How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Hapless]

1 hour ago, Carolus said:

Russian source on infantry warfare in Ukraine.

That's really interesting, good find!
I think one key thing here is how careful to be trying to transfer lessons learned from Ukraine outside the particular conditions of this conflict.

In an environment where a platoon trench position is defended by four men and mutually supporting direct fire is very limited you can get away with what we might consider very risky assault methods. Until you can't, obviously.

A similar thing happens in CM all the time: players develop bad habits and get away with them until they get hit by what seems like a punishing curveball.

[hcrof]

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, that is what I was remembering.  Saves the passengers, but the vehicle is still pretty toasted.  Which is not a great outcome from a strategic perspective, but sure is from the soldier's perspective.

Steve

Im not sure the vehicle is getting toasted though - Bradley's really seem to be able to shrug off a lot of hits from small FPVs, which is not surprising seeing as the ERA was designed to counter precisely the threat of RPG warheads. 

Of course a well piloted FPV can always hit a weak spot like the tracks or turret ring, or where a reactive armour tile has already been hit so it isn't perfect. But in my view a armour can do a good job against the current threat as lot as you don't take too many hits and you prevent extreme accuracy with countermeasures. BUT as soon as you get swarmed you will take too many hits...

[akd]

Been traveling and generally avoiding the internet at all costs.  Has anyone gathered these up and sent them to Steve @Battlefront.com and Charles?

 

[cesmonkey]

Today's update from Ukrainian military observer Konstantin Mashovets notes that the Russians are continuing to grind away in the Kharkov, Toretskoye, and Pokrovsk directions with the pace of their advances slowing and at increasing costs:

https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2038

https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid021xyjvkRUc4gZEFgtWsWoUkXfgZMZVQg1UXgXG4LRu1fVEPe4AaGoqkCd3BnGwLvLl
 

His last comments are:
 

Quote

In my opinion, in the near future, the command of the GV "Center" will have to concentrate on one thing - either the Pokrovsk direction, or Toretsk.

"Conduct two topics" at the same time, obviously, it will not be able to...

And this will happen... not so much in the future...

Of course, if those same terrible "strategic reserves" of the Russian Federation "do not arrive" by now... which, so far, no one has seen with their own eyes.

Although it is quite possible that they saw, but not so much as "felt". For if we consider them to be those who went to the "Kharkov offensive", again tried to "break through to Oskol" or tried to storm "Chasik", or "foolishly" ran head-on to Toretsk, then... the prospects for the Russian command for the end of summer-fall do not look very "joyful"...

 

[Grigb]

Part 1 

4 hours ago, Hapless said:

That's really interesting, good find!
I think one key thing here is how careful to be trying to transfer lessons learned from Ukraine outside the particular conditions of this conflict.

In an environment where a platoon trench position is defended by four men and mutually supporting direct fire is very limited you can get away with what we might consider very risky assault methods. Until you can't, obviously.

A similar thing happens in CM all the time: players develop bad habits and get away with them until they get hit by what seems like a punishing curveball.

Let me comment on it as I have read and analyzed Markin Tactics work. Please keep in mind that what I am writing below is not Markin words. This is my subjective impression/analysis based on better description from the main document.

1) in the immediate vicinity of the attacked trenches, soldiers of the attacking side move almost at full height at a slow (!) pace, often freezing (!) in place to fire 3-7 meters from the enemy trench. 

The vast majority of the assault occur across broken ground covered in various plants, obstacles, and debris. Most of the time firefights are short, small-scale ambushes that can only be survived by paying close attention to your surroundings. 

1. Standing provides you better situational awareness
2. Slowly going forward permits you to spot the threats in advance
3. If you see something (noise, slight movement, or due to a cue from the drone operator), you shoot at the precise suspected area to confuse enemy soldier, encourage him to retreat, or compel him to expose himself by firing back

Artillery is not a concern because the majority of assault are intended to take place during short periods when defender's artillery support is unavailable. Supporting fire from heavy infantry weapons or other units, as well as everything else you take for granted while practicing textbook defense, is also not an issue. Because the majority of firefights occur in so-called gray zones. There are no traditional defenses there because anything larger and slower than infantryman with personal weapon is rather quickly destroyed by drone-adjusted artillery or FPVs. Only small groups of AK/PKM/RPG-armed troops can survive there, spending the majority of their time in makeshift dugouts and underground shelters.

I exaggerate slightly since situations on the frontline vary based on local conditions and overall unit competency. But I hope you got the point.

When stopping their movement, they do not always move to the "lying down" position in the immediate vicinity of the enemy trenches, often taking the "kneeling" or "kneeling" position or remaining in the "standing" position, barely ducking down;

Lying down causes you to become almost entirely blind. The best you can do it to kneel and go down only when facing a specific threat.

the assault almost always proceeds along the trench, and not frontally;

most assaults aim to flank the trenches. You penetrate between trenches and then easily roll them from the sides.

3) the approach to the attacked trench is carried out "in single file", that is, practically in a column, one at a time, without deploying in a chain (wedge), and often such a "column" in front of the enemy trench gathers into a small crowd,

Assaults usually take place along the best path with the most cover and concealment. There are usually just a handful of these (if not just one). Moving in a wedge or a line formation causes the majority of your soldiers to move in the open with very little cover or concealment.

…when the leading soldiers of the column stop, and those walking behind continue to move forward until they catch up with the soldiers who stopped in front. 8/

There is an additional advantage to the so-called "column". You make contact with the smallest possible unit - with just a few guys at the head of the column. Walking in a line result in the entire squad making contact at once, which is a good way to lose the entire squad. BTW Line or Chain formation is RU textbook assault formation mandated by the Field manual.

Now, the so-called "column" is not the column formation you imagine. Buddy teams remain far apart till the last possible moment. It might be a few (5-20) minutes walk between teams. If a buddy team might get hit by FPVs and lost completly - majority of the column survives. AFAIK, this is actually the main method of infantry movement in drone dominated areas (that's how you go to and from your own front-line positions). 

…does not take cover at the moment of dismounting; not to mention the fact that soldiers often sit on top of the armoured vehicle during the approach), and the dismounted soldiers then approach the attacked trench in a "crowd", without moving to the lower level. 

• APC/IFV assaults often occur after defenders' positions have been thoroughly demolished by artillery and tanks. Very little opposition is expected.
• RU APC/IFVs are cramped death traps. You are better off outside.
• Conscripted infantry of both sides... well... often demonstrate certain lack of assault skills.

All this indicates that the density and effectiveness of the defenders' fire in front of the forward edge of the defence is extremely low, otherwise the above actions would be simply impossible. 11/

Yes (see above)

I will ignore the next few statements becasue they are typical RU military pseudointellectual ignorant blah-blah. I have to admit though that because Markin is not a military guy (AFAIK, he is a civil servant), it is of the higher quality compared to official RU military writings.

 

[mosuri]

Looks like some AD unit has a cushy job protecting the tsar's summer cottage:

 

 

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, mosuri said:

Looks like some AD unit has a cushy job protecting the tsar's summer cottage:

 

 

It will be cushy until and unless the Ukrainians hit the place. Then if the palace burns they all get an express ticket to sturm unit with a life expectancy measured in hours.

[Centurian52]

19 hours ago, Haiduk said:

This is very dangerous, but looks like after dismissal of Sodol, some threshold level is already passed. Either all will continue like previous two years and we have all chances to lost this war, or public resonance will force authorities to do something with high command staff. The problem of incompetence and "Zhukov style" command doesn't appear after Zaluzhnyi resignation. Just in 2022 we had success, courage and many motivated soldiers, so about such things tried not to talk. But Bakhmut campaign and unsuccessfull offensive, creating of dozens new brigades with mobilized retired stupid soviet-style commanders, who don't understand modern warfare and don't want to study themselves - all this caused first break between "old army elite" and "men of war", supported by society activists. Fail of mobilization in 2023 and successful Russian PsyOps campaign in many cases were because of criminal and incompetent orders of high command, who sent to grinder without any logic and operative necessity thousands of lives. 

"Old style" commanders could hold the front and even achieve some successes, sending company by company to hold or retake a tree-plant, which already 10 rimes passed from the hand to hand. Some cynically openly told "I'm not care how much them will lost, the order must be accomplished, we will get reinforcement anyway". But in one not good moment the spring of reinforcements sharply dried out. And turned out, these commanders without sending hundreds of private Mykolas to the death again and again, just incapable to wage the war, they are not capable organize communication between own units, they are not capable to organize fire support etc. And the problem has arised in all highness.

This is not a first scandal. 59th motorized infantry brigade was one of capable units from 5x brigades, established in ATO times. During full-scale it was headed by talented officer Sukharevskyi, which personally paritcipated in development of brigade UAV systems and tactic of thier usage, so 59th had one of the most effective UAV forces. But recently Sukharevskyi was appointed as a chief of new established Unmanned Systems Command and his place in brigade seized colonel Shevchuk. Soldiers told he is typical Soviet idiot, he was responsible for stupid command, which cost many lives in some other brigade, but by typical Ukrainian tradition he was removed from that brigade... with promotion and appointing of commander of 59th. Shevshuk in short time disrupted all what created Sukharevskyi, except about what told "Ptashka", medical service of volunteer battalion "Da Vinchi Wolves", who became a part of brigade now had a sharp conflict with chief of brigade medical service. Chief of this service just sit own own place and doesn't want to improve nothing. She even rejects to allow to transfuse the blood to wounded in brigade stabilization point, despite this already allowed by Medical Command directive - and of course after "uprising of combat medics", which during long several month "war" forced Medical Command to recognize this method increasing chanses to save lives.

I can recall scandal, but more silent with 14th mech. brigade. Brigade successfully repelled Russian assault on Kupiansk direction, but their commander had a dare to report to HQ about real situation in brigade and situation around. But top-brass doesn't like a true. Commander was removed and on his place was appointed next "soviet style officer", who already never sent reports, which could make top-brass sad. But level of losses in brigade rised significantly.

And today's appeal of 24th mech brigade to President with demanding to remain colonel Holishevskyi as brigade commander. Soldiers say this is very cool talented commander, which rised combat capabilities of brigade and has respect to soldiers. But.... He also sens "uncomfortable" reports. And top-brass, readinh them getting angry "What? Why?! Retake this area immediately! Will we lost many soldiers?! Don't give a damn! Execute!" Holishevskyi reportedly rejected to execute idiotic orders from HQ generals, which completely don't know real situation and real conditions of troops. So, General Staff is preparing to remove ot from command and to appoint him to military university. Of course, somebody with new experience have to teach future officers, but this looks like usual revenge. 

Other recent episode - conflict between 226th TD battalion and commander of 41st mech. brigade colonel Romashko. Soldiers say he is a cum of Syrskyi. The said Romashko consider soldiers even own soldiers as a cattle, so you can imaging his treatment to attached units. 41st came on place of 24th brigade, which was moved to Chasiv Yar. Comamnder didn't master with defense of own sector and enemy advanced in New-York settlement southern from Toretsk. He ordered 226th battalion (strictly saying a large company of this battalion) to counter-attack the enemy, cut off his logistics and restore positions. But he didn't give any fire support. 226th TD battalion is from Kyiv 241st TD brigade - this is very well trained unit with motivated soldiers, from which many ATO veterans. But TD units are just light infantry. Without support battalion suffered heavy losses, their commander tried to explain Romashko they can't accomplish this task, because he completely didn't understand real situation and this task can accomplish only StarTroopers, but Romashko has started to make threats with criminal cases, so battalion again was sent to impossible mission and again lost many soldiers without any sense. Scandal with Romashko and with on of his HQ officers, who ordered by obscene words to evacuation car driver, who carried wounded soldiers to turn back and "throw down them back to position" was huge. Two days ago some messages appeared that Romashko is dismissed, but this is not confirmed yet.

Other incident from twitter talks of soldiers - one guy told thier battalion commander, who substituted previous commander - "old alcohoilic and scum" in short time rised combat capabilities of battalion and their unit successfully fought several months. But commander gity under Operative Command committee investigation because... their battlion had too low level of losses. Much less than "calculated". By opinion of these staff rats "if you havn't many losses your unit don't fight properly, so you evade from task accomplishing". The same incident I know as far as from ATO times. Nothing changed. 

Now a petition to president is registered to introduce responsibility for high officers for criminal or incompetent orders, which inflicted high level of losses of personnel or equipment. If soldier lost own rifle he will pass seven circles of the hell, but if commander of fighter regiment lost several jets on airfield because he did nothing to protect airfield (of chief of logistic, who ordered the military train to stay several hours on the station close to frontline) - they will have no responsibility. In better case they will resigned from own duty and moved to other duty, often with promotion. 

The situiation now went so far, that society must force authorities to make reforms in high command. Because small Soviet army never defeat large Soviet army 

I had heard that inept Soviet-style leadership was a problem ever since large numbers of old Soviet-trained officers were mobilized into the Ukrainian Army in 2022. I take it from you post that it's still a serious problem, but has there at least been some progress towards solving it?

Obviously inept Soviet-style leadership is a problem for the Russians too, but if it's possible to widen Ukraine's advantage in competent leadership over the Russians then that would obviously be desirable. Theoretically Ukraine, being a democracy, should be better equipped to resolve problems with incompetent leadership than the Russians. The primary mechanism for that of course is that incompetent leadership is more likely to cause a widespread scandal in a democracy, and scandals are more likely to result in meaningful action in a democracy. So if the leadership issue is causing a widespread scandal, then perhaps that's a good sign?

[Grigb]

Leaving aside the question of the conditions for the applicability of one or another method, let us note that none of them provides for a long walk at full height ("sticking") in front of an enemy trench, and even going in a crowd. 19/

The translation is a little unclear here. Markin laments that no Field Manual (RU or NATO) stipulates that the attack group should stick around at the front of the trench as an unorganized blob. Aside from psychological (fear) and organizational issues (delays), there are practical reasons to do so.

The majority of firefights end when one side decides they've had enough or runs out of ammunition. So, it is possible to outlast the enemy just by sticking around. Second, getting into the trench is dangerous. Your situation awareness suffers and usually trench is already pre-registered. Finally, advancing forward beyond the trench is dangerous as well; rear areas outside of the trenches are mined deliberately to keep assault force inside the pre-registered trench.

As you can see, sticking around is not as bad as you may think (Markin fails to realize it). 

[Skipping not very useful part] 

If trenches are not almost completely covered from above (and there are simply not enough materials, as well as time and effort resources to do so), those in such a trench will be knocked out rather quickly. 44/

It is quite problematic to return to the practice of canopies over trenches, which was practised in the First World War, precisely because of the lack of resources in the broad sense of the word for their construction. 45/

In addition, it was noted as early as the early 20th century that canopies interfered with the use of trenches as a starting point for attacks, limiting their usefulness. Canopies were subsequently abandoned. 46/

Interesting problem. A trench that is only partially covered with overhead cover is not protected from drops. Drone will just drop the gift where the cover ends, blasting soldiers with shrapnel from the side. You can cover the whole trench, but your situation awareness will be poor, and it is impractical to send so much material to the front lines. Also, following artillery fire, debris from the cover tends to clog the trench.

In the main document, he suggests doing what UKR do. You dig up a small branch as an individual firing post. Then, cover the small branch and a portion of the main trench that intersects with it. Even if a drone drops anything into the main trench, the soldier inside the branch is behind the corner and will be unaffected. 

[Skipping not very useful part] 

3) The next important factor is the effectiveness of preparatory artillery fire through fire correction by UAVs, the ability for real-time correction of small arms, grenade launchers and small-calibre mortars at individual defensive positions (firing cells/embrasures) using… 61/

…UAVs, which multiplies the probability of knocking out the most significant firepower of the defenders, as well as the use of UAV ammunition drop systems in preparation for and support of an attack. 62/

As a result of the impact of these factors, the defenders, who are initially few in number due to the thinness of the formations inherent in the current conflict, are knocked out a significant number of soldiers and firepower for a given defensive position. 65/

and few next quotes

I will paraphrase these statements based on the main document description. 

• Infantry in forward positions will most likely be significantly reduced owing to dispersion and attrition.
• Anything (including crew-served weapons) and anybody outside of the shelters will most likely be destroyed/killed by drone-adjusted artillery/drone drops/FPVs by the preparatory fires.
• As a result, the defender will most likely have to defend the position with substantially fewer soldiers than he would normally expect (literally 3-4 soldiers for a platoon sized strongpoint).
• In this situation, the majority of standard techniques, such oblique fire or throwing grenades in a volley, won't be effective.

Now I'll compile some Markin's recommendations from the article/tweets (I adjusted it for better readability) 

Quote

 

1) It is required to train men to conduct defensive battle in highly dispersed small fighting units. Typical training tasks should include conducting defensive battles with three-four man teams in a squad or even platoon trench. This includes topics such as crossing corners, moving in the trench with a change of pointman, throwing grenades in volleys, entering and exiting the trench via the parapet and loopholes, retreating and advancing by moving across the top of trench, and so on.

2) When setting up defensive positions, it is necessary to consider both the need for firing at distant targets [from 20 to 700 meters] and conducting a firefight in the [defensive] belt directly adjacent to the trench itself (0-20 meters from the trench's parapet), including firing from positions for oblique (as well as surprise concentrated) fire.

3) When digging the trench, special attention should be paid to the possible assault along the trench, specifically, at the bends of the trench, make loopholes designed for shooting along the trench, as well as points of exit from the trench over the parapet.

4) Despite the objective challenges, it is vital to try to cover the trenches from above, at least from observation by UAVs using fabric materials, and ideally [using materials that can protect] from munitions dropped by UAVs. It appears that the covered section of the trench should have cells [small branches] dug in the trench wall so that the fall of ammunition from the UAV near the entrance to the covered section of the trench (which is not difficult and is widely used in practice) does not result in the loss of the protected personnel.

It should be emphasized [when discussing it with soldiers] that just covering the trench (cell) from above is insufficient to protect against the scattering of fragments from the munition dropped at the entrance to the covered area.If there are under parapet niches sheltered by logs arranged at an angle to the trench wall (as if forming a single-pitched "hut"), they should be deep enough to prevent injury to individuals in such a niche from ammunition falling near the entrance.

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

13 hours ago, hcrof said:

Im not sure the vehicle is getting toasted though - Bradley's really seem to be able to shrug off a lot of hits from small FPVs, which is not surprising seeing as the ERA was designed to counter precisely the threat of RPG warheads. 

Of course a well piloted FPV can always hit a weak spot like the tracks or turret ring, or where a reactive armour tile has already been hit so it isn't perfect. But in my view a armour can do a good job against the current threat as lot as you don't take too many hits and you prevent extreme accuracy with countermeasures. BUT as soon as you get swarmed you will take too many hits...

I was specifically referring to Lancets.  The Brad seems to keep its passengers alive (or mostly so), but the Brad itself seems to be done.  Maybe factory repairable, not not just a new coat of paint and back into service.

As I said, this is not a good outcome for such an expensive vehicle in a protracted war.  Which is the thing we've spent 100+ pages discussing so I'll leave it there

Steve

[Fenris]

Another small, encouraging sign that they're having problems recruiting.

Quote

New Russian recruits can now expect 1,700,000 rubles (£14,000+) in the Moscow region as a one-off payment for joining the invader army. The number more than doubled recently.

 

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I was specifically referring to Lancets.  The Brad seems to keep its passengers alive (or mostly so), but the Brad itself seems to be done.  Maybe factory repairable, not not just a new coat of paint and back into service.

As I said, this is not a good outcome for such an expensive vehicle in a protracted war.  Which is the thing we've spent 100+ pages discussing so I'll leave it there

Steve

Nothing cheap is going to protect the infantry. We've a bazillion Soviet vehicles proving that point ad nauseum. 

  Flying Munitions are cheap and protecting humans will always be expensive. Que sera sera. 

Certainly some expensive models seem to be better at absorbing FPV damage than others. 

I want to see vehicles each with its own  pack of defending drones, like a swarm of gnats around each fat cow.

Provide them as a replaceable package or cartridge that can be swapped/refilled. Use cheap to defend expensive against cheap. 

 

Edited July 17 by Kinophile

[Vet 0369]

23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, that is what I was remembering.  Saves the passengers, but the vehicle is still pretty toasted.  Which is not a great outcome from a strategic perspective, but sure is from the soldier's perspective.

Steve

The Grunt’s perspective should ALWAYS trump all other perspective in these types of observations!

[chris talpas]

Nice interview with General Ben Hodges getting his thoughts on the NATO summit and reluctance to allow long range strikes against airfields which are killing Ukrainians.  Argues that Washington is overly fearful. While Hodges isn’t exactly MacArthur, I’m far less certain that Crimea isn’t a red line.

 

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

Nothing cheap is going to protect the infantry. We've a bazillion Soviet vehicles proving that point ad nauseum. 

  Flying Munitions are cheap and protecting humans will always be expensive. Que sera sera. 

Certainly some expensive models seem to be better at absorbing FPV damage than others. 

I want to see vehicles each with its own  pack of defending drones, like a swarm of gnats around each fat cow.

Provide them as a replaceable package or cartridge that can be swapped/refilled. Use cheap to defend expensive against cheap. 

 

 

1 hour ago, Vet 0369 said:

The Grunt’s perspective should ALWAYS trump all other perspective in these types of observations!

I mean, protecting the lives of your soldiers does in fact matter more than monetary value of a lost vehicle. Even if you factor cold hard logic, losing machines is always preferable to losing people. Especially if you are in a situation like Ukraine where you need to maximise conservation of your forces. Of course you can take the soviet principle and lose both and be even worse off...

Sure, a vehicle is expensive, so is is the whole pipeline of recruiting, training and deploying people. Losing said people hurts a lot more than just in immediate military value as well. That's one less person contributing to a country in various ways. Manpower is really priceless and its pretty evident that protection is perhaps more important than ever. 

Its why things like all those MaxPros were so important. They might not be able to offer the same level of usefulness in an assault as a Tank or BMP, but they -will- help soldiers survive a lot more than a civilian truck or MTLB (I think this conflict has more than anything solidified that soviet design ethos is an absolute dead end with regards to vehicles) Of course, giving Ukraine more actual tanks and IFVs also helps as well. Why Biden doesn't just dump another 300-400 Bradleys into Ukraine's lap I do not know, plenty he can do before the election which remains such a dangerous uncertainty. 

Given vehicles in the format we understand them are unlikely to go too much anywhere at least for a decade or two, we can expect to see a lot more dynamic all round protection to at least ward off some level of FPV strikes, given it looks like the Bradley has proven quite resistant to multiple strikes. Then again, there is a clip of a M1 somewhere eating 11 of the things in a row before finally succumbing. Long term is probably going to be a case of friendly drone swarms protecting your valuable assets, whatever those might look like in 30-40 years. 

Edited July 17 by ArmouredTopHat

[Battlefront.com]

14 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

 

I mean, protecting the lives of your soldiers does in fact matter more than monetary value of a lost vehicle. Even if you factor cold hard logic, losing machines is always preferable to losing people. Especially if you are in a situation like Ukraine where you need to maximise conservation of your forces. Of course you can take the soviet principle and lose both and be even worse off...

Sure, a vehicle is expensive, so is is the whole pipeline of recruiting, training and deploying people. Losing said people hurts a lot more than just in immediate military value as well. That's one less person contributing to a country in various ways. Manpower is really priceless and its pretty evident that protection is perhaps more important than ever. 

Its why things like all those MaxPros were so important. They might not be able to offer the same level of usefulness in an assault as a Tank or BMP, but they -will- help soldiers survive a lot more than a civilian truck or MTLB (I think this conflict has more than anything solidified that soviet design ethos is an absolute dead end with regards to vehicles) Of course, giving Ukraine more actual tanks and IFVs also helps as well. (Why Biden doesn't just dump another 300-400 Bradleys into Ukraine's lap I do not know, plenty he can do before the election which remains such a dangerous uncertainty. 

Given vehicles in the format we understand them are unlikely to go too much anywhere at least for a decade or two, we can expect to see a lot more dynamic all round protection to at least ward off some level of FPV strikes, given it looks like the Bradley has proven quite resistant to multiple strikes. Then again, there is a clip of a M1 somewhere eating 11 of the things in a row before finally succumbing. Long term is probably going to be a case of friendly drone swarms protecting your valuable assets, whatever those might look like in 30-40 years. 

The point here is that if the most important thing to do is protect the infantry riding in it, and doing that is very expensive, then look for other ways to keep costs down.  Think super APC, not super IFV, for example.

One way to keep costs down is to standardize an armored container that multiple vehicle designs can be built around.  Similar to the Boxer's concept, but available to other families of vehicles made by other design firms.  That way we don't have dozens of different vehicles, all with their own R&D and production costs, multiplying the overall investment needed to procure these things.

Another thing to do is recognize what this thing is most likely to do.  If the mission is to get infantry from A to B as quickly as possible, then go back to A before getting destroyed, then you don't need a massive 25mm auto cannon turret stuck on the thing.  Imagine how much less expensive a Bradley would be if it had no turret, no gun, no TOWs, no thermal imaging system, etc.

Life is all about choices.  So far the West has chosen to go with a lot of expensive features, very low rates of production, and extremely high support costs.  I've been arguing, more times than I can count, that this is not sustainable.  Something has to be changed and if protecting the infantry isn't on the chopping block (and I agree it should NOT be), then something else should be.

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

52 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The point here is that if the most important thing to do is protect the infantry riding in it, and doing that is very expensive, then look for other ways to keep costs down.  Think super APC, not super IFV, for example.

One way to keep costs down is to standardize an armored container that multiple vehicle designs can be built around.  Similar to the Boxer's concept, but available to other families of vehicles made by other design firms.  That way we don't have dozens of different vehicles, all with their own R&D and production costs, multiplying the overall investment needed to procure these things.

Another thing to do is recognize what this thing is most likely to do.  If the mission is to get infantry from A to B as quickly as possible, then go back to A before getting destroyed, then you don't need a massive 25mm auto cannon turret stuck on the thing.  Imagine how much less expensive a Bradley would be if it had no turret, no gun, no TOWs, no thermal imaging system, etc.

Life is all about choices.  So far the West has chosen to go with a lot of expensive features, very low rates of production, and extremely high support costs.  I've been arguing, more times than I can count, that this is not sustainable.  Something has to be changed and if protecting the infantry isn't on the chopping block (and I agree it should NOT be), then something else should be.

Steve

The problem is you circle back to the entire reason IFVs were developed in the first place, IE what delivers you firepower in the event the squad runs into something nasty, or just needs a bit more ompf in the first place when delivering troops or performing its own combat missions. 

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1e3wslc/gopro_attached_to_a_ukrainian_m2_bradley_as_it/

There is clearly still a use for having something with the firepower capability, certainly the Ukrainians seem to think so. (I recall them pointing out they like the Stryker too, but consider it far more poorly armed in comparison) Seen enough Bradley footage of them tearing BTRs and infantry to pieces to know they are extremely useful on the battlefield. 

I entirely agree though that NATO needs more common vehicles. Think F-35 but for a family of ground vehicles that everyone can produce at scale. I really do think we can no longer rely on everyone having their specific niche vehicle, it simply does not translate to any scale production at all. The problem is convincing various defence companies to adopt a universal platform has been tricky in the past. Perhaps the reality of the situation might jog something down the line in Europe, especially with a potential US withdrawal of interest in the area. 

Edited July 17 by ArmouredTopHat

[Carolus]

Common vehicles? Gentlemen, please. Historic precident certainly shows that a massive vehicle park cobbled together from the armories of several countries and criss-crossing all manners of towed guns with any available chassis is a guarantee for military success. 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

4 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The problem is you circle back to the entire reason IFVs were developed in the first place, IE what delivers you firepower in the event the squad runs into something nasty, or just needs a bit more ompf in the first place when delivering troops or performing its own combat missions. 

Not really, the IFV in the West seems to be the response to BMP-1, that is to the situation, when the enemy's mechanised infantry vehicles stopped being sitting ducks during the armour fight and suddenly there appeared thousands of additional semi-viable anti-armour combatants by virtue of their AT-3 and HEAT ammunition for the 73 mm gun. I believe it is the anti-armour capability which drives the cost of IFV's up, with the ATGM mounts, thermals, stabilisers, etc. Adding a rudimentary turret with an autocannon just to suppress the trench being assaulted by dismounts or the attackers during an ambush would be much cheaper than what happened to IFVsin reality.

[holoween]

37 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Not really, the IFV in the West seems to be the response to BMP-1, that is to the situation, when the enemy's mechanised infantry vehicles stopped being sitting ducks during the armour fight and suddenly there appeared thousands of additional semi-viable anti-armour combatants by virtue of their AT-3 and HEAT ammunition for the 73 mm gun. I believe it is the anti-armour capability which drives the cost of IFV's up, with the ATGM mounts, thermals, stabilisers, etc. Adding a rudimentary turret with an autocannon just to suppress the trench being assaulted by dismounts or the attackers during an ambush would be much cheaper than what happened to IFVsin reality.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schützenpanzer_Lang_HS.30

If anything the bmp1 is the response. And supplying the infantry with dedicated heavy firepower has been the primary driver of its development.

[hcrof]

The advantage of an IFV is being able to concentrate maximum firepower onto minimum platforms which is efficient from the perspective of crew numbers, length of a marching column, logistics and maintenance requirements etc. 

But it is probably fair to say that a bare-bones 30mm turret has a lot of firepower for minimal cost if you accept that it can only be used from a stationary vehicle during the day - that might be fine for an APC as long as you only plan to use the gun against insurgents or something that can't really shoot back. Expensive stabilizers and thermal sights make it a true fighting vehicle but vehicle-on-vehicle direct fire combat is getting rarer these days. 

[The_Capt]

7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The point here is that if the most important thing to do is protect the infantry riding in it, and doing that is very expensive, then look for other ways to keep costs down.  Think super APC, not super IFV, for example.

One way to keep costs down is to standardize an armored container that multiple vehicle designs can be built around.  Similar to the Boxer's concept, but available to other families of vehicles made by other design firms.  That way we don't have dozens of different vehicles, all with their own R&D and production costs, multiplying the overall investment needed to procure these things.

Another thing to do is recognize what this thing is most likely to do.  If the mission is to get infantry from A to B as quickly as possible, then go back to A before getting destroyed, then you don't need a massive 25mm auto cannon turret stuck on the thing.  Imagine how much less expensive a Bradley would be if it had no turret, no gun, no TOWs, no thermal imaging system, etc.

Life is all about choices.  So far the West has chosen to go with a lot of expensive features, very low rates of production, and extremely high support costs.  I've been arguing, more times than I can count, that this is not sustainable.  Something has to be changed and if protecting the infantry isn't on the chopping block (and I agree it should NOT be), then something else should be.

Steve

The simplest way to keep costs down is to reduce the number of human beings in combat. The downward trend of troop density per km is consistent as we continue to replace people with hardware.  This war has the lowest observed troop density per km we have ever seen in a large conventional conflict - approaching 300-400 troops per km on average.  The problem is that troop density varies from defence to offence.  Defensively very low troop density is effective. Offensively even high densities are not effective.

As warfare evolves, stuffing more humans into increasingly expensive vehicles is really not going to solve anything. Dispersion and shifting humans from trigger pulling to C2 nodes makes far more sense.

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

The problem is you circle back to the entire reason IFVs were developed in the first place, IE what delivers you firepower in the event the squad runs into something nasty, or just needs a bit more ompf in the first place when delivering troops or performing its own combat missions. 

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1e3wslc/gopro_attached_to_a_ukrainian_m2_bradley_as_it/

There is clearly still a use for having something with the firepower capability, certainly the Ukrainians seem to think so. (I recall them pointing out they like the Stryker too, but consider it far more poorly armed in comparison) Seen enough Bradley footage of them tearing BTRs and infantry to pieces to know they are extremely useful on the battlefield.

(not being offensive here) What you just said encapsulates the backwards thinking we should be trying to fix going forward.  What you pointed out is that the super expensive, slow production, long logistics tail stuff we've made in the past aren't completely useless on today's battlefield.  That's a low bar to set.  What you have not done is presented an argument that competes with the notion that the old way should NOT be the new way.

There are other ways to provide infantry the close support it needs without also adding $1m to a vehicle that is probably going to be knocked out of action within a couple of uses.  UGVs and UAS, modified artillery concepts, autonomous robotics, less infantry (as TheCapt just chimed in with), etc. 

On top of that, you are also cherry picking the few incidents where IFVs have still performed their traditional missions and not weighed it against the times they were unable to.  Or considered how reluctant commanders might be to use their expensive IFVs because of the threat environment they face.

I'm not saying the "IFV is dead", as I do with MBTs, but I think this war has clearly shown they need a massive rethink.  My belief is that the infantry protection and mobility roles should be looked at without being weighted down by dogma that it also needs a big, expensive, all inclusive weapons system stuck onto it simply because that's the way it's been done for 40 years.

8 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

I entirely agree though that NATO needs more common vehicles. Think F-35 but for a family of ground vehicles that everyone can produce at scale. I really do think we can no longer rely on everyone having their specific niche vehicle, it simply does not translate to any scale production at all. The problem is convincing various defence companies to adopt a universal platform has been tricky in the past. Perhaps the reality of the situation might jog something down the line in Europe, especially with a potential US withdrawal of interest in the area. 

It's not so much that there has to be only one specific "pod" for infantry to ride in, but that should be an ideal to shoot for.  Instead, standards should be set for all companies to follow when designing infantry protection.  Materials, features, size, number of passengers, etc. could be standardized instead of being the hodge-podge approach it has always been.

Steve

[Kinophile]

Just to clarify, I wasnt suggesting BFC was misreading or misunderstanding the situation. I was noting that there will always be expensive platforms somewhere in the OOB, with protecting infantry practically guaranteeing at least one expensive vehicle type. The disproportionate cost of protecting v attacking is a function of warfare in itself.

Am I facetious if I note that a bulletproof vest with ceramic plates costs far more than a clip of bullets? Yet they are just a assumed cost in having infantry. Roman armor v arrows, etc. 

So something cheap (arrows - >FPV+) is always the threat, and the cost of protecting is sorta irrelevant because it's unavoidable. 

The nature of the protection and where the cost is spread is the real question, no? 

The current overwhelming emphasis is on the material body of the vehicle, protecting against attacking material. 

The issue with FPVs is not that they're cheap flying munitions but that they're very  controllable from a safe distance, ie indirect networked threat that can hit the static weak points of a platform at will. 

Current defenses are static (armor), passive (camouflage) or limited dynamic (APS)  but all are limited to the vehicle body itself, ie against direct material threats. The box is made stronger and tougher with each iteration but its still just a dumb metal box getting punched in the face, ear,  kidneys, etc. 

The vehicle must be able to organically protect itself outside itself. 

A platform mounted Drone CAP unit, slaved to the vehicles Defensive AI OS, might not require radar/emissions. Say 9 drone package mounted on the top of a Bradley-type - 3 in air at all times, 3 immediate reserve, and 3 charging/final back up. Automatic response, layered networked and autonomous defense without human intervention. Minimal additional logistics burden. 

A full rethink of the entire dumb box, into a smart box that can independently protect itself, is needed. 

 

Edited July 17 by Kinophile

[holoween]

8 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Just to clarify, I wasnt suggesting BFC was misreading or misunderstanding the situation. I was noting that there will always be expensive platforms somewhere in the OOB, with protecting infantry practically guaranteeing at least one expensive vehicle type. The disproportionate cost of protecting v attacking is a function of warfare in itself.

Am I facetious if I note that a bulletproof vest with ceramic plates costs far more than a clip of bullets? Yet they are just a assumed cost in having infantry. Roman armor v arrows, etc. 

So something cheap (arrows - >FPV+) is always the threat, and the cost of protecting is sorta irrelevant because it's unavoidable. 

The nature of the protection and where the cost is spread is the real question, no? 

The current overwhelming emphasis is on the material body of the vehicle, protecting against attacking material. 

The issue with FPVs is not that they're cheap flying munitions but that they're very  controllable from a safe distance. Current defenses are static (armor), passive (camouflage) or limited dynamic (APS)  but all are limited to the vehicle body itself.

The vehicle must be able to organically protect itself outside itself.

A platform mounted Drone CAP unit, slaved to the vehicles Defensive AI OS, might not require radar/emissions. Say 9 drone package mounted on the top of a Bradley-type - 3 in air at all times, 3 immediate reserve, and 3 charging/final back up. Automatic response, layered defense without human intervention. Minimal additional logistics burden. 

 

 

Why do you need an IFV for carrying drones?

If you can do everything with drones then putting them on a m113 equivalent gives you the same combat power for far cheaper.