How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Offshoot]

52 minutes ago, Kraft said:

Also since I cant edit my original post anymore, just an innacuracy on my part, these arent international legion they are 'chosen company' international volunteers who are integrated into 59th. Canadians, Americans, a Swede and a japanease fighter. Also while Im at it, if translations dont work the fighter who got shot by the Machine Gunner (in the head?) Survived but was badly wounded.

Sounds like (one of) the go-pro guys is British and I'm sure I heard a New Zealander (possibly Australian) in there ("Oh, yup"; the guy warning about the dud grenade in the trench).

[Ts4EVER]

1 hour ago, Kinophile said:

So this thread is now called, "How Hot is The American General Election Gonna Get?"... 

Just so I'm clear. For myself. 

 

I have to admit that I have reached a point of helpless apathy in regards to this topic. I had already concluded that American democracy (and by extension that in much of the west) was probably a dead man walking back in 2016, both because of the Trump victory and the "not my president" protests following it. The 2020 insurrection just confirmed this.

You simply can not run a democracy if people do not believe that the results of elections are beyond doubt. It's like running a monarchy if people don't believe that you can inherit power by blood. The whole succession of power becomes unworkable. In my mind the fatal mistake was probably not implementing some kind of "new deal" after the 2008 crisis and the failure of the "Occupy" movement. That led to a situation where the only perspective for any kind of "better world" for most people came from the right (however unrealistic it might be) and the left was forced to play the part of "leave everything as is, but maybe a bit better in some places (if possible, maybe not, we will see)." That is like conceding the initiative on the battlefield and lead us to the present situation.

[Grigb]

3 hours ago, pintere said:

Did that one Russian at the end (he had no weapon) really just run into the Legionnaires‘ trench and surrender? I didn’t see what happened to him after he hopped in. 

AFAIR, it was so called Z military reporter aka field propagandist. That's why he was without weapons. During the firefight he got confused and ran toward Legionnaires as he thought they are RU (they were not shooting at him). He realized his mistake when Legionnaires shouted to him to surrender (you can see exact moment on video), so he ran back. I do not remember what happened to him after that. 

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

So this thread is now called, "How Hot is The American General Election Gonna Get?"... 

Just so I'm clear. For myself. 

 

Yeah... it's obviously a touchy subject.

I think the diversion into American domestic situation has served its purposes for this thread.  The takeaways are the usual:

1. The GOP is not what it used to be, namely anti-foreign strong policy, anti-military, and anti-trade
2. Due to quirks in the US political system, coupled with weak/defective leadership, things have ground to a halt
3. Pretty much no chance of a Ukrainian aid package any time soon, perhaps not until after the election
4. If Trump becomes President again it's not certain what will actually happy vis-a-vis NATO
5. What is certain is if Trump becomes President all financial assistance to Ukraine will cease no matter what
6. If Trump does not get elected, the makeup of the House and Senate will determine how easy a time the next President has aiding Ukraine

That's pretty much all this thread needs to know.  So let's move back on topic.

Steve

[Mike Churchmoor]

If one should have free time during tomorrow and/or next Thursday, National Defence University of Finland is hosting a Russia seminar: https://maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu.fi/en/russia-seminar with quite interesting themes, topics and speakers: https://maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu.fi/en/russia-seminar/programme   

Both days are streamed (if not hacked / interrupted by vatniks https://www.youtube.com/@Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu/streams

[Bulletpoint]

6 hours ago, Kraft said:

Also while Im at it, if translations dont work the fighter who got shot by the Machine Gunner (in the head?) Survived but was badly wounded.

Good if he survived. I must say I thought he was killed instantly from the way he dropped.

Also, that group was either very lucky that three kamikaze drone strikes caused so little damage, or they had more casualties off-camera than the video admits.

[Holien]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

That's pretty much all this thread needs to know.  So let's move back on topic.

Steve

I appreciated the diversion as it was useful to understand the possible risks.

Thanks for letting it divert a tad...

Lots can happen from now to November so it is not certain the Orange liar can win.

The good out of this is that Europe seems to still be engaged and supporting Ukraine and will realise that they might have to go it alone.

Ukraine now needs to cut it's cloth to what they have on hand and if we can keep on supplying enough long range missiles and perhaps new airframes the corrosive warfare can continue to hurt Russia even if the possibility of regaining terrority is less likely.

[Beleg85]

5 hours ago, Mike Churchmoor said:

If one should have free time during tomorrow and/or next Thursday, National Defence University of Finland is hosting a Russia seminar: https://maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu.fi/en/russia-seminar with quite interesting themes, topics and speakers: https://maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu.fi/en/russia-seminar/programme   

Both days are streamed (if not hacked / interrupted by vatniks https://www.youtube.com/@Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu/streams

Also, Nammo reportedly started another shift in 155mm production (for Ukraine?). I heard somewhere good opinions about this ammo from one of Krab crews. Good, albeit still far from UA needs.

 

6 hours ago, Grigb said:

AFAIR, it was so called Z military reporter aka field propagandist. That's why he was without weapons. During the firefight he got confused and ran toward Legionnaires as he thought they are RU (they were not shooting at him). He realized his mistake when Legionnaires shouted to him to surrender (you can see exact moment on video), so he ran back. I do not remember what happened to him after that. 

Maybe he was shooting some new patriotic hit, like "7 deaths of Semyon Piegov". On video he seems lying in the ditch at the end.
 

Btw. note there are 3 Russian kamikaze drones during entire video. Did not remember such density during actual assault for long time, if ever. And clip is from August.

Edited February 13 by Beleg85

[cesmonkey]

Quote

Here are all 22 Senate Republicans who voted in support of the spending bill:

Sen. John Boozman (Ark.)
Sen. Shelley Moore Capito (W.Va.)
Sen. Bill Cassidy (La.)
Sen. Susan Collins (Me.)
Sen. John Cornyn (Texas)
Sen. Kevin Cramer (N.D.)
Sen. Mike Crapo (Idaho)
Sen. Joni Ernst (Iowa)
Sen. Chuck Grassley (Iowa)
Sen. John Hoeven (N.D.)
Sen. John Kennedy (La.)
Sen. Mitch McConnell (Ky.)
Sen. Jerry Moran (Kan.)
Sen. Lisa Murkowski (Alaska)
Sen. James Risch (Idaho)
Sen. Mitt Romney (Utah)
Sen. Mike Rounds (S.D.)
Sen. Dan Sullivan (Alaska)
Sen. John Thune (S.D.)
Sen. Thom Tillis (N.C.)
Sen. Roger Wicker (Miss.)
Sen. Todd Young (Ind.)

Two Democrats voted no, Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Peter Welch (D-Vt.), pointing to concerns over Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s military campaign in Gaza. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) also voted against the bill due to the same concerns.

 

Edited February 13 by cesmonkey

[cesmonkey]

While I know this is likely to further widen the lid on a can of worms we want to close, it does still seem relevant:

Quote

In a post on Truth Social on Saturday,
https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/111908663705756439,
the former president said no funds “in the form of foreign aid should be given to any country unless it is done as a loan.” 

He argued the loan could be made on “EXTRAORDINARILY GOOD TERMS,” with no interest and “unlimited life,” but certain strings attached.  

“THE DEAL SHOULD BE (CONTINGENT!) THAT THE U.S. IS HELPING YOU, AS A NATION, BUT IF THE COUNTRY WE ARE HELPING EVER TURNS AGAINST US, OR STRIKES IT RICH SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE, THE LOAN WILL BE PAID OFF AND THE MONEY RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES,” Trump wrote.  

Quote

“There was a group of us, and we were discussing on kind getting an understanding what he’s what he was thinking, and if he was serious about this, because if he is then let’s figure out how to actually work this,” Sen. Markwayne Mullin (R-Okla.) said. “And it was actually a great conversation.” 

Sen. Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.) said he also spoke with Trump, along with a handful of members, on the group call about the idea, which he said he thinks is getting “a lot of momentum” and argued isn’t “overly offensive to the recipients.” 

“I mean, why shouldn’t Ukraine, which is mineral rich with the things that we need as a free country, or for that matter, frozen Russian assets that we have, why wouldn’t we make those things available to the American taxpayer to replenish the generosity,” Cramer said on late Monday.

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

13 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

 

republican house already telling us how they going to smash the bill

 

[cesmonkey]

6 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

republican house already telling us how they going to smash the bill

 

The only sure-fire way to get a vote in the House is a discharge partition. But it's not guaranteed it would get enough support:

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

While I know this is likely to further widen the lid on a can of worms we want to close, it does still seem relevant:

 

Yes, it is relevant.  It is also a new component relative to Ukraine, so as long as we stick to the specific point of loan vs. grant (= not to be paid back), and don't beat it to death, it's worth exploring.

Trump's position is in stark contrast to many other statements, which is quite normal behavior for him.  So is being vague.  Which means a truckload of salt is needed to presume there's some sort of policy statement being made here.  And with the backup sounds of the salt dumptruck ringing in my ear...

It is not unreasonable for a country, any country, to expect repayment for financial/material aid.  After all, Lend Lease wasn't a gift, neither was the Marshall Plan.  Both are considered to be highly effective programs.  It is reasonable to conclude that a program to lend money to Ukraine, on very favorable terms, is on the surface workable.

The problem comes with the "strings".  Trump was impeached because he tried to put strings where they didn't exist, ironically also to Ukraine.  He wanted something that would benefit him personally (dirt on the Bidens) at the expense of US national interests and upholding the duties of his office.  So when a "transactional" mafia style leader says he wants to put "strings" on a deal, I see a pretty huge red flag.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

15 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Machine translation of a summary:

SVO and the revolution in military affairs
New weapons change the nature of combat operations and force tactics textbooks to be rewritten

The special military operation, which began in February 2022, has definitely gone beyond the scope of a limited armed conflict in terms of the scale of forces and means involved by the parties, the intensity of hostilities and the level of technology used. Moreover, experts are confident: the SVO marks a major milestone in the development of military affairs and will launch a real revolution in the field of weapons, tactics, operational art and strategy.

The Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) was one of the first to undertake the difficult work of analyzing military events taking place in the Northern Military District zone, as well as identifying new trends in the field of armed struggle. He prepared a collection of military scientific articles, “Algorithms of Fire and Steel,” dedicated to our special operation and military conflicts of recent years. The foreword to this analytical work was written by the former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (2004–2008), Army General Yuri Baluevsky. "Army Standard" introduces its readers to the conclusions of the famous military leader.

Genre crisis

The North Military District, the former Chief of the General Staff believes, has become an unprecedented test of literally all components of military affairs and military development - from tactics, operational art and strategy, the organizational structure of troops to combat testing of almost all non-strategic types and types of weapons and military equipment. All this experience has yet to be comprehended by military scientists. But it is already clear that the SVO has shown the inconsistency of many forecasts for the development of military affairs and required a reassessment of the role and place of different types of weapons. In the development of combat operations, the combat use of forces and means, it is important to see the right trends, to grasp the patterns, without which it is impossible to overcome the crisis and positional impasse of the so-called “transparent battlefield.”

So, what “wonderful discoveries” did the Northern Military District reveal to the world in military affairs? Firstly, modern highly mechanized armies, instead of highly maneuverable combat operations, suddenly switched to positional trench warfare, where the pace of advance on the battlefield looks snail's pace even by the standards of the First World War.

Artillery, primarily long-range and high-precision, has been returned to the pedestal of the god of war. Almost the determining factor in the battle and operation is the number of shells fired.

There is a renaissance in infantry combat, for which, after World War II, the armies of the leading countries of the world did not prepare either their soldiers or their officers.

Air defense achieved an unexpected triumph over military aviation, which not only lost the ability to operate en masse over enemy territory, but was also forced to fly and base cautiously over its own territory.

Finally, unmanned aircraft quickly and unconditionally conquered the airspace. The sky was filled with clouds of micro-devices - copters, FPV drones, hunting for almost every infantryman. The unmanned revolution provided unprecedented transparency of the battlefield and began to crowd out artillery.

Conclusion: a new face of war is emerging, which largely contradicts previous ideas. Its main features are high dispersion and low density of troops; sharply increased capabilities for reconnaissance and high-precision target destruction in real time.

As a result, the vulnerability of troop groups, including the level of tactical units and above, and even individual combat vehicles and soldiers on the battlefield, has significantly increased.

The vanished "fog of war"

What ensures unprecedented transparency of the battlefield? A huge number of constantly deployed reconnaissance and target designation equipment, primarily unmanned and satellite ones. But not only. There is a qualitative leap in the volume and speed of intelligence data received and transmitted using these means.

The abundance of unmanned reconnaissance systems makes it possible to organize almost continuous monitoring of the battlefield at all levels, right down to the individual fighter. The explosive expansion of commercial satellite reconnaissance and surveillance systems will in the coming years lead to the entire planet being entangled in colossal satellite surveillance networks with ubiquitous access.

Electronic reconnaissance tools, cyber reconnaissance methods, and tracking enemy information networks are rapidly developing.

According to Baluevsky, all this virtually completely eliminates the “fog of war”, and also dramatically speeds up the processes of issuing target designation and decision-making in the “shot-kill” connection.

Moreover, full transparency becomes a reality not only at the tactical level, but also at the operational and strategic levels. It becomes possible to deliver high-precision strikes to almost any depth, even strategic. Online target designation and hypersonic missiles make it possible to fight second echelons of troops and objects deep behind enemy lines. The arsenal of weapons has confidently included relatively small and inexpensive loitering munitions with a flight range of thousands of kilometers.

All these technological innovations are relegated to military archives as textbooks on the covert transfer, deployment, concentration and use of large groupings of troops. Any concentration becomes an immediate target of destruction. Compounding the problem is the enormous vulnerability of these groups' logistics forces.

It turns out that the impossibility of concentrating troops forces us to change the fundamentals of military affairs. For example, it forces combat operations to be carried out by small units and individual combat vehicles. And this requires a radical change in approaches to all aspects of combat, logistics and technical support, the organization of troops and forces, and the development of all weapons systems and military equipment.

The tank is the main victim

Tanks are among those weapon systems whose role on the battlefield changes radically and rapidly during the course of the military offensive. According to Baluevsky, the tank “became one of the main victims of the combat experience of the last two years.” The recent symbol of striking power and combat power has proven to be an easy to spot and easy to kill target. In addition, the tank turned out to be very vulnerable to mines.

In this regard, the former Chief of the General Staff asks a number of questions that, apparently, do not yet have answers. Can tanks be used massively? Do they have the required security? Do they have effective weapons for firing in line of sight conditions? And the main question: has the tank lost its importance as the main striking force, a means of breakthrough and maneuver, the basis of modern warfare?

Yuri Baluevsky outlined only directions in the search for answers to these painful questions. In his opinion, a promising tank will first need to demonstrate the retention of powerful direct fire on the battlefield compared to indirect fire weapons.

On the other hand, solutions await the problems of mine protection and overcoming minefields, as well as protection from loitering ammunition and FPV drones. One of the ways is to create a new generation of active protection complexes, possibly based on new physical principles.

Artillery horizons

Another hot topic is the role of field artillery. The main trend here is increasing the firing range and introducing precision-guided ammunition. According to Baluevsky, the evolution of artillery also changes the principles of counter-battery warfare. In it, unmanned reconnaissance and gunners are increasingly coming to the fore.

Modern reconnaissance and fire contours can dramatically reduce the time from target detection to its destruction, while simultaneously increasing the accuracy of artillery fire. In the future, Baluevsky concludes, a complete transition of artillery to high-precision ammunition is inevitable.

Another tactical innovation is the dispersed actions of gun crews. Single guns, rather than batteries and divisions, actually themselves acquire the character of high-precision weapons and can be used separately. This is what we are seeing during the fighting in Ukraine, notes Baluevsky.

According to him, Russian developers of artillery systems, unfortunately, remain in the role of catching up. There is a qualitative superiority of NATO artillery due to the transition to 155-mm guns with a 52-caliber barrel length, and in the future 58-60 calibers, and the development of 155-mm ultra-long-range shells. The ex-Chief of the General Staff summarizes: the Northern Military District has identified a significant lag in domestic artillery and missile systems and requires priority and radical rearmament of them in the coming years.

Aviation impasse

The eternal confrontation between air defense and military aviation showed an unexpected result during the Northern Military District. Intermediate result: the loss of relevance of such established forms of using combat aviation as an offensive air operation or massive air strikes.

The task of effectively suppressing enemy air defenses turned out to be practically impossible. But its decision predetermines the further course and outcome of the fight in the air, and not only that.

According to Baluevsky, the solution to the problem of countering enemy air defense forces and suppressing them must be systematic. Key elements are systems for reconnaissance, opening and detection of air defense systems; special means of anti-jamming and air defense radio suppression; fire weapons; special aviation jamming and radio jamming systems; decoys; airborne defense systems for combat aircraft; special combat aircraft for suppressing and destroying air defense systems.

“All these elements,” notes Baluevsky, “must be built into a complex of a unified control system and must undergo joint training and combat training in advance to implement the planned tasks.”

Unmanned bacchanalia

The rapid development of military unmanned equipment and methods of its use became a headache for air defense, which was not prepared to combat this “trifle.” Nevertheless, drones of various classes and purposes have become probably the main problem of air defense systems and the main challenge for any air defense system.

We have to admit that such an exaggerated role of drones, which they play today in armed struggle, was not predicted by military theorists. Although hints of a new trend were already visible in the second Karabakh war in 2020.

Baluevsky draws attention primarily to the radical change in the paradigm of the use of drones by both sides, from a focus on the use of large aircraft-type drones (MALE class), medium and short range, flight duration and size to the mass use of small commercial copters. Moreover, both for reconnaissance and surveillance, and as strike weapons, including FPV drones and loitering ammunition.

“This,” notes the former Chief of the General Staff, “led to an explosive expansion of their use, actually turning them into one of the main types of weapons in combat operations.”

FPV drones can destroy almost all types of military equipment on the front line, possessing a cost-effectiveness ratio that is unprecedented for any type of guided weapon.

The drones that revolutionized combat operations during the SVO were small loitering munitions, including the Russian Lancets. They are becoming a widespread, inexpensive, high-precision tactical weapon and one of the main means of counter-battery warfare.

It can be assumed, Baluevsky predicts, that the future development of “lancet-like” devices as flying artillery will lead to their partial transformation into small-sized tactical missiles. According to him, FPV drones and small loitering munitions will become more widespread, which in the shortest possible time will evolve up to the individual weapon of a fighter. “This means that in the coming years tens and hundreds of thousands of small unmanned aerial vehicles will be deployed on the battlefield,” sums up Baluevsky. “Accordingly, there will be a huge task of combating them, also starting from the level of lower units, crews and crews.”

In conclusion, the ex-Chief of the General Staff cited a well-known statement by the famous military theorist A.A. Svechin from his book “Strategy”, written in 1926: “In strategy, prophecy can only be charlatanism; and genius is unable to foresee how the war will actually unfold. But he must form a perspective in which he will evaluate the phenomena of war.” “To these words,” Baluevsky noted, “I would add: “Wars of the future.”

 

That was a good read, thanks.  My three takeaways:

1. As we've long understood, the Russians do understand the battlefield as well as we do.  Yet they aren't seemingly making decisions that are complimentary to this knowledge.  There are likely a host of reasons for that (all of which we've discussed here a zillion times) and those reasons are strong/relevant enough that Russia will likely continue to take baby steps towards addressing Baluevsky's questions about how to solve the various problems.
2. A fairly recent and senior ex-Russian general officer of the General Staff has just said the tank is dead.  At least as we know it.  Russia's tank fetish makes the US' love of the tank look like a passing interest.  For a senior Russian military thinker to proclaim the tank is effectively dead is quite something!
3. The summary of his conclusions of air superiority ("The task of effectively suppressing enemy air defenses turned out to be practically impossible") may have some room for translation error, but taken as it was stated this is not something I agree is universal.  It might be, and likely is, impossible for Russia to suppress enemy air defenses, but I believe NATO can effectively achieve it.  The reason is Russia was never set up for success.  Equipment, doctrine, and training were all focused on denying its airspace, not establishing air superiority over someone else's.  At least not one competently fielding NATO equipment.

Good stuff.

Steve

[cesmonkey]

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

35 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

 

IMO most important parts:

"This has led to significant increases in production output. For example, Russia is delivering approximately 1,500 tanks to its forces per year along with approximately 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles of various types. Russian missile production has similarly increased. At the beginning of 2023, for instance, Russian production of Iskandr 9M723 ballistic missiles was six per month, with available missile stocks of 50 munitions."

"Of the tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, for example, approximately 80% are not new production but are instead refurbished and modernised from Russian war stocks. The number of systems held in storage means that while Russia can maintain a consistent output through 2024, it will begin to find that vehicles require deeper refurbishment through 2025, and by 2026 it will have exhausted most of the available stocks."

"Perhaps the most serious limitation for Russia, however, is ammunition manufacture. In order to achieve its aspiration to make significant territorial gains in 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has assessed an industrial requirement to manufacture or source approximately 4 million 152mm and 1.6 million 122mm artillery shells in 2024. Russian industry has reported to the MoD that it expects to increase 152mm production from around 1 million rounds in 2023 to 1.3 million rounds over the course of 2024, and to only produce 800,000 122mm rounds over the same period. Moreover, the Russian MoD does not believe it can significantly raise production in subsequent years,"

"This means that to properly resource the armed forces, Russia must – in the short term – further draw down its remaining 3 million rounds of stored ammunition, though much of this is in poor condition. To further compensate for shortages, Russia has signed supply and production contracts with Belarus, Iran, North Korea and Syria, with the latter only able to provide forged shell casings rather than complete shells. Although the injection of around 2 million 122mm rounds from North Korea will help Russia in 2024, it will not compensate for a significant shortfall in available 152mm"

"The Russian theory of victory is plausible if Ukraine's international partners fail to properly resource the AFU. However, if Ukraine's partners continue to provide sufficient ammunition and training support to the AFU to enable the blunting of Russian attacks in 2024, then Russia is unlikely to achieve significant gains in 2025. If Russia lacks the prospect of gains in 2025, given its inability to improve force quality for offensive operations, then it follows that it will struggle to force Kyiv to capitulate by 2026. Beyond 2026, attrition of systems will begin to materially degrade Russian combat power, while Russian industry could be disrupted sufficiently by that point, making Russia's prospects decline over time."

[Aragorn2002]

21 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

IMO most important parts:

"This has led to significant increases in production output. For example, Russia is delivering approximately 1,500 tanks to its forces per year along with approximately 3,000 armoured fighting vehicles of various types. Russian missile production has similarly increased. At the beginning of 2023, for instance, Russian production of Iskandr 9M723 ballistic missiles was six per month, with available missile stocks of 50 munitions."

"Of the tanks and other armoured fighting vehicles, for example, approximately 80% are not new production but are instead refurbished and modernised from Russian war stocks. The number of systems held in storage means that while Russia can maintain a consistent output through 2024, it will begin to find that vehicles require deeper refurbishment through 2025, and by 2026 it will have exhausted most of the available stocks."

"Perhaps the most serious limitation for Russia, however, is ammunition manufacture. In order to achieve its aspiration to make significant territorial gains in 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has assessed an industrial requirement to manufacture or source approximately 4 million 152mm and 1.6 million 122mm artillery shells in 2024. Russian industry has reported to the MoD that it expects to increase 152mm production from around 1 million rounds in 2023 to 1.3 million rounds over the course of 2024, and to only produce 800,000 122mm rounds over the same period. Moreover, the Russian MoD does not believe it can significantly raise production in subsequent years,"

"This means that to properly resource the armed forces, Russia must – in the short term – further draw down its remaining 3 million rounds of stored ammunition, though much of this is in poor condition. To further compensate for shortages, Russia has signed supply and production contracts with Belarus, Iran, North Korea and Syria, with the latter only able to provide forged shell casings rather than complete shells. Although the injection of around 2 million 122mm rounds from North Korea will help Russia in 2024, it will not compensate for a significant shortfall in available 152mm"

"The Russian theory of victory is plausible if Ukraine's international partners fail to properly resource the AFU. However, if Ukraine's partners continue to provide sufficient ammunition and training support to the AFU to enable the blunting of Russian attacks in 2024, then Russia is unlikely to achieve significant gains in 2025. If Russia lacks the prospect of gains in 2025, given its inability to improve force quality for offensive operations, then it follows that it will struggle to force Kyiv to capitulate by 2026. Beyond 2026, attrition of systems will begin to materially degrade Russian combat power, while Russian industry could be disrupted sufficiently by that point, making Russia's prospects decline over time."

That may all very well be true, but I'd rather count on our own strength than on the weaknesses of our enemy. The Russians are no fools and so far more resourceful than the West expected. 

In that respect I agree with orange boy, rearming is key for NATO. Whatever the costs. The time of free riding is over. Let's hope we're not too late.

Edited February 13 by Aragorn2002

[Jiggathebauce]

1 hour ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

republican house already telling us how they going to smash the bill

 

They just got done swatting down a border bill that had everything they were asking for, because Trump needs that issue to run on to scare older white folks who live nowhere near a good Mexican restaurant. He has no other issue to really campaign for. 

The US mis leadership class, if willing to just allow a two bit conman to become dictator, proves that this system and those that defend it deserve every heap of scorn that radicals put on them.  

I'm not going to accept American Putinism, even if they win the election. I will not comply and I hope most of the civil service and military defies him and his thugs, openly and directly.

 

 

[Centurian52]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

After all, Lend Lease wasn't a gift

It sort of was. From what I recall the idea of "leasing" equipment to the UK, and later to the Soviet Union, was basically a way of selling the still isolationist US public on the idea of sending large amounts of military aid overseas, but with the understanding that the US probably wouldn't actually want any of the equipment (that survived) back after the war. Legally the equipment was leased, but in reality it was pretty much just gifted.

Of course it wasn't entirely a gift. The US was hoping to get a friendly and non-hostile Europe out of the arrangement.

Edited February 13 by Centurian52

[kimbosbread]

On 2/12/2024 at 8:19 AM, Centurian52 said:

It's far from an ideal situation. But continuing to inflict Pyrrhic victories on the Russians until the West provides enough aid to enable to Ukrainians to attempt another major offensive is not an ineffective strategy.

I agree with the “Waiting for Scipio” strategy (where Scipio can be poverty-wunderwaffen ie el-cheapo-long-range-strike-drones and/or the definitive military genius of our age).

[Aragorn2002]

47 minutes ago, Centurian52 said:

 

Of course it wasn't entirely a gift. The US was hoping to get a friendly and non-hostile Europe out of the arrangement.

Among other things

[Beleg85]

Russian propaganda claim it hit with Iskander grouping of soldiers in Selidovo proving grounds several days ago, killing hundreds of soldiers concentrated there for Avdiivka counterattack.

https://t.me/voynareal/83768

UAF gave dementi, but some Ukrainian tg's indeed write there are military victims, aside from civilians.

Edited February 13 by Beleg85

[kimbosbread]

17 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Pulling this whole thing back to this war, I think what a Trump win might do is result in US contraction in the world.  There would be unpredictable power spasms but overall US power projection would begin to recede.

Meh already happened, we’re just seeing the corpse twitching.

Nuclear non-proliferation was dead and done the momement Russia invaded in 2022.

[Grigb]

Quick update regarding Avdiivka.

• RU reached Industrialnyy avenue cutting it off
• RU reached City park
• RU did not reach Brevno
• There are conflicting reports as to who controls Avtobaza
• Overall situation seems to fluid at the moment. 

 

[Centurian52]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The summary of his conclusions of air superiority ("The task of effectively suppressing enemy air defenses turned out to be practically impossible") may have some room for translation error, but taken as it was stated this is not something I agree is universal.  It might be, and likely is, impossible for Russia to suppress enemy air defenses, but I believe NATO can effectively achieve it.  The reason is Russia was never set up for success.  Equipment, doctrine, and training were all focused on denying its airspace, not establishing air superiority over someone else's.  At least not one competently fielding NATO equipment.

It's also worth remembering that all of the aircraft currently operating in Ukraine are fourth generation aircraft. My own view is that fourth generation aircraft are obsolete. The capability gulf between fourth gen and fifth gen aircraft is enormous.

I'm not sure if I've posted this video before. But I assume all of us here appreciate the value of simulations for providing insights into warfare: