IMHO

I did make a few tweaks to the scenario and hopefully the new version will be released with the Steam release.  I've submitted it anyway so hopefully they will grab it when the time comes.  I wasn't overly concerned at first about the set up zone, although I felt it was not ideal I figured it was manageable.  I think what might be happening is that many players haven't figured out their course of action by the time the main attack force arrives and thus they are basically sitting in the setup zone rather than executing their plan of attack.  That's why I gave the player 15 minutes to play around with the minor recon force prior to the arrival of the main force - in the hope that the player would have a plan of action by then and the setup zone 'problem' would be minimized since the player would be on the move.  
I think I've addressed the issue by planting a whole bunch of the biggest trees available in the editor - they are probably about twice as tall as the ones currently there.  Even so some of the TOWs still get in there somehow, but it should be minimized to the point where it should be acceptable for most players.  It does look a little funny to me, but it's all I could think to do.  I also anticipated the Bradley down by the river situation and modified the American setup accordingly.  It's still possible for the American player to do that, but it's an even less probable thing for someone to think to do with the way I have redeployed everything.  
I also made a few minor adjustments to the American AI and reduced their combat power ever so slightly - probably not even noticeable for most players.  I also made some modifications to the Soviet briefing in an effort to help steer players in the right direction if they are not familiar with Soviet equipment / capabilities or perhaps newer to the game.  I increased the time by ten minutes as well.
I've had scenarios panned before so it's nothing new.  You can't make as many scenarios as I have if you have a thin skin.  Sometimes they work out and sometimes they don't.  Hopefully the modifications I've made will result in fewer complaints.  I typically try not to comment in scenario threads except for maybe a single post or two, but I was a little surprised and confused by some of the reactions that players were having when playing this scenario.  My honest reaction was 'what the heck are these guys doing?'  I'm thinking that most of the frustration was the TOW into the setup area when they can't spot what's hitting them.  If you are unsure of what your course of action is and stuff is 'spontaneously combusting' I can definitely see someone getting aggravated by that.  Hopefully now if a player wants to sit in the deployment zone for thirty minutes while they determine a course of action it will be safer for them to do so.

And thanks for making this happen! CMCW is incredibly well designed and full of most enjoyable content!

Yes, they are called ladies of the night. 

I've been playing both franchises for about 20+ years so I remember the timeline  OFP: ColdWar is 2001 whereas the first CM - CMBO - is 2000. ARMA2 is June, 2009 whereas CMSF is July, 2007. BUT ARMA3 is Sept, 2013 and CM Engine 4 is Dec, 2016 (but more like Jan, 2017 ). So CM had more time to mature at first but later on fell behind. I'd call it a a pattern of progressive underinvestment into the engine  So it'd be interesting to know how many people really understand CM engine internals by now...  We can discuss AI/Scripting side if you're into it. I sometimes play with ARMA3 scripting when I'm fed up with selling PMs/BAs/QAs/Coders and want to vent it out with hands-on coding Don't know how it works  But I kinda doubt you cannot customize viewport rendering in OpenGL. My guess is massive downside with going DirectX path goes with all those versions of Windows, DirectX, GPU drivers. It'll multiply your development/testing effort. But on the upside you can utilize GPU resources whereas CM cannot use more than 20%-40% of a platform's computing resources. Loading time certainly has nothing to do with OpenGL/DirectX. My first guess would be there's no pre-loading/pre-processing the maps - every time we load CM engine "starts fresh". And secondly it's most probably an architectural problem - too many layers, using "consumer" libs or being too high level with abstractions. All those things will end up in bottom line of Steam sales channel. Those are not the folk used to "CMesque experience". I kinda think CMCW is a swan song of CM

Soviet Campaigns = Tough and Challenging:
- First off the player has to manage an entire MRB TF (so Bn and a Tank Coy as a min) in each battle (except the last one but lets leave that one for now).  Over the Campaign the player is basically managing an MRR across the campaign scenarios, so 3 x MRBs, a TB and AT Bn as they fight down towards Alsfeld.
- The Campaign reflects Soviet doctrine (and POV to be honest) so there is very little RRR between battles (in March or Die it is zero).  So if one loses the better part of a tank company in Battle #1, you have to live with those losses for the rest of the campaign.  It is very easy to run out of gas by the end if a player is reckless.
- Force ratios are pretty forgiving actually, Soviets will go into each fight with at least a 2:1 advantage or higher.
- Tough as in US troops quality and positioning.  The US troops are 11 ACR and 3rd Armd Div, about the best equipped and trained the West had in this area.  They have owned the ground for nearly 40 years at this point and know every inch of it.  So each fight sees them very well positioned and with the best stuff.
As to saving and bush-searching, well I will leave that decision to you but each fight in on the clock so don't take too long.  Bottom line is that the campaign is not recommended for first time players as it will likely be frustrating.  Veterans should be prepared for shaking hands and tears in their eyes if they make it to seeing the street lights of Alsfeld.

Yep, main issue on the M774 was availability if I recall.  That and the usual military acquisition song and dance.

This topic should not die. Here is post I had on the playtesting forum on June 6th. I have been too busy with work to resume tests and make a Mantis report, yet. In my estimation the T-64A/B is better protected and more capable in CMCW than in any board wargame, computer game or simulation I have played, developed or play tested in 30+ years of wargaming. This includes modern armored warfare board games like Assault, MBT (original), MBT 2 (GMT), Lock n' Load, Mech War (SPI) and others. PC games ranging from Tanks, Steel Panthers, Flashpoint Germany & Campaigns, HPS Simulations and Armored Brigade. The only Sim I have used is Steelbeasts.
POST from June 6th------- 
I set up a test range that is approximately 2000m long and flat. It is June 1st, 1982, at 0000 hours and the conditions are hazy, cool and dry. I placed 1x M60A3TTS behind a berm hull down with armored arcs set to 1500m. At the opposite end of the map approached 4x T-64A’s (4x tank platoon). The scenario is set for two player hot seat and the Soviet tanks are given a move order to move toward the M60A3TTS’s. All crews are regular, normal and fit. I played the scenario enough times to get 100 shots of M774 APFSDS rounds at an engagement range of 1500m and less and 30 shots of the M256A2 HEAT round an engagement range of 1500m and less. At only no time during the engagements was a T-64A able to engage a M60A3TTS, this is due to the conditions and the thermal sight of the M60A3TTS. BUT I suspect the T-64A may be underperforming in IR optics.
Here is a summary of my findings:
The distribution of M774 hits which were all from the frontal arc on the T-64A and are as follows:
1.       The turret (top turret, front turret, weapon mount and weapon) was hit a combined 5.0% of the time. I believe this is too low
2.       The lower front hull (Lower, right, left) was hit a combined 17.2% of the time
3.       The upper front hull (front, right, left) was hit 77.8% of the time. I believe this is too high
4.       There were no track hits
The M774 hit 99 out of a 100 shots for 99% accuracy. Perhaps too high.
Overall,  the M774  penetrated the whole of the T-64A, 18.2% of the time. The only areas to be penetrated on the T-64A was the upper right hull and lower front hull.
1.       The upper front hull  was struck 1 time and was penetrated for 100% of the time
2.       The lower front hull was struck 17 times and penetrated 17 times for 100% penetration
 

The distribution of M256A2 HEAT hits which were all from the frontal arc on the T-64A and are as follows:
1.       The turret (top turret, front turret, right turret, weapon mount and weapon) was hit a combined 6.6% of the time. I believe this is too low
2.       The lower front hull (lower, right, left) was hit a combined 23.3% of the time
3.       The upper front hull (front, right, left) was hit 70.0% of the time. I believe this is too high
4.       There were no track hits
The M256A2 HEAT hit 30 out of a 30 shots for 100% accuracy. Certainly, too high. Most of the rounds were fired at 400m or less but some were fired at >1000m.
Overall,  the M256A2 HEAT  penetrated the whole of the T-64A, 30.0% of the time. The only areas to be penetrated on the T-64A was the upper front hull and lower front hull.
1.       The upper front hull  was struck 2 times and was penetrated for 100% of the time
2.       The lower front hull was struck 7 times and penetrated 7 times for 100% penetration

I may Mantis this concerning the high concentration of upper front hull hits and low concentration of turret front hits.
Pete
 

It takes me about a 1.0-1.5 minutes to load a "big" CMCW game like a Czechmate. Save is somewhat faster - 1.33-1.5 times faster, yet even for them 40-60secs is kind of unbearable. ARMA3 takes 15-20 secs to load a real 3D game with all its glitz. It seems current CM engine has waaaaay overstayed its welcome. 

It takes me about a 1.0-1.5 minutes to load a "big" CMCW game like a Czechmate. Save is somewhat faster - 1.33-1.5 times faster, yet even for them 40-60secs is kind of unbearable. ARMA3 takes 15-20 secs to load a real 3D game with all its glitz. It seems current CM engine has waaaaay overstayed its welcome. 

Glorious March to Victory, Final Post - "Like Tears in Rain"
Well big thank you to all who watched.  I figure I should stop leaving you all hanging, so we cease fired on the last turn (33 I believe).  Now take the end-screen with a grain of salt:

So first off there was a dumb double-accounting error for the Soviet side.  Basically the parameters were:
En Cas 50% = 50 VPs
En Condition 50% = 50 VPs
Dollbach Village = 100 VPs.
The error was the Soviets had another 100 VPs for having fewer than/better than 50% cas/cond, so I subtracted that because if we had paid attention Bil was above 50% too.  So the score was really 100 because I held the town.  (Note, also a small error in that his M150s were counted as tanks...a bug we noted for fixing)
The outstanding question is "could Bil have reduced me to 50% without going there himself"...that one is tougher.   So for Soviets:
215 men: lost 71 = 33%
17 Tanks: lost 10 = 58%
17 AFVs: lost 9 = 53%
For the US:
138 men: lost 56 = 40.5%
12 Tanks: lost 6 = 50%
17 AFVs (also counting his mortar carriers): Lost 6 = 35%
So this was by no stretch a "Total Victory", that was straight up on us for not checking the victory parameters.  I hold the village but given the drubbing I received in taking it, I am not sure I can put a statue up in Red Square for this either.  Add to this the fact I started with a lot more men and tanks, it starts to push the whole thing into Draw territory to my mind.  
Now Bil had much better arty, had air (I had none) and EW which made my arty next to useless without TRPs (which I did not have) so there is that.  And my starting position was not the best but it is a poor craftsman that blames the workbench.  
I will let you all judge for yourselves.  Regardless, was a helluva fight, the kind that comes around only every so often,  and we are all working to get you guys a chance at it yourselves soon enough.
 

Ok, so as promised, for those that might be interested here is the scenario that Bil and I played (consider it bonus content) so you guys can see in detail how this whole thing went down.  I am also attaching the last couple turns from the Soviet side so people can see the final layout when we ended it.  Password is "rochette" (don't worry I don't use it anywhere else...and she is our dog).  Up front this is not a finished or official scenario (so no briefings or such), nor is there any AI, strictly H2H.  But if you guys want to recreate the fight, have at it!  Are you a Bil, leading his capitalist swine to their inevitable doom?  Or are you a Capt, who led his men to a glorious victory for mother Russia (unfortunately only a few get to enjoy that fact)?
Note: the map is Dollbach Heights, a Pete Wenman original (seriously with this whole crypto art thing, this map might in crease in value over time).  The bare map is also included in the Master Maps folder, for aspiring designers.  Finally if you do want to play as is, I would highly recommend turning Blue EW off, as the Soviet arty is really neutered currently.  Enjoy.
BETA-AAR Meet-Force v3.btt 1892770176_DolbachHeights066.ema 2039406995_DolbachHeights068.ema

Seems like everyone has to play CMBS before playing CMCW  Specifically RUS vs US or at least UKR vs RUS.

SPOILERS!!!
PS CMCW is pure gold! Kudos to the team - arguably the best release ever!

If I take the years 2001 through 2021 in to account, and average all the sales data over that period, including but not limited to flash sales, community events, door prizes, bundles and giveaways, the best prediction based on the data is the next sale will be in never.

Maybe we could get Ric Flair
 
 

Shoot and scoot maneuvers are possible to some degree. ATGM vehicles do not fire ATGMs if waypoints are still available. So you can not give the order to drive from a hidden position into a hull down position, give a pause order of some seconds and then go reverse into the hidden position, as the vehicle will not fire ATGMs from the paused waypoint. At least not as the game is done right now, because of engine limitations.
But there is a work around, if you give a pause order in the hidden position first, then drive up to the hull down position, so that the vehicle will stand there for about 10-15 seconds, before the turn ends, then it will shoot, as there are no following waypoints ahead. You can then drive reverse into the hidden position in the beginning of the next turn, to perform a full shoot and scoot maneuver.

Well... You understand I kinda "can" only what was posted (and vetted) in other (Russian language) sources?  My primary interest in guy was in Cuban Missile Crisis (that was my crush of university years ) and the Soviet decision making in beginning of 80s. But in principle he was the head of the whole of Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service Analytics since 1971 and he was quite open (or open enough? ) so that made him quite an outstanding person. Plus it was not a kind of free-for-all course - there was a compulsory pre-selection - so there were normally about 12-18 of us who had his undivided attention for few hours once a week. The discussion normally dragged on pretty much into the late night.

@37mm,
I had a course at the university taught by the guy who had been the head of the Analytics Division of the KGB's First Directorate (Foreign Intelligence). He had obviously been very much into the deliberations of the highest echelons of the Soviet Union as he personally was the Politburo's primary source of information and assessment of the West's intentions. And the guy was quite frank and direct in sharing his views on the mindset prevalent there. He said by beginning of 80s these war plans existed in a kind of parallel reality. In 60s and 70s they served as a very much needed conventional deterrent to the US's superiority in nuclear weapons. But by the beginning of 80s the Soviet Union caught up in nuclear capabilities and political leadership understood the moment you would really need to open these plans it would be pretty much the end of the world. So there were plans how the Soviet Army steam-rolls to the Channel but there were no serious planning on what to do AFTER. Even how to feed these millions and millions of soldiers thousands kilometers away from the borders of Soviet Union. It was somehow tacitly assumed that were these plans to succeed no one would really care by than. Soviet army (together with the Military Industrial Complex) was a huge and very influential part of Soviet economy. So as every other army in the world the Soviet one should be allowed to plan however fantastical these plans may look like. And to train to execute these plans.
And there was a clear understanding how much Soviet economy of 80s depended on the inputs of the West (primarily the Western Europe). So these plans were a kind of a specter of a mad dog one should not mess around with. Because denying the Soviet Union access to world markets would dealt a VERY severe blow to the Soviet Union. With no military action whatsoever.

Thank you so much, @CMFDR. Now I have the name to the rhyme long loved!

The LOS tool (as in, the Target line, as well as the Hull Down command) uses a pre-calculated grid of different heights, which is generated when the map is created.

This is one of the reasons why this is so fast - even in early versions of CMSF, where the game was not as well optimised as it now is, and hardware was generally weaker to boot, the Target tool never lagged out the game, because all it is doing is referred to a lookup table.

This is firmly distinct from the actual unit line of sight, which is traced from the eyeballs and is calculated when they need to actually fire. This is why you can have a situation where the target line is solid blue, but the tank still can't fire, because the gunner's view is blocked by terrain or whatever.

As to their vulnerability - clearly there's survivorship bias here. If they're exposing only part of themselves, that's the part that's going to get hit (because nothing else can). So... yes, they'll be vulnerable, especially in the modern titles, where being Hull Down in general means a lot less.

One thing that's going to be very interesting about Cold War is where it falls on that spectrum - how much it feels like late-war WW2, versus how much it feels like CMSF.

Nah, for the Soviet side of the time the idea was to get as fast as possible to the ports to deny the US the ability to reinforce/resupply NATO forces in Europe. So as such:
Attacking force is not expected to face a defence not thouroughly softened by conventional artillery or tactical nukes. Heavy fire support would be used against probable enemy positions BEFORE the attack. Not a concept of a move to contact, relay enemy coordinates and lay in wait to see them destroyed. However attacking units would expect a SWIFT fire support should they run into troubles. I'd say in 80s Soviet fire support would be WAAAAY quicker then US's. And even in CMBS Russian fire support is unrealistically retarded as compared to US IMO. At the beginning of the UKR hostilities UKR Army basically didn't exist yet today UKR fire support is world class. Attacking units would need to absorb whatever casualties happen in the process. If a unit is thouroughly degraded then it will be replaced by a reserve one yet the tempo of operations needs to be maintained. Nobody cares to cleanse fortified areas, rather you avoid a head-on fight, go around and leave the mopping task to rear echelons. No one's stopping for a "smart" tactical fight - keeping the movement tempo is uber alles. As such the TACTICAL direction of attack may be changed at the discretion of lower-level commanders. It's up to the rear echelons to keep up. Again tempo is uber alles. You achieve "overmatch" on the battlefield first and foremost not by putting up an overwhelming force to fight in direct contact but rather by avoiding the costly head-on confrontation, maneuvering around the enemy and degrading it by fires. Then annihilating the weaked enemy if it's required for keeping your logistics lines. If it's not - then leave it behind and move on. So:
No sure if CMCW will show it this way - it's totally different from previous CM titles IMO. Hope it may expain many things about Russian side in other CM titles. To understand the origins of the concept it's worth reading about the political/economy side of the equation for both the West and the East.

Since you mentioned it
CMCW screenshots that I've seen represent a Soviet Army field uniform. But in reality GSVG frontline troops were to fight in camo (Berezka at that time). Refer to Zapad exercises photos.  For tanks/BMPs and other frontline equipment there were military district specific colors - e.g. GSGV and TurkVO used different ones. Comparing your and @BFCElvis screenshots - yours look perfect but for TurkVO (unlike GSVG) and @BFCElvis 's are kind of way off the mark. GSVG used a deeper green anyway unlike TurkVO. But most of all helmets are unnatural. They were colored at the production plant - so the same color for everyone and it was deeper green. If you want I can provide you the samples of old Soviet colors of 80s.

?
In my experience LOS in CMBS is pretty predictable. Just one needs to think not in terms of WYSIWYG but in terms of those ellipsoids-for-tree-crowns and tree trunks (that are not much of a concealment yet block the shells pretty well). IMO CMBS uses the best possible proxy for discovery - everything else would have increased the load hundreds of times for negligible improvement in gameplay. My guess is we have this discussion in CMBS thread because discovery in CMBS is maxed out so the difference between LOS and LOF is minimal. In my experience it's rather the opposite for CMBS - in many cases pixeltruppen tend to open fire having a clear LOS but no clear LOF. But guess there should be some logic in LOS-LOF buried deep down in the code. Yet TacAI way of thinking seems clear and predictable IMO.

@37mm,
I had a course at the university taught by the guy who had been the head of the Analytics Division of the KGB's First Directorate (Foreign Intelligence). He had obviously been very much into the deliberations of the highest echelons of the Soviet Union as he personally was the Politburo's primary source of information and assessment of the West's intentions. And the guy was quite frank and direct in sharing his views on the mindset prevalent there. He said by beginning of 80s these war plans existed in a kind of parallel reality. In 60s and 70s they served as a very much needed conventional deterrent to the US's superiority in nuclear weapons. But by the beginning of 80s the Soviet Union caught up in nuclear capabilities and political leadership understood the moment you would really need to open these plans it would be pretty much the end of the world. So there were plans how the Soviet Army steam-rolls to the Channel but there were no serious planning on what to do AFTER. Even how to feed these millions and millions of soldiers thousands kilometers away from the borders of Soviet Union. It was somehow tacitly assumed that were these plans to succeed no one would really care by than. Soviet army (together with the Military Industrial Complex) was a huge and very influential part of Soviet economy. So as every other army in the world the Soviet one should be allowed to plan however fantastical these plans may look like. And to train to execute these plans.
And there was a clear understanding how much Soviet economy of 80s depended on the inputs of the West (primarily the Western Europe). So these plans were a kind of a specter of a mad dog one should not mess around with. Because denying the Soviet Union access to world markets would dealt a VERY severe blow to the Soviet Union. With no military action whatsoever.

Original in Russian: https://lostarmour.info/articles/ostalnye-dni-vtoroy-voyny-karabah-2020-zamechaniya-i-rassuzhdeniya/. The last part with the author's conclusions - I neither agree nor question the author's opinion. Previous parts were mostly about reconstructing actual course of war from videos and photos and how it relates to propaganda from both sides. The pictures and video referenced can be seen at the original URL.
Armenia
1. Did the Armenians have a chance to win the war? If we talk about complete victory, the only possibility is to tie the navel with the strongest belts in 1994 and continue the war until Azerbaijan agrees to the independence of the NKR with the transfer of Lachin. The truce did not work for Armenia.
If by this we mean the relatively complete preservation of the existing front line, then the chances were negligible. I think that the Armenians in any case would have lost the Araks valley and the adjacent desert plateau - they would not have been able to supply troops there along unprotected roads.
But to retain the main territory of the former NKAO and, relying on the mountains and "greenery", and albeit with high losses, but wait for a favorable change in the international situation and / or depletion of Azerbaijan - they had chances. If it was not possible to defend the complete secession of Artsakh, then it would be possible to fight for more favorable conditions, to force one to reckon with oneself - everything would be better than his current completely undefined state, suspended in a fog and obedient fulfillment of Azerbaijani demands.
It is now clear that Aliyev was not disposed to go so radically, confidently and decisively to the end, as he demonstrated in his statements. At the same time, outwardly, as of November 9, everything spoke for the continuation of the war by Azerbaijan until complete victory. If the war continued in the same way as before November 9, then Azerbaijan would completely destroy or expel the Armenian armed forces (obviously, together with the population) from Karabakh until the end of 2020, in the worst case - until the end of winter. But Aliyev stopped the war without achieving the previously stated goals (restoration of territorial integrity and raising the Azerbaijani flag in all occupied lands). Karabakh is not quite Azerbaijan yet, and the phrases "Khankendi bizimdir, Agdere bizimdir, Khojavend bizimdir, Khojaly bizimdir" have not been uttered. This suggests that there were serious factors restraining Aliyev. Most likely, this is the threat of isolation, sanctions and an embargo on oil and gas from the Western countries for the expulsion of Armenians, possibly also limited financial and military resources (for example, ammunition). And if the Armenians were able to stop the offensive of Azerbaijan, the effect of these factors would only increase, persuading Aliyev to conclude a real, and not a fictitious demonstration (like October 9 and 26) truce. There was no guarantee that this would happen, of course, but there were chances.
However, these chances were completely destroyed by the current military-political leadership of Armenia, which decided not to send full-fledged regular units from Armenia to Karabakh (not counting rocket launchers, artillery and other special units, as well as the defense of Zangezur, i.e., the actual territory of Armenia) and not declare a general mobilization.
Now it has become a commonplace that the main problem in Armenia was Azerbaijani drones. But this is not the case. There were simply too few attack drones to inflict really serious losses in manpower; they could sensitively thin out equipment and deprive the Armenians of the ability to attack, but they were not able to seriously damage the infantry sitting in the mountains, properly sheltered, dispersed and mindful of the air. Even the use of heavy guided bombs from the Su-25 did not guarantee the collapse of the Armenian defense, as the successful defense of Martuni (Khojavend) in early November showed.
The main problem of the Armenian army, which left a clear imprint on all operations of this war, was the severe shortage of infantry. After the breakthrough of the front in Boyuk-Marjanli, the Azerbaijanis seemed to have sunk into emptiness. There were no significant Armenian reserves there - only separate cover groups, and the Azeri offensive was essentially restrained only by its own caution. These reserves did not appear until the very end of the war, the Armenians were unable to create anything that could be called a new front line. In the future, the Armenians acted only in small, scattered detachments, which were not enough even to control large settlements, and no one tried to defend small villages. The battles for Hadrut are especially indicative here. This city was of great moral and strategic importance and was located on the direction of the Azerbaijani offensive. Aliyev even prematurely announced his capture, clearly indicating his intentions. However, the Azerbaijanis were only found in the city center when they were hanging their flag. This means that there was no control not only over the approaches and possible routes of the enemy's approach, but the city itself was poorly controlled. The next day, Armenian reinforcements were shown to Hadrut - President Harutyunyan himself with his special forces, more reminiscent of a gang of mountain robbers. And when a few days later the Azerbaijanis seized the city without serious battles, it became clear that the Armenians had practically nothing but this special forces. And without reserves, without replenishment of losses, with many kilometers of uncontrolled terrain, no enemy drones are needed to be defeated. Azerbaijan would have won even without the "Harops", "Skystrikers" and "Bayraktar" - its assault infantry detachments could always find an unguarded gorge and bypass, surround and destroy, or force the small and scattered Armenian groups to withdraw (this is well shown in the film "Anna News "From near Karin-Taka in early November). It would take a little longer and cost a lot, but the result would be the same.
Meanwhile, theoretically, Armenia was able to saturate the front with infantry to sufficient densities. According to the experience of world wars, the country is able to mobilize up to 10% of the total population without serious stress. In the case of Armenia, this meant conscription of no less than 200-250 thousand people. This number made it possible to create and maintain a full-fledged solid front in Karabakh. In the event of a total war with an extreme strain of forces, up to 20% of the total population can be mobilized, as Germany did in both world wars and the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, i.e. for Armenia - up to 500-600 thousand people. This did not guarantee victory (since Azerbaijan could mobilize a million or more), but it gave chances for a successful defense and wasting time. However, even an attempt at such mobilization was not made - according to an estimate "by eye", Armenia during the war had mobilized no more than 70 thousand people, and in any case - no more than 100 thousand.
 The reason for this, as already mentioned, is in the decisions of the Armenian leadership. The simplest and most logical explanation for this behavior is that the Armenian leadership, for some reason, did not want to fight for Karabakh, in other words, Pashinyan, Tonoyan and others are traitors. Whether this is so and how much so, the Armenians themselves must find out. The Armenian leadership is indeed behaving strangely and surprisingly, which was clearly manifested in the post-war incident with Khtsaberd, Khin Taher and Dizapayt. It seems to me more interesting and useful to consider the possibility of the influence of other, more "traditional" factors - mistakes, stupidity, incompetence and so on.
So, in addition to betrayal, in my opinion, the only explanation for the refusal to send corps from Armenia is the fear of an attack by Azerbaijan on the territory of Armenia proper from Nakhichevan, Gazakh and Tovuz, as well as the fear of Turkey entering the war. However, such a case made it possible to use the CSTO mechanism and it is very doubtful that Aliyev and Erdogan had a great desire to test his strength, teasing and humiliating Putin. Turkey did not at all demonstrate a desire to actively intervene in this conflict and, I think, would start acting only in the event of a complete catastrophe of Azerbaijan with a retreat to the Kur. The opening of new fronts from Azerbaijan was more likely, however, I am sure that Aliyev would start thinking about it only after the failure of the offensive in Karabakh itself. But for this to happen, it was just necessary to send additional Armenian forces to Karabakh, therefore, without this action, the preservation of troops in Armenia would be meaningless. Yes, sending troops to Karabakh was risky - but the risk was justified. Pashinyan should have preferred the explicit and immediate threat of losing Karabakh to the implicit and perceived threat of an attack from other directions. Thus, the Armenian leadership can be accused, if not of betrayal, then at least of strategic timidity, myopia and inadequacy.
2. Отдельного замечания заслуживает армянская предвоенная дипломатия. Армения находилась в сложнейшем геостратегическом положении, будучи зажата между превосходящими в десятки раз врагами и не обладая надёжными коммуникациями с миром. Но и в такой ситуации слабое государство может противостоять противникам, если заручится поддержкой и защитой достаточно сильного и способного повлиять на ситуацию союзника. Армения должна была стать для такого союзника настолько ценным партнёром, чтобы он согласился ради неё пожертвовать своими отношениями с Турцией и Азербайджаном и способствовать нарушению территориальной целостности Азербайджана (что до сих пор считается одиозным деянием), а также предпринять силовые действия, достаточные для того, чтобы остановить Азербайджан.
 Подходящих государств было всего два – США и Россия. Но для США ценность Армении никогда не превысит ценность Турции, пока последняя является членом НАТО и не выступает прямо против США. Кроме того, США очень ограничены в средствах непосредственного силового воздействия в регионе и не способны их достаточно быстро нарастить. Что касается России, то Армения считала себя достаточно сильной и независимой, чтобы вести вполне свободную политику и не связывать себя более тесными и крепкими обязательствами, чем в рамках ОДКБ. А ОДКБ никогда не имела ввиду решение Карабахского вопроса, и членство Армении в ней носило в первую очередь антитурецкий характер. Хуже того, в Армении рос скепсис относительно союза с Россией, к власти пришли соответствующим образом настроенные люди, а в России в ответ ширились взгляды на Армению как на чемодан без ручки. Результатом этого стало заявление Путина в начале войны о том, что Армения и Азербайджан одинаково важны для России. Таким образом, одна из самых важных битв этой войны – на дипломатическом фронте – была проиграна Арменией до первых выстрелов, и на настоящих фронтах ей пришлось сражаться в одиночку.
В то же время необходимо отметить, что даже в таких обстоятельствах членство Армении в ОДКБ оказало колоссальное, хотя и практически не заметное, влияние на картину войны. Оно резко ограничило свободу действий Алиева и заставило его очень сдержанно хулиганить на территории собственно Армении. Будь Армения действительно в одиночестве, наступления Азербайджана со стороны Нахичевани и Товуза были бы практически неизбежными – слишком большие стратегические выгоды они сулили. Весьма вероятными становились обстрелы и бомбардировки армянских городов. В этом случае положение Армении из тяжёлого стало бы совсем невозможным.
3. Нельзя не отметить и ответственность армянского общества в целом. Одержав в значительной мере за счёт высокого боевого боевого духа замечательную победу в 1994 г., армяне решили, что дух не только необходимое, но и вполне достаточное условие победы, преисполнившись гордыней и презрением к врагу. В результате, когда Азербайджан занимался деятельной подготовкой к реваншу, армяне, снисходительно на это взирая, вместо подготовки общества и поиска средств и способов победы занимались самолюбованием. Эта война стала ярким примером того, как уверенность в себе и своей победе могут стать для этой победы смертельными врагами.
Эта самоуверенность и самонадеянность проявилась практически во всех аспектах подготовки Армении к войне. Я лишь хотел бы обратить внимание на один аспект: воспитанные в уверенности в собственном превосходстве, солдаты и офицеры оказались не готовы к действиям в условиях превосходства противника. Это привело к неоптимальным и ошибочным решениям, повышенным потерям и во многих случаях – к моральному слому личного состава (при том, что вообще армяне себя трусами не проявили).  Именно о полном моральном коллапсе свидетельствует множество брошенной в исправности военной техники, даже при наличии всех возможностей её уничтожить (особенно в этой связи вспоминается ангар с танками в Физули).  
4. Информационную политику армянского руководства нельзя назвать иначе как позорной. Попытки удержать на пропагандистском фронте те населённые пункты, которые давно уже были потеряны на реальном, не имеют никакого военного смысла и свидетельствуют только о трусости перед лицом собственного народа и неверии в его боевой дух.
5. Некоторые действия армянского командования не поддаются никакому объяснению. Своё важнейшее оперативно-стратегическое оружие – тяжёлые РСЗО «Смерч» - армяне, судя по всему, всю войну продержали в одном месте – в долине реки Хачинчай, к западу от с. Алиагалы. Все атаки и уничтожения армянских «Смерчей» произошли всего в паре километров друг от друга.
The main problem of the Armenian army, which left a clear imprint on all operations of this war, was the severe shortage of infantry. After the breakthrough of the front in Boyuk-Marjanli, the Azerbaijanis seemed to have sunk into emptiness. There were no significant Armenian reserves there - only separate cover groups, and the Azeri offensive was essentially restrained only by its own caution. These reserves did not appear until the very end of the war, the Armenians were unable to create anything that could be called a new front line. In the future, the Armenians acted only in small, scattered detachments, which were not enough even to control large settlements, and no one tried to defend small villages. The battles for Hadrut are especially indicative here. This city was of great moral and strategic importance and was located on the direction of the Azerbaijani offensive. Aliyev even prematurely announced his capture, clearly indicating his intentions. However, the Azerbaijanis were only found in the city center when they were hanging their flag. This means that there was no control not only over the approaches and possible routes of the enemy's approach, but the city itself was poorly controlled. The next day, Armenian reinforcements were shown to Hadrut - President Harutyunyan himself with his special forces, more reminiscent of a gang of mountain robbers. And when a few days later the Azerbaijanis seized the city without serious battles, it became clear that the Armenians had practically nothing but this special forces. And without reserves, without replenishment of losses, with many kilometers of uncontrolled terrain, no enemy drones are needed to be defeated. Azerbaijan would have won even without the "Harops", "Skystrikers" and "Bayraktar" - its assault infantry detachments could always find an unguarded gorge and bypass, surround and destroy, or force the small and scattered Armenian groups to withdraw (this is well shown in the film "Anna News "From near Karin-Taka in early November). It would take a little longer and cost a lot, but the result would be the same.
Meanwhile, theoretically, Armenia was able to saturate the front with infantry to sufficient densities. According to the experience of world wars, the country is able to mobilize up to 10% of the total population without serious stress. In the case of Armenia, this meant conscription of no less than 200-250 thousand people. This number made it possible to create and maintain a full-fledged solid front in Karabakh. In the event of a total war with an extreme strain of forces, up to 20% of the total population can be mobilized, as Germany did in both world wars and the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, i.e. for Armenia - up to 500-600 thousand people. This did not guarantee victory (since Azerbaijan could mobilize a million or more), but it gave chances for a successful defense and wasting time. However, even an attempt at such mobilization was not made - according to an estimate "by eye", Armenia during the war had mobilized no more than 70 thousand people, and in any case - no more than 100 thousand.
 The reason for this, as already mentioned, is in the decisions of the Armenian leadership. The simplest and most logical explanation for this behavior is that the Armenian leadership, for some reason, did not want to fight for Karabakh, in other words, Pashinyan, Tonoyan and others are traitors. Whether this is so and how much so, the Armenians themselves must find out. The Armenian leadership is indeed behaving strangely and surprisingly, which was clearly manifested in the post-war incident with Khtsaberd, Khin Taher and Dizapayt. It seems to me more interesting and useful to consider the possibility of the influence of other, more "traditional" factors - mistakes, stupidity, incompetence and so on.
So, in addition to betrayal, in my opinion, the only explanation for the refusal to send corps from Armenia is the fear of an attack by Azerbaijan on the territory of Armenia proper from Nakhichevan, Gazakh and Tovuz, as well as the fear of Turkey entering the war. However, such a case made it possible to use the CSTO mechanism and it is very doubtful that Aliyev and Erdogan had a great desire to test his strength, teasing and humiliating Putin. Turkey did not at all demonstrate a desire to actively intervene in this conflict and, I think, would start acting only in the event of a complete catastrophe of Azerbaijan with a retreat to the Kur. The opening of new fronts from Azerbaijan was more likely, however, I am sure that Aliyev would start thinking about it only after the failure of the offensive in Karabakh itself. But for this to happen, it was just necessary to send additional Armenian forces to Karabakh, therefore, without this action, the preservation of troops in Armenia would be meaningless. Yes, sending troops to Karabakh was risky - but the risk was justified. Pashinyan should have preferred the explicit and immediate threat of losing Karabakh to the implicit and perceived threat of an attack from other directions. Thus, the Armenian leadership can be accused, if not of betrayal, then at least of strategic timidity, myopia and inadequacy.
On October 17, a video was posted of an attack by the Azerbaijani "Harop" on the Armenian "Smerch", trying to hide in the bed of the Khachinchay River (www.google.com/maps/place/40.037656,46.699284).
The result of this attack is still unknown, but even if the "Harop" missed, the Armenians are unlikely not to notice the explosion, which, at least, should have alerted them. But they continued to use the same area for launches.
As a result, on October 29, the Azerbaijanis, angry after the shelling of Barda, could easily (even before the start of the shooting) spot one launcher and destroy it with several drone strikes (id26419). This happened just 2.5 km from the site of the first attack (www.google.com/maps/place/40.035058,46.728555).
Moreover, it turned out that on October 13 the Sentinel-2 satellite captured the moment the Smerch fired from the same position somewhere to the northeast in the direction of Terter-Yevlakh.
And the Armenian video of "Smerch" shooting posted after the war was also filmed at the same place, the fire is being directed to the north.
https://vk.com/wall-164246427_103522
But the destruction of the "Smerch" did not affect the Armenians in any way - they did not change either the place of deployment, or the launch area, and did not even disperse the vehicles. The next day, without embarrassment, they went to shoot at a position just 2.2 km to the west (www.google.com/maps/place/40.039233,46.703739). Naturally, they were already expected there. This time, the Azerbaijanis acted smarter - they let them shoot, then followed the launcher to the place of shelter (www.google.com/maps/place/40.034257,46.685200) and destroyed 2 Smerch at once, recklessly placed next to each other (id26426 and 26427). Together with the "Tornadoes", a fire engine died, which drove up to extinguish the id26426 that was hit by the first.
On the other hand, this episode illustrates the good camouflaging properties of the greenery even against modern means of observation - even if the Azerbaijanis, who were extremely motivated after shelling their cities, could not find huge launchers in their shelter in a small grove without the help of Armenians.
6. I hope that the Armenian military has kept and will be able to upload the complete recordings from their surveillance cameras. On the one hand, there is no military secret there, all positions are lost, and on the other hand, until now the general public could not observe the large-scale battles of the two armies completely from beginning to end, and Armenia can be the first to provide the world with such an opportunity.
Azerbaijan
1. Azerbaijan waged this war for a solid four, showing not only quantitative, but also noticeable qualitative superiority over Armenia. And most of the credit for this belongs to the autocratic regime of President Aliyev. Aliyev was at the height of his position as Bashkomandan. And if it is still difficult to say anything about his purely military talents, then his abilities as a foreign and domestic politician had no less, if not greater influence on the victorious outcome. He was able to create a favorable international environment for Azerbaijan and to a significant extent isolate Armenia. As the leader of the country for 17 years, he was able to ensure the planned and systematic preparation of the army and society for war. Particularly noticeable were Azerbaijan's solid investments in the information front (up to the purchase of "experts" in Russia and the creation of many fake pseudo-Russian and pseudo-Armenian accounts on social networks). And if the centralization of state administration, the absence of opposition, the suppression of dissent, the restriction of information, the rabid propaganda of ethnic hatred, militarism and the like can have a negative impact on the peaceful development of Azerbaijan, then their influence on victory in the war was purely positive. I doubt that a parliamentary republic would have been able to achieve comparable efficiency in specific ethnogeographic conditions.
At the same time, there were clearly flaws and mistakes in the military organization, which led to the failure of the first offensive on September 27. In the future, their influence was smoothed out by the quantitative and qualitative weakness of the enemy, and if the Azerbaijani command is unable to soberly and honestly analyze its actions and draw conclusions from them, then these flaws can painfully backfire in the future.
2. Azerbaijan, despite its superiority in almost everything, at any given time could successfully advance only in one fairly narrow direction. At first it was the northern Talysh direction, then, after breaking through the front, the Azerbaijanis attacked Jebrail, Hadrut and further north until the 20th of October, forcing the Armenians to leave Fizuli. Somewhere on October 16-17, the Azerbaijanis discovered that there was practically no one in the Araks valley and on the plateau north of it, and launched an offensive there, quickly reaching Zangelan and the valley of the river. Akers. After October 20, when they did meet resistance there, within a week the focus of the fighting shifted to the west. Then, from the middle of the 20s, Azerbaijan begins a slow advance through the mountains to Shusha. A little later, a parallel attack on Martuni (Khojavend) is read. And here it is indicative that this offensive never reached its final goal, although on November 3-4 Azerbaijanis broke through directly to the city. They were thrown back and for the week remaining until the end of the war, when decisive battles for Shusha unfolded, they could not overcome the several kilometers separating them from Martuni.
At the same time, it cannot be said that an offensive in the other direction was unnecessary - it could paralyze the Armenians' ability to maneuver their forces and reserves. But attempts to advance from Matagis / Sugovushan to the south were almost unsuccessful.
This testifies to the presence of some kind of bottleneck in the Azerbaijani grouping, which did not allow successfully advancing in several directions at once. This may be a lack of artillery for a sufficiently dense artillery support, a lack of high-class strike infantry, a lack of logistics capacity, or a lack of drones that were not able to provide sufficient information and force support in several directions at once. One way or another, but this once again shows that Azerbaijan's success was based on a very limited basis.
3. It is surprising that Azerbaijan, in the front ranks in the direction of the main strikes, of unmodernized T-72A tanks without reactive armor. On the modern battlefield, their combat value is only slightly higher than that of the T-55, which in this war were completely correctly used as an SPG. It is also unclear why Azerbaijan, spending substantial money on defense, was unable to allocate not so large funds for their modernization. To do this, it was possible to reduce the obviously excessive and completely useless in the current realities of the cost of the fleet. This testifies to the lack of consistency in the Azerbaijani strategic planning.
4. The main failure of Azerbaijan in this war is civil defense. In the early days, the villages immediately adjacent to the front line were evacuated, but, as far as can be judged, there was no evacuation from the large cities and villages located a little further, even after the start of Armenian rocket attacks, they lived as if in peacetime. Also, the system of early detection and warning of a missile attack was not organized (in any case, its work is not visible on the video of the shelling of Ganja and Barda). The result was significantly greater losses of civilians behind the front line than the Armenian side (the only indicator by which Armenia “defeated” Azerbaijan). And a noticeable part of the responsibility for these victims lies with the leadership of Azerbaijan.
5. A large number of hits on the Armenian equipment filmed with the cameras of "Bayraktar" caused a furor and almost the cult of "Saint Bayraktar". The hundreds of tanks they destroyed were counted. However, the analysis of the results makes the applause damp down. First, it is far from always clear whether the target was destroyed by Bayraktar's own weapons, or whether he only watched its defeat by other systems. Secondly, "Bayraktars" performed well against trucks, artillery, light armored vehicles and inadvertently crowded infantry. But heavy armored vehicles demonstrated significantly better stability. Filmed on camera, the defeat of the tank did not always mean its death.
So, for example, this tank in Merdinli
and this tank in Fizuli
got 2 hits each and were able to leave from there - in those places later there was nothing.
Of the 7 tanks at Karaköllu, 6 received hits, but only one was destroyed (the far right, id26456), and that, most likely, not immediately.
The article previously considered several more cases when a hit from the Bayraktar did not lead to the death of the tank.
At the same time, it is impossible to underestimate the danger of controlled weapons attacking from above for tanks. Even without destroying a tank, hits from drones inflict damage and can force you to withdraw from the battle or even throw the tank as a gift to the enemy. The role of tanks without an all-aspect KAZ on the battlefield with a modern enemy narrows down to indecency, in fact, they can only perform auxiliary functions. But the importance of BMPTs is sharply increasing: if their guns are provided with the ability of anti-aircraft firing with appropriate detection and control systems, no one else will have a question why they are needed.
The combat value of hand-operated small-caliber anti-aircraft systems dropped to zero. The ZU-23-2 in its current form against modern means of destruction looks like a ZUlus with an assembly against machine guns and magazine rifles.
6. The main advantage of Bayraktars and similar drones over air defense systems is the optical reconnaissance distance, which is much higher than the range of the short (Osa, Pantsir, Tor) and even medium (Buk) air defense systems, and is provided US-Canadian optoelectronic station CMX-15D. A good illustration of its capabilities is the AzMO video from September 30.
The distance between points on the earth's surface at the top and at the bottom of the frame is about 15 km. View from northeast to southwest. In the distance, the valley of the Chailag river, the old Azerbaijani village of Minbashyly and the new Armenian Arajamug; the lower left edge of the frame shows the village of Kuydzhak. The observed target is located near the village of Tulus. At the same time, the drone itself flies much farther - near the villages of Ashagy Kurdmakhmudlu and Gayidish, in the deep Azerbaijani rear. The distance to the front line is more than 20 km, i.e. the drone flew in complete safety. The distance to the observed target is about 53 km, to the upper edge of the frame is about 58 km.
At such a distance, the drone cannot independently destroy the target or give target designation with a laser, but it can observe tens of square kilometers of enemy rear and detect the work of artillery, missile launches of MLRS and air defense systems and transmit their coordinates for destruction by other weapon systems. In the case of an air defense system, he can follow it until a convenient situation arises (redeployment, exhaustion of air defense missile systems, etc.), direct "Spike-NLOS", "Harop" or artillery, and, if the opportunity arises, get close and attack independently.
In this case, "Bayraktar", apparently, did not participate in the destruction of targets, but only watched their defeat with other weapons. At the same time, from the targets to the front line at that time about 17 km. Approximately 90 seconds elapsed between the defeat of the two targets.
Exactly what targets were hit, it became clear from the AzMO video posted on October 1. These are 2 SAM "Osa" (id25896 and 25898).
25896 (www.google.com/maps/place/39.365434,47.070959):
25898 (www.google.com/maps/place/39.364449,47.071670):
Filming is being conducted from another Bayraktar, flying eastward in a southerly direction at a fairly large distance (since the camera is already losing color perception), but no more than 15 km, since the territory of Iran is already beginning further. It is also possible that the operation involved 2 Bayraktar, which both flew in approximately the same direction (one flew further, since the image quality was noticeably different), while each was keeping an eye on its target. It is difficult to say whether the Bayraktar hit targets with its weapons or only provided target designation to foreign missiles - the size of the shells, as far as we can judge, roughly corresponds to the standard for the Bayraktar MAM-L, but they fly up to the targets from the north, not the east. At the same time, the air defense system does not see the drone, or is jammed with interference, or is distracted by another target (possibly An-2). All this shows how systematically and consistently the Azerbaijanis approached the task of suppressing even outdated air defense.
 

What is this 9 pack of presumably unguided rockets?
UPD I found out those are blanks to imitate shooting, part of MILES gear. Never seen it in pics, thank you so much!