as long as it stays in and around Ukraine.

Russian air power and air defense losses in Ukraine and even inside Russian territory immediately around Ukraine wouldn't tip the conflict over the "threshold." The conflict WOULD go nuclear if the U.S. decided to strike deep inside Russia which is what would be required to defeat Russian air power and prevent it from being a factor in the Ukrainian conflict.

The result of this standoff is that, assuming Russia sees some high-value reason for being in Ukraine, Russia knows that they will take high losses of their aircraft over Ukraine and air defenses on the ground, and the U.S. knows that it will have to continually fight off Russian aircraft and air defenses sneaking in because striking too deep beyond a limited AO is too risky. But I agree with you that it's just a game based on a hypothetical situation that could really go the way of anyone's imagination.

[Sgt Joch]

I'd rate Iraqi claims as extremely low. We all remember the claims they were kicking US butt while we were in Baghdad itself. I do admit the source is credible - the Air War College at Maxwell AFB - my father was director of non-resident studies for most of the 2000's before he retired. They have a gigantic (perhaps biggest on base?) library there.

Still the original source - the Iraqis, are not really believable to me at all. I bet air power's effectiveness was overstated, especially in Gulf War I. However the airpower was a force multiplier on an unprecedented scale, with amazing accuracy that only improved in OIF 2. That cannot be denied as well.

Still, I think the Russians would stand and fight, and if you add that in with hordes of equipment on par at least, usually better than most say.. Iraqi equipment you have a tough battle. OIF 2 is unique also because of the beating we inflicted 12 years before, and the embargoes, no fly zones, etc. that seriously degraded and weakened Iraq until the climax in '03.

Also, the first hand experiences in dozens of accounts I read of say the Highway of Death is in direct odds to the Russian assertion that most equipment was only destroyed when the ground forces encountered it, which I still find fairly believable. I bet all too often equipment was simply left behind, or salvageable at least with determination.

you have other sources that arrive at pretty much the same conclusion, for example:

http://uploads.worldlibrary.net/uploads/pdf/20121011222013airpower_against_army_pdf.pdf

USAF carried out six weeks of airstrikes against the 3 Republican Guards divisions camped along the Iraq-Kuwait border with B-52s, F-16s, A-10s and F-111s, sometimes as many as 450 sorties per day:

Pilots and BDA even at the time showed that it was difficult for pilots to identify valid targets due to Iraqi camouflage/deception efforts.

At the beginning of the ground offensive, U.S. HQ estimated the 3 RG divisions had been written down to: Medinah (54%), Tawakalna (55%) and Hammurabi (77%). However, when U.S. forces came into contact with the Republican Guards, notably at 73 easting, it appears the bulk of the RG divisions were still there. After the war, efforts were made determine who killed what, but many destroyed Iraqi vehicles were hit by multiple weapon systems which made this difficult.

However comments from Iraqi prisoners seem to indicate that the air offensive did not cause substantial damage, i.e:

It should also be noted that the 3 RG divisions made no effort to move during the entire air offensive, they had no effective air defences and the USAF knew exactly where they were.

Now it is true that targeting systems/weapons in 2015ish will be more advanced than in 1991, but it does show the problems faced by air power alone in effectively attacking ground units.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

However much of what air power does a an operational level is not directly relevant in the tactical environment of CMSF although we can, if we wish, model the effects by giving one side limited/poor/scarce supplies and/or lowering morale. We can delete some AFVs, impose a percentage of casualties and so on as losses caused by air action should we wish to do so Thus we can model the operational impact of the ar campaign. And on a tactical level we can give the side ith air supremacy a lot of aircraft, reduce enemy artillery availability etc. Not saying this would be a balanced game, just that there are options we coud choose.

aving said that the deep penetration helicopter attack aganst the Madinah Division during Gulf War 2 demonstrating the problems attack helicopters can have even against an enemy who s not regarded as very capable

[Sublime]

Point conceded Joch. However I still say there were other factors that make that situation sort of unique. The Scud Hunt was a massive diversion of aerial resources that otherwise would perhaps have hit those ground units. Also much of the air campaign was directed at a full array of other targets (of course) and was extremely effective. I'd say the USAF pretty much completely isolated the battlefield and so whether or not one bttn commander or another had 32 or 39 T72s is regardless if they have to stay in hiding to survive, and cannot be resupplied.

When they came out of hiding, they were bombed into oblivion. See the Highway of Death. I also seem to recall the B52 carpet bombing strikes having a devastating effect on Iraqi ground troop's morale.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

Point conceded Joch. However I still say there were other factors that make that situation sort of unique. The Scud Hunt was a massive diversion of aerial resources that otherwise would perhaps have hit those ground units. Also much of the air campaign was directed at a full array of other targets (of course) and was extremely effective. I'd say the USAF pretty much completely isolated the battlefield and so whether or not one bttn commander or another had 32 or 39 T72s is regardless if they have to stay in hiding to survive, and cannot be resupplied.

When they came out of hiding, they were bombed into oblivion. See the Highway of Death. I also seem to recall the B52 carpet bombing strikes having a devastating effect on Iraqi ground troop's morale.

Only part of the truth. The Iraqi troops whose morale was most effected were the hapless conscript divisions. As accounts such as Certain Victory(Scales) shows the Republican Guard ansd some regular army armoured/mechanized divisions stood and fought (or at least attempted to do so before being overwhelmed by superior technology. The battles of 26 and 27 February 1991 formed part of one of the largest tank battles of modern military history. While we remember the images of surrendering Iraqi conscripts because that was what got filmed we often overlook the later battle because it did not get filmed being fought mostly at night for e thing. One sided it was but easy it was not.

[FGM-Bootie]

Im happy playing wherever in CMSF2. Both options have their benefits IMO.

[Sublime]

Lucas - no it definitely wasn't easy. None of any of these campaigns were easy. One sided or not. That'd be like me claiming Barbarossa 41 was easy because the Germans kicked the $hit out of the Red Army for months.

Lopsided they were though - insanely lopsided. 73 Easting and the rest. OIF 2 you have Bradleys penetrating T72s with their chain guns loaded with DU...

The Iraqi's had crappy equipment. And never had a chance vs just the US, never mind the rest of the coalition.

As hard fought and lopsided as the battles were you simply cannot claim that without airpower they perhaps wouldnt have been lopsided, or perhaps even won.

No way. I just dont see it. Yes, the conscript divisions were affected most, but theyre still part of the Iraqi military. Conscript divisions falling apart make holes in the line and system just as veteran units doing so do as well.

[John Kettler]

Peter Cairns,

Without wading through all seven pages of this thread, I'd invite you to consider the following facts.

1. Unlike every other land force the U.S. has fought, the Russians have, and will assuredly use, DU ammunition in the event of war. This alone could upset the applecart.

2. Unlike every other force the U.S. has fought, the Russians have not only things like SFW, but have laser guided munitions for practically every artillery type and even the Grad rocket. Russian deep strike capability is on par, if not better than, ours. Certainly, it's far more extensive.

3. The best Russian antitank munitions are NEVER exported while operational. Thus, the exported SAGGER was MCLOS, but the highly classified and rigorously protected homeland version was SACLOS and had a better warhead. The Kornet E ate the IDF's lunch, but the one not exported is even nastier. Similarly, export KE ammo is tungsten carbide (good stuff) or monkey model steel (bad stuff). The Russians first fielded DU in 1989.

4. The same holds true of SAMs. Case in point, the SA-6 GAINFUL. All told, four models were produced. Homeland version and stripped down (have talked to people who've seen the inside of one and you can see where whole modules have been removed) export model. Improved homeland version and improved export model.

5. The Russians possess, arguably, the most extensive and advanced large scale fielded SAM and AAA on the planet. Where we have the anemic Avenger, they have the awesome Tunguska. We have nothing like the Tor, for we have no SAM system whatsoever until you hit the level of the Patriot. At that level, they have the S-300 and S-400.

6. The Russians have an A-10 equivalent, the Su-25 FROGFOOT. Combat has shown it to be both hard hitting and highly survivable.

7. The Russians have two modern attack helicopters--Mi-28 HAVOC and Ka-50 series HOKUM--over and above hordes of heavily armed Mi-24 HIND in a slew of models.

8. The U.S. ground forces haven't been under serious air attack since Tunisia in WW II, and our force structure reflects this. The Russians have an air attack issue going back to the Zeppelins of WW I, got hammered until the end of WW II and have acutely observed U.S. use of strike airpower in Korea, Vietnam, GWs I and II, Serbia, etc. They get it. We don't. Further, they have multiple means for detecting, tracking and engaging Stealth aircraft and Stealth standoff weapons.

9. The Russians won't allow unchallenged use of high leverage systems such as AWACS and JSTARS. They've had munitions able to kill these key weapons in their inventory for decades.

10. The Russians have a jamming capability second to none, as well as extremely sophisticated and effective maskirovka techniques. Jammers are deployed against the entire spectrum of our principal sensors, to include AWACS and JSTARS.

11. The Russians have long had nonnuclear EMP weapons. The Swedes tested one such bomb after the Soviet Union fell and found it devastating. Not good for a super high tech force!

12. The Russians have pioneered the mass use of FAE/thermobaric weapons and have such a capability from RPGs through deep strike munitions.

13. We're still tied to old school runways. Much of the Russian Air Force can operate from rugged bases or even improved earth fields. And did I mention all the runway busters long in inventory?

14. Tank for tank and crew for crew, they're not in our league, but this isn't going to be a gross technological overmatch, like vs the Republican Guards in 73 Easting. We no longer have an effective monopoly on FLIR systems, they have advanced ERA, tank mounted ATGM jammers and hard kill tank defense systems.

15. Much has been made of the aged equipment the Russians used in Georgia, but few realize that just as in the Afghanistan invasion, the Russians gained surprise by rapidly employing in place, poorly equipped lower readiness units now, than higher readiness, better equipped units later. Do not mistake what we saw then in Georgia for what we'd encounter in the coming wargame.

These are but part of the story in understanding just how formidable the Russians could be in war. Their willingness to take casualties far exceeds ours, and they have enormous quantities of men, weapons and equipment--on short supply lines. They have loads of special forces, too. Nor are most of theirs tied up in Afghanistan and such.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Apache]

As to "CMSF 2 should stay in the desert", I'm glad it's not. Purely personal preference but I find desert terrain dull and boring, I did with CMSF and did with CMAK.

The whole backdrop to CMSF was a turn off for me. Massive wide open spaces with well equipped modern forces ducking and diving from single non-cons hiding out on rooftops with ATGMs. Realistic portrayal it may be, interesting....hmmm? Of course there were some scenarios that differed from this but the overall feel of the game was as described, for me at least.

I'm looking forward to playing forces almost equally as well equipped in a richer terrain.

YMMV

[Erwin]

What I am amazed to find is that I find that I enjoyed the fully-patched CMSF more than the CM2 WW2 versions(!) because the less resource hogging terrain graphics of CMSF allowed for larger maps and more maneuver games rather than the relatively claustrophobic WW2 maps that nearly all result in repetitive straight ahead assaults.

I don't mind whether the region is not desert so long as we can have much larger maps that suit the longer range modern weapons systems. ie: 2K+ ranges.

[Alan8325]

Relevant to Russian airpower: The T-50 (PAK FA) testing is supposedly going very well and is expected to enter service within the next couple of years with performance similar to the F-22. Word coming from the Russian military boasting their own hardware may be taken with almost a grain of salt, but the Indian military jumping on board with $25 billion for their own export version shows that there may be some merit to the claims of progress.

http://indrus.in/economics/2013/06/29/t-50_fighter_to_be_ready_in_2013_26603.html

[Skwabie]

What I am amazed to find is that I find that I enjoyed the fully-patched CMSF more than the CM2 WW2 versions(!) because the less resource hogging terrain graphics of CMSF allowed for larger maps and more maneuver games rather than the relatively claustrophobic WW2 maps that nearly all result in repetitive straight ahead assaults.

I don't mind whether the region is not desert so long as we can have much larger maps that suit the longer range modern weapons systems. ie: 2K+ ranges.

echo, can't breathe on small maps, hopefully eastern front can bring some change..

[Tank Hunter]

Here is your backdrop to the whole Russia vs NATO in Ukraine scenario

[Vark]

The most impressive thing about the T-50, from the videos, is the camo scheme.

[Buzz]

I loaded up The complete Eurofacation of CMSF with the recently released final file. If you have not tried this mod it will surprise you how different the CMSF world looks in Euroscape theater. The striking thing to me was loading a scenario designed for desert / sandy and seeing temperate!

The complete Eurofacation of CMSF

http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=106745