How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[zinz]

8 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

This is a mistake we have seen western pundits make repeatedly, these are far too large muscle movements for the RA of 2024.  First off, there is no "surprise" left anymore.  It has been reported that the UA saw this one coming well out but were either restricted by ROEs or simply did not have the resources to stop right at the border.

The RA is not able to do "drives" at this point.  They do not have the logistics nor combat power to sustain it.  Nor do they seem able to exploit any "fixing".

Surprise is still very much a factor. Surprise of timing and action or inaction. Sure as soon something moves it's seen by the enemy. But look back at the Ukrainian counter offensive in Kharkiv. Russians knew about the buildup of troops but were still surprised by Ukraine actually attacking them. 

And also this tries to reason why from a Russian perspective they are choosing these options. Not if Russia is able to achieve them or if it's objectively a good option. 

[photon]

37 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Since the start of the Kharkiv move it looked to me to designed to get the Luhansk front moving (at a minimum) and not the other theorized reasons (buffer, taking Kharkiv, blitzing to London, etc).  Accepting that premise the question is why they felt opening up a long closed section of front was necessary?  The obvious answer is that they didn't think they could move the front in any significant way using their usual strategy of costly fights over a few KMs of ground. 

The more alarming explanation is that they think they can sustain more resource sucking frontal assaults on the theory that they will run Ukraine out of something critical (manpower? western willpower?) first. The west seems allergic to the idea of any resource sucking frontal assaults, so perhaps the Russian theory of victory is the establishment of resource-sucking-frontal-assault supremacy?

My understanding of Soviet doctrine was that you reinforce success to produce operational breakthroughs, and the tear around in your enemy's backfield causing havoc. If you take the very idea of "operational breakthroughs" off the table, which I think makes sense given what we've seen, what does that operational art become?

Let's say we're convinced that no amount of success will produce an operational breakthrough (and I'm pretty much there; you'd have to blow a hole in the enemy lines that's like fifty kilometers wide to be able to exploit it without something carving up your logistics train, and at that point you've probably already won the war). If echeloning your reserve units to develop breakthroughs isn't a thing anymore, what do you do with reserve units?

Edited May 23 by photon

[The_Capt]

24 minutes ago, Ts4EVER said:

To me this kind of depends on China.

Possibly.  But how far does China want to get pulled into this thing.  Sustaining a half a million Russians in the field in the modern environment costs billions.  I don’t think China is interested in free loans and aid on those levels.  They are willing to sell but how long can Russia buy?

[Battlefront.com]

28 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So the Russian military strategy really is feeling like a Big Bluff by this point.  Look mean, big and bottomless.  This has led to an "always attack, always be seen attacking" approach in order to keep the "weak kneed west" shaking and doubting - we saw it here on this forum.  So if the RA is starting to run out of any or all of those elements they need to shift "always be seen attacking" to another area where they can get juice for squeeze.  This Kharkiv thing was noted for being largely dismounted and light on support, it was low hanging fruit.  Now we may see RA bites elsewhere as they keep trying to take nibbles and sell them as bites.  This all makes a lot of sense if they are running out of gas on the main effort down south.

Exactly.  Think about what we just saw.  Russia invested a massive amount of resources into Avdiivka and achieved a "breakthrough".  Shortly after they launched a large scale series of tactical offensives across most of the front, including the relatively quiet south.  They grabbed some additional bits of terrain, but also lost a lot of resources in the process.  In the end, Ukraine's defenses held and Russia was largely exhausted.  All of this while Ukraine was starved for military and civilian aid.  Then came news that the US was back in the giving mood.

Russia's only hope of "victory" has been Ukraine giving up.  That was true on the first day of this war right through to today.  If Russia recognizes that its standard methodology isn't going to make that happen, then it will need to do something else.  Having Ukraine view Russia as being strategically defeated means an end to Russia's one hope of "victory", therefore it *MUST* find a new way to convince Ukraine it can't win.  That seems to be the Kharkiv move which, unfortunately for Russia, was quickly squashed.

28 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So the next question - how long can they keep this up?

We always return to this question because it's always the one that matters given Russia's strategy of wearing out Ukraine before it wears itself out.

I don't see Russia having much left that it can do that it hasn't already done or doing now or is capable of doing.  We might finally be seeing the start of the end game.  The cleaning house of the MoD may not be unrelated.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

20 minutes ago, photon said:

The more alarming explanation is that they think they can sustain more resource sucking frontal assaults on the theory that they will run Ukraine out of something critical (manpower? western willpower?) first. The west seems allergic to the idea of any resource sucking frontal assaults, so perhaps the Russian theory of victory is the establishment of resource-sucking-frontal-assault supremacy?

My understanding of Soviet doctrine was that you reinforce success to produce operational breakthroughs, and the tear around in your enemy's backfield causing havoc. If you take the very idea of "operational breakthroughs" off the table, which I think makes sense given what we've seen, what does that operational art become?

This is what Russia has been doing pretty much since the start of the war, but massively so since the end of 2022 with Bakhmut.  The Soviet concept of "operational art" has failed repeatedly.  We've even wondered if the Western concept of "maneuver warfare" would have a shot at working, so we must remind ourselves that this may not be a legacy Soviet problem alone.

20 minutes ago, photon said:

et's say we're convinced that no amount of success will produce an operational breakthrough (and I'm pretty much there; you'd have to blow a hole in the enemy lines that's like a fifty kilometers wide to be able to exploit it without something carving up your logistics train, and at that point you've probably already won the war). If echeloning your reserve units to develop breakthroughs isn't a thing anymore, what do you do with reserve units?

Russia has already shown us the answer... you feed your reserves into the meat grinder hoping that will do the trick.  We saw this with Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and probably thousands of localized operations.  Russia has, up to this point, had enough to achieve a breakthrough (sometimes!) but never enough to exploit it because the exploitation forces were wrecked making the breakthrough.

Steve

[zinz]

6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

We always return to this question because it's always the one that matters given Russia's strategy of wearing out Ukraine before it wears itself out.

It's an attritional war right now. 

[zinz]

https://mastodon.social/@MAKS23/112490580627635439

Quote

Yesterday, 5 ATACMS missiles struck the positions of the Russian air defence in Mospino, Donetsk region, - RU source

 

2 S-300/400 launchers destroyed;

1 S-300/400 launcher damaged;

Radar "96L6E" destroyed;

S-300/400 control point destroyed.

Russian air defense. So hot right now. 

 

In the past Russia was moving air defense systems from Kaliningrad and the far east to Ukraine. Do we know of any recent movements? 

Edit more pics :

https://mastodon.social/@noelreports@mstdn.social/112490693861087410

Edited May 23 by zinz

[danfrodo]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is what Russia has been doing pretty much since the start of the war, but massively so since the end of 2022 with Bakhmut.  The Soviet concept of "operational art" has failed repeatedly.  We've even wondered if the Western concept of "maneuver warfare" would have a shot at working, so we must remind ourselves that this may not be a legacy Soviet problem alone.

Russia has already shown us the answer... you feed your reserves into the meat grinder hoping that will do the trick.  We saw this with Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and probably thousands of localized operations.  Russia has, up to this point, had enough to achieve a breakthrough (sometimes!) but never enough to exploit it because the exploitation forces were wrecked making the breakthrough.

Steve

I am sticking to my theory that this is all just Putin saying "attack, attack, attack".  Then getting mad because it fails.  So someone says "maybe we attack somewhere else" and they go do it.  And it fails.  So then he gets mad and starts firing everyone.  And now he'll have even less militarily-savvy folks running the military, who will probably lean toward the same things as before but with even less skill.  Attack attack attack and launch even more terrorism strikes on civilians.  

My ongoing question is whether Putin will burn up enough resources such that UKR can actually do something offensively, somewhere.  Will a RU artillery & soldier shortage lead to weakened sections of the front?  Could weak areas be exploited, considering mines & drones?  

On the earlier discussion about RU breaking up, I am pretty sure China wants a nice peaceful breakup that leaves all those eastern provinces independent but also quite reliant on China for trade & arms & loans.  Those eastern provinces have yummy fossil fuels.  So china would get RU threat off its border and get cheap energy.  

[The_Capt]

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is what Russia has been doing pretty much since the start of the war, but massively so since the end of 2022 with Bakhmut.  The Soviet concept of "operational art" has failed repeatedly.  We've even wondered if the Western concept of "maneuver warfare" would have a shot at working, so we must remind ourselves that this may not be a legacy Soviet problem alone.

This is pretty much where I am at for this war at least - manoeuvre is essentially dead (or perhaps dormant).  We know western-style manoeuvre did not work last summer and likely will not under these conditions.  Even if the RA could manage a breakout, modern ISR would pin it pretty quickly and those deep battle forces would effectively be surrounded by a bunch of PGM armed resistance.  The UA is too connected and integrated in defence.  And here is the thing, I am not so sure the UA would not risk suffering the same fate at this point if they managed to achieve breakout.  The RA may have different emphasis but their ISR is still effective and they have PGM too.

So we are really back to WW1 games here - attrition/exhaustion. This is really engineering systemic collapses on an opponent through longer term front end attrition or corrosive warfare in depth.  Neither side is going to be able to pull off a "drive" anywhere until the other side suffers catastrophic internal failures.

[LongLeftFlank]

21 hours ago, hcrof said:

Drones launching drones, to clear a minefield no less...

Looks like a pretty early prototype but good to see the forum stays one step ahead of reality!

 

[Haiduk]

A pressure on Presiden't Administration is continuing. I hope, this will bring result on background of position UK and France (though on the words for now)

Indeed, ATACMS already seveal times hit Russians in "their" "sacral" Crimea and no nuclear strikes on Wasshington yet.

 

Edited May 23 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

Strange information form UKR TG  - UKR troops allegedly abandoned Krynky, but advanced, seized new territory and gain foothold in other place. 

Reaction or Russian TG:

Nobody known either they abandoned positions or not. They sat in the house basements near the river bank. To reach this place we have to overcome enough large distance over open skies, filled by drones. Maybe they really have gone, but this hasn't any sense for us. The can to return so easy as they leaved. 

[Haiduk]

Russian squad sailed to land on recently liberated by Ukrainians Nestryha island oppose to Hola Prystan' in Kherson oblast. But work of 123rd TD brigade finished their raid by these acrobatic trics. "Birds on Magyar" have spotted results and finished survivors by FPVs.

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

And here is the thing, I am not so sure the UA would not risk suffering the same fate at this point if they managed to achieve breakout.  The RA may have different emphasis but their ISR is still effective and they have PGM too.

The only realistic way the UA could breakthrough the Russians is if the RA collapses.  Such an event would dramatically alter the status quo and so I'd say "all bets are off".

Steve

[cyrano01]

At a slight tangent; thinking about the need for the West's military to adjust its thinking about how to attack in the face of  developing technologies and the evidence of the war in Ukraine. I was strongly reminded of The_Capt's comments on the likelihood of them failing to do so, while watching this on the subject of similar failures by the militaries of 1914 - there is not much new under the sun.

 

https://youtube.com/clip/UgkxqdauNaUaVdyrgT5FxmJikhd2cHb8Dphm?si=w8OJNPoxj4kqy9sF

Edited May 23 by cyrano01

[Haiduk]

Allegedle plan of Russian troops in current operation on the north of Kharkiv oblast. 

Troops of 6th CAA and 11th Army Corps from the north capture Vovchansk and advance south along the water reservoir of Siverskyi Donets river. Simultainoulsly (or with some delay) troops of 1st Tank army comes from the east to Oskol river and cut off the road Shevchenkove - Kupiansk. Next is encirtclement of Kupiansk group of UKR troops. 

Russian advance in Vovchansk now is bogged. But from the east Russians attack through captured Kyslivka village along railroad toward Kupinask-Vuzlovyi.

 

[Eddy]

https://mastodon.social/@MAKS23/112491319767010989

Quote

110th brigade shot down another Russian Su-25.

That's the fifth claimed since 4th May.

Edited May 23 by Eddy

[Haiduk]

5 minutes ago, Eddy said:

https://mastodon.social/@MAKS23/112491319767010989

That's the fifth since 4th May.

Still no confirmations. Just in one case brigade showed a photo of large smoke on the ground, which was claimed as fallen down Su-25

[Haiduk]

Russians pretty effectively use newest Kh-38 missile-bombs (similar to French Hammer) against AD and radar assets. During two weeks they managed to hit several radars and launchers. In this time newest MR-18 readar was destroyed. If we had more SHORAD, Russian drone couldn't track this target for the strike  

 

[Haiduk]

Maybe "Tsyclon" missile corvette realy has sank

 

[Haiduk]

Jawa Crowler from Star Wars %)

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Allegedle plan of Russian troops in current operation on the north of Kharkiv oblast. 

Troops of 6th CAA and 11th Army Corps from the north capture Vovchansk and advance south along the water reservoir of Siverskyi Donets river. Simultainoulsly (or with some delay) troops of 1st Tank army comes from the east to Oskol river and cut off the road Shevchenkove - Kupiansk. Next is encirtclement of Kupiansk group of UKR troops. 

Russian advance in Vovchansk now is bogged. But from the east Russians attack through captured Kyslivka village along railroad toward Kupinask-Vuzlovyi.

 

OK, the intention of the attack is not surprising. 

It is about 60km from Martove (on the east side of the basin) to Kupyansk.  The terrain is mostly fields with modest amounts of tree plants.  There is what looks to be an important east/west road coming through Prymorske at the south tip of the basin.  Disrupting that would not be good.

What's the current state of the fighting on the east side of the basin?  It looks like they might still be 10km from Martove.

Steve

[poesel]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This could be what is happening.  The narrative could be "we found out how corrupt these guys were.  Which explains how bad the state of the military is".  In theory this shouldnt be a viable message because for 2+ years Putin has been singing their praise and bragging about how well the SMO is going.  But this is Russia and Putin is the Tzar, so this sort of dot connecting is rather alien to their cultural makeup.

"We were always at war with Eurasia" - there is really no problem explaining that to the Russians, since the English guy wrote the handbook.

[A Canadian Cat]

10 minutes ago, poesel said:

"We were always at war with Eurasia" - there is really no problem explaining that to the Russians, since the English guy wrote the handbook.

LOL Yeah, I often think of 1984 when reading the propaganda coming out of the Kremlin.

[Eddy]

https://bsky.app/profile/noelreports.bsky.social/post/3kt6epdd7os2j

Quote

The 110th Mechanized Brigade reports that yesterday and today, two Su-25 fighter jets were shot down. In recent weeks, 6 Su-fighters were claimed to be shot down.

Make that 6 claimed since 4th of May.