How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

From ISW's August 8 update:

More evidence that Ukraine gets to decide if the bridge is operational or not.

Steve

Heh heh heh.  Wait until they drive a bunch of equipment all the way across crimea and up to the river.  Let them get repairs nearly done.  Then blast it.  I can picture UKR HIMARS guys rolling around on their dugout floor, laughing until they can barely breath at these schmucks -- everyone on earth knows everything RU does to that bridge is doomed, yet they have to keep at it because Putin says so, over & over & over & over.  Gawd, I do love this.

 

10 minutes ago, dan/california said:

There are a lot of analogies with Guadalcanal. Bear with me on this. The Japanese eventually lost because their resupply was gradually choked down over a period of months. Some weeks they got more, some weeks they got less, but on average they didn't get enough to maintain a force that could stand up to the Marines. Even though the Marines had no shortage of problems themselves. In the end the U.S. won the logistics battle, and in an attritional fight that is really the only one that matters. And to put to mildly the Russians are less motivated than the Japanese.

That's an interesting analogy, maybe the best one yet.  If any of y'all have not read about this, you should.  It's a fascinating story.  Can't wait until RU starts filling barrels w supplies and trying to float them across the river.

[Battlefront.com]

Damn, now I have to go and burn all my Pink Floyd albums...

Quote

But Waters defended Russia in the contentious discussion with Smerconish.

“Any war, when did it start? What you need to do is look at the history and you can say it started on this day. You can say it started in 2008,” Waters said.

“This war is basically about the action and reaction of NATO pushing right up to the Russian border, which they promised they wouldn’t do when [former Soviet leader Mikhail] Gorbachev negotiated the withdraw of the USSR from the whole of Eastern Europe.”

https://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/3592647-pink-floyds-waters-backs-russia-calls-biden-a-war-criminal-over-ukraine/

I never thought I would think of Roger Waters as a "useful idiot".

Steve

[Grigb]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

As @sburke kindly observed, my thread participation has become scant in the past month due to work (sadly, I'm not an oil trader, although I do ok). Also, I note our esteemed new grognards in residence, @Grigb , 

@Beleg85 , @Hubaand others are finding better sources now than I could. Many thanks, guys!

Ref. @chrisl 's post, it seems to me the UA reactions to Russia's blunt force saturation bombardments are the time tested ones:

1.  where they have time, or the use of existing tunnel works, dig deep, with solid overhead cover and camou. That's the 'WW1 solution', used in nearly all positional warfare ever since explosive shells became available to armies in volume. Leave the dugouts only when the enemy is danger close.

2.  otherwise, 'deepen' their fronts -- up to 10kms now? -- (a) avoiding putting too many defenders in one targetable spot, (b) maxing use of dummies and camou, (c) using schweige (silent) ambush positions, (d) mines in huge volumes, and (e) nimble shoot-and-scoot fire teams to retard Russian advances into this thinly manned zone prior to calling in their own guns.  I believe the Russians are adopting similar (though not identical) dispersed tactics, which is why the UA in turn is having trouble attacking in mass/with mech (except in the wooded areas near Izyum or the densely settled areas around Kharkiv, where they can infiltrate at scale).

=>  This urgent need to spread out seems to me to explain many of the UA withdrawals we've seen (and now, some of the Russian moves); being 'cauldroned' isn't just being cut off, it's about being forced to be too dense on the ground.  Furthermore, forcing the attacker to make himself 'dense' in canalised terrain, bring up his direct fire vehicles, etc. and then blasting the hell out of him, can be well worth giving up some ground (temporarily or permanently).  However, I also believe both sides are becoming skilled at leaving behind mines and sensors to make reoccupying vacated ground costly.

.... (which is why I believe the next phase of this war -- retaking the lost lands -- is going to be less about drones and more about mines, which the Russians can still make in quantity)

Villages or hedgehog strongpoints are less valuable tacticallly than previously, as the Russians just zero and level every structure. Conversely, woodlands or large urban or mining/industrial zones that mask movement but can't be leveled remain valuable, and very tough nuts to crack.

Notice, these dynamics also make river crossing bridgeheads far more vulnerable for both sides (on top of the crossing risk itself), as there's less space in the kessel to spread out and avoid counterfires (e.g. Inhulets crossing).

As most here know well, the Wehrmacht tried out a lot of the above 'zone' defence tactics in later WW2, although their artillery tended not to be equal to the task of area denial when the Red Army was determined to break in en masse.

....Anyway, that's the basics of it, I'm sure more knowledgeable folks here can elaborate and correct.

P.S. Some of the same dynamics above are readily visible in my (unfinished) CMBN Le Carillon sequence, where successive US regiments kept 'clearing' the Germans out of Le Meauffe village, only to (re)discover it was a trap, a lethal mortar magnet. They'd withdraw leaving just an OP, and the German snipers and sappers would come in again, infiltrating from the bocage: lather-rinse-repeat for a full month. A lot of the Italian campaign was fought much the same way.

Yes, that's pretty much what I see happening there as well. The following paragraph describes nicely what happened at Pisky

Villages or hedgehog strongpoints are less valuable tacticallly than previously, as the Russians just zero and level every structure. Conversely, woodlands or large urban or mining/industrial zones that mask movement but can't be leveled remain valuable, and very tough nuts to crack.

In Pisky UKR defenders retreated from village strongpoints to urban district and since then RU were unable to clear them out.  

[sburke]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Damn, now I have to go and burn all my Pink Floyd albums...

I never thought I would think of Roger Waters as a "useful idiot".

Steve

was looking at that same article.  Not the first stupid thing he has said this past week, but definitely the worst.  He's out of Floyd so you can keep the albums.   

[Battlefront.com]

Good video summing up where Russia's economy was, is now, and is going towards.  (Hint... not great, really bad, terrible):

Hat's off to Russia for once again being able to keep its economy from completely collapsing right away, but there's really no hope for it without an end to sanctions.  That's because everything that Russia has done so far is temporary, superficial, or artificially suppressing natural processes.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

27 minutes ago, sburke said:

was looking at that same article.  Not the first stupid thing he has said this past week, but definitely the worst.  He's out of Floyd so you can keep the albums.   

Except Waters was Pink Floyd (says a guy who saw both David Gilmore and Roger Waters solo in the 80s)   Seriously though, Pink Floyd itself came out early and strongly for Ukraine.  Kinda interesting.

I am still willing to excuse people from saying things like "the West is making it worse by keeping the war going instead of insisting on a cease fire".  This sort of thinking can be either naive and ignorant or deeply rooted in fantasy morality.  Such people might be won over in a factual debate.  However, the statements like "Russia was forced to attack because of NATO encroachment and broken promises" is a different matter.  That is Russian propaganda drivel and whomever is repeating it is likely unwilling to change their views. 

When I read the article about Waters it started out with me lamenting his deeply held anti-war beliefs being misdirected, then I read the Kremlin talking points.  Nope, no slack given to him now.  Then he went on to say that Taiwan is part of China and... well... damn, I suppose if you're going on a trip to la-la-land, might as well take the express flight.

Obviously Roger Waters isn't important to what is going on in Ukraine.  His influence is minuscule.  I only brought it up because it's been a while since I've come upon a well known Western celebrity coming out out and parroting Russian talking points.  Seems most celebrities have already made their positions known (pro or con) or have decided to keep their mouths shut if they have any sympathies for Russia.  Especially after Bucha and other horrors.

Steve

[Offshoot]

To underline what people have been saying here, the best Russian advance recently has been towards Bakhmut, a whole 10 km in 30 days

 

[Aragorn2002]

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/08/08/natos-nordic-opportunity-is-multidomain/

[Taranis]

Deep strikes in "Kherson" area (just north of Crimea) : (approximately 140km from the nearest (known) frontline)

"Explosion reported earlier this morning in Henichesk, north of Crimea - possibly a Ukrainian strike against a weaons depot"

 

"Russian ammunition dump reportedly hit in Novooleksiivka, Kherson Oblast"

 

[Huba]

6 hours ago, dan/california said:

JDAM-ER is definitely better, but newer more, expensive, and there are probably less of them. And that seventy k range is assuming you launch 30,000 feet or higher. It will be a lot less if if launched at 400 ft. What I don't know is how far far back from the front Ukrainian panes have to start hugging the deck, and or how long of a SEAD campaign it would take to meaningfully affect the stand off range at which Ukrainian planes can operate at altitude. U.S. doctrine is built on the assumption that there are enough wild weasels, HARMs, cruise missiles, and god knows what else to essentially obliterate air defenses that can reach ~ 30,000 ft/10,000 meters. Then they can rain JDAMS and other things that are merely expensive on you until don't want to play anymore. How much of this the Ukrainians can do with HIMARs, and some harms remains to be seen.  If they can do ENOUGH it is war winning, since trains and railway bridges will both just go away.

I wonder if flying high 50+ km from the front is safe enough or not at the moment, probably not, but with HARM in the picture it can change maybe? HARM itself has advertised range of 110 vs JDAM-ER's 70 km, but it's also for high altitude launch.
I wouldn't even bother with that thought, but as US surprisingly put that much of an effort to giving UA the SEAD capability, I think there's a reason and it will be followed up by something. Otherwise what's the point? Of course the goal might just be a more permissive environment for Bayraktars and other drones, but I think there might be more here. The sale of Azerbaijani LGBs for Su-25 is a bit telling I think, these are even riskier to use than JDAMs and yet UA is getting them. 

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yes, technically.  However, I avoided using the term siege as it creates some images that aren't analogous to the situation in Kherson.  In particular a siege is usually associated with a city, a fortress, or something like we saw with Azovstal. This is somewhat different in that it's open terrain marked by small settlements and fortified defensive lines.  In that way Kherson is more akin to any other fight in depth with limited supply opportunities for the defender.  The reason I draw this distinction is the character of the fighting will be more akin to the battles in the Donbas than that of Mariupol.

The other way to view Kherson is as a bridgehead battle, though that too doesn't quite work as generally bridgeheads don't have time for the defense to pour concrete bunkers. 

The battles to develop in Kherson, therefore, will share characteristics of an urban siege, a large scale bridgehead, and a traditional defense in depth.  Assuming, of course, that Ukraine goes on the offensive there.  As much as it looks like this will be the case, it's far from certain at this point.

Perhaps bridgehead is the better analogy when we look into more recent historical analogies, I agree. I thought about siege cause earlier (well, looking to the times of the Commonwealth, not Mongolians) fighting in the steppes more often than not took the form of sieges, which might be a bit counter-intuitive for anyone not  familiar with the place and period. Fixed fortification weren't that common and usually would only serve as a base to creating a system of field fortification/ armed camp. It usually wouldn't be the full proper siege too, with circumvellation and contravellation of the besieged position, as there just wasn't enough men and spaces were too vast and open (sounds familiar?  ). Instead the fight was more mobile, the sides would bombard each other, fight a series of skirmishes and sorties and try to intercept the supply convoys. 
First battle of Khotyn is a great example of how that worked.

Edited August 9, 2022 by Huba

[Holien]

This popped up on another site I follow and seems a pretty good explanation of what has been done with the AGM-88

The chap seems to have a good knowledge of what the different uses are and what is possible if attached to a non NATO plane.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1556751670402596865

Quote

This leaves only the Pre-Briefed mode. In this mode a AGM-88 is programmed before the fighter departs from the air base with the coordinates of an enemy radar site.

Once in the air the fighter releases the AGM-88 at maximum speed and maximum altitude, giving the missile a range in excess of 150 km. Once released the AGM-88 will fly towards the coordinates, and when it reaches lock-on range it will scan for, detect, lock on and attack

This mode works with Ukrainian fighters jets. All they have to do is lift the AGM-88 up, go supersonic, and release the missile. While AGM-88B and AGM-88C-1 use INS to steer them towards a target area, where they then scan for targets, the

AGM-88D also includes GPS-guidance, which enables the missile to strike known radar and air-defense sites, even when they do not emit radio frequencies. And C-1 and D also have the ability to home-on-jam, which forces russia to switch off it's electronic warfare systems.

 

[Huba]

Timeframe for the UA counteroffensives is getting extended. If US is onboard with the plan, postponing it for another 4 months makes perfect sense in my opinion.

 

Edited August 9, 2022 by Huba

[Butschi]

Don't know if it was already mentioned, interesting little detail of German arms deliveries (in German, sorry):

https://www.golem.de/news/militaerische-aufklaerung-deutsche-drohnen-in-der-ukraine-im-einsatz-2208-167436.html

Press release (English) by Quantum-Systems:

https://www.quantum-systems.com/2022/08/02/vector-long-range-reconnaissance-drones-in-operation-in-ukraine/

Summary:

• 43 military recon drones with comm range of up to 25km to be delivered
• drone defense systems including sensors, jammers and anti-drone guns
• maritime drones
• includes logistics

Paid for by German state.

Edited August 9, 2022 by Butschi

[Huba]

This is extremely interesting, I'll be waiting for some confirmation. It could be sabotage or accident of course, but could also be ER-GMLRS rocket:

Edit: The same was posted by @Taranis a bit up the page, I missed it somehow. 

Edited August 9, 2022 by Huba

[Butschi]

16 hours ago, danfrodo said:

On the nuke plant subject:  I suspect if RU were to cause a radiation disaster, they would of course blame it on HIMARS.  And no one would believe that except Amnesty.  But this would be a massive escalation -- I think it would cause EU to become more aggressive, not less.  

More reading tea leafes here... This morning I read some comments below an article about that topic. Well, some people argue that, since the area is currently occupied by RU, there's no point for them in blowing up the plant. UKR, on the other hand, is desperate to get NATO involved and so they might be tempted to HIMARS the plant and say it was the Russians. Well played, Mr. Putin.

As for the real repercussions: No clue what would happen. At least here in Germany, the memory of the Chernobyl-desaster still runs deep. So there will be a reaction for sure, just in what direction is unclear to me. It may convince people that a more direct intervention is necessary or it could just be the opposite: Blowing up a nuclear plant could be perceived as a very strong warning, just one level below an actual nuke and cause us to be more cautious. And it would certainly not help in putting nuclear power back on the menu.

[Huba]

Guy from Amnesty International crew smack talks the way their "investigation" was done:

 

[Holien]

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/stop-tiptoeing-around-russia

An interesting read and review of past policy. 

"The United States was not necessarily wrong to pursue a mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. Where it erred was in continuing to pursue this objective long after there was no realistic chance of success, which should have been obvious by 2004, when Russia interfered in Ukraine’s elections on behalf of its preferred candidate, or at the very latest by 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia. Instead of looking for more cooperative partners, however, U.S. policymakers continued their futile courtship of Kremlin leadership. As a result, they passed up opportunities to invest in the U.S. relationship with Ukraine, which was always a more promising engine of democratization in the region."

Chinese relations and foreign policy might need tweaking? Another tightrope that there is no easy way to cross and falling off it will be deeply painful. 

I am ever grateful that America is supporting Ukraine as they have been, even if its not as much as they need to end this quickly. 

Edited August 9, 2022 by Holien
Added text

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Butschi said:

More reading tea leafes here... This morning I read some comments below an article about that topic. Well, some people argue that, since the area is currently occupied by RU, there's no point for them in blowing up the plant. UKR, on the other hand, is desperate to get NATO involved and so they might be tempted to HIMARS the plant and say it was the Russians. Well played, Mr. Putin.

As for the real repercussions: No clue what would happen. At least here in Germany, the memory of the Chernobyl-desaster still runs deep. So there will be a reaction for sure, just in what direction is unclear to me. It may convince people that a more direct intervention is necessary or it could just be the opposite: Blowing up a nuclear plant could be perceived as a very strong warning, just one level below an actual nuke and cause us to be more cautious. And it would certainly not help in putting nuclear power back on the menu.

UKR says RU wants to divert electricity to RU territories. Hence the tensons around it.

[Grigb]

Khodakovsky (Vostok battalion commander) about their experience advancing at Vugledar and how RU army treats mobilized Ukrainians from "liberated" territories.

The more territory RU controls the more UKR people will be killed or maimed and more will live in misery like family of this guy.  

Quote

Advancing in the [open] fields have its own specifics [well, actually they are advancing along the tree lines and forests. But the terrain is much more open than Mariupol or Donetsk where they used to fight]. We suffered losses with the [RU] paratroopers, we made insignificant progress, but we made progress. It is impossible to drive up with vehicles - the bodies of comrades had to be dragged under fire for more than one kilometer on themselves. The first day we cover - the paratroopers pull their own and ours. On the second day, on the contrary, we drag paratroopers and our own. [We] pulled out paratroopers - one of our own [we] could not get out in time... [We] got him out this morning...

I took a ride on Sunday to the wounded, scattered in different hospitals. I go into the ward - there is another sufferer besides ours, - who are you? So and so a regiment (Russian), - and from where? From Donetsk.... How is that? - Well, I was mobilized, and then I went to a contract in a Russian regiment - I've been lying with a shattered sacrum for three months, and no one is looking... So lie down, get treated... But there is no money, the family is in poverty, and I didn't have time to get any salary...

[I] brought something to [my] own [troops] for all sorts of needs - also gave a neighbor in the ward, - how to give to my own in front of the poor guy? So don't leave your guys - neither dead nor wounded...

 

[Grigb]

Girkin confirms LDNR infantry is wasted.

Quote

According to some reports, during the battles for Bakhmut, our troops managed to clear the Artemovsky  [Bakhmut] champagne factory from the enemy.

On the Donetsk front - unchanged, according to reports from the front - the attacking potential of the Donetsk infantry units operating here (initially not rich) is almost exhausted. With the available forces, it is hardly possible to achieve the capture of Avdiivka and advance in other areas. Fighting continues for the outskirts of Peski. Although the enemy is suffering much greater losses during this operation, even the tactical successes of the "Third Effective Stage" in terms of moving forward are still humiliatingly minimal. Even I - with all my undisguised skepticism - did not expect such modest results.

[UPDATE] BTW it is Wagnerites that fight in Bakhmut not LDNR infantry.

Edited August 9, 2022 by Grigb

[Maciej Zwolinski]

9 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Fighting continues for the outskirts of Peski. Although the enemy is suffering much greater losses during this operation, even the tactical successes of the "Third Effective Stage" in terms of moving forward are still humiliatingly minimal.

What do you make of the Russian claims that the UKR forces are suffering significantly heavier losses than the RUS in the Donbass fight? This claim is being repeatedly made, at least by Strelkov.

If this is correct, then the automatic assumption that RUS attacks are "frontal and costly", i.e. costly because they are frontal should be changed somewhat. They certainly are slow and require huge expenditure of ammunition, but if they protect RUS infantry, which is their most precious resource at the moment, this change of tactics is not evidence of stupidity, but quite reasonable adaptation. As opposed to men, RUS post-soviet stockpiles of 152mm ammunition are an almost unlimited and almost free (except transportation costs) asset.

AFAIK, this is possible, the "bite and hold" tactics of 1917 (which I see as almost direct analogue, exchaning observation baloons for drones)  did inflict more casualties on the Germans than on the British, and the Germans found no direct counter to them. Their indirect counter was to take advantage of the slowness of this method and prepare a counteroffensive, which is a whole different kettle of fish; as far as I can see, the UKR have yet to find a method to deal with RUS defensive artillery concentrations which would allow them to attack in the face of determined RUS opposition. On the other hand, Strelkov does not directly see the extent of UKR casualties and probably relies on RUS reports. He may be completely wrong.

What do you guys think?

[Grigb]

18 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Girkin confirms LDNR infantry is wasted.

[UPDATE] BTW it is Wagnerites that fight in Bakhmut not LDNR infantry.

Looks like LDNR command know it as well for a few days already. That's why they shifted Vostok to Vuhledar. Apparently, this is their attack.

Though it does not make any sense - if they try to attack Pavlivka they will be hammered from Vuhledar. And Vuhledar is much bigger urban area than Pisky they cannot currently take.

Anyway this needs own separate map.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

What do you make of the Russian claims that the UKR forces are suffering significantly heavier losses than the RUS in the Donbass fight? This claim is being repeatedly made, at least by Strelkov.

If this is correct, then the automatic assumption that RUS attacks are "frontal and costly", i.e. costly because they are frontal should be changed somewhat. They certainly are slow and require huge expenditure of ammunition, but if they protect RUS infantry, which is their most precious resource at the moment, this change of tactics is not evidence of stupidity, but quite reasonable adaptation. As opposed to men, RUS post-soviet stockpiles of 152mm ammunition are an almost unlimited and almost free (except transportation costs) asset.

AFAIK, this is possible, the "bite and hold" tactics of 1917 (which I see as almost direct analogue, exchaning observation baloons for drones)  did inflict more casualties on the Germans than on the British, and the Germans found no direct counter to them. Their indirect counter was to take advantage of the slowness of this method and prepare a counteroffensive, which is a whole different kettle of fish; as far as I can see, the UKR have yet to find a method to deal with RUS defensive artillery concentrations which would allow them to attack in the face of determined RUS opposition. On the other hand, Strelkov does not directly see the extent of UKR casualties and probably relies on RUS reports. He may be completely wrong.

What do you guys think?

Welcome, Maciej, to the swelling ranks of CM's elite Polish brigade! 

I won't repeat my post above, but I'll venture to guess that UKR losses have NOT run 200 KIA per day for at least 6 weeks now, if indeed they ever did.  And the Russians definitely aren't giving better than they get.

...I know this sounds awfully trite, but as you know of course, the only way to kill and maim enemy infantry in bulk day-by-day is to be spotting and shelling concentrations of them, preferably on the move and up front, in range of your mortars and direct fire ordnance (not just your heavy guns).

And the main way to force them to concentrate that way is by concentrating your own forces. On the move and up front. Bite and hold / 'grab the belt', or by other methods (probes, infiltration). Which is costly.

...That's why almost by definition, an attacker generally loses a lot more than a defender, unless he can achieve a payoff in terms of a rout or encirclement. The latter appear to be fairly few in number since February, thanks to generally superior Ukrainian tactical mobility (not tied to AFVs), NCO initiative and situational awareness.

Arithmetic on the Frontier, FWIW.....

Edited August 9, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Grigb]

2 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

What do you make of the Russian claims that the UKR forces are suffering significantly heavier losses than the RUS in the Donbass fight? This claim is being repeatedly made, at least by Strelkov.

Inflating enemy losses to cover his own incompetence is an old RU military habit. But I do believe UKR are suffering much bigger losses in wounded. A significant stream of wounded is what I see. Remember - get a wound in the leg where there is no armor, and you are lost as the fighter for the time being. But it is different from the public perception that everybody died. RU does see all these evacuation attempts, and radio intercepts and they are like OMG UKR LOSSES ARE HUGE. T

Also, you need to keep in mind that UKR are countering it by keeping Mobilized in the trenches. Heavily fortified positions are the best place for light mobilized infantry. The downside is they suffer heavy losses in wounded. Upside their main fighting forces are spared until the main fight begins.

So, it is not as critical as RU says.

 

2 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

If this is correct, then the automatic assumption that RUS attacks are "frontal and costly", i.e. costly because they are frontal should be changed somewhat. They certainly are slow and require huge expenditure of ammunition, but if they protect RUS infantry, which is their most precious resource at the moment, this change of tactics is not evidence of stupidity, but quite reasonable adaptation. As opposed to men, RUS post-soviet stockpiles of 152mm ammunition are an almost unlimited and almost free (except transportation costs) asset.

Except they still lose men on grand scale. This is the fresh quote (9-aug) from RU propagandist describing manpower situation after few weeks of offensive.

Quote

 

Human famine at the front near Donetsk. First of all, this explains the fact that the enemy has not yet been pushed back from the capital of the DPR.

Losses? Yes. War. Takes companies. Whole companies. This is a vile law of war.

Lack of people in platoons and battalions. Alas, it is. And the situation, to put it mildly, is not easy. No scaremongering and decadence. Who was [there], he understands.

It just happens [sometimes] that there is no one to go forward.

 

Despite the claims that infantry is protected by the arty the infantry is finished in couple of weeks. 

You need to understand that their scale to measure losses is different from yours. For example, by default RU ignore wounded to make losses appear smaller. And I see that in arty ping pong wounded are the biggest part of losses. So, if you count only dead then yes RU losses are smaller. But that's just a trick that allows them to boast in their posts but does not allow them to fight effectively. 

And the point is - they have not forced any breakout through UKR main defenses anywhere. Even in Pisky. They cannot breakout and they cannot preserve infantry. But their deaths are smaller, so they have something to brag about for a time being.

 

2 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

AFAIK, this is possible, the "bite and hold" tactics of 1917 (which I see as almost direct analogue, exchaning observation baloons for drones)  did inflict more casualties on the Germans than on the British, and the Germans found no direct counter to them. Their indirect counter was to take advantage of the slowness of this method and prepare a counteroffensive, which is a whole different kettle of fish; as far as I can see, the UKR have yet to find a method to deal with RUS defensive artillery concentrations which would allow them to attack in the face of determined RUS opposition. On the other hand, Strelkov does not directly see the extent of UKR casualties and probably relies on RUS reports. He may be completely wrong.

What do you guys think?

It is indeed a variation of the said tactics but worse. Bite and hold do not work as intended if all you do is bite small pieces of the enemy forward defense zone. And especially if you can bite just a couple of places. Look at Souther axis. Avdyivka failed, Maryinka failed. Even in Pisky situation is bad.

Tell you example, on 6-Aug (3 days ago) RU reported they took farm at the south of Maryinka under full control. There is a farm at the south of Maryinka. It is situated several hundred meters from DNR controlled territory. And still managed to run out of infantry.

[The_Capt]

47 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

What do you guys think?

This

  You are describing a war of attrition, or exhaustion in which Russia is able to trade "ammo" for UA "people" - Russia has "endless ammo"; UA does not have endless "people" = Bad outcome for Ukraine in the long run.  Would be true if that were the entire picture.  Points:

 - It isn't about Russian "ammo", it is about Russian indirect fire capability.  An ocean of 152 ammo is useless if one does not have the trains and trucks to move it, the guns and gunners to fire it, and the ISR to direct it.  And lets not forget the assets to protect the entire system.  That systems ability to translate solid materials into effective kinetic energy, and then apply that energy to a target is not solely a question of "Russian ammo".  Through that lens, and we have heard anecdotes of how bad Russian logistics are getting, the Russian attrition picture does not look so good.

- The graphic above is half the picture, there is a Ukrainian one going the other way - they are in collision.  So as the Russians dry-hump their way, about 100m per day (and this has been consistent since Severdonetsk), the theory is that - just like WW1 - that "one more push" will cause the UA to break.  Then the Russians can get back to doing what they do best; stringing mechanized forces without enough infantry, logistics and air cover along 100km advances, so that the UA can cut them to pieces because RA density becomes so shallow that the UA gains defensive manoeuvre in depth (go Russia!).  This is "Effect" space, an the problem from the Russian side is becoming unsolvable.  That ocean of 152mm ammo has a very low probability of delivering the Effects, Decision or Outcomes because it is too slow, and even if it leads to "fast" the Russians are worse prepared for that than they were in Feb.

- The biggest missing piece in all this is the one thing the Russians can afford the least, and that is time.   There is a perception in the West that "We have all the watches but Russia has all the time" - we see our greatest fears in our opponent and a long drawn out stalemate scares us cause that is how we got burnt in Afghanistan (and Iraq to some extent).  Truth is that Russia does not have the time.  Why?  Because everyday they lose is one more day for the UA to get stronger, larger and better. With every shipment of support from the west, every training serial and further ISR integration the hill Russia has to climb gets steeper.  Finally, back to that nasty Will thing, Ukrainian Will does not appear to be going anywhere because it is shored up by national power and stunning levels of unity, which for the Ukraine is growing via western support. 

Russian Will is held together by an autocrat and his cronies who have been adept at lying, suppressing freedom, and generally greasy dealings.  All built on an economy that is making some ominous sounds, and a war machine that has already had to regress in order to stay in the game.  From where I sit I think we might be at the end of the road for RA operational offensive capability - they never really came out of the operational pause of Jul, I am not sure they can.

What we are all waiting for is the UA to solve the Riddle of the Modern Operational Offensive, if it can be solved under these conditions.  I suspect it can but the UA are waiting for their moment, patience in your opponent is a bad sign as it means they have the initiative.

In summary, I think the RA is doing everything it can with what it has because "the boss is watching" - but it is not enough, it will never be enough, Russia broke their best chance for victory in this thing back in Feb-March.  The theories that Russian pundits have about EU falling apart in the winter, US presidents coming in and cutting off Ukraine, NATO collapsing are sounding more and more desperate...all the while the UA is poking and pinching, waiting for its moment.