How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

5 hours ago, Hapless said:

Gonna climb up on a hill, dig in and say we've been watching the offensive for the last few weeks or so.

It's just getting hard to draw a line between traditional pre-offensive shaping operations and the potential for the long-range precision deep battle to be decisive in and of itself.

So very true. 

First, let's look at someone else's definitions (both from Wikipedia, which I find sufficient):

Offensive - "a military operation that seeks through an aggressive projection of armed forces to occupy territory, gain an objective or achieve some larger strategic, operational, or tactical goal."

Counter-Offensive - "a large-scale strategic offensive military operation, usually by forces that had successfully halted the enemy's offensive, while occupying defensive positions."

There can be a blurry line between these two, but I think most of us here would agree that Kherson fits "Offensive" more than it does "Counter-Offensive" due to the fact that the forces that forces on both sides of the line are significantly different than the ones that were there several months ago.  Also, the intention of the action in Kherson is to affect a strategic outcome, not simply arrest or reverse a Russian attack.

With that out of the way...

We've had some good conversations about this very point a number of times.  As you say, the problem everybody is having, and I include myself in this mix, is trying to draw the line between preparations ("pre-offensive shaping") and the offensive itself.

Another confusing thing that Ukraine is making us wrestle with is the element of time (or timing, if you like).  Ukraine seems to be in no hurry, if you will, to achieve traditional measures of success compared to Russia or historical examples.  We have no way of knowing to what degree this is deliberate (i.e. cautious, keep down casualties, let other things run their course, etc.) or obligatory (i.e. own forces are tired, logistics aren't deemed sufficient, equipment lacking, etc.).  I think we can assume, for now, that it seems to be a combination of both to some extent.

As for what is going on, we do not know what Ukraine is planning, therefore it's hard to assess.  Especially because we've already seen that Ukraine doesn't operate on our expected timelines.  Is Kherson a part of a larger plan, is it the only part, or is Ukraine still keeping its options open.  We just do not know.

Personally, I think Kherson is (at a minimum) a planned Offensive.  I also believe that this offensive started when the first PGMs hit the Kherson bridges.  I said that at the time and I still believe it to be correct.  However, without knowing what Ukraine has planned I don't know if it is just the first phase of the offensive ("pre-offensive shaping") or the offensive itself.  Either fits the definition of "Offensive" just fine IMHO, but we won't know how to label it until later.

If this deep strike activity is the full offensive, then wow... that's definitely a bold and novel way to fight back.  It's also likely to be a slower way to end the war.  But if that's all Ukraine thinks it can manage to do, then speed is not really all that important.  Which again frustrates us people who insist on trying to draw from historical examples to predict how this war is going

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, chris talpas said:

Steve, you really need to give us a way to give you likes.

Not in the forum programming me thinks, but thanks!

1 hour ago, chris talpas said:

Thanks for bringing a smile to my face.  Thanks as well for all the commentary and analysis.  This has been a go to thread for intelligent discourse on the course of this war from a military and larger perspective.

Yes, absolutely.  Unfortunately saving the stuff we link to is not possible in any comprehensive way and trying to copy it manually is not practical.  I have, however, selectively backed up portions of what has been displayed here (Grigb's maps, for example) and what I see on Twitter (ex: Jomni account) or other venues (ex: ISW).  I have also cobbled together some pretty large amount of materials on specific events that have outsized importance to the conflict.  This way, at least, I have what I need to refer to for future CM and/or personal needs even if the links here go dead.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

10 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This is drastically narrowing the role of the tank, to in-effect sniping TD.  So what is filling the capability that a tank used to have?  If the answer is nothing than Russian conventional warfare is broken.  This is not gamey, it is all they can do.  If the Russians are forced to hide their tanks behind buildings (or in the churches of sburke) to “pop up” shoot and move, they are not able to mass direct fires - which is kinda important cause it is pretty central to any form of manoeuvre.

Russia may be fighting like a CM player; however, it is one on the worst end of a ROW tourney and can’t think of anything else they can do.

 

9 hours ago, Cederic said:

Hermit tanks from Howondaland? Look away for just a moment and a cluster of garden sheds appears, long snouts peeking out?

I'm not mocking, if I was a Russian tanker I would absolutely looking for lightweight profile changing misdirection that'd confuse the NLAW and Javelin.

While we're resurrecting old games....

Kekekekekekekekekekekeke!!!!!

[Battlefront.com]

Interesting report in ISW from yesterday, especially given my suspicion that the Dugin assassination is related to DLPR in some way:

Quote

Ukrainian intelligence reported that the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) will begin “general mobilization” proceedings on September 1. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 22 that LNR Head Leonid Pasechnik announced the start of the first phase of general mobilization during a radiobroadcast in occupied Svatove, Luhansk Oblast. The GUR noted that LNR officials will mobilize Ukrainian citizens who received Russian passports and satisfy military requirements during the first phase of the mobilization. The GUR also stated that the second phase will mobilize the rest of the male population aged 18 to 65. ISW could not locate the original radio broadcast in open sources and cannot independently verify this report. The LNR also claimed that it has not announced mobilization and is not engaged in covert mobilization on August 20. The LNR previously announced a general mobilization on February 19 that conscripted all eligible men ages 18 to 55—both registered and not registered at the military recruitment centers—and reservists. The LNR’s previous February mobilization also prohibited men from leaving the territory of occupied Luhansk Oblast and transitioned the economy to a wartime mode. Pasechnik previously claimed that the LNR ended its active mobilization periods in late March.  Russian law allows the Russian military to activate both reservists and new conscripts during general mobilization, including those previously exempted from conscription.

It's hard to imagine there is anybody left in LPR that is able to walk and talk, not to mention is fit to fight.  This indicates that things there have entered a new phase of desperation.  It seems there's not going to be any adult males left out of uniform by the end of September.  I can only imagine what that is doing to the internal tensions between the civilians, their puppet authorities, and Russian intentions.

Related, yesterday Murz directly disputed LPR claims that they aren't forcefully mobilizing people and that they are, in fact, paid handsomely:

https://wartranslated.com/lpr-volunteer-dismisses-republics-commissariat-claim-about-forced-mobilisation/

This is the sort of thing that I'm talking about in terms of sending a message.  Russia is desperate for manpower.  It has obviously pressured LPR into forcing people to the front, more recently including kidnapping individuals (yesterday Ukraine released a video of two forced LPR soldiers who surrendered as soon as they were able to).  They are not paying what they said they are going to pay.  Now they are looking to go to full mobilization of the rest of the male population.  This is risking all the sorts of things that Putin is trying to avoid in Russia.  Why would the Russians allow people like Murz and Girkin to make things potentially worse?

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Well, this isn't good even if it was expected as a response to all of Ukraine's recent strikes.  Nothing like responding to an enemy's targeting of military infrastructure with terror attacks on innocent civilians:

 

[Battlefront.com]

Nobody trolls as good as the Ukrainians:

 

[chuckdyke]

 

 

[chuckdyke]

Russian Tanks Parade.

 

[Grossman]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

So very true. 

First, let's look at someone else's definitions (both from Wikipedia, which I find sufficient):

Offensive - "a military operation that seeks through an aggressive projection of armed forces to occupy territory, gain an objective or achieve some larger strategic, operational, or tactical goal."

Counter-Offensive - "a large-scale strategic offensive military operation, usually by forces that had successfully halted the enemy's offensive, while occupying defensive positions."

There can be a blurry line between these two, but I think most of us here would agree that Kherson fits "Offensive" more than it does "Counter-Offensive" due to the fact that the forces that forces on both sides of the line are significantly different than the ones that were there several months ago.  Also, the intention of the action in Kherson is to affect a strategic outcome, not simply arrest or reverse a Russian attack.

With that out of the way...

We've had some good conversations about this very point a number of times.  As you say, the problem everybody is having, and I include myself in this mix, is trying to draw the line between preparations ("pre-offensive shaping") and the offensive itself.

Another confusing thing that Ukraine is making us wrestle with is the element of time (or timing, if you like).  Ukraine seems to be in no hurry, if you will, to achieve traditional measures of success compared to Russia or historical examples.  We have no way of knowing to what degree this is deliberate (i.e. cautious, keep down casualties, let other things run their course, etc.) or obligatory (i.e. own forces are tired, logistics aren't deemed sufficient, equipment lacking, etc.).  I think we can assume, for now, that it seems to be a combination of both to some extent.

As for what is going on, we do not know what Ukraine is planning, therefore it's hard to assess.  Especially because we've already seen that Ukraine doesn't operate on our expected timelines.  Is Kherson a part of a larger plan, is it the only part, or is Ukraine still keeping its options open.  We just do not know.

Personally, I think Kherson is (at a minimum) a planned Offensive.  I also believe that this offensive started when the first PGMs hit the Kherson bridges.  I said that at the time and I still believe it to be correct.  However, without knowing what Ukraine has planned I don't know if it is just the first phase of the offensive ("pre-offensive shaping") or the offensive itself.  Either fits the definition of "Offensive" just fine IMHO, but we won't know how to label it until later.

If this deep strike activity is the full offensive, then wow... that's definitely a bold and novel way to fight back.  It's also likely to be a slower way to end the war.  But if that's all Ukraine thinks it can manage to do, then speed is not really all that important.  Which again frustrates us people who insist on trying to draw from historical examples to predict how this war is going

Steve

Steve. Thanks. To my mind the Ukrainian strategy is the "long term". For them the war has been going on since 2014 the invasion of Crimea. Ukraine has expected a Russian invasion since at least 2010 when it rejected being a Russian satellite state. So for Ukraine, this is an existentialist struggle for the preservation of an independent state. The time line for Ukraine is "forever". So, Ukraine is hunkered down for the long struggle. it's major tactic is attrition of Russian men and munitions...it's aim is to break the Russian resolve to continue the struggle, and with Putin in power, it would take an internal revolt in Russia. It's aim is to restore all territories occupied by the Russians back in Ukrainian hands. There is no sign at all of a weakening of Ukrainian resolve; it appears to be strengthening with successes on the battlefield. Russia is faced with major issues, many discussed. The death of Dugina appears to be an FSB warning to the ultra-nationalists "don't mess with Putin". And of course blame Ukraine. The Russians tried this with the Chechnya War ( blowing up hotels and blaming Chechnya) so we could expect more with the aim of bringing public opinion around to order a general mobilisation, as Putin knows he will not win as things stand. For Ukraine it is essential the west principally the US continues to stand behind them, in arms, munitions and money. 

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Another confusing thing that Ukraine is making us wrestle with is the element of time (or timing, if you like).  Ukraine seems to be in no hurry, if you will, to achieve traditional measures of success compared to Russia or historical examples.  We have no way of knowing to what degree this is deliberate (i.e. cautious, keep down casualties, let other things run their course, etc.) or obligatory (i.e. own forces are tired, logistics aren't deemed sufficient, equipment lacking, etc.).  I think we can assume, for now, that it seems to be a combination of both to some extent.

There is also another factor. It looks like RU is doing another offensive - in Kherson toward Nikolaev (they also started push to Kharkiv as well, but it is not relevant to our conversation regarding Kherson offensive).  Yes, seriously - recent capture of easter part of Blagodatnoeis seems to be part of RU major push. This is seems to be the RU offensive we are all were waiting. 

So, it seems right now UKR command is focusing on countering RU push. 

[sburke]

 

This

Ukraine Situation Report: Russia Building Pontoon Bridge Into Kherson (thedrive.com)

makes me think of this

 

 

[Grigb]

Regarding Kherson RU Nats are much less detailed and UKR GS as usual is very vague. So, I looked at UKR expert Mashkovets. He has several posts regarding Kherson direction.  Simple translation is not very useful, so I made a map.  The RU party started there around 7 of August.

[FancyCat]

Trying to push the HIMARS out of range of the bridges?

It's the only thing I can think of for the Russian combat power being used offensively.

 

[Grigb]

31 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Trying to push the HIMARS out of range of the bridges?

It's the only thing I can think of for the Russian combat power being used offensively.

 

From the talks I understand that RU dreams to develop offensive toward Mykolaev. It is unclear whether they really want to take it (they cannot take) or just threaten it. 

RU believe UKR is about to collapse so a push toward Mykolaev will bring them closer to Mykolav. So, when UKR forces collapse it will allow them to capture Mykolaev quickly. 

[Grigb]

Here is another Mashkovets post explaining UKR thinking. I put it on the map so it is easier to reference it.

 

[Grossman]

The head of Ukraine’s security and defence council, Oleksiy Danilov, said he expects Russia’s security services to stage a series of terrorist attacks in Russian cities, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties.

Danilov said that the murder on Saturday of Darya Dugina, the daughter of Russian ultra-nationalist Alexander Dugin, was the first in what he expects to be a number of attacks.

He also said support for the war in Russia is falling and the Kremlin needs to introduce general mobilisation.

[pavel.k]

Isn't the ideal time to begin Kupiansk offensive finally?  We are waiting for it a few month already.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

Trying to push the HIMARS out of range of the bridges?

It's the only thing I can think of for the Russian combat power being used offensively.

 

Fits the "quick lets do something, anything" strategy employed by the Russians so far.  Could also be to "prove" the UA is not on the offensive - we discussed awhile back that Russia sees the defensive as a loss in this war because of the overwhelming certainty that Ukraine could never possibly attack them: "Ukraine is being obstinate and annoying but will never gain the offensive because they are less than us." 

Problem with the HIMAR theory is that even with just GMLRS, they would have to take Mykolaiv which is a city of 1/2 million.  Severodonetsk was a fifth that size and it took the RA over a month to grind through it.  The RA would be entirely relying on air supply by the time they even got close to pushing UA HIMARs (GMLRS) out of range - for ATCAMS the RA would need to push to the Moldovian border and about half way to Kyiv.  What melts my brain is that the ATCAMS is actually very old tech (late 80s early 90s) and is being replaced by this monster:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precision_Strike_Missile

Enough of those things and you do not need aircraft, and anything less than ground based high powered directed energy weapons, which come with their own problems, will not stand a good chance at countering.

[Grigb]

6 minutes ago, pavel.k said:

Isn't the ideal time to begin Kupiansk offensive finally?  We are waiting for it a few month already.

AFAIK There is zames in Kharkivand Izum as well. I would not expect anything till RU is forced to calm down a bit.

[Grigb]

Next map

[Kinophile]

24 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

 

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precision_Strike_Missile

Enough of those things and you do not need aircraft, and anything less than ground based high powered directed energy weapons, which come with their own problems, will not stand a good chance at countering.

"The PrSM will use advanced propulsion to fly faster and farther (originally out to 310 miles (500 km))^[1] while also being thinner and sleeker, increasing loadout to two per pod, doubling the number carried by M270 MLRS and M142 HIMARS launchers." 

Jeepers. Double HIMARS...

[Huba]

Pretty sure it will come at a cost of reduced warhead though, the missiles being more similar to ER-ER-GMLRS rather than something with hitting power of Iskander (not that it's a bad thing, US has bombs for that). It is supposed to have a multimode seeker on top of GPS/INS guidance though with ability to hit moving targets, including ships...

Edited August 23, 2022 by Huba

[The_Capt]

4 minutes ago, Huba said:

Pretty sure it will come at a cost of reduced warhead though, the missiles being more similar to ER-ER-GMLRS rather than something with hitting power of Iskander (not that it's a bad thing, US has bombs for that).

Lesson #1 from the modern era is "forget everything you think you know" (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336975512_Nanotechnology-Driven_Explosives_and_Propellants)

Lesson #2 is "never forget what you knew"

Lesson #3 is don't think too hard about the relationship between lessons #1 & #2, it is just how it is. 

[chuckdyke]

Be friendly to Russian tourists.

 

[billbindc]

43 minutes ago, Grossman said:

The head of Ukraine’s security and defence council, Oleksiy Danilov, said he expects Russia’s security services to stage a series of terrorist attacks in Russian cities, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties.

Danilov said that the murder on Saturday of Darya Dugina, the daughter of Russian ultra-nationalist Alexander Dugin, was the first in what he expects to be a number of attacks.

He also said support for the war in Russia is falling and the Kremlin needs to introduce general mobilisation.

Meh. Unless the FSB/Kremlin think there's a demonstrable win in terms of military recruitment, I don't really buy this. Political acquiescence within the country has already been thoroughly coerced and pretty much the whole point of the Putinist state is to avoid hard-to-control political mobilization of the population.  The GRU might be stupid and sloppy enough but the FSB is still blowing on its fingers after getting burned in Ukraine.