How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

Could you drop a link to that?

 

Here you go.

[The_Capt]

37 minutes ago, JonS said:

One you can do at home:

Mentos + coke in a shallow bowl

Vs.

Mentos + coke in a coke bottle

At home, but I do reccomend doing it outside ...

Bag of flour with a kicker charge + slight delay incendiary in an enclosed space = BFB.  Seriously one can blow up a concrete bunker.  Now if you really want to ruin someone’s day get some aluminum powder.

[Vanir Ausf B]

5 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

My apologies, the statements of Kofman which are very similar to Gady's Twitter thread are in a different podcast - that's "War on the Rocks" podcast http://warontherocks.libsyn.com/assessing-ukraines-three-axes-of-advance.

They start at around 8.38 time mark.

I am sorry for the confusion. I listened to both podcasts on consecutive days, so when I heard some of Kofman's remarks on the "Geopolitics Decanted" they reminded me of the earlier podcast and got mixed up.

 

Thanks for that. Kofman does echo Gady's observations about how the UA operates. The key difference is that he doesn't see it as a problem in need of solving. In fact, he spends a good 5 minutes pooping on the whole idea of training the UA in AirLand battle.

[Joe982]

5 hours ago, DesertFox said:

Lets see what happens - could be the end of the black sea fleet, if they make one false move...

 

https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/1681683779054714881?s=20

 

But but but the Turkish navy is protecting the grain shipments. What happened to that?

 

[DesertFox]

6 minutes ago, Joe982 said:

 

But but but the Turkish navy is protecting the grain shipments. What happened to that?

 

That will be the "interesting" part. Lets wait and see...

[JonS]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Bag of flour with a kicker charge + slight delay incendiary in an enclosed space = BFB.  Seriously one can blow up a concrete bunker.  Now if you really want to ruin someone’s day get some aluminum powder.

I meant legally. To see the difference open vs confined makes. Without damaging anything or injuring yourself.

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Bag of flour with a kicker charge + slight delay incendiary in an enclosed space = BFB.  Seriously one can blow up a concrete bunker.  Now if you really want to ruin someone’s day get some aluminum powder.

I rehabbed a building that used to handle feedstock (grain).  Everything in the section that was responsible for transferring the grain had special enclosed electrical services.  Lights, light switches, motors for machinery... everything had to ensure that not one tiny spark got into the room while there was grain dust in the air.

Steve

[kevinkin]

Anyone rushing out to see Oppenheimer this weekend? I am not a big movie goer. But this has been getting good previews especially in IMAX. So it looks like next week for me. I heard the thing really goes boom - no feedstock nor livestock harmed during the filming. It would make for an interesting observational project to see who goes into the Oppenheimer theater and who goes to see Barb*e. 

[FancyCat]

5 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

One growing season is not long. But semantics.

Grain is only a portion of the whole Ukraine sea cargo and that even that part was further constrained by the Russians.

Ukraine has been in total sea blockade except grain shipping that was "just" constrained.

According to Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-19/what-end-of-ukraine-grain-export-deal-means-for-the-world

Grain is a extremely important foodstuff and the world's pulse partly depends on its pricing, both Ukraine and Russia undertake steps to emphasize the importance of grain and leverage it to influence world opinion. Considering grain futures are a free market, just like everything else, even temporary spikes will have downstream effects on the world's poorest. 

Anything that spikes the pricing of commodities generally helps Russia more, and weakens Europe/USA, domestically and internationally. 

Quote

1. Why is Ukraine so influential in global food markets?

Ukraine is Europe’s second-largest country by area, and its vast plains of dark, rich soil are ideal for farming. Food from Ukraine has helped to shape the course of European history, feeding the populations of fast-growing industrial cities in the 19th century and sustaining the Soviet Union through decades of isolation. Before the war, Ukraine exported more grain than the entire European Union and supplied about half of the globally traded sunflower seeds and oil. Even in the 2022-23 season — the first full year under Russia’s invasion — Ukraine has held as the sixth-largest wheat shipper and third for corn. As the season came to a close at the end of June, Ukraine’s grain exports were more than 48 million tons, about steady with the 2021-22 season.

2. How did the export agreement work?

The grain deal signed in July 2022 reopened three of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports to crop shipments. All ships were required to pass inbound and outbound checks at a center set up in Istanbul, which was jointly staffed by Russia and Ukraine — as well as Turkey and the United Nations, the two parties that brokered the agreement. Nearly 33 million tons were shipped in the year it was in force, led by corn, wheat and sunflower products. Monthly shipments via the corridor peaked at 4.2 million tons in October, but held below 3 million tons from April onward as inspection times grew increasingly lengthy and Russia blocked ship registrations to one of the ports. Before the war, Ukraine exported as much as 5 million tons of grain a month in total via all routes, according to the country’s agriculture ministry.

3. Was the deal the only way out for Ukraine’s grain?

No. Problems with the pact pushed more crops toward Ukraine’s smaller Danube river ports, plus rail and road transit via the EU border. The tonnage shipped that way actually surpassed the volumes moved through the Black Sea corridor, at least as of May. Still, those alternatives are more cumbersome and expensive than shipping via Ukraine’s deep-sea ports.

 

[Jiggathebauce]

10 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

According to Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-07-19/what-end-of-ukraine-grain-export-deal-means-for-the-world

Grain is a extremely important foodstuff and the world's pulse partly depends on its pricing, both Ukraine and Russia undertake steps to emphasize the importance of grain and leverage it to influence world opinion. Considering grain futures are a free market, just like everything else, even temporary spikes will have downstream effects on the world's poorest. 

Anything that spikes the pricing of commodities generally helps Russia more, and weakens Europe/USA, domestically and internationally. 

 

Then perhaps it would be a good idea for western powers and their capital owners to RESTRAIN some of their worst impulses in the event of disruption. I'm told constantly that it's all about the decisions of individuals exercising personal responsibility,after all. Make a few less dollars off a humanitarian crisis, and live off the hype of the free world for once.  Just sayin

[Jr Buck Private]

I was glad to see another Russian ammo dump go up in smoke.   It seems like the Ukrainians have been good at finding them.   Do you think they are using spies on the ground or some kind of satellite imagery, or maybe even reconnaissance drones?   I figure the west might be helping in that area as well.    I think the ammo is easy to conceal, but it still has to be transported to the front lines somehow, so a lot of truck activity would be one kind of give away.

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

The question facing military professionals everywhere out of this war are:

- "What is unique to this war?"

- "What is universal to all future wars?"

Yes.  Though my comments were if NATO fought this specific war from the outset. 

What Russia revealed is that it was barely prepared to fight this war at all.  NATO, for all its limitations and problems (sorry Germany, I've got to look your way), it is designed to crush the sort of war Russia launched.  And quickly.

The point of my previous post was to say that NATO would not likely have to worry about 10s of thousands of casualties, figuring out how to deal with Lancets, EW, or any of the stuff that Ukraine is forced to deal with because the war would have been over before any of those elements came into play. 

Russia's forces barely survived being challenged by a vastly materially inferior foe, I don't think it could have handled having its air forces slaughtered, it's navy sent to the bottom of the Black Sea en mas, that famous 40mile long convoy smeared by Apaches, or its infrastructure being massacred by B-2s, ATACMS, and everything else that Ukraine doesn't have access to.  NATO would also not have put up with Belarus being an active part in the war, so the same devastation would have befallen the Russian logistics there as well.

And this would all happen within a few days of hostilities opening up with hardly a dent being put into NATO's stocks of munitions and weaponry.  Which would mean none of the things we're puzzling through with Ukraine would be applicable because the war would be over before they took form.

Which is why it is so important for NATO and its allies to learn from this war so that...

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Now here is the punchline: this is all if we were fighting Russia.  I, frankly, am far less concerned about fighting Russia - now more than ever.  I am very worried about fighting Ukraine.  If we get stuck on the wrong side of a proxy war and our opponent is armed with C4ISR, PGM and A2AD like Ukraine is right now, we are in very serious trouble. 

Or worse, we get into a straight up shooting match instead of being a proxy.  China, for example.

The problem with that is we really don't know how a war with China our a future hostile "Ukraine" like proxy.  Maybe the West's "knock out punch" strategy would work, maybe not.  And if it doesn't, then what?  We saw what happened when that strategy didn't work against the Taliban, ISIS, or the Iraqi insurgency.  It wasn't mass casualties, but it was too much to dismiss and the loss of treasure, time, and opportunities certainly huge.  The impact on domestic politics in the US was also not a good thing.

So, while I believe that the Western strategy for crushing an inferior conventional force fielded by a conventional political state, I'm not sure it is set up to deal with pretty much anything else.  And as unconventional, non-state based enemies become more technologically centered, the issue will get worse.

Additionally, I don't have much faith in the West's political and economic strategies for dealing with anything other than clear do-or-die confrontations.  It handled Ukraine 2014-2022 better than some other challenges, but it really blew opportunities in 2014 that could have precluded this current war.  I think it's more important to figure out how to avoid needing to get through a dense minefield defended by PGMs and drones than to deal with those military challenges.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, Jiggathebauce said:

Then perhaps it would be a good idea for western powers and their capital owners to RESTRAIN some of their worst impulses in the event of disruption. I'm told constantly that it's all about the decisions of individuals exercising personal responsibility,after all. Make a few less dollars off a humanitarian crisis, and live off the hype of the free world for once.  Just sayin

Oh, I think the West should do more than that.  I think it should partner with the countries most affected and offer to escort their ships to/from Ukrainian ports.  Dare Russia to sink an Indian or Egyptian flagged civilian vessel or the NATO warships already in the Black Sea.

If there's one thing we've learned about Russia is that they are as cowardly as they are pragmatic about such things.  I think they wouldn't challenge such a thing, though they would still try destroying Ukrainian infrastructure on land.

Steve

[Kinophile]

https://sp.rmbl.ws/s8/2/I/A/K/6/IAK6k.caa.mp4?u=th8n9&b=0

3rd Brigade Mech Infantry Assault With Armor

Not sure if posted previously.

 

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

https://sp.rmbl.ws/s8/2/I/A/K/6/IAK6k.caa.mp4?u=th8n9&b=0

3rd Brigade Mech Infantry Assault With Armor

Not sure if posted previously.

 

At the end we see yet more Russians in solid colored uniforms or parts of uniforms.  These could be from 72nd Motor Rifle Brigade as they have been 3rd Assault Brigade's primary foe for the canal battles.

I'm wondering if these are individual replacements coming from lower quality manpower pools, such as prison.

Steve

[Kinophile]

58 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

At the end we see yet more Russians in solid colored uniforms or parts of uniforms.  These could be from 72nd Motor Rifle Brigade as they have been 3rd Assault Brigade's primary foe for the canal battles.

I'm wondering if these are individual replacements coming from lower quality manpower pools, such as prison.

Steve

Quote possibly. Gerasimov has certainly cornered the convict manpower tap. They're not people you place as large units (discipline,  for one) and it would make sense to use them as filling for existing,  actual military units.

Like filling a rotting chicken with kitty litter and serving it for Christmas. 

 

[dan/california]

 

Quote

 

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-19-2023

Russian authorities opened a case against an affiliate of the ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club for discrediting Russian forces, prompting the Angry Patriots Club to make explicit demands of Russian officials. Russian media reported on July 18 that Russian authorities initiated a criminal case against former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov under the article for discrediting the Russian Armed Forces............................

The Federal Security Service (FSB) previously reportedly attempted to censor notable Angry Patriots Club member Igor Girkin.[49]

 

There is a long paragraph between the two bits I quoted. The short version would be that I think Girkins chances of learning to fly, or being chopped into really ugly hamburger garnish is rising by the day. His delightful organization of murderous psychopaths may or may not have coup plan waiting to forestall that possibility. 

[Battlefront.com]

39 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Quote possibly. Gerasimov has certainly cornered the convict manpower tap. They're not people you place as large units (discipline,  for one) and it would make sense to use them as filling for existing,  actual military units.

Like filling a rotting chicken with kitty litter and serving it for Christmas. 

 

The Storm-Z units are (exclusively?) prisoners and are, like under Wagner's leadership, designated for meat waves.  However, I have seen some comments that some prisoners are being stuck in as replacements due to a lack of manpower in established units.  Maybe they are selecting ones with previous military experience?  Maybe the reports are wrong or I am misconstruing what I've read.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

27 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

There is a long paragraph between the two bits I quoted. The short version would be that I think Girkins chances of learning to fly, or being chopped into really ugly hamburger garnish is rising by the day. His delightful organization of murderous psychopaths may or may not have coup plan waiting to forestall that possibility. 

It does seem that Putin's regime is running full speed into what often turns out to be the last stage of totalitarian control.  Putin appears to acknowledge that the people most interested and vocal about winning the war are too much of a political threat to control in more subtle manner.

Coincidentally, this OpEd just got posted to the NYT:

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/19/opinion/putin-prigozhin-military-russia.html

It's likely behind a paywall, so I will summarize...

The failed coup by Prig and Wagner indicate things are bad at the front and Putin's reaction since then indicates that he's going to make it worse.  Opportunities to fix problems are squandered, actions to make things worse seem to be actively employed.

This is nothing new here, but still well stated:

Quote

Whatever his fate will be after the failed rebellion, Mr. Prigozhin’s criticisms of the war are still dangerous — because they are correct. He repeatedly pointed out, in coarse, angry language, how the war is mismanaged at the highest levels by out-of-touch bureaucrats, leading to many logistical problems and ammunition shortages. He criticized Mr. Shoigu and General Gerasimov for downplaying bad news and misleading Mr. Putin while engaging in petty intrigues with subordinates. He noted how the children of Russia’s elite avoid military service while the poor return home in coffins.

But Mr. Putin’s cocoon of loyal interlocutors filters out these problems and instead offers a substitute view to both the president and a disengaged public. Dmitri Medvedev, the deputy head of Russia’s national security council, says 185,000 men joined the Russian military in 2023 alone. The Ministry of Defense claims to have destroyed over twice as many HIMARS trucks as were ever delivered to Ukraine. As Mr. Shoigu says, “Everything is proceeding according to plan.” None of this is true.

The question we still haven't answered, though, is how clueless is Putin.  The Russians critical of the war seem to think he's ignorant of how bad things are.  However, the Russian tradition of blaming the boyers and not the Tzar is certainly in play.  It could be Putin knows full well how bad things are and his critics know it, but they hold back from saying so because they don't want to have an accident.  Or it could be that they are correct, that despite direct contact with the very critics Putin is now (apparently) silencing and other things that Putin must know (like the map doesn't look good), that Putin really is unaware of how bad things are.

Personally, I think he knows how bad things are for both the regime and the war.  His decisions are about regime stability first, war second.  He might be wrong about his approach, but he might not be wrong to prioritize the political.  Surely Prig's ride to Moscow showed that there's reason for Putin to worry.

Steve

[dan/california]

I have just had a strange thought. The lesson Ukraine has taught the entire world will make it vastly more difficult to manage the break up of Russia, should that unhappy circumstance occur. After Ukraine's/Russia's lesson in what to states with nuclear weapons vs states with out them, no fragment of what used to be Russia would ever give up any weapons it ended up with.

[The_MonkeyKing]

How US is employing MQ-1C Gray Eagle (division level asset) 

[cesmonkey]

https://t.me/dva_majors/21682

Quote

The head of the Melitopol district of the Zaporizhia region Andrey Siguta:

“In our area, exactly where the main Kakhovka reservoir, in the Vasilyevka area, it is practically gone.”

The Dnieper and Konka rivers returned to their former channels.
Water no longer enters the North Crimean Canal, “it is already a meter below the level of the fence”

 

[womble]

40 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I have just had a strange thought. The lesson Ukraine has taught the entire world will make it vastly more difficult to manage the break up of Russia, should that unhappy circumstance occur. After Ukraine's/Russia's lesson in what to states with nuclear weapons vs states with out them, no fragment of what used to be Russia would ever give up any weapons it ended up with.

I don't think that's necessarily a worry. Nukes take a lot of money and expertise to keep viable (both their delivery systems and the warheads). Smaller fragments will have other priorities, and the raw components of a standby nuke aren't even particularly useful as dirty bombs, which in turn aren't very useful as a deterrent. I think The Rest of the World will be able to put together a package that will satisfy the new polities. One thing those packages will probably have to include will be guarantees rather than the (largely worthless, and they knew it) "assurances" which were all Ukraine got.

[Tux]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

I have just had a strange thought. The lesson Ukraine has taught the entire world will make it vastly more difficult to manage the break up of Russia, should that unhappy circumstance occur. After Ukraine's/Russia's lesson in what to states with nuclear weapons vs states with out them, no fragment of what used to be Russia would ever give up any weapons it ended up with.

Surely in this scenario the lesson that Ukraine would have taught the world would be that, with the proper support from allies but without nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-armed state not only repelled the nuclear-armed state but damaged it to the extent that the latter disintegrated?

Combined with Womble’s response I think there should be a good case to be made after this war that nuclear weapons don’t offer the same security as proper alliances do.

[Rokko]

Looks like some significant engagement took place near Krasnohorivka, near Marinka. Looks like the emblem of one of the Air-Assault brigades

 

https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681934452438585347?s=20