How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Centurian52]

1 hour ago, chrisl said:

So if the camera moves at exactly the right (or really wrong) path, you can't see that the thing is flat.  So what.  Drones aren't going to just be moving in a straight line and not gimbaling the camera.  You're thinking too automotively.  You don't even need heuristics or assumptions if you have a reasonable IRU (which can be done on a chip) - you can fly around and build a 3D model.  My dentist does that realtime now with a stick that they wiggle around in my mouth to make crowns, instead of making a casting.

Tracking without doing individual frame by frame detection is not only possible, but there are multiple ways to do it.  Doing frame by frame and stitching sucks when you have low SNR or are near the resolution limit, but you can improve SNR by taking advantage of relative motion of the camera and scene.

There is definitely software that can build an accurate 3D model of an area based on data gathered from a moving camera. That is not a capability that an image-recognition AI would normally have. It isn't hard to image pairing the 3D modeling capability with the image recognition capability. But remember the first rule of AI. What's hard is easy, and what's easy is hard.

You'd need extra logic to prevent it from spitting out an answer other than "yep, there's a tank at the location of that flat rectangle in the 3D model". You might solve that by building a 3D model recognition AI. But it probably won't always be possible or practical to build a full 3D model, so you'll want to retain the flat image recognition software. But there will be cases where the image recognition software will say an object isn't a tank, while the 3D model software will say that it is a tank and visa-versa. Which do you train the overall program to trust?

For now I think the answer is manned-unmanned teaming (swarms of unmanned platforms controlled from a single manned command platform). If what's hard for humans is easy for AI, and what's easy for humans is hard for AI, then having them work together just makes sense (at least until we can figure out how to make what's easy for humans easy for AI). I think manned-unmanned teaming is the route we're going down in the near-term. It allows us to use AI on the battlefield right now, without having to wait for it to get more advanced, while effectively compensating for the weaknesses of modern AI. And it seems like a natural mid point between a fully manned force and a fully unmanned force (it seems plainly obvious to me that fully unmanned is the way things will be done in the far future).

For sure our 6th gen fighter program is going for manned-unmanned teaming. But I think ground warfare is going to go down that route as well sooner or later. Imagine a tank platoon, or possibly even a tank company, in which all of the actual "tanks" are UGVs and the only manned platform is the HQ vehicle. Or an artillery battery in which all of the guns are UGVs, with their fire directed from a single HQ vehicle. I could even imagine a mortar platoon in which all of the tubes are mounted on UGVs controlled remotely by a specialist from the company HQ.

Edited May 20 by Centurian52

[Battlefront.com]

12 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

There is definitely software that can build an accurate 3D model of an area based on data gathered from a moving camera. That is not a capability that an image-recognition AI would normally have. It isn't hard to image pairing the 3D modeling capability with the image recognition capability. But remember the first rule of AI. What's hard is easy, and what's easy is hard.

You'd need extra logic to prevent it from spitting out an answer other than "yep, there's a tank at the location of that flat rectangle in the 3D model". You might solve that by building a 3D model recognition AI. But it probably won't always be possible or practical to build a full 3D model, so you'll want to retain the flat image recognition software. But there will be cases where the image recognition software will say an object isn't a tank, while the 3D model software will say that it is a tank and visa-versa. Which do you train the overall program to trust?

For now I think the answer is manned-unmanned teaming (swarms of unmanned platforms controlled from a single manned command platform). If what's hard for humans is easy for AI, and what's easy for humans is hard for AI, then having them work together just makes sense (at least until we can figure out how to make what's easy for humans easy for AI). I think manned-unmanned teaming is the route we're going down in the near-term. It allows us to use AI on the battlefield right now, without having to wait for it to get more advanced, while effectively compensating for the weaknesses of modern AI. And it seems like a natural mid point between a fully manned force and a fully unmanned force (it seems plainly obvious to me that fully unmanned is the way things will be done in the far future).

For sure our 6th gen fighter program is going for manned-unmanned teaming. But I think ground warfare is going to go down that route as well sooner or later. Imagine a tank platoon, or possibly even a tank company, in which all of the actual "tanks" are UGVs and the only manned platform is the HQ vehicle. Or an artillery battery in which all of the guns are UGVs, with their fire directed from a single HQ vehicle. I could even imagine a mortar platoon in which all of the tubes are mounted on UGVs controlled remotely by a specialist from the company HQ.

Yeah, a mapping concept of sending drones out to scan the terrain makes a lot of sense.  It is something that's been around for a very long time, so definitely an option for some combat situations.  For example a prepared offensive or a defensive sector that is under repeated attacks.  What it isn't good for is far ranging searches for targets of opportunity.  That's where the volume of space to be scanned becomes a major problem.  But going out and scanning a 10km2 patch of earth to look for specific forms of enemy vehicles?  I don't see why that would be a problem for a bunch of cheap drones.

Steve

[chrisl]

38 minutes ago, dan/california said:

This is a long, fairly technical article about how apple puts together a three D scan of a room. A decent autonomous drone control system would a mostly analogous process.

And as Steve has been emphasizing, in a real war perfection is not a requirement.

Some time ago I spent a bunch of time at work talking to one of the metrology guys about photogrammetry, which at the time took a special camera and software, coded stickers, calibrated sticks, and the like, and cost about $70K for the hardware.  I think about 5 years later you could get pretty decent performance from a $1000 iphone without any of the extra stuff.

[chrisl]

34 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

There is definitely software that can build an accurate 3D model of an area based on data gathered from a moving camera. That is not a capability that an image-recognition AI would normally have. It isn't hard to image pairing the 3D modeling capability with the image recognition capability. But remember the first rule of AI. What's hard is easy, and what's easy is hard.

You'd need extra logic to prevent it from spitting out an answer other than "yep, there's a tank at the location of that flat rectangle in the 3D model". You might solve that by building a 3D model recognition AI. But it probably won't always be possible or practical to build a full 3D model, so you'll want to retain the flat image recognition software. But there will be cases where the image recognition software will say an object isn't a tank, while the 3D model software will say that it is a tank and visa-versa. Which do you train the overall program to trust?

For now I think the answer is manned-unmanned teaming (swarms of unmanned platforms controlled from a single manned command platform). If what's hard for humans is easy for AI, and what's easy for humans is hard for AI, then having them work together just makes sense (at least until we can figure out how to make what's easy for humans easy for AI). I think manned-unmanned teaming is the route we're going down in the near-term. It allows us to use AI on the battlefield right now, without having to wait for it to get more advanced, while effectively compensating for the weaknesses of modern AI. And it seems like a natural mid point between a fully manned force and a fully unmanned force (it seems plainly obvious to me that fully unmanned is the way things will be done in the far future).

For sure our 6th gen fighter program is going for manned-unmanned teaming. But I think ground warfare is going to go down that route as well sooner or later. Imagine a tank platoon, or possibly even a tank company, in which all of the actual "tanks" are UGVs and the only manned platform is the HQ vehicle. Or an artillery battery in which all of the guns are UGVs, with their fire directed from a single HQ vehicle. I could even imagine a mortar platoon in which all of the tubes are mounted on UGVs controlled remotely by a specialist from the company HQ.

I don't know that you even need it to build much of a 3D model - it just needs to do a simple dimensional evaluation: is it flat or not flat?  And as Steve points out, you're not limited to visible spectrum single image data.  You can ask "does it move/not move?", "is it hot/not hot?", and more without a lot of sophisticated model buildup, and then you feed it to a classifier that decides what to do with it.

Edited May 20 by chrisl

[Battlefront.com]

17 minutes ago, chrisl said:

I don't know that you even need it to build much of a 3D model - it just needs to do a simple dimensional evaluation: is it flat or not flat?  And as Steve points out, you're not limited to visible spectrum single image data.  You can ask "does it move/not move?", "is it hot/not hot?", and more without a lot of sophisticated model buildup, and then you feed it to a classifier that decides what to do with it.

The LRAS3 system that all CMSF2 and CMBS players are familiar with has a stored library of heat signatures.  IIRC the system is sensitive enough to know the difference between a T-55 and a T-62, for example.

Steve

[poesel]

The solution to this 'billboard problem' is to fly a half circle around each target as standard practice. You might want to do that anyway to get a better attack angle.

Additionally, you train the model with pictures of tanks on billboards.

Btw, how long do you think would a billboard last on the battlefield?

[Haiduk]

What happens, if you set tank speed as "fast" for minecleaning with a tank plow. Russian "barn-tank" likley retreated on full speed and its plow just drove over the mines too fast, so mines blew up under the tracks. It's amazing one crewman has survived

 

[Haiduk]

New batch of YPR-765 from Netherlands, equipped with more protected combat modules.

These Cold War YPR/M113 showed itself as perfect "combat taxi" - cheap - without surplus high-tech features, well-protected, well-offroad and with proper space inside for equipped soldiers. We need hundreds and thousands of them. 

 

 

[danfrodo]

war stuff here today, some of it already seen on this thread.  Video of new, young RU war widow crying and asking if anyone has seen her husband who's been pronounced dead on the Kharkiv front.  I suspect by tomorrow she'll realize she is supposed to be paid nicely for this (but good luck collecting).  Maybe her hubby was conscripted.  Maybe he thought he'd make some easy money raping and pillaging and murdering his way thru Ukraine.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2024/5/20/2241700/-Russian-stuff-blowing-up-Ukraine-sinks-a-Russian-missile-cruiser?pm_campaign=front_page&pm_source=trending&pm_medium=web

 

[cesmonkey]

Russian telegrammer WarGonzo admits not everything is going well on the Kharkiv front for the Russians:
https://t.me/wargonzo/20053
 

Quote

Does the Ukrainian Armed Forces have the potential to turn the situation around on the Kharkov front?

I’ll answer right away – of course there is. And these are not my abstract guesses, but real front-line mathematics, which I tried to study while traveling the last few days along the roads of the Kharkov border area. So, to begin with, let us briefly outline what we have by May 21 based on the results of our offensive actions in this direction. A number of border villages were taken, our troops took them, as they say, in a swoop, they used the effect of surprise, the enemy frankly missed our breakthrough. Until the enemy woke up and came to his senses from this front-line hook, in the first couple of days the losses of our troops were truly minimal, however, the enemy was not knocked out and began to snap back. Snarling is painful and sometimes powerful, and our losses have increased accordingly.

Of our serious successes, it is important to note the breakthrough to Liptsy (we approached the northern outskirts) and entry into Volchansk, where we gained a foothold in the center of the city, practically along the line of the river dividing it in half. This is from the good. The bad thing is that it becomes more and more difficult to advance further every day. Necessary and full-fledged rotations of personnel, saturation of occupied territories with troops and guns after almost two weeks of intense fighting - sometimes become impossible - due to massive artillery fire and the saturation of the front with enemy FPV drones, which, we recall, according to the estimates of many military commanders, are playing in this war, if not a determining role, then at least very close to it.

Plus, I must admit honestly - the enemy managed to quickly saturate the Kharkov front not only with FPV drones, but also with reserves and artillery units hastily transferred here. If at the beginning of the offensive operation there was relative parity in these indicators (manpower, artillery, drones), now the numerical superiority - and this is obvious to everyone at the front - is on the enemy’s side. 27 battalions were deployed near Volchansk alone, while the enemy was defending rather than attacking.

You can talk as much as you like about the quality and motivation of the personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other armed rabble, but now there is every reason to believe that the enemy forces massed in the Kharkov direction may be enough to try to catch us on the opposite move and seize the initiative. It is not necessary that the enemy will decide to do this, but there are certainly such risks, they must be taken into account and be prepared for such a scenario too. There are also problematic issues in the Liptsy region, where our troops are deeply wedged into enemy territory and have formed a kind of ledge (similar to Torsky and Vremevsky). To sum it up, our successes are very glorious, but engaging in dangerous auto-training in the spirit - the enemy is running, only our heels are shining, tomorrow we will be near Kharkov - may be fraught with danger for ourselves. You can make mistakes, you cannot deceive yourself.

Semyon Pegov especially for the project@wargonzo

 

[zinz]

Quote

Pressures from the war in Ukraine are reportedly contributing to a massive staff shortage in Russia's internal security forces. The Interior Ministry is said to be short of 152,000 staff. As a result, it is reportedly "paralysed" and unable to do its job of fighting crime.

The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reports that Interior Ministry head Vladimir Kolokoltsev recently told Russia's Federation Council (the Russian legislature's upper house) that his ministry was short of 152,000 personnel. This figure had increased by 150% in the last 6 months. 

This follows reports last year about tens of thousands of vacancies in the Ministry of the Interior (MVD), with many policemen and other security personnel quitting to find better prospects elsewhere. The situation appears to have got worse since then. 

According to an Interior Ministry source, this is due to a combination of cumbersome recruitment processes, competition from the military due to better salaries being offered to go and fight in Ukraine, and a steady exodus of demoralised employees.

New employees must pass a military-medical examination and obtain various pieces of paperwork for employment (presumably for vetting purposes), which takes 6 months. Once they join, they must undergo 6 months of training. It therefore takes a year for them to be operational.

Excessive bureaucracy and mismanagement within the MVD are also cited as factors. According to VChK-OGPU's source, the flow of resignations increased after it became clear that Kolokoltsev would be staying in his position.

"The reason for this is the fact that [the MVD's] work is completely paralysed, employees are puzzled by tasks unfamiliar to them, as well as instead of a real fight against crime there is paperwork, assignments, checks, and reports."

The Interior Ministry's problems illustrate how the pressures of the war in Ukraine are hollowing out other elements of the Russian state. As previously reported, the result has been a rise in crime, with many serious offences including rape and murder going unsolved. /end

Source:
https://t.me/vchkogpu/48292

https://mastodon.social/@ChrisO_wiki/112472540071030065

Kind of to be expected that especially members of security / police etc. Are going to the war in Ukraine and dying there. These are missing inside Russia now. 

[danfrodo]

8 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Russian telegrammer WarGonzo admits not everything is going well on the Kharkiv front for the Russians:
https://t.me/wargonzo/20053
 

 

Hilarious.  Calls UKR forces an 'armed rabble', which is as unintentionally ironic and completely non-self aware as one can get.  Then the usual RU psuedo-dostoyevsky type philosophical mismatch, at the end of which is says 'you cannot deceive yourself'. -- really?  

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, zinz said:

https://mastodon.social/@ChrisO_wiki/112472540071030065

Kind of to be expected that especially members of security / police etc. Are going to the war in Ukraine and dying there. These are missing inside Russia now. 

The only surprise here is that this information is out there for us to see.  Which is curious.

As for the shortages, I know I was predicting this back in 2022 when they were actively poaching MVD officers into the armed forces.  And let's not forget MVD units are also tasked with security operations within Ukraine, which means their manpool needed to expand to cover its new duties.  Instead it's shrinking.

This was not hard to predict.  Both MVD and MoD services appeal to "alpha males" and there's only so many of those available at any given period of time.  This number is reduced by age, physical fitness requirements and some threshold for basic competency (i.e. not clinically insane, not a drug addict, able to follow orders, etc.).

I'm sure what's also going on is someone who might want to be a cop, but not a soldier, is concerned that if he goes to become a cop he might be turned into a soldier.  This is a real and valid concern as a) the Russian government can not be trusted and b) the MVD already put its units into combat situations in 2022 with disastrous results.

Another complication I can imagine being in play here is Russia's vast size and ethnic makeup.  Most law enforcement positions are local in nature, so specific areas might be worse off than others.  For example, it would probably take a lot of incentives to get someone from Moscow to take a position in small city outside of Vladivostok (or vice versa). 

Steve

[sburke]

23 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This number is reduced by age, physical fitness requirements and some threshold for basic competency (i.e. not clinically insane, not a drug addict, able to follow orders, etc.

Steve

I am not sure those are considered a negative factor anymore.  In fact those just might be the folks they want now....

[Battlefront.com]

9 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Russian telegrammer WarGonzo admits not everything is going well on the Kharkiv front for the Russians:
https://t.me/wargonzo/20053
 

 

That's a funny read, but there were some valid points buried in with the turds.

1.  Their offensive stalled out because Ukraine's defenses solid

2.  Russian losses were initially light, but now they are significant

3.  Any further offensive action will likely be slow and costly

4.  The fighting has gone on long enough that rotations are necessary.  This will make it even harder to increase frontline troop strength

5.  There is a risk of Ukraine conducting local counter offensives and, potentially, reversing some of Russia's gains

And yet, his overall message is that Russia will soon be at the gates of Kharkiv.  Funny stuff.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Just now, sburke said:

I am not sure those are considered a negative factor anymore.  In fact those just might be the folks they want now....

For the MoD, where life expectancy is short and expended pointlessly, sure.  No doubt the MVD will lower their standards, and in fact that was mentioned in the article, but there's only so low they can go.  In the MoD you only have to suffer through the rejects for a month or two before they get killed or wounded, with the MVD the point of recruiting someone is to have them for years.  A drug addict that doesn't show up for work isn't something they can work around.

Steve

[sburke]

Russia Arrests Top Commander Who Slammed Putin's Military (msn.com)

A senior Russian commander who criticized the Russian military and its treatment of soldiers operating in southern Ukraine has been arrested, Russian state media reported on Tuesday.

Major General Ivan Popov, who had headed Russia's 58th Army, was "arrested on suspicion of fraud," Russian state news agency, Tass, reported, citing a law enforcement spokesperson.

Popov was removed from his command of Russian troops in Ukraine's annexed southern Zaporizhzhia region In July 2023 after he criticized the Russian Defense Ministry for failing to provide sufficient support for the country's fighters.

Popov condemned what he called a "lack of counter-battery combat," too few resources to scout for artillery and the "mass deaths" of Russian soldiers.
In a recording published to social media by Russian MP and former military commander Andrei Gurulyov, Popov—appearing to be addressing his troops—said he had "raised a number of other problems" to the top of Russia's military command, and was dismissed by then-Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu.

"The senior chiefs apparently sensed some kind of danger from me," Popov said.

[kimbosbread]

10 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Russian telegrammer WarGonzo admits not everything is going well on the Kharkiv front for the Russians:

…due to massive artillery fire and the saturation of the front with enemy FPV drones, which, we recall, according to the estimates of many military commanders, are playing in this war, if not a determining role, then at least very close to it.

But muh guns!

[The Steppenwulf]

39 minutes ago, sburke said:

Russia Arrests Top Commander Who Slammed Putin's Military (msn.com)

A senior Russian commander who criticized the Russian military and its treatment of soldiers operating in southern Ukraine has been arrested, Russian state media reported on Tuesday.

Major General Ivan Popov, who had headed Russia's 58th Army, was "arrested on suspicion of fraud," Russian state news agency, Tass, reported, citing a law enforcement spokesperson.

Popov was removed from his command of Russian troops in Ukraine's annexed southern Zaporizhzhia region In July 2023 after he criticized the Russian Defense Ministry for failing to provide sufficient support for the country's fighters.

Popov condemned what he called a "lack of counter-battery combat," too few resources to scout for artillery and the "mass deaths" of Russian soldiers.
In a recording published to social media by Russian MP and former military commander Andrei Gurulyov, Popov—appearing to be addressing his troops—said he had "raised a number of other problems" to the top of Russia's military command, and was dismissed by then-Defense Minister, Sergei Shoigu.

"The senior chiefs apparently sensed some kind of danger from me," Popov said.

Since Prig - perhaps even before his outbursts - but especially following his insurrection, the Kremlin has been gripped with fear about the potential of any top brass in the TOA "going rogue".

I'd suggest the main reason we haven't ever seen large localised downing of arms from the RA rank and file is due to command and control exerted by the leadership in the field (as one would expect). But when we reach a point where these individuals are no longer toeing the line, voicing dissenting views, that's when the dominoes are at most risk of tipping. 

After Prig, the Kremlin is on high alert (with immediate consequences) for any dissenting senior staff. 

Edited May 21 by The Steppenwulf

[billbindc]

For those folks who think there's anything like stability within the Russian state:

 

[sburke]

1 hour ago, The Steppenwulf said:

Since Prig - perhaps even before his outbursts - but especially following his insurrection, the Kremlin has been gripped with fear about the potential of any top brass in the TOA "going rogue".

I'd suggest the main reason we haven't ever seen large localised downing of arms from the RA rank and file is due to command and control exerted by the leadership in the field (as one would expect). But when we reach a point where these individuals are no longer toeing the line, voicing dissenting views, that's when the dominoes are at most risk of tipping. 

After Prig, the Kremlin is on high alert (with immediate consequences) for any dissenting senior staff. 

I think this is also Putin "cleaning house" after the election of any hint of disloyalty.

[billbindc]

"The Putin regime may not seem weak on the surface, but its stability is a mirage produced by the repression it exerts."
 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/theory-victory-ukraine

[dan/california]

8 minutes ago, billbindc said:

"The Putin regime may not seem weak on the surface, but its stability is a mirage produced by the repression it exerts."
 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/theory-victory-ukraine

Quote

TO ACHIEVE VICTORY, STOP FEARING IT

From the same article.

[MikeyD]

A historical question. What prompted Russia to withdraw from Afghanistan, and can we draw any conclusions from it in regard to the future of Ukraine? How is it similar? How is it dissimilar? We've had plenty of similar debates circling around why the US withdrew from (Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, etc etc etc).

[A Canadian Cat]

40 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

A historical question. What prompted Russia to withdraw from Afghanistan, and can we draw any conclusions from it in regard to the future of Ukraine? How is it similar? How is it dissimilar? We've had plenty of similar debates circling around why the US withdrew from (Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, etc etc etc).

My understanding was it was $ and upset citizens (especially mothers of casualties). 

On the subject of $ back then, like now, the war cost a lot and it was effecting people's standard of living which they didn't like. But unlike now there was no "deal" with citizens to improve their standard of living so it wasn't as serious an issue back then.

On the subject of upset citizens, there were protest groups protesting the loss of their loved ones. This was tolerated since it wasn't viewed as direct challenge to the authority of the Kremlin. It got out of hand especially combined with the previous issue. Or there was a concern in the Kremlin it could get out of hand. Since they didn't view the Afghanistan conflict as existential they could pull back. Note they kept control of key parts of the country for a while after the pull out. The Najibullah government lasted for several years without the issues of the Soviet occupation.

Putin could be facing the same pressures except he learned from the Afghan war and the fall of the Soviet Union. All protests are a direct challenge to his authority, period. He has been dealing with all protest harshly from the beginning. He also realized that if the people don't know the truth then they cannot complain about it. Hence his work from the start to take the old Soviet "you cannot trust any source as correct" propaganda method but dialed up to 11 and combined with just covering up the number of casualties.

Back in the Afghan war the "loss" of the war was not existential to the Kremlin - they started it to quell Islamic unrest. While the loss itself seemed bad they really maintained control for a long time after they pulled out through their usual proxy arrangement so it didn't seem so important compared to the cost any more.

Whereas this current war is existential to Putin since he made it that way when he started.

That's the Cole's notes from memory.

My take away is that Putin learned the lessons of that part of history well and applied them here.