How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[AlexUK]

I am very much wondering how effective the Russian army is now compared to the one that invaded. 
Ukrainian forces seem to note that many aspects of Russian fighting have significantly improved over the course of the war. I’m thinking drones, potentially EW, use of glide bombs.  
 

if Putin does come out of this ahead (Trunp win, support for Ukraine dries up, pressure to come to a settlement), I would think the threat to NATO would remain minimal in the near term, but what if Putin turned that ‚new’ army on to a smaller nation state that is not under the NATO umbrella? Most people here seem to be of the opinion that an effective drone force would be far superior to a small state’s mechanised force with limited/no combat experience.  

[sburke]

2 hours ago, fireship4 said:

Says the RA is both losing experienced men and gaining experience and adapting, apparently one effect is faster than the other, without explanation.  Then accepts the argument, then dismisses it again. 

Not to pile on but this sentence is a good example of linking items that aren't the same trying to prove a contradiction that doesn't exist.

Yes Russia is losing soldiers that have gained experience in combat.  However that is not the same as Russia realizing that drones have changed warfare.  Tactical flexibility is not the same as envisioned in 2012 (or 2022).  Helicopters have become largely obsolete etc. Naval forces are being defeated by a country with no Navy. Logistics is now harder than ever as logistical hubs are extremely vulnerable even 100's of Kms from the front.

Those experienced soldiers are learning what combat is like at the sharp end.  What they aren't learning is what it takes to develop and field an army under these conditions.  What production criteria are required.  There is a lot more being learned in Ukraine than just how to employ drones at the tactical level.  Those lessons need to be learned at the higher echelons of leadership.  Just as @The_Capt has argued that Western militaries need to understand how warfare has changed and adapt.  It isn't the Sgts and Capts who will drive that.  Granted they will need to learn the systems that are developed, but they won't be the ones making any decisions about what to develop.

Edited Wednesday at 07:44 PM by sburke

[ArmouredTopHat]

For the tank afectionardos here, likely to be something based on this if M1E3 goes for an autoloader. 

[dan/california]

 

Quote

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/ukraine-the-latest/id1612424182?i=1000674179992

 

Really good today. They quote extensively from a Jack Watling(RUSI) article from Foreign Affairs magazine that is apparently not published yet, at least I couldn't find it, and I looked. The article, which they quoted from at length, portrays both sides as worn out boxers on their last legs. There were some very interesting specifics about Russian higher altitude recon drones. They quote over a thousand flights per day. They say the new Ukrainian interceptor drones are effective, but they need help fielding more of them. A lot of other interesting information. If anybody finds a link to the actual article please post it. Watling isn't perfect, but he is probably as plugged in as anyone writing public facing stuff.

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, mosuri said:

Apologies if this was already mentioned - it's from September - but another side of the barrel bottom is being scraped

 

BRDM-2??!  Holy crap.  The only POSSIBLE thing they might be good for is running small amounts of supplies and having enough armor to maybe not get the driver killed in the process.

As for the MT-LB supply, that is one lonely boneyard.  One should expect that most of the ones remaining have been passed over several times already because of their condition.  I've seen some people not understand that stored vehicles are not identical and the better ones are going to be the first restored, while the worse ones the last.  If we're seeing the last ones, then logically they are the worst ones.  That means more time, more money, and less results from what remains.

Steve

[CHARLIE43]

Got to thinking, and you know how that can go sometimes, but I wonder if the Russians are thinking the same thing. All the second rate hand me downs that the Ukrainians are getting equates to the West becoming weaker and weaker over time. Less backup equipment...What if they may be doing the same thing (albeit with their own forces) in an attempt at preserving whatever new stuff they already have or have produced since the war started and are instead using up old stuff to do so?

It'd be interesting if that is what General Cavoli was getting at by stating what he did.

[acrashb]

4 minutes ago, CHARLIE43 said:

 but I wonder if the Russians are thinking the same thing.

Not only the Russians, but the anti-Western bloc in general. As I've mentioned, this situation can be likened to a three-person game of Risk, where two sides are locked in conflict while the third builds up its strength.

In some ways, this is strengthening the West, as it has unified our Will at certain levels. However, it is also depleting our resources and exposing vulnerabilities as our opponents observe.

Despite these challenges, the conflict has led to a significant increase in shell production and other critical supplies.

[The_Capt]

12 minutes ago, CHARLIE43 said:

Got to thinking, and you know how that can go sometimes, but I wonder if the Russians are thinking the same thing. All the second rate hand me downs that the Ukrainians are getting equates to the West becoming weaker and weaker over time. Less backup equipment...What if they may be doing the same thing (albeit with their own forces) in an attempt at preserving whatever new stuff they already have or have produced since the war started and are instead using up old stuff to do so?

It'd be interesting if that is what General Cavoli was getting at by stating what he did.

Interesting idea but I am not sure the losses we have already seen support it:

https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html

This shows a pretty wide spread of newer and older equipment. The use of older equipment could easily be due to severe losses of the newer stuff than any detailed plan for force preservation. Interestingly we have not seen any of the really new stuff like the T-14s or 15s but my bet is that those were very few in number and largely for show.

If you look at it, what you describe better aligns with the Western strategy. We are largely sending last-gen stuff to Ukraine while holding the newer stuff for ourselves. The one area we are getting depleted is in ammunition. This is because no one planned for a war of this scope and scale. General C was half right in my opinion, and no doubt has a lot of insider info, but I find it hard to believe Russia has somehow held back some sort of silver bullet force they could swing at NATO in any meaningful way. 

The RA is broken in my option, but we need to be very careful in understanding how it will rebuild itself. I suspect they will be taking some of this new technology in new directions. This is a good news/bad news story: the good news is that we will likely have about ten years to figure it out, the bad news is that the threat will be ambiguous and a moving target.

[acrashb]

And in casual news, Zelensky retains his ability to communicate.  "Make Russia Small Again"   From a recent thank-you speach re: a new tranche of funds.

[sburke]

Russia's wartime economy peaks and begins to deplete - Bloomberg

The growth of the Russian economy during wartime has peaked. Currently, a decline is being observed, Bloomberg reports.

"The peak for growth was passed most likely in the middle of this year. What next year’s growth trajectory will be is an open question — whether it will be a ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ landing for the economy," said economist Oleg Kuzmin in an interview with the news agency.

As Bloomberg reports, the rapid growth of the Russian economy has been driven by military production. However, despite its continued expansion, it is insufficient to compensate for the decline in other sectors of the economy.

It is also worth noting that recently the International Monetary Fund downgraded its forecast for the Russian economy, now projecting a growth rate of 1.3% in 2025, down from 1.5% previously.

Interestingly, in September, Russian production contracted for the first time since April 2022. In August, however, the Russian economy grew by 2.4% year-on-year, marking the slowest rate since the recession that followed Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

This slowdown outside of the military-industrial sector underscores Russia's further immersion into a war economy.

Russians are already facing crisis interest rates, and on Friday, the central bank may raise the key rate to 20% — as high as it was a few weeks after the invasion began. This move is aimed at curbing inflation. Any decline in the economy could lead to Russians experiencing "economic pain," from which they have largely been protected amidst the sanctions continuously imposed by the US and its allies.

 

Russia's economy

Earlier, we reported that Russia's oil export revenues increased in July 2023 as prices surpassed the cap set by the G7 countries. According to the IEA, Russia earned $15.3 billion, which is 20% more than in June, due to rising global prices and a decrease in oil discounts.

At the same time, the EU's Special Representative for Sanctions, David O'Sullivan, stated that sanctions have a serious impact on Russia, and this will become increasingly evident over time. According to him, Putin has been forced to "eat away" at the Russian economy.

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

Leopards continue to hunt in Kursk.

*Edit*
 

Further geolocation, plus a T-90M in the background.

Edited Wednesday at 08:54 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[CHARLIE43]

10 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Interesting idea but I am not sure the losses we have already seen support it:

https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html

This shows a pretty wide spread of newer and older equipment. The use of older equipment could easily be due to severe losses of the newer stuff than any detailed plan for force preservation. Interestingly we have not seen any of the really new stuff like the T-14s or 15s but my bet is that those were very few in number and largely for show.

If you look at it, what you describe better aligns with the Western strategy. We are largely sending last-gen stuff to Ukraine while holding the newer stuff for ourselves. The one area we are getting depleted is in ammunition. This is because no one planned for a war of this scope and scale. General C was half right in my opinion, and no doubt has a lot of insider info, but I find it hard to believe Russia has somehow held back some sort of silver bullet force they could swing at NATO in any meaningful way. 

The RA is broken in my option, but we need to be very careful in understanding how it will rebuild itself. I suspect they will be taking some of this new technology in new directions. This is a good news/bad news story: the good news is that we will likely have about ten years to figure it out, the bad news is that the threat will be ambiguous and a moving target.

Quote

https://www.globalfirepower.com/armor-tanks-total.php

I found this, not sure how they get the #s, but it shows 14,777 tanks est. Even if you subtract those #s from that, (3495) you still have 11282. That's still a lot of tanks.

[ArmouredTopHat]

37 minutes ago, CHARLIE43 said:

I found this, not sure how they get the #s, but it shows 14,777 tanks est. Even if you subtract those #s from that, (3495) you still have 11282. That's still a lot of tanks.

Its been covered a few times here, but there are serious doubts on just how usable what's left of the Russian tank fleet reserve is, or if they even have those numbers that exist on paper. Plenty that remain on the reserve have clearly been stripped for parts (we see barrels / turrets missing on a number of vehicles via sat photos) and lord knows what the average condition for what's still in the fields is. 

The common assumption is that when the Russians started pulling reserves they picked kit most suitible / ready for service, so as the years have gone on the quality of stuff in the depots has only decreased as the scraps get left. From the photos we have seen of these storage sites, there is a fair assessment that a lot of vehicles have simply rusted to the point of being scrap after being exposed to the elements for so long. These vehicles are pretty much write offs or require extensive rebuilds, at which point just building a new tank might be easier. 

In short: The Russians are rapidly running out of vehicles to refurbish, and those that remain are only becoming more expensive and time consuming to do so. 
 

CovertCabal in particular has done excellent work on this and has noted the staggeringly rapid transformation of tank / vehicle depots across Russia from having heaps of tanks to...having not many left at all, at least in any usable state. 

The video above is especially great as it mentions the fact that Russia actually destroyed a whole bunch of its tanks in the early 2010s (around 10k), which a lot of figures fail to compensate for (hence the notion that Russia has 10k + tanks in reserve when they actually dont)

 

Edited Wednesday at 09:33 PM by ArmouredTopHat

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, CHARLIE43 said:

I found this, not sure how they get the #s, but it shows 14,777 tanks est. Even if you subtract those #s from that, (3495) you still have 11282. That's still a lot of tanks.

Here is another really good article from last year.

https://en.defence-ua.com/industries/analyzing_russian_report_of_2100_tanks_produced_in_2023_and_wheres_the_catch_in_these_data-8511.html

So a major question, what amount of Russian equipment is still serviceable? If we take tanks, that article shows that Russia can only really produce 4-500 new tanks per year and even fewer of the newest models (T80s and 90s). So it is making up a lot by refurbishing, cannibalizing and recycling. Now to your point, is Russia holding those new tanks back to try and keep some sort of reserve? Possibly. But we do know it has been gutting its current reserves pretty deeply as older and older models show up on the battlefield. 

So this goes back to my earlier point. Russia could keep trying to pull T55s and 62s out of boneyards  and wind up with more operational tanks than it started with in this war…on paper. But T55s and 62s are only really useful for mediocre indirect fires and meat assaults. So is Russia really a “greater threat” if this happens? 

And then there is all the operational stuff that really matters…that stuff is very hard to replace.

Edited Wednesday at 11:22 PM by The_Capt

[Vanir Ausf B]

On 9/23/2024 at 10:05 PM, Fenris said:

In a similar vein - these are said to be hi-res before/after shots of the Plesetsk ICBM test facility where RU Sarmat test launch failed.

 

Possible explanations.

On first examination, then, some of the plausible reasons for the Sarmat’s repeated test failures would suggest that Russia’s efforts to shorten the missile’s boost phase created complications which would not otherwise have existed, particularly if the missile uses a variant of the tried and tested RD-274 engine. If this is the case, it would be illustrative of the degree to which Russian planners regard future developments in air and missile defence as credible threats, as they will have paid a considerable price in system complexity in order to overcome these challenges.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-sarmat-test-failure-implications-strategic-balance

[Silentkilarz]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Here is another really good article from last year.

https://en.defence-ua.com/industries/analyzing_russian_report_of_2100_tanks_produced_in_2023_and_wheres_the_catch_in_these_data-8511.html

So a major question what amount of Russian equipment is still serviceable. If we take tanks, that article shows that Russia can only really produce 4-500 new tanks per year and even fewer of the newest models (T80s and 90s). So it is making up a lot by refurbishing, cannibalizing and recycling. Now to your point, is Russia holding those new tanks back to try and keep some sort of reserve? Possibly. But we do know it has been gutting its current reserves pretty deeply as older and older models show up on the battlefield. 

So this goes back to my earlier point. Russia could keep trying to pull T55s and 62s out of boneyards  and wind up with more operational tanks than it started with in this war…on paper. But T55s and 62s are only really useful for mediocre indirect fires and meat assaults. So is Russia really a “greater threat” if this happens? 

And then there is all the operational stuff that really matters…that stuff is very hard to replace.

I think a aspect of that that gets overlooked is how many of those tanks are actually serviceable? We've seen from plenty of satellite photos RU doesnt really store equipment very well compared to Nato/Western militaries. What's the percentage of vehicles that can be fixed up  vs those that General Oligarch sold off parts to his buddies and cant be quickly fixed or fixed at all.

 

Once we get to that problem whats more efficient? Replace the vehicles with new ones or fix up the ones in storage? Ehats the best use of your factories to do it? Just as a expample the Lima, OH plant has been very busy over the years refurbbing and upgrading M1's to M1A2/3 patterns and havent really produced more tanks besides some small foreign orders iirc

[Vet 0369]

On 10/20/2024 at 7:31 PM, chuckdyke said:

As much chance of getting a WW2 US Marines Island Hopping Campaign. I would love to see something like that. Or Merrills Marauders is another one. 

Hey! The U.S.Army also had an island hopping Campaign. The difference was that the USMC basically went the “middle route, and the USA did basically a flanking around the edge to the Philippines.some Army units did go with the Marines though. Most don’t hear of the Army’s amphibious assaults though because they got pretty much overshadowed  by the Marines in the media.

[Vet 0369]

On 10/21/2024 at 6:57 AM, The_Capt said:

China might be interested in going that way but they are not going to do it for charity. And they also have their own military power to think of. So I am not sold that Chia is suddenly going to ramp up tank production to try and replace the nearly 3500 Russia has lost - assuming tanks are even going to be replaced. Russia will remain a pain in the @ss but I would not worry too much about an invasion of Poland too soon.

As Poland says “Aww Damn it!”

[chuckdyke]

58 minutes ago, Vet 0369 said:

Most don’t hear of the Army’s amphibious assaults

Like Omaha and Utah Beach, us foreigners know that the US Army can do amphibious assaults.  

[Vanir Ausf B]

5 hours ago, dan/california said:

Really good today. They quote extensively from a Jack Watling(RUSI) article from Foreign Affairs magazine that is apparently not published yet, at least I couldn't find it, and I looked.

This one?

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraine-must-turn-tide-it-can-negotiate

[dan/california]

12 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

This one?

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ukraine-must-turn-tide-it-can-negotiate

Think so, thank you!

[Fenris]

He doesn't link a source in the post, hopefully it's true and is another of those small indicators of mounting trouble for RU at home.

Quote

Russia's major butter producers are either halting production or suspending deliveries to retail chains, while warning of impending price hikes. Since the start of the year, the cost of butter has surged by at least 25%.

"Producers are grappling with steep inflation in raw cream materials, which rose by 39% in the first half of the year. Cumulative inflation has reached 46% for the first eight months of 2024 compared to the same period last year," reported HN, the former Danone subsidiary.

Butter thefts have also been on the rise. Since late 2023, RFID tags have been appearing on butter packages in St. Petersburg, designed to alert store security in case of attempted theft.

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1848637588963262563

[Fenris]

Fireworks.  What is it?  A loaded BUK?  Edit - from the comments this is apparently an BUK destroyed back in August.

 

Edited Thursday at 03:21 AM by Fenris

[chris talpas]

A good interview with Condoleezza Rice.  Discusses China, Iran and Russia particularly with respect to Ukraine.  While acknowledging weariness America feels from leading, she also argues America cannot withdraw inwards.

 

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, CHARLIE43 said:

Got to thinking, and you know how that can go sometimes, but I wonder if the Russians are thinking the same thing. All the second rate hand me downs that the Ukrainians are getting equates to the West becoming weaker and weaker over time. Less backup equipment...What if they may be doing the same thing (albeit with their own forces) in an attempt at preserving whatever new stuff they already have or have produced since the war started and are instead using up old stuff to do so?

It'd be interesting if that is what General Cavoli was getting at by stating what he did.

Well, if they are thinking that then it's delusional.

The West isn't running out of stuff, it's running out of stuff it can spare without restricting its own needs.  Russia, on the other hand, is running out of stuff for its own needs.  Huge difference.

All evidence suggests that Russia is indeed running out of stuff.  Others have already helped explain that, but in addition to this it's simple math.  The stuff the Russians had in service at the start of the war has been lost several times over in many categories.  Those losses far outstrip new production, which means they are dipping into reserves.  It's simple math.

Also, let's not forget that for decades much of Russia's "new" production was nothing more than upgrading something built during Soviet times.  So what are they going to do after this war is over when there's nothing left from the Soviet days of old?  Ground up production is a lot more expensive and slower than modest upgrades.

It is probably true that Russia has tried to hold back stuff for future needs and not squander it on the war.  However, as time has gone on, and losses have mounted, it's been pretty clear that's not feasible.  The first to go was ground forces stationed as far away as the Arctic and naval personnel in the Pacific Fleet.  Forces pretty much everywhere were drained, probably with a fair amount of their equipment too.

The withdrawal of artillery and air defenses from all over the place is also pretty well documented.  You don't move that sort of stuff from places like Kaliningrad if you have ample reserves sitting elsewhere.

Steve