Why ShockForce 2 should stay in the desert.

[Buzz]

Thanks Sgt Joch. Should help me get up to speed.

[Peter Cairns]

Sgt Josh,

Thanks for the links, they are well worth a read.

I suppose different people will take different things from them, but for me the description of the current Russian army they give is one that in terms of structures, command, equipment, training and moral is more akin to Syria's than Americas.

I think the Russians would generally be better but the gap between the US And Russia would be a lot bigger than the one between the Russians and Syria.

The only way I would see the Russians avoiding a slaughter would be in a heavy ECM. Or post EMP scenario where both sides lost their net capabilities and GPS. Even then I would expect the US to be the clear winner as they have better leaders, doctrine, tactics, communications, training, organisation and equipment.

Better trained and more disciplined Russian troops might stand and fight, but for me that would mostly mean they would just die rather than run away. Different casualty count same outcome.

Peter.

[Stagler]

T-90A isn't the best Russian tank. T-80U is. T-80U could easily go against an M1A2 or a Challenger 1 in a slugging match with a high possibility of winning. T-90 and T-72B are just as capable of killing an M1A2 with their 2A46M or GLATGM, its just that they have lower survivability. To think of the Gulf war as an example of Western vs Eastern kit is extremely outdated, nevermind the fact that the Iraqi kit was all export model gear. Besides, I believe CMSF2 will be set in near future. So Russia will have current development kit in service. Also to note is the fact that tanks aren't everything, you have to look at everything in a combined arms picture. Russian doctrine is different to western but its troop leaders are much more skilled, motivated and adaptable than that of Syria, the example which you quoted.

And to think that Russian troops would not put up a fight is to be naïve. Russian professional soldiers have been to war over three times in the last twenty years. They have experience and have survived. Despite their military not being ready for the low intensity conflicts they have fought in the past twenty years. It is however true that Russian low readiness units are not as motivated as others. But high readiness units such as all the VDV divisions, the guards divisions, and the Naval Infantry are as motivated and drilled as any western unit. Especially now Russia has come out of the economic slump of the 1990s and can afford to run large scale training exercises again.

Russian frontal aviation is just as advanced as western aviation, its just the rest of the Russian airforce isn't and lacks interception capability. But for the purposes of CMSF 2 which I guess will not model CAP or interception, Russian CAS capability will be just as deadly as western. Mi-28N, KA-50/52, SU-39, Mi-24PN. All systems with FLIR and advanced avionics, all carrying tandem and/or triple HEAT warhead AT missiles. All realistic threats to western armour.

It doesn't need to be a "tom Clancy airborne dropping into kiev" situation. Georgia has showed us the possibility of limited wars with Russia. I don't think it will be as high stakes as you are thinking. Even so, I for one wouldn't mind such an action represented in CMSF2 to explore the possibilities.

[Sgt Joch]

On paper, the Russian army is similar to the Syrian army, but there is that imponderable known as "quality" to consider.

On paper, both the 1967 and 1973 wars should have been decisive Arab victories since the Arab armies had large numerical superiority and generally better equipment.

There have been numerous studies written has to why Arab armies generally do poorly, some cite cultural factors, others training or organisation. What is clear is that Arab units do not react well to unforeseen situations. They generally fight well in prepared defensive positions or if following a pre-rehearsed ofensive plan, but tend to freeze in mobile, fluid battles.

For example, look at a situation where a unit is attacking a hill and an enemy unit suddenly appears on their flank. In a NATO unit, the commander on the spot would generally rearrange his plan/forces to take into account the new situation and how to deal with it. In an Arab unit, the commander would generally either freeze and ask higher HQ for orders or try to follow his original plan, neither of which is usually the right choice.

The Russian army fights more like a western army, as we can see from 1943-45 or the 2008 war.

As to what a U.S.-Russia battle would look like, we can presume each side will try to play to its strength.

The U.S. will try to leverage its technological edge: satellites/UAVs to spot enemy forces, air power to attrite them before they come in contact, "blue force tracker" to maximise firepower once contact is made. There is also the possibility of "cyber warfare" to further disrupt enemy forces.

The Russians would probably try to neutralize U.S. air superiority with their air defenses and achieve local numerical superiority to overwhelm U.S. forces.

The big question mark is air power which is a big plus for U.S. forces. In Kosovo in 1999, the Serbs tried new air defence tactics which partly neutralized NATO air power. Many observers think the Russians were behind the the new tactics and the Russians now have much more sophisticated systems. On the other hand, one of the principal design goal behind the new F-35 is the ability to penetrate sophisticated air defences, plus there is also the entire area of "cyber warfare".

So, if the battle goes as the U.S. wants, air power will blast much of the Russian forces before they come in contact and ground forces will deal with the survivors. If the battle goes as the Russians want, U.S. air power will be neutralized and very large Russian ground forces will overwhelm the defenders.

The nice thing about CMSF2 is that you will be able to try out both scenarios.

[Peter Cairns]

Sgt Josh,

"The Russian army fights more like a western army, as we can see from 1943-45 or the 2008 war."

I'd have to challenge that.

Firstly although in 43-45 Russia was far better than in 41-42 They didn't fight like the US or the Germans. Consistently they used tactics where weight of numbers overwhelmed the enemy but at huge cost. They just couldn't do that now.

As to 2008, a bit like the UK lauding the performance of it's forces in the Falklands you need to remember that although the British were highly professional the Argentinians were not, particularly their conscripts.

The main view of the short 2008 conflict was;

Georgia: Better equipment, poorer troops

Russia: Poorer equipment, better troops.

The US has far better equipment and far better troops and they have been fighting a tougher war for a lot longer.

The Russians would present a stiiffer challenge to the US than the Iraqi's but not hugely so, but....

The Russians haven't met anything like the current US since Barbarrosa, and you could argue that right now the Russian army is in closer shape to "41" than "45", so I'd expect a similar outcome.

Peter.

[Wodin]

Some very famous people have underestimated the Russians..do so at your own peril.

[Vanir Ausf B]

I don't think any serious person would consider Russia a peer rival to the US, or even close to it. But I do think that outside of the US's own NATO allies it is probably the closest thing to it. We know from real world conflicts that all Middle Eastern countries should be eliminated from the discussion. Asymmetrical guerrilla warfare is a different story, but that in not the kind of conflict Combat Mission is about. China would be interesting, but it is not at all clear that the PLA is any better than the Russians, just bigger.

"The people's army is not merely an organ for fighting; it is also an organ for the political advancement of the party," Mao once said, in another statement whose truth has been confirmed by all his successors. Xi may be able to build a military that is either modern and capable or loyal and political. But many in China now believe he can't have both...

...Politics have always played a key role, and the PLA retains a Soviet-style dual command structure. A powerful political department sits at the center of the organization, while political minders shadow commanders at every level of the enormous hierarchy. With its crucial role at home as well as internationally, the PLA today boasts 2.3 million active-duty personnel, and its capabilities have been greatly strengthened by two decades of double-digit budget increases, enabling it to invest in everything from its first aircraft carrier and stealth fighter jets to the world's only anti-ship ballistic missile.

Despite the hype, however, high-ranking insiders have come forward to say the Chinese military is rotten to the core. Formal hierarchies are trumped by personal patronage, coordination between branches is minimal, and corruption is so pervasive that senior positions are sold to the highest bidders while weapons funding is siphoned into private pockets. "Corruption has become extremely institutionalized and significant," says Tai Ming Cheung, director of the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California/San Diego. "It makes it much more difficult to develop, produce, and field the weapons systems required to achieve world-class power projection."

It's not just corruption. More than three decades of peace, a booming economy, and an opaque administrative system have taken their toll as well, not to mention that the PLA is one of the world's largest bureaucracies -- and behaves accordingly. "Each unit has a committee with a commander, political commissar, and deputies, to the point they have a meeting now for everything," says Nan Li, associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College's China Maritime Studies Institute. Li told me that PLA military universities have even been reduced to printing textbooks that instruct commanders how to transcend the tyranny of committee-style decision-making. "That shows how much the PLA has been defeated by -- corroded by -- peace," he says...

...At the same time, another top-level document emerged: a speech delivered in December by Xi himself, in which he gave thundering confirmation that the PLA's primary function is to defend the regime, not China. This was the lesson learned from the Soviet Union's collapse, he said. "In the Soviet Union, where the military was depoliticized, separated from the party, and nationalized, the party was disarmed," Xi warned, according to an extract of his speech that was published by journalist Gao Yu and broadly corroborated by other sources. "A few people tried to save the Soviet Union; they seized Gorbachev, but within days it was turned around again because they didn't have the instruments to exert power." Nobody in the vast Soviet Communist Party, Xi averred, "was man enough to stand up and resist."

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/xis_war_drums?page=full

[Vanir Ausf B]

There have been numerous studies written has to why Arab armies generally do poorly, some cite cultural factors, others training or organisation. What is clear is that Arab units do not react well to unforeseen situations. They generally fight well in prepared defensive positions or if following a pre-rehearsed ofensive plan, but tend to freeze in mobile, fluid battles.

I think the central problem with Arab armies has been that their primary purpose is to suppress internal dissent rather than defeat external threats. This is why I suspect that if the US and China every were to come to blows in a land war the PLA would do little better than Iraq in 1991.

[Lethaface]

I think the central problem with Arab armies has been that their primary purpose is to suppress internal dissent rather than defeat external threats. This is why I suspect that if the US and China every were to come to blows in a land war the PLA would do little better than Iraq in 1991.

I'm not so sure about that, but that's only because of Chinese performance during the Korean war. I think Chinese soldiers will be much more steadfast than Iraqi soldiers were during the 1991 Gulf war.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Hard to say. The PLA hasn't seen real combat on a large scale in decades. That itself is a problem. At least the Russians have recently learned real-world lessons and are attempting to apply major structural changes to increase combat performance. With the PLA is looks like nothing is changing but the hardware, which reminds me of the Saudis.

[Vark]

I'd be very dubious about equating the current Western combat experience of LIC's, and a rapid take down of a threadbare conventional force, with that of a modern 'full spectrum' conflict.

As for Arab armies I never thought Sadat bought start of the art Soviet equipment to tackle internal dissent. Arab armies are made up of tribal structures fighting for largely artificial constructs, using rapidly learned tactics and technology, historically not a good combination.

[Vanir Ausf B]

We should be thankful that we don't have any real-world examples of high-tech, 1st-world armies clashing over the past 60-odd years. That doesn't mean we ignore the examples we do have and resort to pure guesswork.

By 1991 the Iraqi army had spent most of the past decade at war. I don't think it could be said that they were still adjusting to new tactics and technology, unless you meant that of their opponents.

[Vark]

The Iraqi Army had been fighting a WWI style conflict for 10 years, it came up against a force who had assiduously trained for a full spectrum Cold war conflict, for 40+ years. It was a tribal Army, with religious divisions, made up from an artificial state created after WW1, with limited experience of modern military technology, versus a Western civilisation with a history of large-scale mechanised warfare, using indigenously created weapons and tactics.

Arab armies suffer from history, not bravery or resourcefulness, their critical limitations in logistics, massive inconsistency in troop training, quality and morale are painfully exposed by Western forces. Jordan, is perhaps the best Arab Army and although it gave a good account of itself, it was still defeated by the IDF.

As for examples, they are tenuous at best, as the forces in 1991 and 2003 and fighting the recent insurgencies have had luxuries that I doubt would exist in a 1st world clash. Not to say that the Russians would win, the Wests industrial strength would virtually guarantee that, but they'd loose battles, which makes a CM2 conflict more appealing than, 'destroy a Syrian Mech brigade, but try not to loose more than 10% of your force', scenarios.

[Vanir Ausf B]

During Iran-Iraq war Iraqi Sunnis and Shia of various tribes fought and died together against Shia Iran, and generally out performed non-artificially-constructed Iran. The Iraqi army was overwhelmed in 1991 not because it could not understand the technology is was attempting to use, but because its opponent had access to much better technology and was much better trained. Tribal divisions do matter to the extent that the ruling regime is typically of a particular tribe and/or religious affiliation and therefore senior military commanders are picked primarily from that pool because of their perceived loyalty rather than command ability, which has a detrimental effect on combat performance. That is what I was saying about armies that have the function of keeping the ruling regime in power. Less politicized militarizes fight better. Arab armies are, in general, highly politicized.

As for lessons learned from LICs, you can compare tactics and results from, for example, the First and Second Battle of Grozny with the First and Second Battles of Fallujah and see clear differences in tactics and training between the Russian and US forces despite the fact that they were not fighting each other. That these are imperfect analogues to a 1st world conflict goes without saying, but they are nevertheless valuable sources if for no other reason than that they are the only sources we have regarding real combat performance, therefore our choice is to glean what information we can from them or to ignore them and rely purely on theory and guesswork. Both the US and Russian militaries have implemented changes in their forces based on their experiences in non-1st world conflicts over the past 20 years, so they apparently feel the lessons learned are of value.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

The Iraqi Republican Gaurd and some of the regular army armoured/mechanized Divisions in 1991 were theonly units that came even close to the standard of US/UK troops. In game terms I would probably not rate RG units as bette than Regular though they mght deserve a decent morale rating. I might consider stretching a point with the RGSF Division and rate them as Veteran but I think it would be better to give them the same quality as the rest ofthe RG but with better leadership and morale.

The modern Syrian army would likely be similar though they have hada couple of years combat experience against insurgents. I would reflect this by improving small unit leadership and perhaps adding some better quality small units.

[Vark]

Iraq and Iran had similar problems common to Islamic armies, poor training, poor leadership, and difficulty in maintaining equipment (Iran's situation was worse in this regard, due to embargoes on military supplies and withdrawal of US advisors). Both armies had been ruthlessly purged, so leadership and consequently command and control was poor. Critically, the Iranians had to contend with the wholly artificial tension between the army and the revolutionary forces.

The Iraqi's did not out perform the Iranians in the war, what they did have was a definite quantitative advantage, 12 divisions to 6 (some merely brigade formations) with a third more armour. When it came to the respective air forces, the disparity was even more marked, with the Iranian F-14's, F-4's and 5's lacking in critical components and beginning to run out of spares.

In spite of all these advantages, a year after the limited Iraqi invasion, the Iranians had inflicted a series of devastating operational blows and sent Iraq reeling and suing for peace. They had thrown out the Iraqis a year later and then made the same mistake as the Iraqis attacking fortified defensive lines. Even then, the Iraqis could only stabilise the line using WMD's and deploying their overwhelming air force, and armoured forces. Worse for the Iranians was the reaction of the outside world, and soon Iraq's logistical shortcomings were counter-balanced with France and the USSR supplying so much equipment, on credit, the MSR's were full of low loaders 24 hours a day.

So far from out performing the Iranians the Iraqis won by out gunning them, backed by Western credit. If the pre-Saddam Iraqis had tackled the pre-revolution Iranians, the Iraqi's would have been defending the suburbs of Bagdad, in pretty short order.

In 1991 the Iraqi army had only a rudimentary understanding of the tactics needed, as it had barely mastered the ability to defeat anyone who they did not massively outnumber or used WW1 tactics. As for Grozny and Fallujah, Russian crushed the resistance, the US retreated from Iraq, sorry voluntarily withdrew, like the Soviets from Afghanistan in 89. As I said, operationally the Soviets do better than their tactical performance might suggest, alas CM models the tactical environment.

Secondly, I don't think the performance of an army with uninterrupted logistics and air superiority, massively out-numbering a small group of rag-tag insurgents can be used to adequately predict the results of a full spectrum clash, with little, if any numerical superiority. Anyway, Grozny is not Fallujah, by any stretch of the imagination, though both sides relied on massive amounts of artillery and air support to achieve their aims.

The trouble with comparing tactics, is the interested party will always claim theirs is more effective. Western counter-insurgency tactics are second to none and there is a body of expertise that runs through their armies which is priceless. Trouble is, with your SOP honed to call in air support/artillery to deal with most tactical problems, how are you going to react when they are not there, or in significantly reduced numbers? Worse, how will your soldiers perform when they encounter similar weapon systems being trained on them? The definite training/technological edge the West has should see them through, but as Wodin so aptly said, don't underestimate your opponent.

[GSX]

I don't particularly mind any match up for CMSF 2 as long as its slightly more believable than the last one, which was, when all is said and done, a thinly veiled Iraq war game with a neighbouring participant.

So to CMSF 2. What is the most important thing in modern warfare between conventional forces?

The answer is always going to be airpower. Airpower decides battles and really has done since it was invented. Coming to the fore in ww2.

So in any war in the foreseeable future, the nation that controls the skies, essentially wins the battles. I cant see anyone but the US not doing this for the next 30 years and so any conflict that CMSF 2 will ever represent, no matter who the opponent is will only ever be the same as CMSF. To depict otherwise will be pure fantasy.

The last time that there was ever parity in a battles outcome may have been 1943.

Russians vs US will always result in a US victory in a conventional type conflict when you remember that the US spends more on war fighting than almost the whole world combined.

CMSF would be better off being 1975 Germany, Soviets Vs NATO pre Nuclear holocaust. This was probably a time when the outcome was stacked in favour of the Soviets and not the West.

Other than that, it's just fantasy land.

[Sublime]

I think a WW3 CMSF2 with modules covering different eras would be fantastic - For example the first could be a 61 Checkpoint Charlie battle. Or 1985 Fulda Gap. Then the first module could jump to late 40's, maybe flare up during Berlin Airlift. Next could be mid 70s and so on.

I think 1975 NATO would lose too, the US military was in a bad way after Vietnam..

[Vark]

I think until the mid eighties, NATO could not rely on conventional weapons to hold the line. Trouble is BF have said no to any Cold War scenarios, so perhaps it might be franchised off, so that all those Cold War warrior gamers can recreate the nightmare they avoided.

Personally I'd spend twice as much for a CW set of games, than a contrived 'future' scenario, but I'd be in a minority I think. I can also dream of an AI conflict pact, but again that would have to be franchised out. Still I can dream of MRR's and RAG's and SPAAGS and AG's, oh my!

[Sublime]

Hmm they said no? When?

I think even into the 80s it was NATO policy to use nukes after a certain point, (or strongly hinted at) and I think definitely in the 50s/60s/70s it was accepted fact NATO would use tactical nukes off the bat... And I cant see that not escalating into a full scale nuclear war and apocalypse for the world.

[Peter Cairns]

Well if we were to accept the maxim that "Airpower wins the War" then the only scenarios that brings up are where the US couldn't deploy it's airpower to negate an enemies conventional superiority on the ground.

That really leaves us looking at a scenario where the event is unexpected and quick and at distance while being one that the US must react too.

If for example however unlikely we were to see a conflict over South Korea or Taiwan the Us would perhaps not be able to dictate the start of the conflict the way it did in the Gulf, but couldn't let an ally fall.

In this case South Korea is the poorer example because the US already has substantial support in place and has effective based near by. In addition if anything North Korea is in terms of kit even more backward than Syria, so it would be Tech v Mass so a bit too like SF1

Taiwan would be interesting but the Chinese though more able to interdict US support now, would still struggle to launch a substantial amphibious operation.

So for a quick need to respond campaign for me the obvious one for me would be securing Pakistans 50+ nuclear warheads which puts us back in my Arc of Crisis game.

The US having to react immediately and at long range would need to put boots on the ground to secure them at very short notice, so a long slow Gulf style build up wouldn't be an option.

Looking at states bordering Pakistan; the US has forces in Afghanistan, Russia and India (it's only foreign base) have bases in Tajikistan and Iran and China have borders with it.

A "Race for the Warheads " on very hostile and densely populated groundcould be interesting!

Peter.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

First apologies for not having read all of the preceding posts...

Do remember that the Gulf War one and two prove nothing. They were a “no shows...” on the part of the Iraqis. And armed with obsolete Soviet kit.

The closest comparison, and it is very close, is the 2006 Lebanon War/Second Lebanon War. The Israelis were whacked by what they describe as an infantry brigade of 3,000 men. The Israelis threw the tool in because in order to “win..” casualties would have been far too high.

All here have seen the casually rates that can result when US forces attack Syrians armies with the 1990s Soviet kit... massively high. Well that is what would happen in a war against Russia. NATOs professional arms would not even exist six months after its start. You could expect casualty rates of around 100% for front line battalions after three to six months tours.

If the Red forces are “up for the fight...” which the Iraqis never were, and armed with 1990s onwards Russian kit that can, and as the Lebanon war proved do inflict heavy enough casualties to hold their own against any NATO force. The attrition rate would be WWII standard which professional armies cannot accept.

The Gulf Wars have, or did until Lebanon ’06, give false lessons. BTW... it gets worse, think NATO air assets would be immune from WWII attrition rates...think again . If you read what the Israelis think of current Russian ground to air systems you would not wish to be in NATO air forces. They also work.... even against F35s.

All interesting stuff,

All the best,

Kip.

[kipanderson]

Hi,

if this download works for you guys you will get the US Army view of the '06 Lebanon War.

http://carl.army.mil/download/csipubs/matthewsOP26.pdf

Not something the US Army would wish to repeat on ten times the scale .

All the best,

Kip.

[LUCASWILLEN05]

As regards the Arc of Crisis concept it is an idea I really like and it issomething I would like to see as the subject for a future CMSF title following the forthcoming war in the Ukraine game. However, I still want a moderns game in the Eastern European setting first.

I think history has been quite harsh to the 1991 Iraqi army and not always fairly so. We remember of course the abject collapse and mass surrender of the conscript infantry divisions. The truth is theier heart was never in it anyway and they had been subject to weeks of aerial bombardment. Plus their supplies were cut off. And, to top it all they were totally outclassed in terms of training and equipment. It is no surprise they folded. If you set up Syrian force in a similar situation with little training, por leadership and abysmalmorale chances are you will get similar results.

On the other hand the Iraqi regular armoured/mechanized units did, at least make some attempt to fight. There was even an Iraq mechanised division who trieda magor counter attack against the Marines at Burgan Oilfield. They were routedof course but this was one of the very few attempts the Iraqis made to counter attack and the point is they did try.

The Republican Guard performed uite well, moving out of their initial positions and setting up a hasty defence/rearguard. True, some units were caught unprepared by the Allies. However the Guard divisions put up a fight for around a day and displayed some level of professonal competence. See for example the accountgiven by General Scales in Certain Victory.

And in 2003 there were some RG units who did make an attempt at a last ditch stand around Baghdad

However, on both occasions the RG was technologically outclassed and probably qualitatively outclassed as well.

[Vanir Ausf B]

The Iraqi's did not out perform the Iranians in the war, what they did have was a definite quantitative advantage, 12 divisions to 6 (some merely brigade formations) with a third more armour.

This was only true at the beginning of the war. By the end of the conflict Iran had roughly twice as many men under arms as Iraq. It was the Iranians who were using human wave assaults, a tactic that relies on overwhelming numerical superiority.

Regardless of whether or not Iraqi troops out performed Iranian by whatever measure you want to define performance, the bottom line is that there is no evidence that I have seen that suggests Iraq's "artificial" nature put it at a significant disadvantage vs. Iran. Iraqi Shia fought Iranian Shia; Iranian Arabs fought Iraqi Arabs. To any extent that this artificiality would be a disadvantage would be defined by to what degree it feeds into the politicization of the military. What you refer to as "artificial tension between the army and the revolutionary forces" within the Iranian armed forces is simply another example of the debilitating effects of the aforementioned politicization of the military. The purge of Iranian generals after the revolution of 1979 was similar to Stalin's purge of '38 and had a similar effect.

That politicization has a negative effect on military performance should go without saying. That Arab armies have been generally more politicized than their western counterparts is also incontrovertible. Why anyone would argue against this is beyond me.

As for Grozny and Fallujah, Russian crushed the resistance, the US retreated from Iraq, sorry voluntarily withdrew, like the Soviets from Afghanistan in 89. As I said, operationally the Soviets do better than their tactical performance might suggest, alas CM models the tactical environment.

"Russian (sic) crushed the resistance". In the second Battle of Grozny during the First Chechnya War a force of Chechen rebels attacked and routed a much larger Russian force garrisoning the city, a defeat which forced the Russians to negotiate a treaty recognizing the defacto independence of Chechnya (until they lost it in the Second war). During the First Battle earlier that year the Russians sustained major losses in men and vehicles when armored columns were sent into the city without infantry support. Russian units were given vague orders to simply "move forward" without any specific objective. Many units became lost and some units requested as reinforcements were found to be partying on New Years.

Not that any of that is indicative in any way of the level of training and discipline within the Russian army at that time as it would have pertained to an engagement vs. a 1st world opponent because, you know, that's different.

BTW, it is good that you corrected yourself on the characterization of the US withdrawal from Iraq since to call it a retreat would have suggested a profound ignorance of the situation.