How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[chris talpas]

Weekly Perun video has just dropped.  

 

[Haiduk]

Two days ago the video is appeared as Slovenian M-55S was "destroyed or taken out" by direct hit of Krasnopol guided shell. It's turned out the tank survived, and even saved capability of driving. The shell hit in the gunner's sight and beat in a piece of top turret armor. On the video the damage and burning marks can be seen

So, not each HE shell hit is 100 % destroying of the tank. Top turret armor can in some cases resist to HE shells, but if this shell hit engine compartment from the top, the tank would be at least heavy damaged. Original T-55 has 30 mm of turret's top armor thickness

 

Edited July 16, 2023 by Haiduk

[Probus]

59 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Two days ago the video is appeared as Slovenian M-55S was "destroyed or taken out" by direct hit of Krasnopol guided shell. It's turned out the tank survived, and even saved capability of driving. The shell hit in the gunner's sight and beat in a piece of top turret armor. On the video the damage and burning marks can be seen

So, not each HE shell hit is 100 % destroying of the tank. Top turret armor can in some cases resist to HE shells, but if this shell hit engine compartment from the top, the tank would be at least heavy damaged. Original T-55 has 30 mm of turret's top armor thickness

 

I bet the gunner wasn't too happy about it though... 

Edited July 16, 2023 by Probus

[Haiduk]

Two 2A65 Msta-B howitzers were HIMARSed near Yalyns'ke village, Donetsk oblast. This is about 8 km SE from Staromlynivka - objective of UKR offensive on V.Novosilka (Vremiivka)salient. 

Strelkov and Romanov92 wrote UKR could capture Staromajors'ke because of Russian artillery didn't work due to ammo shortage. Probably and because barrels shortage %) 

Though in present time no any information about situation around Staromajorske. Some Russian sources claim the village is under UKR control, some - that Russians are counter-attacking, some - UKR forces are pushed back from the village. UKR sources keep silence. 

Edited July 16, 2023 by Haiduk

[Beleg85]

Reportedly clip from maritime drones (which were supported by flying ones) that attacked Sevastopol today. Oddly little news about this Ukrainian attack in the net.:

 

Edited July 16, 2023 by Beleg85

[Haiduk]

5 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Reportedly clip from maritime drones (which were supported by flying ones) that attacked Sevastopol today. Oddly little news about this Ukrainian attack in the net.:

 

There was combined atatck of several aerial and two maritime drones, local Sevastopol publics wrote about loud explosions, but reportedly all targets were intercepted. 

[Haiduk]

Nove village - 11 km south from Robotyne. JDAM hit ?

 

Edited July 16, 2023 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

11 hours ago, dan/california said:

This is the same Girkin speech in the tweet just above. I finally worked through twitters ever increasing dysfunction to get the whole text. He seems to think the state of things in Russia is either bad, worse, or never mind.

This is really the key part of the whole operation:

Quote

The enemy has the ability to withdraw weathered formations for rest and bring up fresh ones to continue the battle. But we have the same units fighting on the front - yes, they fight in defence, but the commanders who are continuously taking part in combat don’t feel much better from this. It is a similar situation that led to the dismissal of the commander of the 58th Army, General Popov, who put forward an issue that existing personnel and equipment are not enough to carry out the rotation and give the troops at least some semblance of rest. And there are no reserves to bring them to a fully capable state. [...] I will not be revealing a military secret - the enemy knows the situation very well,

Girkin is saying that Ukraine has plenty of troops to rotate, Russia has none.  Even if losses are slightly unfavorable to Ukraine (and there are no indications that is true), Russia will lose simply because it will lose critical mass for defense.  Not just the frontline positions currently being fought over, but the rear positions that are not manned for defense.  I know I've been harping on this very point for some time now, and it seems Girkin's group recognizes the military significance of Russia's position.  Trenches and minefields don't work so well when there's nobody there to defend them.

Steve

[DesertFox]

Edit: Haiduk beat me to it.

Maybe a couple of Orc-Leaders less to worry about, we might learn it soon Nove, Zaporizhzhya, Tokmak axis

 

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1680589274645778436?s=20

Edited July 16, 2023 by DesertFox

[DesertFox]

Could be JDAMs?

 

https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1680613990253187073?s=20

[FancyCat]

So how would NATO navigate Ukraine's issue? Just eliminate the defenders and then slowly carve paths thru the minefields? I assume with airpower?

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

Update from Ukrainian deputy defense minister, Hanna Maliar:

https://t.me/annamaliar/938
 

 

Thanks for the various updates.  Based on the latest info, I'm seeing the following...

Significant Russian forces are continuing to build up pressure in the Luhansk area, making small gains here and there (Maliar).  The concern is that the forces are a) very large and b) designed to distract Ukraine from its counter offensive in the south (Mashovets).  However, Russia doesn't have any strategic reserves and has mostly committed its operational reserves to such an extent that it can't conduct unit rotations (Girkin).  Russia's artillery is still a power to be reckoned with, but Ukraine's artillery seems to be quite strong and plentiful where attacks are happening (Rybar).  Ukraine continues its strategy of shifting areas of emphasis looking for vulnerable spots and exploiting any that it finds (Rybar and various OSINT).

I don't see anything conflicting in these various sources, not with each other or with other OSINT sources.

It's slow going, but Ukraine still has the initiative and its strategy is the sort that is likely to produce large visible territorial gains only after prolonged and seemingly minor successes.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

So how would NATO navigate Ukraine's issue? Just eliminate the defenders and then slowly carve paths thru the minefields? I assume with airpower?

Think Desert Shield.  In that situation the Coalition took months to prepare for the ground attack, putting the pain on defending Iraqi units in every way imaginable.  The minefields would still be a real challenge even undefended, but they would be breached fairly quickly and with few casualties compared to fighting for them against functional defenses (not to mention lacking air superiority).

Steve

[DesertFox]

 

 

 

[danfrodo]

18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Significant Russian forces are continuing to build up pressure in the Luhansk area, making small gains here and there (Maliar).  The concern is that the forces are a) very large and b) designed to distract Ukraine from its counter offensive in the south (Mashovets).  However, Russia doesn't have any strategic reserves and has mostly committed its operational reserves to such an extent that it can't conduct unit rotations (Girkin).  Russia's artillery is still a power to be reckoned with, but Ukraine's artillery seems to be quite strong and plentiful where attacks are happening (Rybar).  Ukraine continues its strategy of shifting areas of emphasis looking for vulnerable spots and exploiting any that it finds (Rybar and various OSINT).

Putting myself if RU shoes, what is Putin up to?  I think RU is trying to run out the clock -- meaning get to the wet season w/o a devastating UKR breakthrough.  It doesn't matter how many RU troops are killed because can make more soldiers over the fall & winter to refill the trenches.  RU seems to be gambling that they can threaten toward Kupyansk-Kharkiv strongly enough to pull in enough UKR reserves for long enough to weaken the southern offensive such that time just runs out and the mud comes.  

UKR, I suspect, will do like in Bakhmut.  Use economy of force, give ground and bring reinforcements as necessary, and grind down the RU forces at relatively low cost (no cost is 'low' of course if you are a casualty).  I think UKR would happily trade a little ground in Luhansk (for now) for retaking the landbridge.  UKR still has the river line behind it.  Plus around Kremmina it's just all woods, not a big strategic or operational loss. 

In summary, RU is looking like it's taking a gamble of burning up its mechanized reserve forces to keep UKR from launching full offensive in the south.   RU is betting the minefields and 'garrison' troops in the trenches will be able to hold out for 3 more months as long as UKR is pouring forces into the north.  Interesting strategy, if true.  Could have all those RU forces as reserves in the south and get the same effect, one would think?? 

This seems like a really stupid strategy, but look at how incredibly stupid the Bakhmut campaign was.  So clearly RU command is capable of really stupid things.  Maybe Putin thinks he can retake Kharkiv because UKR busy in the south?  Is that what this is??

[sburke]

3 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Putting myself if RU shoes, what is Putin up to?  I think RU is trying to run out the clock -- meaning get to the wet season w/o a devastating UKR breakthrough.  It doesn't matter how many RU troops are killed because can make more soldiers over the fall & winter to refill the trenches.  RU seems to be gambling that they can threaten toward Kupyansk-Kharkiv strongly enough to pull in enough UKR reserves for long enough to weaken the southern offensive such that time just runs out and the mud comes.  

Couple things

1.  Russian trying to restore manpower is fraught with problems none of which will improve based on weather

2. Not sure how much rainy season really matters if you aren't doing a mechanized push requiring extending supply lines.  UA could continue its present strategy regardless of weather.

3. So far I've seen no sign of UA committing the reserves it has built up anywhere so I can't say that Russian attempting to force UA to divert resources is having any impact.  In fact going on the offensive only makes it easier for UA to kill Russians.

Net result. It doesn't appear that Russia has come up with anything new in its bag of stupid tricks and UA continues to erode their C&C as well as artillery park.  Patience.

[danfrodo]

11 minutes ago, sburke said:

Couple things

1.  Russian trying to restore manpower is fraught with problems none of which will improve based on weather

2. Not sure how much rainy season really matters if you aren't doing a mechanized push requiring extending supply lines.  UA could continue its present strategy regardless of weather.

3. So far I've seen no sign of UA committing the reserves it has built up anywhere so I can't say that Russian attempting to force UA to divert resources is having any impact.  In fact going on the offensive only makes it easier for UA to kill Russians.

Net result. It doesn't appear that Russia has come up with anything new in its bag of stupid tricks and UA continues to erode their C&C as well as artillery park.  Patience.

Ah, Sburke, you just gave good reasons why my proposed RU plan won't work, and I agree.  I was asking "what does RU think it's doing?"  not "will it work?".   Hopefully Girkin is correct and the south is in trouble while RU has committed huge forces in Luhansk.  That would go down as yet another of the stupidest things in military history, of which Putin has many in the top 100 list already. 

I am hoping what we're seeing in the south is analogous to Normandy, where once broken at the front there's nothing in the rear.  2nd El Alamein is another analogy but that seems less apt.

[womble]

1 hour ago, FancyCat said:

So how would NATO navigate Ukraine's issue? Just eliminate the defenders and then slowly carve paths thru the minefields? I assume with airpower?

SEAD

Then some more SEAD

Then some airpower to eviscerate logistics and C4ISR and degrade the actual fighting power covering the chosen paths through the fields. Some of this could be going on during the SEAD phase, but it'd really kick in once the AD umbrella has been rendered ineffective.

They'd have air cover in a position to counter RUS TacAir, and enough precision long range fires to crimp RUS artillery.

At least in theory...

 

[cesmonkey]

By the way, here are the most useful Ukrainian telegram channels covering the war that I've come across so far.

Are there some others that people might recommend? 

Official:
https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua
https://t.me/AFUStratCom
https://t.me/operativnoZSU
https://t.me/annamaliar
https://t.me/CinCAFU
https://t.me/DIUkraine
https://t.me/kpszsu
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official
https://t.me/verkhovnaradaofukraine

Non-official:
https://t.me/DeepStateUA
https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu
https://t.me/supernova_plus
 

Then, there's this list from the Kyiv Post:
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/17868
12 Telegram Accounts to Follow for the Latest Ukrainian Counteroffensive News

There's also this list of non-telegram sources:
https://mediacenter.org.ua/trusted-sources/

[sburke]

51 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Ah, Sburke, you just gave good reasons why my proposed RU plan won't work, and I agree.  I was asking "what does RU think it's doing?"  not "will it work?".   Hopefully Girkin is correct and the south is in trouble while RU has committed huge forces in Luhansk.  That would go down as yet another of the stupidest things in military history, of which Putin has many in the top 100 list already. 

I am hoping what we're seeing in the south is analogous to Normandy, where once broken at the front there's nothing in the rear.  2nd El Alamein is another analogy but that seems less apt.

One thing I didn't note, but should have about rainy season.  As the UA continues to punish Russian supply lines, rainy season will compound those affects as Russia relies more and more on long distance truck hauling versus RR and obviously the heavier stuff is the worse the impact- i.e artillery shells.

Regarding analogies.  I don't think it is helpful to try and compare to prior military campaigns.  They rely too much on the technology and political constraints of the time.  We are in a whole new ballgame and preconceptions based on historical situations that aren't really comparable leads to incorrect expectations.  I don't expect we will see a "breakout" campaign on the order of COBRA for example.  Honestly not sure which will occur first, the collapse of the political or military will in Russia.

Edited July 16, 2023 by sburke

[Carolus]

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/16/politics/us-ukraine-f16-jake-sullivan-cnntv/index.html

Is this the greenlight we have been waiting for? 

[Battlefront.com]

38 minutes ago, Carolus said:

https://edition.cnn.com/2023/07/16/politics/us-ukraine-f16-jake-sullivan-cnntv/index.html

Is this the greenlight we have been waiting for? 

Oh, I'd so so!  Great news!

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, danfrodo said:

I was asking "what does RU think it's doing?"  not "will it work?".   Hopefully Girkin is correct and the south is in trouble while RU has committed huge forces in Luhansk.  That would go down as yet another of the stupidest things in military history, of which Putin has many in the top 100 list already. 

Re: what the heck are they thinking?

I am floating in and out of the boards again, but FWIW my hypothesis remains that, like many amateurs, Putin is focused on maps: trying to attain and secure intuitive 'stop lines' on key features such as rivers or heights that can then be 'frozen' and fortified until a cease fire in place can be reluctantly extracted from a weary Ukraine.

....meanwhile declaiming at home that this 'security zone' was all he ever really wanted from bad Ukronazis all along, cuz Putin iz Chessmaster!

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, danfrodo said:

I think RU is trying to run out the clock

Oh, for sure, however dragging things out into the rainy season 2023 isn't in-and-itself the goal.  The goal is to drag out the war until Ukraine's willingness or ability to keep the war going collapses.  Making it to Spring 2023 is really no more important than making it through Winter 23/24 or through Summer 2024, etc.  Surviving this campaign season is just a step along Russia's strategic path to a better outcome than it could achieve today.

Putin and his top goons are behaving like a criminal defendant, charged with a complex crime, that has access to a well funded unscrupulous team of lawyers.  They know he is guilty and they know the prosecutors have sufficient evidence to prove it, which means mounting a straight forward legal defense isn't a viable option.

So what do they do?  Sometimes they negotiate a plea deal, but that is up to the client.  If the client doesn't want to settle, then the lawyers are instructed to obstruct the process as much as possible, question the integrity of the government, trash the witnesses, wait for a shift in politics, etc.  As long as the client has the money to do this, good lawyers can totally prevent justice from being served seemingly endlessly.

The purpose of these delaying tactics is to buy time in hopes that something unfavorable becomes more favorable.  Leading to either a better plea deal or perhaps even the charges being dropped, dismissed, or reduced.

Putin's stalling for time is not stupid from his standpoint, as damaging as it is for everybody else.  It has the potential to work.  At the very least it has way more potential for improving the outcome for Russia than anything military in nature.

Steve

[dan/california]

27 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I am hoping what we're seeing in the south is analogous to Normandy, where once broken at the front there's nothing in the rear.  2nd El Alamein is another analogy but that seems less apt.

I think there are a LOT of analogies to Montgomery's breakthrough at El Alamein. Monty executed a well planned deeply resourced set piece attack against a prepared defense. His casualties were extremely high. But when he broke thru the British smashed the Africa Corps in an afternoon.