Jump to content

How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


Probus

Recommended Posts

2 hours ago, DesertFox said:

I am tempted myself to  restrict myself to weekly updates only .

When I was young many years ago the Sunday NY Times had a full section called "the week in review". The granularity of the incoming information today just feeds the minds of those who react before thinking. 

Edited by kevinkin
Link to comment
Share on other sites

So,  Day 2 of the Offensive is passing.

Nothing much has shifted or changed.  The Russian lines hold,  albeit with a fair amount of local buckling and flexing. But no talk of routs,  abandoned positions, or large prisoner counts. 

The UKR main effort appears to be developing towards Melitopol. 

Most of the new brigades are not committed yet,  it is certainly too soon. 

RUS air seems to be having certain local effects but not enough to delay the main push. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

In some ways this is helpful to Ukraine.  For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.  People who are now convinced, either because of Copium or ignorance, that Ukraine is in trouble are simply setting themselves up for a major emotional reversal when things go the other way.  Especially if Ukraine does something dramatic.

Steve

Gonna be interesting to see what the faithful do when UKR breaks through.  They learned nothing from Kharkiv, from Kherson, from Bakhmut slaughterhouse.  Yet they still believe.  Kinda like the folks that showed up for some end of the world party in  ~1840 in Illinois, like 30,000 of them.  World didn't end.  Charlatan-leader said "I forgot to count year 0, come back next year!".   Many less came the next year.  Sadly though, many kept coming back and then formed the basis of a couple of incredibly stupid american religions that shall go nameless here. True believers always find some copium, and often double down.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

16 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

So,  Day 2 of the Offensive is passing.

Nothing much has shifted or changed.  The Russian lines hold,  albeit with a fair amount of local buckling and flexing. But no talk of routs,  abandoned positions, or large prisoner counts. 

The UKR main effort appears to be developing towards Melitopol. 

Most of the new brigades are not committed yet,  it is certainly too soon. 

RUS air seems to be having certain local effects but not enough to delay the main push. 

So recall the UA Fall offensive took about 3 months to shape, form up and culminate.  Early days in what is likely going to be an operation that will last all summer.  

These guys are operating in a different war…things will likely go slow until they go fast.  Unless the RA is so rotted that they shatter early but we will see.  This whole thing right now looks like probing and prodding to be honest.  This is not to see the enemy - the UA can do that already - it is to see what the enemy can and will do as a reaction.  My guess is that we have moved into a more active shaping phase, the main assaults have yet to come.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, pintere said:

It‘s still far too early to draw any conclusions about how effective the Leo 2 is.

I would just say that having more mobile protected firepower platforms is simply better than not having them.  And they got a couple hundred Leos & AMX10s.  The best ability is availability sometimes.  There's units that would've had no armor w big guns in support that will now have them. 

I am just hoping UKR can get a breakthrough somewhere that will get the rats fleeing south instead of having to grind through for 2 weeks.  Every UKR casualty is a horrible tragedy.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, danfrodo said:

Every UKR casualty is a horrible tragedy.

The defeat phenomenon can occur rapidly, but when and when remains a mystery until it does.  It like watching someone work on a stuck zipper. They work and work on it until 2 or more elements finally align and connect and the slider suddenly gives way. 

Edited by kevinkin
Link to comment
Share on other sites

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

So recall the UA Fall offensive took about 3 months to shape, form up and culminate.  Early days in what is likely going to be an operation that will last all summer.  

Yes, though I have a hunch that Ukraine is going to push harder sooner than it did last Fall.  Not because they have to, but because I think the opportunities will come up sooner than they did last year.

I also wonder how much of a lesson Ukraine learned about the end of the Kharkiv counter offensive, where it ran out of steam and resources.  Imagine if they had been able to start a few weeks earlier and had a couple more brigades in reserve.  Northern Luhansk might be empty of Russians.

This is not to be critical, it is to point out how CLOSE they possibly came to nearly doubling their gains.

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

These guys are operating in a different war…things will likely go slow until they go fast.  Unless the RA is so rotted that they shatter early but we will see.  This whole thing right now looks like probing and prodding to be honest.  This is not to see the enemy - the UA can do that already - it is to see what the enemy can and will do as a reaction.  My guess is that we have moved into a more active shaping phase, the main assaults have yet to come.

I expect the Russians in the forward positions to largely keep their cool and fight back as effectively as the Russians can, given their full bag of problems, until Ukraine achieves a major breakthrough.  As I've banged on about for months now, Russians do NOT like being surrounded.  The minute they think their routes are in danger of being cut off, they will pull up stakes and withdraw to safer positions.

Currently we have two possible pushes to break through the southern line with a sizeable sector inbetween.  Further, that sector relies upon mostly secondary roads for supply.  Coming in from behind in either direction, but especially both, will hopefully cause the Russians to voluntarily withdraw.  If they don't, then it is probable that Ukraine can keep them in place without additional resources, which keeps them out of the fight and increases their chances of being "pocketed".

Steve

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Various reports from the fighting of June 8th posted by Rob Lee.  Not much new here, though there are some details about which Russian units are fighting and who is commanding them.

Rybar confirms, or perhaps is the source, of the news that Ukraine has taken some positions of significance:

Quote

🇬🇧🇺🇦 Chronicle of the battles on the Orekhovsky site for June 8, 2023 Since almost midnight, Ukrainian formations have been trying to break through the defenses of the 70th and 291st regiments of the 42nd Motor Rifle Division and the 22nd special forces brigades of the RF Armed Forces at the Rabotino-Verbove line.

During all this time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were only able to move a little, taking a tactical height at the turn. As a result, units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost more than 40 armored vehicles, including several Leopard 2A4 tanks.

Thanks to a well-built defense and mining approaches, the majority of Ukrainian mechanized units could not even approach the first line of the Russian army. The forces of the 65th mechanized brigade, as well as the new 47th brigade from the 9th Army Corps, took part in the battles south of Malaya Tokmachka.

To complicate the supply of the RF Armed Forces grouping, Ukrainian formations began to mine the paths with DM-31 magnetic mines. 🔻

The only area where the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to advance is Lobkove.

The presence of the enemy remains there, from where the assault groups of the 128th Guards Brigade are trying to attack the positions of the RF Armed Forces near the village of Zherebyanka.

At the moment, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have suffered huge losses in personnel and equipment, however, the AFU grouping still has combat-ready reserves, including formations of the 9th and 10th army corps, as well as landing formations as part of the Maroon tactical group. #video #Zaporozhye #Russia #Ukraine #Orekhov

Note that Rybar puts the vehicle loss in the minefield/artillery fustercluck at 40.  Seems high compared to the video evidence, but we've already been through that ;)

Rybar had this to say in another post for today:

Quote

Despite the failure of the Ukrainian offensive, it is too early to relax: the enemy is just beginning to seriously attack in the Zaporozhye direction. In addition, a blow should be expected in other sectors of the front.

Once again, despite all the distortion and propaganda drivel, Rybar does stand out as one of the more realistic Russian sources. Of course right after he said this was a post about the glorious Russian emergency services saving children flooded out by the evil Kyivites who blew their own dam.  Grr.  The funny thing about that is the only image he had to show as proof was a single BLATANTLY Photoshopped invention.  Yup, Rybar couldn't even find ONE picture, not to mention video, showing Russians helping flood victims.

Steve

Link to comment
Share on other sites

ISW's June 8th report was mostly stuff we've already seen here.  However, there were two things noted that have not been:

Quote

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) responded to the Ukrainian attack with an uncharacteristic degree of coherency and praised Southern Military District elements for repelling the attack and regaining lost positions. The Russian MoD published a video statement by the commander of the Russian grouping in the Zaporizhia direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, wherein Romanchuk reported that Ukrainian forces started attacking around 0200 local time June 8 and that Russian forces, particularly those of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, succeeded in repelling the attack.[8] Romanchuk claimed that Ukrainian forces telegraphed the ground attack with extensive artillery preparation of the battlefield.[9] The Russian MoD also released a statement by 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov, who credited elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army with effectively laying mines to impede Ukrainian advances.[10] The overall Russian response to the attack, both among various milbloggers and the Russian MoD, was notably coherent and relatively consistent with the available visual evidence, which may suggest that Russian forces were not surprised and reacted in a controlled and militarily sound manner. As ISW has previously assessed, the Russian information space reacts with a high degree of chaos and incoherence when taken by surprise by battlefield developments that do not allow the propaganda apparatus to develop a clear line.[11] By contrast, the Russian responses to this attack suggest that Russian forces defended in the way that they had prepared to, thus giving Russian sources a rhetorical line to coalesce around.

This should not be that surprising.  Russians like planning and as long as things go according to plan then they operate relatively effectively.  The reason Russia lost this war so long ago is that so much has not going according to plan.

In this case the Russians knew the attack was coming.  They knew roughly where it would come from and roughly what form it would take.  Hell, even we knew all of this!  So it is not surprising that given a few months to prepare, they have their initial defense pretty well organized and that minimal stress hasn't broken it.  Stress and disruption of the plan are bound to happen.

Quote

[this section pertains to the western Zaporizhia front]

It is additionally noteworthy that the Russian Southern Military District Forces deployed in this particular area are likely to be a higher quality force grouping than Russia has elsewhere in theater, and their defensive performance is unlikely to be reflective of defensive capabilities of Russian groupings elsewhere on the front. Elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army have been deployed in a doctrinally consistent manner to the Orikhiv area and have been conducting defensive preparations in this sector of the front for several months.[19] The 291st and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiments in particular have reportedly gained experience in defending against limited Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force efforts this area over the past months and have had time to commit to and prepare for defensive operations and familiarize themselves with the terrain.[20] The 58th Combined Arms Army elements in this sector, therefore, are likely generally fresher and more experienced than elements in other areas of the front. The Russian defense of this sector should not be taken as indicative of overall Russian defensive capabilities as Ukraine continues counteroffensive operations. Russian forces defending in other sectors have indeed performed much more poorly. Ukraine, having recently regained the battlefield initiative across the theater, will be able to choose exactly where in to continue attacking based on observed defensive capabilities of various Russian groupings along the frontline among other factors.

It appears ISW did not receive information before their cutoff that Ukraine took Luhove since they always note significant claims even if they can't verify them.

Steve

Link to comment
Share on other sites

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Russians do NOT like being surrounded.

I think the pros and cons of linear vs column formations might be applicable. Recon pull is happening with strong probes composed of elite highly mobile and networked troops. They are looking for opportunities to bring in a second echelon force whose main role is to hold ground. Waiting in the wings are the big boys - the third echelon. Their deployment awaits RA reaction to newsworthy gains and passes through the second echelon into significant operational space where UA losses are not prohibitive. At this point it’s imperative that the third echelon assume the tactical defensive and place the RA in a dilemma - do they counter attack (which they stink at) or give the ground to the RA (politically bad)? Wash and repeat across the front. Not in a linear way, but in narrow combined arms flying columns. One interesting point to consider: once into operational space do you try to take out a key military position or head to a more newsworthy (political )one?  Either way to your point Steve, the RA may just fall back not knowing where the envelopment is coming from. 
 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

War Gonzo again:
https://t.me/wargonzo/13094

Quote

⚡️Urgently⚡️The situation in Zaporozhye at 6:30 Moscow time⚡

As we wrote earlier, the enemy again stepped up offensive operations by nightfall.

The fighting continued all night, as a result of which the enemy, with massive support from artillery and armored vehicles, managed to occupy several positions of our troops in the Orekhov-Tokmak direction.

The situation is really serious. Neo-Nazis by their actions are trying to create a threat of encirclement of some of our advanced groups in one of the directions. The activity of the battles is extremely high.

Recall that during yesterday's roll-on, the enemy was also able to cling to our advanced positions, but failed to gain a foothold on them.

 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm interested to hear more about the night ops.  RU has a deficit in NV capabilities to UKR (assuming they're in NATO gear), that's correct yes?

I have no direct experience but have read that night operations are difficult to execute, anyone with knowledge able to comment?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

13 minutes ago, dan/california said:

We need more and better mechanics for mine warfare in the next game. Their effect on the conduct of this war has been absolutely enormous.

I am on board historically and tactically. However, mine warfare and fun game play are a difficult things to get correct. Mines produce a lot of random factors that frustrate players having beer on a Saturday night. The "next game" will be so cool and very playable. That's why we are here to help design that game. Battlefront is taking notes. 

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Sorry about replying to this so late. I was in a conference all day yesterday, and then was so tired when I got home that I went to sleep. I'm in Italy right now so the time zones are a little wonky.

On 6/8/2023 at 8:50 AM, kevinkin said:

Definitive meaning something other than raw data and analysis not based on raw emotional wounds that recently occurred

 There have been professionals analyzing this war with tools other than raw emotion since day 1.

On 6/8/2023 at 8:50 AM, kevinkin said:

The term definitive in history usually means a balanced fact based approach not weighed down by very recent traumatic events

Definitive is only really used in pop-history. The term has no place in a serious study of history. And an event being recent and traumatic does not prevent us from analyzing it in a balanced manner (what has ISW been doing all this time?).

On 6/8/2023 at 8:50 AM, kevinkin said:

When I am 80 we might get there if this freaking war ever ends. 

We won't get there even then. More information does become available after a war. And as the decades stretch on you will get fresh viewpoints and better analysis. The 50th draft of a history of a war is certainly more accurate than the 1st draft. But the fog of war never fully lifts. There will be questions about this war that we will still be arguing about even in a hundred years (I never fail to be impressed by the leaps that have been made in WW1 scholarship in the last couple of decades, but there are still things we don't know, and that war is just over a hundred years old now).

Edited by Centurian52
Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm wondering how the air war is going. We've not seen much of anything, released by the UKR side, and the GS report doesn't mention any downed birds, which is understandable, while the op is ongoing. The RUS side have claimed that air support is contributing to the effectiveness of the defense. I wonder whether the CAS are just exploiting gaps in the UKR general AD umbrella, and are mostly evading local MANPAD-based AD at the point of the spear(s).

How effective is the denial over the lines of contact? I guess we'll see later how many CAS casualties there have been in these first couple of days, on both sides on the air and on the ground.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Unfortunately, your content contains terms that we do not allow. Please edit your content to remove the highlighted words below.
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

×
×
  • Create New...