Doug Williams

As a bit of an outsider, I *think* JasonC's comments are being taken a bit the wrong way -- I don't know enough about any of you, but I don't think he's trying to be offensive.
 
I would guess he's promoting the idea from Napolean's quote, 'There are in Europe many good generals, but they see too many things at once. I see one thing, namely the enemy's main body. I try to crush it, confident that secondary matters will then settle themselves.'  As in, you can use the objectives for clues to where the enemy might go or be, but don't make trying to capture them your primary objective -- make destroying the enemy force your main goal, and capturing the objectives will fall into your lap.
 
I'm not saying I agree or disagree with that theory, just trying to mitigate some of the drama before it blows up -- JasonC, Bill and Ian are some of the posters whose material I value the most.
 
I think the entire comment was meant to be a little sarcastic in tone, not really calling the scenario designers idiots.  His choice of word "murdering" seems a bit out of character from other posts of his I have read, making it also seem a bit more sarcastic in tone.  I mean he wrote haiku's when told he should shorten his comments!  I could be wrong, but I'll assume the good until proven otherwise.

I think the fascinating insight is more helpful in getting scenario designers to put their creations together and give a "historical" feel to them than it is a recipe for battlefield success. All the doctrines Jason has described have valuable tactical principles in them, but I don't think buying a platoon of infantry instead of a company, to get the right proportion of arty-to-boots-to-tracks (for illustrative, inexact example) as Americans in a QB will get you more success than picking the more usual "arty light" (relatively) combined arms force, and it's often considered less than exciting to have a scenario mostly decided by overwhelming artillery on one side, so you won't often see a scenario where the infantry are "just FOs" like the hyperbolic recounting Jason mentions.
 
If a scenario designer has put together a historical battle though, I think you'd probably do well to bear the doctrines in mind, because at least one side will have thought they could win, and would have expected to do so using their doctrines... But most of the time, even historical scenarios won't be giving one side the advantage (usually in materiel and personnel, in the stages of the war we've got games for) that allows Russian and US doctrine to function effectively in the round.

sandman - I can talk about US doctrine, sure.  I am not going to put it into its own thread here, because it isn't really about CMRT and it also isn't one of the "ideal types", like Russian attrition methods and German maneuver methods.  It is closer to the Russian way of doing things but with some specific differences, and also with the US Armor force more inclined to the German approach.
 
First some background.  The US army was relative young in WW II, as a major conventional war ground force.  The US learned most of its military doctrine from French models at the end of WWI. Many of the force structures, tasking, even specific artillery pieces and their roles, came directly from French models.  In the interwar years, the US army was very small, but retained a professional officer corps of WWI veterans and active military schools.  Those tried to learn the lessons of WWI, including places where they saw a need to depart from French methods, and to keep abreast of developments in military strategy elsewhere through academic study and liason postings of officers and mutual observers and the like.  The US was blessed with some particularly sound characters in that effort, notably George C Marshall, the chief of staff during WWII, who basically ran the US infantry school in the 1930s and oversaw its doctrinal publications.  Meanwhile men like Patton were experimenting with the new armor warfare methods during peacetime maneuvers.  There were some weaknesses in US doctrine at midwar - early for the US - but those had largely resolved by the time of the ETO campaign.
 
The next bit of background is to understand some of the strengths of the US force structure.  The US emphasized the firepower arms, which effectively substitute money spent on munitions for blood or brilliance.  Send shells; its only money.  This reflected logistics being a very long suit for the American armed forces generally, and the army specifically.  The US air force was the best in the world, and the US artillery arm was also arguably the best in the world, when the manner in which is could be coordinated was tied to its logistics and supply, etc.  So there was a definite and justified tendency to lean on fire support and let it do as much of the job as possible.  The US army also had a lot of armor by the standards of other nation's forces, with even its infantry divisions well equipped with supporting tank and tank destroyer battalions, as well as truck mobility lift.  Nearly the entire army was mechanized, by the standards of German or Russian contemporary armies.  Culturally, the US army didn't have any of the class or political hierarchies of other period armies; it was more level and the officers relied on voluntary cooperation of the men to get things done.  Initiative at the lower levels was good, discipline and subordination were not, by the standards of the martinets of other armies.  This put a premium on doing things the safe way, the way that was cheapest in blood, not cheapest in time or forces committed, ammo expended, etc.
 
With that as background, I will first describe the typical way the US infantry division force fought, and especially how it attacked.  (Mostly it was attacking, from the overall strategic situation etc).  That system can be described as persistent nibbling, endlessly repeated small probes backed by firepower.  These methods were frankly a marginal updating of late WWI practices, in which "artillery conquers, infantry occupies".  One veteran described his role as an infantry officer fighting clear across Europe as that of a glorified forward observer, whose constant mission was to get close enough to the enemy to call down accurate artillery fire on his positions, and little else.  That's an exaggeration but not a misleading one.
 
The typical tactical unit for infantry division missions was the infantry battalion, but it rarely used all of its component companies in a single attack.  Instead the normal, almost formulaic tasking was to have one company "in assault", a second "in support", and the third "in reserve".  The support company occupied the start line and held it.  It would observe the attack, fire in support of it, shelter anyone who had to retreat, and fight off any local counterattacks if those occurred, but it was not expected to leave its cover and advance, until the immediate objective of the attack was taken.  Then if would move forward to relieve the assault company.  The reserve company didn't have frontage assigned, typically, and could be half a mile behind the support.  It was deliberately left out of action to give the commander flexibility to meet any contingency, and also just as a deliberate "rest" period of less exertion for the men.  They would reorganize, take replacements, restock ammo, repair damaged equipment, etc.  Their primary mission was just to be ready to fight *tomorrow*.  Meanwhile the assault company got to deliver the attack for the whole battalion, as a modest probe.  Yes they would occasionally depart from this normal usage to put 2 or even all 3 companies "in assault" while some other formation stood as reserve, but this was the typical daily way the formation fought.
 
The assault company was thus supported by the full battalion's mortars and all available artillery fire support.  It would also get at least a portion of any supporting tanks, typically a platoon of Shermans or perhaps of SP TDs, and sometimes twice that.  The assault itself was not much more than a reconnaissance by the standards of other armies.  A few scouts leading, their squad behind them, their platoon behind that in a wedge, and the company's platoons and weapons typically only 2 up and 1 plus weapons supporting.  Thus a small number of scouts and a few skirmish lines walked toward the enemy.
 
But they had God Himself on the radio, and called his Wrath down on whatever messed with the scouts.  A US infantry division had 12 155s and 36 105s in its divisional artillery, and another 18 105s in its regimental cannon companies.  Corps level artillery groups added another 36 155s or larger per division slice.  An intantry division would typically use 2 up 1 back deployments at the battalion level and sometimes also at regiment, so that only 4-6 infantry battalions were sending forth these company sized probes at one time.  The support of a single company level probe was thus frequently 1 or 2 *battalions* of artillery fire support - plus the infantry battalions own 81mm mortars, if those had any ammo.
 
And that's with even tasking.  But they didn't use even tasking, they let every 2nd Lieutenant with a radio call for anything he could, passing fire mission requests up the divisional command nets.  This could even cause large scale problems down the road because they could fire off all the ammo that could be trucked up to the guns, if let unchecked - the artillery "pull" appetite was practically limitless.  The aggressive and capable FOs and infantry officers got more than their share of support, and sometimes the others heard that the guns were busy or ammo dry.  But the amount of firepower that *could* wind up supporting each little company probe topped out at wrath of God levels.
 
Of course, it wasn't always trivial to make use of that.  Fire at unlocated enemies or enemies deep in their cellars was wasteful and ineffective.  The infantry had to create the threat that made the enemy stand, man his forward defenses, and fight.  And the enemy could "go thin" to fight with just the infantry, not giving the guns enough to chew on, by using scattered small MG nests and snipers and the like.  Against those, the infantry and its armor support had to make their own way.
 
The fundamental approach, though, was relentless artillery pounding ahead of those endless small infantry probes.  The rotation system was designed to ensure another one could be launched on an hour's notice, and another the next day, every day, with all the men getting enough reorganization and rest to keep it up indefinitely.  They were not trying to win the war today, or even tomorrow.  They were trying to take yet another very nearby terrain objective, and get the artillery some nice shoots if anyone tried to stop them.  That artillery shooting was conceived as protecting and supporting the *movement* of the infantry, and the fact that the infantry was sending a pittance was conceived as an economy of force measure to limit losses on any given fearsome screw up.  The whole line of nibbles was also supposed to find softer spots in the enemy defense and advance more surely, if not appreciably more rapidly, in those locations.  The harder spots could stick out into the advancing line and worry the higher commanders, but would call down upon themselves more than their share of artillery pounding, in consequence.
 
That pretty much describes the US infantry force's way of war.  It has similarities to the Russian attrition method, in its emphasis on just finding the enemy and then clobbering him by fire.  It doesn't launch wave after wave regardless of losses to ensure advance, though.  It backs off from anything too hard and just lets that place hold, though plastering it, and expects somebody else to efficiently advance elsewhere.  Anything left relatively undefended, it will find and pocket pretty cheaply, and the whole thing is a broad front ratchet washing over the enemy.
 
The US armor force way of fighting was different, however.  Its standard operating formation was an armored task force, which means a battalion sized force created by cross attaching tanks with armored infantry or the other way around.  They could vary from 2 to 4 companies in maneuver force strength, but 2 tank and 1 infantry company or the reverse were the usual amounts.  They would then have additional smaller attachments, platoon sized typically, of other supporting arms - cavalry, TDs, engineers, etc.  They might also have a battery of 105mm self propelled, or just have a battery to a battalion of those on call, instead of co located with the task force.
 
A task force was conceived as a force for, and operated along, a single major road or direction.  It might split off minor pieces to recon or block flanking routes, but the main body was a one road affair, and normally stayed together for the most part.  Once it finds the enemy, it deploys to fight, off road, and leads with the appropriate arm for the terrain and enemy.  A task force expected all of its elements to fight; any reserve was strictly local and temporary.  In other word, they didn't leave out of battle a third or two thirds of the force to fight later.  (The whole armor division could and did, as a "combat command reserve",  but the committed task forces were themselves all committed to action).
 
Their methods were much closer to the German way of war, described, with special emphasis on flanking and bypassing the enemy.  Something would find him, much like the German scouting wave, and try to fix them.  Another element would then flank them, and either destroy them by doing so or secure a way around them that was safe from their fire.  The whole task force would then exploit any such wedge or entry into the enemy position, with only minimal elements left to "mask" whatever they worked around that way.  The 105s in support would plaster the bypassed, but the task force itself moved on to its next target.
 
The firepower, especially the soft or anti-infantry firepower, of a US armored task force was very high.  The tank component was usually very close to TOE, 80 to 90% of strength being typical, much higher than the running strength often found in German or Russian armor (outside of the very beginning of an offensive, in the latter case).  All the infantry was halftrack mounted with a plethora of full machineguns, both 30 and 50 caliber, mounted on those vehicles.  Every halftrack carried at least 1 and sometimes 2 bazookas.  There was little that a full armored task force could not simply outshoot, locally, outside of a company of German armor and even in that case, only the superior types would be likely to check the task force.
 
Tactically, they could lead with dismounted armored infantry squads when the terrain was close, and with Shermans when it was open.  A little economy of force for scouts, then a main body dominating enemies found by direct firepower.  They were perfectly willing to use recon by fire, as well, with the Sherman coaxials liberally spraying the countryside as the formation advanced.
 
The basic idea was to smash anything small by just hitting it with way more armor than it could handle ,and bypass larger forces after "blunting" their edges or outposts in the same fashion.  The bypassed are just shelled and follow on forces from the same armor division encircle them, or leave them to infantry division forces to mop up later.  In the meantime, "bypass and haul ass".  
 
Up at the full division level, the armored division is attacking with 2 combat commands of 3-4 task forces each, and reinforcing success, shifting away from failure.  It finds or creates routes into the enemy defense, then through it to his rear area, with bypassed "cells" of holdouts just left in the division's wake.  The objectives are terrain ones - gain ground, get through the enemy, keep moving - not focused on the destruction of enemy forces.  That will come, if the division as a whole gets around or through them.
 
If the division hits serious enemy armor, but only then, it has to get more circumspect about its attacks.  Then it cares about maintaining a line and a reserve, and attrites the enemy by putting armor on armor, with TDs and firepower arms helping.  It still tries to envelop that enemy.  The effectiveness of all the division's armor increases significantly if they get on 2-3 sides of the enemy.  They also try to win the soft firepower, HE war, to strip the enemy of his infantry support.  That is a matter of divisional and higher level artillery, tank and assault gun fire, and air support; L-5 spotting aircraft also direct artillery fire and add to an intel differential.  The assumption is that winning the soft firepower war will deprive the enemy armor of its "eyes", and that then maneuver to its flanks and cutting its road routes will render it immobile and impotent.
 
I hope that helps understand US tactical methods, and how they differed between its infantry division and armor division components.

Ok. I'll play Iron instead of Elite from now on.

Ok. I'll play Iron instead of Elite from now on.

Ok. I'll play Iron instead of Elite from now on.

Daz, as you can probably tell by now, this type of whine isn't going to get you far here on these forums.

I personally use 15s pauses for that. You might get away with shorter pauses in clear terrain but in difficult terrain it is a minimum for not getting tired.

That covers the left sector, now for the right:
 

 
Attack and Support Companies will conduct a movement to contact down this right side of the map. The ultimate objective is to deny enemy traffic over the Road Bridge, and secure the Town. My Scout Team is selected to show Doug an example of my long-range Quick Move technique I alluded to in his DAR vs Bil Hardenberger. Quick Move 3 AS then Pause 5 seconds will get your guys to their destination without getting completely exhausted.
 

 
This shot shows how I maintain dispersion over a long distance without falling victim to the "Conga Line of Death". It is a lot slower than normal movement, but it increases the safety factor. Waypoints are plotted every 3 Action Spots, and it's surprisingly quick to do, by group selecting the Platoon, and using the outside forward team as the guidepost to plot the moves.
 

 
As I said before, I am now aware this is a Meeting Engagement, which means there is no overall force advantage to either side. Small-Unit Tactics, and control of the map will determine the winner. My overall intent is now to deny the enemy the ability to cross the river, and thus control the majority of the VL's and the map.
My supporting weapons will deploy as they did before, and my Attack Company will move as before also. My Objectives have changed from seizing the Road Bridge, to denying the enemy access to it. Once I have weapons posted, the remainder of the Attack Company will secure the town (in the USMC sense), then move to destroy any enemy forces that have crossed the Rail Bridge. The Solid lines on the image show my currently plotted orders, and the Dashed green lines show my movement plan for Attack Company.
 
There are a lot of unknowns going into this battle. I have never even seen a Polish OOB, so I don't know what to expect aside from probably British Equipment backed up with Sherman tanks, and Tank Destroyers.
There may be a lot of unknowns making me nervous, but there is absolutely one thing I am without a doubt completely confident in:
 

 

 

 
Whatever Armor Ithikial brings to the fight, I can smash it to bits, and sell it for scrap! (knock on wood)

I just wrote you out a long and detailed reply, then accidentally clicked the "back" button on my browser, erasing everything!
 
Basic point is that while Moore's Law is still making chips smaller, it's not making them more powerful.
 
Here's just a couple of links without my commentary.
 
http://www.extremetech.com/computing/116561-the-death-of-cpu-scaling-from-one-core-to-many-and-why-were-still-stuck
 
Important graph in that article:
 

 
That graph only goes till 2010. And updated version is found here:
 
http://www.karlrupp.net/2015/06/40-years-of-microprocessor-trend-data/

I think it is this one:  Hills Town Water (1120x736) 010   Link to the thread when the new ones were released is below. 
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/118485-coming-soon-27-v311-qb-maps/

Ok, here it is.




Looks like the map in my video has one less VL than the one that you guys are playing on, but other than that, it's the same.

This is a great map. Tough attack. I really need to start digging around in the repository and other sites for better QB maps.

Good luck, SLIM. Is Ithikial going to do his own DAR thread?
 

Thanks for posting user1000.  Below are some old screenshots your post made me remember.  I think they kinda help illustrate your point.  (not exactly but close enough)
 
Recon

 
Counter recon.

Awesome work. Thanks, Shane. Bookmarked.

Great wee scene from the film Rob Roy - the physical sparring has echoes in the verbal sparring between Argyll and Montrose.
 

Firstly, you are an infantryman and thus your opinion is invalid.  
 
Kidding aside however:

 
 
The HEAT fusing has been adjusted to be more sensitive.  It will now go off when striking pretty much anything more solid than loose mud.  Same deal with the MPAT.  The next step is the AMP which will allow you to "dial" a target, with either HEAT-type fusing (for killing PCs), a short of shrapnel approach (replacing cannister), airburst, or anti-building sort of thing (basically PD with a slight delay so it bursts after going through the wall.

As far as Canister, it's actually pretty good against buildings, it'll knock a huge hole in a wall (the pellets are tungsten), cars, most all things you'd find inside a structure etc.  Firing against some dismounts inside a house it'll cheese the target area pretty good.  Against a dedicated bunker it won't do much obviously but that's why the OR round was made and is retained for missions that entail taking the Maginot line 2.0 (which is basically a HEAT round with a penetrator tip and short delay so it goes off inside a target building).    
 
Machine guns on a tank are actually vastly superior to infantry machine guns.  As yeah I want your M240B teams to advance in the face of intense small arms fire for 500 meters with enough ammo to be effective.  The M240 on the coaxial mount has something like 8,000-12,000 rounds "ready" depending on the model plus whatever 7.62 is stashed on the tank.  The newer CROW type system is also very effective considering the other options for bringing a .50 cal to the fight, and the effects of an accurate stabilized M2 (and having it on a platform that'll shrug off all small arms and most AT systems from the front).
 
So in that regards in terms of pulping infantry, tanks are still pretty good!  Also I don't know how your unit worked, but usually we'd have a Company Team concept, so we'd lose four tanks in exchange for an infantry platoon, which gave us the fun stuff a Bradley carried too (sort of the whole point of a company team, Tank heavy teams gain dismounts+some potent anti-infantry weapons, Infantry heavy teams gain a lot more AT capability and a much more resilient fire support system).  
 
 
That was not my experience.  The proliferation of heavy cargo hauling trucks and the need for bridges to often support large amounts of traffic has meant most highway bridges, and nearly any that are paved can support a tank.  We took tanks through Baghdad with no significant mobility hazards and considering the state of those roads, that's an accomplishment.  Further my company in Korea rolled over Korean roads, bridges and all sorts of things and as a rule, anything but the smallest bridges could handle it a tank at a time.

The real comment to take away from this is how reliant the Stryker is on "good" terrain, and how much its mobility is threatened by even modest damage to roads (because if you want to talk about mobility problems, boy howdy let me get started on Strykers).  Further in terms of bridges and recovery assets, the M88A2 has been in service for some years and is capable of towing a broken M88A2 with an M1A2 attached.  Seriously.  Planned that way.  The new AVLB (M104?  Dunno the Wolverine) also is rated to handle M1s.
 
The weight creep has been a simple reality of armor design.  I'm sure Sherman supporter folks lose their collective minds when the first M26 rolled up.  However the payoff in increased armor protection and firepower was worth it.  Same deal with the Abrams, although weight reduction measures are part of the next "block" from my understanding (chiefly reducing the weight of the main gun, and replacing a lot of the wiring with fiber optics and reducing wiring harness redundancy, should save something like 7-10 tons based on whatever estimates you like).  
 
 
It goes more places than the Bradley.  True story.  The tank is heavier but has better power output by a long shot.  Also my limitations on approaches were:

1. Terrain unsuitable to any sort of armored vehicle (swamps)
2. Terrain the Army did not let me use (PROTECT THE WOODPECKER/WHATEVER IS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ON THIS POST!!!!111oneoneone)
3. Terrain that was inherently a bad idea (wide open, limited hull down positions, had deep gullies that would either force us to expose our flanks, or leave us exposed)
 
I've driven up and down icy roads, across small streams, I've kicked up 30 foot tall rooster tails of mud, crossing terrain that was eating HMMWVs (1025s mind you, not uparmors) like it was the blob.  These mobility issues, I know not of what you speak.
 
 
There's a lot wrong in this statement, so I'll address what's correct:

1. The engine produces a lot of heat.  Much of the problems that result from this (setting the Prairie on fire at Yakima Training Center) can be addressed using the heat shield (which is usually made from scrap-metal with some rebar handles, it's not high tech).  
2. Gas consumption is a problem, however in terms of operational range and refueling requirements, it has similar duration to the Bradley and other Army equipment.  So while it requires more fuel, the resupply frequency is on par with mechanized infantry units.  
 
The only engine fire I saw were a result of an electrical short.  It was extinguished with no great difficulty*.  I have seen tanks operate in the deserts of Eastern WA, NTC, Korea during the "hot as balls I want to die" part of the summer (between monsoons), Kuwait, Iraq and overheating and catching fire was not something I'd heard of. The newer diesel engines still take significantly longer to reach max capacity power output, and involve significantly more moving pieces (our tanks went down much less frequently than the Bradleys and M113s in terms of engine faults).  
 
I have no idea what you're talking about with the engine spool up.  I don't have the literal times beside me but the greater delay cold start was waiting for the optics to cool (so the thermal would "see") and the computers to run up.  If you're doing a "powered" start (like you already have turret/hull power on, just the engine is off it's pretty darn fast (I killed my engine and hid my tank while playing as opfor, the delay from "engine off" to "exploding from the treeline like an angry dinosaur** was negligible)
 
 
I think she's doing fine.  The Abram's infantry murdering abilities are still very capable, and there's a lot of piles of rubble in Baghdad that attest to the ability of the main gun to ruin faces.  During the "Thunder Run" and Falluhjah the Abrams functioned very effectively against infantry and building type targets.  I sat on the DMZ in Korea more than reasonably confident that:

A. If I had to shoot people it was going to be dismounts mostly
B. My tanks (and tankers) were more than up to the task.
 
There's this persistent mythology that the optimal tank should be something like the old ARVE, or assault guns.  Something like that wouldn't be half bad as an auxiliary.  But tanks, and their ability to eat enemy armor for breakfast, and then smoke the crunchies all on the fly is an essential piece of combined arms warfare.  Trying to relegate armor to the infantry support role as a primary mission went out of style in the 1940s.  As much as you can bring up the fate of British Cruiser tanks, we can also point to how equally the infantry tanks failed***.  At the end of the day you resulted in the Main Battle Tank which MUST include both missions, and as I have, and will likely continue to illustrate, the Abrams can smoke armor and dismount alike.  
 
*The conversation still went "Sir one of the tanks caught fire" followed by me getting about 50% of the way to losing my mind until it was explained only the  short circuted component suffered any fire damage.
**It was one of the cooler things I've done in a tank, as the thicket just disintegrated around us and we MILEs a few tanks before anyone knew what was happening.  Took a while before we lose all the branches off the deck though. 
***The Churchill only really becoming successful because it eventually was outfitted with the same sort of weapons package other "cruiser" type tanks had at the time.  As much as the various CS model tanks, or things like the M4 105mm were useful, they remained as specialist tools for a reason.

Ok I did a career in the military. Both Marine Corps and Army. The last part of my gig was a Plt Sgt in Bradley Mechanized Infantry. I am also Bradley Master Gunner Qualified. Just stating that so you know I am not just a village idiot. And yes I know opinions are like assholes. Everybody has one and they all stink. But here is some facts to mull over with a cup of coffee and a good doughnut to provide a balanced breakfast.
 
I have hung out with the tank master gunners on several occasions and I always asked the same question, We support the tanks in close terrain environments but how come the tank has lost the interest, ability and mission capability of supporting the grunt. And how can the armor community continue to glorify a Cold War weapons system without realizing the world it operates in has changed and the tank needs to change to meet these new demands.
 
There is no HE round that can knock out a bunker or devastate a house like the M4 Sherman or the M60A3 tanks. Sure they have a canister round but that is no good for the aforementioned targets that are busy pinning the infantry down. A Sabot round and a Heat Round are lousy substitutes as they make neat holes in targets but lack the explosive power for a area kill radius. HEAT rounds will not go off unless they hit something hard. If fired at troops in the open it will usually skip off the ground and it just buries itself in wet ground. Machine Guns on the tank are not the answer. If they could solve the problem the infantry could extricate themselves.
 
Speaking of extricating themselves.The M1 has gotten heavier and heavier in armor tonnage to were the current bridging equipment and recovery vehicles can barely hold their own against them. It is well documented that M1's fell through bridges in the Middle East or crushed culverts causing the following vehicles to detour to another route. I have a friend who is a civilian technician for the Stryker computer systems. He spent a lot of time in the sandbox and he said it used just piss the Stryker troopers off something fierce when a M1 would bust up a approach route causing them or follow on forces to use a different route that caused delays and a security risk to the forces using the detour.
 
This is another lesson we need to remember is that a lumbering armored behemoth is not the answer in armored warfare. At 70 tons for the current M1 you think we would remember the German monsters of the same weight and fuel consumption needs and what befell them before they could even get into combat. Plus the weight of the M1 has placed more of a restriction on what types of terrain it can operate on thus restricting avenues of approach to a objective.
 
And let us not forget the 4 miles per gallon turbine engine that kicks out 1700 degrees of heat. Time to get rid of that logistical nightmare, After idling for just 8 hours a M1 will suck the fuel tanks dry. That is if the heat build up doesn't cause a engine fire. See funny thing about turbine engines is that they are aircraft engines and the more air flow around the engine the better it cools off. The Army stated they wanted the turbine engine because it could produce the 1500 horsepower needed to power the tank. Guess what ladies and gentlemen the newest iteration of the Leopard tank has a 1650 horsepower engine and OMG it is a diesel engine that sucks a hell of a lot less fuel. Also a diesel engine starts faster than the 40 seconds minimum to get a turbine engine running.
 
So what do you think? Has the military gone off on a tangent with the M1 as a glorious killer of tank hordes and has forgotten the linage of the tank. The British tried the tank vs only tank concept with the Cruiser tanks that had no HE to fight enemy infantry and look where that got them, The humble beginnings of the tank was to support infantry and then it evolved into a balanced machine capable of support and taking on enemy armor as that threat became more prolific on the battlefield.
 
Infantry takes and holds the ground, It defeats threats against it with combined arms supporting it's effort. Right now the tank is missing part of it's potential in contributing to the combined arms doctrine.

"We' re burning daylight!". Favorite western line from John Wayne in "The Cowboys". It always reminds me of my Dad since we watched it together, and I used to go to work with him as a kid house painting. We would get up around 4-5am, and I would be draging ass, and he would give me the line come on "We're burning daylight!". Always made me smile because it was something between us.

Stuarts have been a favorite of mine for a long time now. I love them, especially in city battles.

From a PBEM turn I received today. This is a meeting engagement on the Holland "Elst" map.

*Chuckles*
 
First two AP rounds and then a beehive, what a mean motherhugger.
 
...a very smart one indeed, he hit about the only spot his little gun could penetrate at all.
 
*thumbs up*

Love it. I have lost as many as seven tanks before finally getting the better of a Tiger. You were much more fortunate in that battle. Did you know there were Tigers about?

User1000:
 
Check out the M5s loadout. 12 rounds of canister.  Hit the Tiger w/ 3 AP shots and then when the crew bailed he shot a canister round to cause some casualties.  NO mercy!

Nice video what did the impacts say couldn't read it. The stuart has a high velocity 37mm just like the 37mm anti-tank gun. The penetration values are similar to the m4 shermans weak low velocity 75mm believe it or not.It could fire canister for anti-troop purposes as well but I doubt battelefront added that as ammo?
The inner city is not a place for Tigers to be..
The Tiger tanks turret speed and general track speed is slow. It would probably be quicker for a tiger to track turn instead of a turret turn.
 
The closer the stuart gets to an enemy tank the more deadly it is. Since the M8 greyhound also has the 37mm, It could probably do the same. If a .50cal could not out a tanks engine from behind, the 37 would have no problem knocking out any tanks engine from behind.
 
Shermans and Stuarts reign in inner city battles.. Up close is where the 75mm WORKS as well.

Results like this are why I love the game. Truly anything can happen.

They were for the time. That's why both the Russians and Germans equipped whole Companies with them, and would've equipped even more men with them if they could have. The assault rifle's invention came earlier than people think, and was predicated on the invention of an intermediate cartridge between the power of a full rifle round and pistol round. Most nations couldn't change their standard ammunition dead in the middle of the war though. Just ask the Italians and Japanese how good that worked for them. The Russians waited until the war was past its decisive stage before they started fiddling with Kalashnikov's designs and the Germans were desperate enough to try just about anything.
 
So you know, the Thompson was still in use with the US Army in Vietnam, and it was quite popular. The issue with the Thompson is that the ballistics of the .45ACP round are not very good beyond about 100m or so. The round loses energy too fast. It could kill someone much farther out but the trajectory falls off a lot at range. Their is a reason modern machine pistols and SMGs prefer the 9mm parabellum round. Assault rifles replaced SMGs because they offer all the advantages of a compact machine gun with none of the disadvantages of a pistol cartridge. Older ARs used to be somewhat unwieldy in tight quarters but a modern M4 is about the size of the Thompson and weighs less.
 
I hate hate hate these video-game esque K:D ratio statements. They totally gloss over the operational realities of the war and encourage people to remain ignorant of how fighting in a modern war works. I hope you don't frequently paint pictures of the war to laypeople like this. Really I don't because it's actually very irresponsible and unhealthy.
 
You should try being shot at, half starved, and fresh out of a 200km road march if you want the truly realistic experience.
 
You should know that the developers are wary of "I think XYZ is too strong/too weak". Do some tests, come back with some figures, and do some research. I'm a little surprised that everyone is so befuddled with Russian SMG squads when they're no better armed than the Syrian militiamen we all played against in Shock Force. If you stumble into a killzone and don't cover sectors right than it barely matters if your men are armed with M4s or K98s, they'll get wrecked.