How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[billbindc]

6 minutes ago, dan/california said:

 

Some good maps here, especially of the minor water ways.

 

 

The hydrography, rail and road transport maps all make a very strong argument for option 2 on the operational map. And that option 2 is right on the border of RuAF groups Center and South makes it even stronger.

[kevinkin]

25 minutes ago, DesertFox said:

I guess every country has some of this kind.

Yep, and a state senator has zero influence on foreign policy. Most have primary jobs and some run to effect local policy especially when it can make them money. Real-estate and zoning are biggies and just being on the "inside" gives them advantages over other citizens. I am on a first name bias with my state senator. The perks are real. But he is dumb as a stump. Buys everyone a round after golf and smiles a lot. BTW, technically he would on my side of aisle. But he is still schmuck. Don't get worked up over that Black dude. They are a come out of wood works in a imperfect free society. 

Edited June 16, 2023 by kevinkin

[DesertFox]

Not bad at all.

 

 

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, billbindc said:

The hydrography, rail and road transport maps all make a very strong argument for option 2 on the operational map. And that option 2 is right on the border of RuAF groups Center and South makes it even stronger.

Well the AFU General Staff is rather good at this after all. A lot to be said for having a water obstacle on both sides of your advance.

[Harmon Rabb]

Here's another clip for all the folks who love artillery here.

[DesertFox]

This appears to be the 100 KIA/100 WIA strike we talked about yesterday.

 

 

[NamEndedAllen]

12 hours ago, benpark said:

This remote deminer is the only thing I've found that looks beyond a prototype, which could be in some form of production beyond what is seen in the attached press images:

https://www.military.com/equipment/m160-remote-controlled-mine-clearance-system

Far from being a new concept, remote controlled de-mining vehicles were designed and widely use last century. While reading and rereading various accounts about Kursk, I came across a vehicle I’d not seen before. Numerous sources discuss the German use of such equipment.  There are even model kits of one of these! https://www.walthers.com/military-german-army-wwii-remote-control-mine-resin-kit-springer-radio-guided-medium-tracked-carrier-pkg-2
This is from a more extensive article at https://www.historynet.com/arms-men-german-remote-controlled-vehicles-world-war-ii/   More references follow at bottom of the excerpt.

The Germans issued a more refined model, the B.IV, to various Funklenkpanzer battalions and separate companies in April 1942. The steel-hulled B.IV was not intended to be expendable: It carried a 450- kilogram explosive charge in a detachable bin mounted on its front. It had a driver’s compartment, enabling an operator to drive the B.IV like a tank for a considerable distance before dismounting and activating its radio control.

Once radio control was initiated, an operator in a command tank, typically a Panzerkampfwagen Mark III or Tiger tank or a Sturmgeschütz III assault gun, steered the B.IV to its target. Using radio controls, the operator detonated explosive bolts securing the demolitions bin to the B.IV, depositing the bin on or near its target. After the vehicle made good its escape, the operator also detonated the charge by radio control. Borgward built 1,181 B.IVs before its Bremen factory was bombed out in October 1944.

After testing Kégresse’s recovered prototype in late 1940, the Wehrmacht directed Borgward to design a “light load carrier.” The result was the Goliath, which the Germans began issuing to armored engineer and assault engineer units in the spring of 1942. Unlike the B.IV, the wire-guided Goliaths were designed to be expendable, a species of caterpillar-tracked mobile mine. An operator controlled the vehicle via a telephone cable spooling out from the rear of the Goliath to a joystick control box. As the electric motors used in early-model Goliaths were expensive and their battery life was short, a later model was powered by a gasoline engine. Borgward produced 7,579 Goliaths, counting both versions.

For vehicles whose operations were typically conducted with utmost secrecy, B.IV and Goliath-equipped units nevertheless saw considerable action on every front where the Wehrmacht fought. 

H
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borgward_IV

her
Here is a model

[kevinkin]

24 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Some good maps here, especially of the minor water ways.

Thanks for posting that. My take away is that tank country is not "tank country" since any delay to an advance can get quickly nailed by various sources of firepower under the observation of expendable UAVs. I still think the single axis of attack will become a fait accompli once the RA is worn down by alteration can can't parry the killing thrust. We might be entering a new war of attrition where the attrition is not physical but wears down the ability of the RA to react.  

[benpark]

2 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

Far from being a new concept

Of course! The original. Over-engineered, for engineering.

[NamEndedAllen]

1 minute ago, benpark said:

Of course! The original. Over-engineered, for engineering.

I'm just surprised in view of the extensive use of mines across the planet *since* WWII and their danger to successive generations,  that at least SOME advancement of this tech might have been tested and deployed where needed in and by some of the various countries and conflict zones. In the past 80 years or so. 

[NamEndedAllen]

10 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:

Now it has been revealed that the real puppet masters are really in Ukraine and the United States government are really the puppets.

No no no! Fake news!! Great Britain is the REAL puppet master. And they are of course giant lizards disguised by alien tech. Everyone knows that. 
https://www.express.co.uk/news/weird/768800/David-Icke-queen-shape-shifting-lizard

[sburke]

30 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

No no no! Fake news!! Great Britain is the REAL puppet master. And they are of course giant lizards disguised by alien tech. Everyone knows that. 
https://www.express.co.uk/news/weird/768800/David-Icke-queen-shape-shifting-lizard

you know, that is almost believable... i mean look at Charles....

[The_Capt]

9 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

Gonna have to put on my historical nitpicker hat here. The European powers closely examined the US Civil War (I have a whole book somewhere on tactical development in the British army as a result of the US Civil War (there certainly was a lot of "America Sux" at the beginning of the war, which petered out as the war progressed)). They also had multiple, far more relevant, conflicts to examine between the US Civil War and WW1. There was the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian war, the two Boar wars, the Russo-Japanese war, and many others that I skipped for brevity. The devastation of WW1 had nothing to do with failing to pay attention to recent wars.

In fact much of the devastation can be chalked up to overlearning the wrong lessons from some of those wars, rather than failing to learn any lessons. One of the French lessons from the Franco-Prussian war was to re-emphasize shock, as opposed to firepower (there was a feeling that the previous emphasis on firepower and entrenchment made units hesitant to attack), leading to masses of French infantry being cut down in 1914. Among the lessons that many armies took from the Russo-Japanese war was that a high degree of tenacity and casualty tolerance was necessary to overcome modern firepower. Which resulted in masses of unnecessary casualties in battles that were pressed long after they should have been abandoned in 1915 and 1916.

And often the correct lessons were learned, but with spotty implementation. Most people had figured out that it was better to abandon the old close order formations in favor of fighting in a single rank in extended order (basically, make the skirmish line the default battle formation), although there were ongoing arguments about that right up until the early battles of 1914, with some units being brutally punished for going into battle in close order formations (I believe the French in particular had a fondness for close order formations, which they quickly abandoned after a few battles). The British had figured out that cavalry would mostly be acting as mounted infantry from here on out, and there were fierce debates about whether the cavalry should even retain their sabers at all (the Russians apparently had the opposite viewpoint, and tried to use their cavalry primarily for traditional charges, while most armies fell somewhere in between the British and the Russian viewpoint on cavalry (as it turned out, British cavalry were probably the most effective cavalry of any army in 1914)).

I'd say that most of the obvious lessons had been learned reasonably well by 1914. What remained to be learned from 1914-1918 were the smaller and far less obvious details. Things such as how much artillery ammunition is needed in modern war, how to maintain command and control on a highly dispersed battlefield before the invention of man-portable radios, how to improve coordination between the infantry and the artillery, how best to employ artillery against dug in positions, etc...

My takeaway from studying tactical development in the late 19th century and early 20th century was not that officers of the time weren't paying attention. It was that deriving correct lessons from ongoing developments, and then applying those lessons to sound changes in doctrine and force structure, is exceptionally difficult.

Gotta disagree, but not vehemently.  There is plenty of evidence of failure to translate the evidence of shifts in the wars prior to WW1 to actual changes in doctrine and structures that were not simply “missing details”.  For example the Austrian Calvary on the eastern front rode out in 1914 in parade dress complete with shiny breastplates.  The key lesson that was not taken aboard was the fact that warfare had shifted towards defensive primacy.  The evidence was hinted at in places like Gettysburg and more loudly at Petersburg.  They definitely should have gotten the memo by the Franco-Prussian War - the US commanders expressed the same reticence to digging in as a “morale issue and hindrance to the offence” in 1863, and had the massacres to prove it.  Further in places like Culps Hill where Union troops dug in, it was bloody obvious that this had a significant impact on force ratio calcs in favour of the defence on Day 2 of Gettysburg.

Your point on learning the wrong lessons is sound; however it also has to be considered in light of military culture of the day.  The militaries of the 19th century were still living under the shadow of 1812, which was a high watermark for formation manoeuvres and firepower all backed by the spirit of the offensive…in fact that was Jomini’s entire point on concentration.  Clausewitz gave it some breathing room but neither of the old masters can be considered as Defensive proponents. The militaries of Europe build an entire culture around offensive “press of the bayonet” that set them up to learn the wrong lessons as they unfolded in front of them - and we are not immune to this either.  They talked themselves into half-measures and failed to see the shift completely.  Your example of close versus extended order is simply rearranging deck chairs in a kill box.  It definitely hinted at from the slaughters of Pickets charge that the answer was “no orders of infantry…dig”.  Once machine guns and fast firing (and coordinated artillery) came into play what order ones infantry was in was an argument in relative obsolescence.  They slaughter millions on the western front learning and re-learning that one.

So, sure “wrong lessons and spotty implementation” but why that happened was built on a mountain of European military culture that had a lot of blind spots…and we have the same dynamic today.  Our culture creates lenses in seeing only what we want to see.  I have been in meeting where army officers are using observations from this war to double down on heavy formations, we are trapped in boxes of our own thinking.  I argue WW1 happened because western military culture created conditions for blind spots and learning wrong lessons.  As well as stifling any imagination on changing force structure or doctrine - and again, we see that today.

Edited June 16, 2023 by The_Capt

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, NamEndedAllen said:

I'm just surprised in view of the extensive use of mines across the planet *since* WWII and their danger to successive generations,  that at least SOME advancement of this tech might have been tested and deployed where needed in and by some of the various countries and conflict zones. In the past 80 years or so. 

The Pentagon threw a LOT of money at IED solutions while we were in Iraq. I wouldn't say the didn't get anything out of it, but they were distinctly short of miracles. That is why we have an approximate infinity of MRAPS to give the Ukrainians.

[billbindc]

20 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Gotta disagree, but not vehemently.  There is plenty of evidence of failure to translate the evidence of shifts in the wars prior to WW1 to actual changes in doctrine and structures that were not simply “missing details”.  For example the Austrian Calvary on the eastern front rode out in 1914 in parade dress complete with shiny breastplates.  The key lesson that was not taken aboard was the fact that warfare had shifted towards defensive primacy.  The evidence was hinted at in places like Gettysburg and more loudly at Petersburg.  They definitely should have gotten the memo by the Franco-Prussian War - the US commanders expressed the same reticence to digging in as a “morale issue and hindrance to the offence” in 1863, and had the massacres to prove it.  Further in places like Culps Hill where Union troops dug in, it was bloody obvious that this had a significant impact on force ratio calcs in favour of the defence on Day 2 of Gettysburg.

Your point on learning the wrong lessons is sound; however it also has to be considered in light of military culture of the day.  The militaries of the 19th century were still living under the shadow of 1812, which was a high watermark for formation manoeuvres and firepower all backed by the spirit of the offensive…in fact that was Jomini’s entire point on concentration.  Clausewitz gave it some breathing room but neither of the old masters can be considered as Defensive proponents. The militaries of Europe build an entire culture around offensive “press of the bayonet” that set them up to learn the wrong lessons as they unfolded in front of them - and we are not immune to this either.  They talked themselves into half-measures and failed to see the shift completely.  Your example of close versus extended order is simply rearranging deck chairs in a kill box.  It definitely hinted at from the slaughters of Pickets charge that the answer was “no orders of infantry…dig”.  Once machine guns and fast firing (and coordinated artillery) came into play what order ones infantry was in was an argument in relative obsolescence.  They slaughter millions on the western front learning and re-learning that one.

So, sure “wrong lessons and spotty implementation” but why that happened was built on a mountain of European military culture that had a lot of blind spots…and we have the same dynamic today.  Our culture creates lenses in seeing only what we want to see.  I have been in meeting where army officers are using observations from this war to double down on heavy formations, we are trapped in boxes of our own thinking.  I argue WW1 happened because western military culture created conditions for blind spots and learning wrong lessons.  As well as stifling any imagination on changing force structure or doctrine - and again, we see that today.

My great-great-grandfather's unit used so called Coffee Mill guns during the Civil War. My grandfather knew his grandfather and I knew my grandfather in turn. The point being that these transitions happened, in historical terms, quite quickly. 

Edited June 16, 2023 by billbindc

[dan/california]

42 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Gotta disagree, but not vehemently.  There is plenty of evidence of failure to translate the evidence of shifts in the wars prior to WW1 to actual changes in doctrine and structures that were not simply “missing details”.  For example the Austrian Calvary on the eastern front rode out in 1914 in parade dress complete with shiny breastplates.  The key lesson that was not taken aboard was the fact that warfare had shifted towards defensive primacy.  The evidence was hinted at in places like Gettysburg and more loudly at Petersburg.  They definitely should have gotten the memo by the Franco-Prussian War - the US commanders expressed the same reticence to digging in as a “morale issue and hindrance to the offence” in 1863, and had the massacres to prove it.  Further in places like Culps Hill where Union troops dug in, it was bloody obvious that this had a significant impact on force ratio calcs in favour of the defence on Day 2 of Gettysburg.

Your point on learning the wrong lessons is sound; however it also has to be considered in light of military culture of the day.  The militaries of the 19th century were still living under the shadow of 1812, which was a high watermark for formation manoeuvres and firepower all backed by the spirit of the offensive…in fact that was Jomini’s entire point on concentration.  Clausewitz gave it some breathing room but neither of the old masters can be considered as Defensive proponents. The militaries of Europe build an entire culture around offensive “press of the bayonet” that set them up to learn the wrong lessons as they unfolded in front of them - and we are not immune to this either.  They talked themselves into half-measures and failed to see the shift completely.  Your example of close versus extended order is simply rearranging deck chairs in a kill box.  It definitely hinted at from the slaughters of Pickets charge that the answer was “no orders of infantry…dig”.  Once machine guns and fast firing (and coordinated artillery) came into play what order ones infantry was in was an argument in relative obsolescence.  They slaughter millions on the western front learning and re-learning that one.

So, sure “wrong lessons and spotty implementation” but why that happened was built on a mountain of European military culture that had a lot of blind spots…and we have the same dynamic today.  Our culture creates lenses in seeing only what we want to see.  I have been in meeting where army officers are using observations from this war to double down on heavy formations, we are trapped in boxes of our own thinking.  I argue WW1 happened because western military culture created conditions for blind spots and learning wrong lessons.  As well as stifling any imagination on changing force structure or doctrine - and again, we see that today.

 

Quote

 

https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/88998/RICE0033.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

William II always had the German war games end with a climactic charge by cuirassiers in white tunics, gleaming breastplates, and all the other traditional trappings.^ It was a magnificent spectacle, but hardly war.Yet some considered the German Emperor's plan of brooking through at one point with heavy cavalry masses not merely a parade-ground maneuver calculated solely to raise the spirits of the cavalry. A French general labeled it a "well-thoughtout and practicable plan of action. 

 

There was a lot of slow learning, some pretty serious just NOT learning. The whole paper is long but very, very good. As a side point getting bleeped by the Boers did the the British army a great deal of good a ~decade later.

 

Edit: The title "THE DECLINE OF CAVALRY 1900-1918"

 

Edited June 16, 2023 by dan/california

[Battlefront.com]

Long video from recently liberated Blagodatne by 68th Jager Brigade.  Closed Caption is OK, but there is an obvious glitch for a bit.  Minor annoyance only:

 

Steve

 

[Fenris]

Nice find on those mortar rounds, very useful.

[kimbosbread]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

They talked themselves into half-measures and failed to see the shift completely.  Your example of close versus extended order is simply rearranging deck chairs in a kill box.  It definitely hinted at from the slaughters of Pickets charge that the answer was “no orders of infantry…dig”.  Once machine guns and fast firing (and coordinated artillery) came into play what order ones infantry was in was an argument in relative obsolescence.  They slaughter millions on the western front learning and re-learning that one.

It’s been a few years since I last read Infrantrie Greift An, but I remember Rommel’s big lessons were as soon as you stop, you dig, and when you attack, go all in.

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

The Pentagon threw a LOT of money at IED solutions while we were in Iraq. I wouldn't say the didn't get anything out of it, but they were distinctly short of miracles. That is why we have an approximate infinity of MRAPS to give the Ukrainians.

Apparently nobody learned anything from the bush wars either.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

1 hour ago, kimbosbread said:

Apparently nobody learned anything from the bush wars either.

There were also wrong lessons learned. My favourite is the TUSK upgrade for Abrams, with a termal sight for the loaders machine gun. And room clearing tactics straight out of police SWAT training course.

[Hapless]

We're in macro-masking/tactical deficit country again!

Like in WW1, this war has revealed (or confirmed, or reiterated, take your pick) that the factors influencing success in base tactical interactions did not align with the pre-war expectations of the belligerents. So officers have been ordering units around with an inaccurate concept of what they're capable of achieving in the prevailing conditions.

This happens all the time, the tricky part is figuring out what has changed and whether those changes are going to be important or applicable in the future... something people from a wide array of boxes typing in a wargame forum might be able to process better than a collection of people all sitting in the same military career box.

Or we can at least be wrong in original and unexpected ways!

[Offshoot]

Aprobotos

 

[womble]

BBC article on counting Russian casualties. May be of some interest. 

[Tux]

6 hours ago, sburke said:

you know, that is almost believable... i mean look at Charles....

It would explain why Andrew doesn’t sweat, as well!

[Astrophel]

29 minutes ago, womble said:

BBC article on counting Russian casualties. May be of some interest. 

Don't know why the BBC promote such a massive underestimate of Russian casualties.  Perhaps they worry about their reporters in Russia being arrested.