How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

58 minutes ago, Yet said:

once again spotless gear. oh and his chechen flag badge is right, the russian one upside down?!

could be as well filmed 100km behind the lines. 

There is at least some sounds of artillery, but probably very well to the rear as is usual for Russia's brave Chechens.  I don't think the Russians would let a woman anywhere near the front. 

Steve

[DesertFox]

Where do the Orcs prepare for defense? Where do they expect the center of gravity? Some of that can be deduced from this map.

 

 

[Harmon Rabb]

The Pentagon leak being discussed on Russian television.

[Battlefront.com]

9 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:

The Pentagon leak being discussed on Russian television.

Yeah, this is indeed quite humorous.  The Russians can't talk about this without getting all tripped up by the unpleasant realities being uncovered.  The only way for Russia to avoid this is to dismiss the documents, completely, as a US intelligence operation designed to screw with the Russian people's perception of the war.  But then nobody can talk about the identified problems with Ukraine's forces, that US has suffered massive damage from the leak, or that Russian agencies have been compromised.  Seems they didn't think this through before they started talking about it.  How fun!

Steve

 

[A Canadian Cat]

31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Seems they didn't think this through before they started talking about it.  How fun!

I love when the host asks for an example of information the US got from spying and the guy points to the mood of the troops and their plans. She knows that's going no where good for her narrative and cuts him off by saying "The mood is good and our plans are big..." I find that even more funny than the other clip which ends with one guy telling off the first for stating that the Russian army has taken more casualties than the Ukrainians.

But overall yes loads of fun.

[kevinkin]

https://indianexpress.com/article/sports/chess/ian-nepomniachtchi-russias-next-big-hope-to-join-long-line-of-world-champions-is-critic-of-ukraine-war-8544589/

What happened to Carlsen? He got bored winning all the time and makes more via outline rapid. Good thing, he would would never have played a Russian anyway. I don't think he cares much for China and Ding either. 

[Pablius]

1 hour ago, kevinkin said:

https://indianexpress.com/article/sports/chess/ian-nepomniachtchi-russias-next-big-hope-to-join-long-line-of-world-champions-is-critic-of-ukraine-war-8544589/

What happened to Carlsen? He got bored winning all the time and makes more via outline rapid. Good thing, he would would never have played a Russian anyway. I don't think he cares much for China and Ding either. 

Magnus Carlsen indeed sort of grew bored with having to defend his title every two years, apparently he didn't like the format of the match (Probably he favors more rapid chess and less classical chess as he is usually even stronger than his opponents in rapid and blitz).

Carlsen will most likely remain the top ranked player for a good while if he chooses to keep playing at the top level.

Edited April 10, 2023 by Pablius

[Harmon Rabb]

Given Jake Broe's knowledge of economic matters as well as his military background. This is a YouTube channel I'm definitely going to be paying attention to this year

[cyrano01]

On 4/9/2023 at 1:53 PM, DesertFox said:

Masters of mocking the Orcs:

 

 

Is it just me or does anyone else think that the British Army seem to have re-incarnated Brian Horrocks/Edward Fox from 'A Bridge Too Far' and he is currently cosplaying as a Royal Lancers badged Lt. Col?

Edited April 10, 2023 by cyrano01

[sburke]

4 hours ago, IanL said:

Not to mention the RA just had to lie about the casualty count and regular folk could not really be sure who was giving the correct numbers but if you control territory there is no lying about it that will stick. Sure you can fib about a few blocks here or there but when the press are entering liberated towns and villages and talking to people about their experience under Russian occupation there's no amount of lying the Russians can do that will fool regular folk about who controls what.

never underestimate people's capability of bolstering their alternate reality

[Battlefront.com]

6 minutes ago, cyrano01 said:

Is it just me or does anyone else think that the British Army seem to have re-incarnated Brian Horrocks/Edward Fox from 'A Bridge Too Far' and he is currently cospalying as a Royal Lancers badged Lt. Col?

Heh.  Well, it wouldn't be a bad thing if that is what happened.  Er, except for what it would do to our understanding of how the Universe works.

Steve

[quakerparrot67]

18 minutes ago, cyrano01 said:

Is it just me or does anyone else think that the British Army seem to have re-incarnated Brian Horrocks/Edward Fox from 'A Bridge Too Far' and he is currently cosplaying as a Royal Lancers badged Lt. Col?

he's got the chipped tooth.

 

cheers,

rob

[Fenris]

Some not so pleasant reading from the intel leak (if true)

 

[Kinophile]

23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Partisan activity didn't do much in Kherson in terms of changing the dynamic, so I would not count on it doing so in Melitopol.  Now, maybe if UA forces were already mostly surrounding the city and showing signs of getting in, then partisan activity might have a real impact.

Melitopol has had partisan activity since it fell, no? Despite multiple sweeps increasingly severe repression the activity has continued. This implies a fundamental and widespread resistance no matter what the occupiers do, and suggests that a reinforced, well lead, sustained and timed surge in partisan activity could amplify local ZSU successes. Reviewing the Resistance prep for the Normandy lanndings would be a good example. 

23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Otherwise, partisans operating to disrupt Russian LOCs is the way to go.  This worked very well on all fronts in WW2, whereas partisan attacks within urban areas were generally rare.  Warsaw was the largest scale uprising and we know how that went.

That wasn't classic partisan though. They fought a traditional urban fight with very army-like force structure. 

23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Maybe, but the terrain is terribly easy to defend against a mechanized attack. 

This is true,  and idea's fatal weakness Tbh.

23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The only reason why UA did so well in the Kharkiv offensive was the defenders were scattered unprepared to fight at all, not to mention in prepared positions.  Once Russia realized what was happening they shut down the momentum pretty solidly.  Ukraine can not afford to have that happen to them this year.

I think it would be a hard and difficult slog, but I do agree that if such an attack was successful it would likely have a huge impact on the course of the war.  However, it is a less sure bet than attacking in the south and Ukraine really needs as sure of a bet as possible.

Depends on how you calculate the Dnepr as a frontline.  If you exclude it completely, then indeed the frontline in the south goes from about 150km to about 350km.  If you include it entirely the frontline is reduced from 450km to 350km, which is a major reduction.  However, this probably isn't as important because...

The presumption is that if Ukraine makes it this far the Russians will have lost quite a lot of manpower, equipment, and supplies and Ukraine will not have suffered the same scale of losses.  If Ukraine invests 30,000 new forces into the mix, they should have enough to cover the line better than Russia.  Especially bottling up Crimea as that will take minimal forces due to the geography and Russia's inability to easily attack out of it.

Actually, I think taking back a large amount of territory is what Ukraine should focus on this year.  Ask yourself... what was the public's reaction to Ukraine retaking huge amounts of territory last year vs. achieving a possible 5:1 favorable kill ratio in Bakhmut?  The first one was inspirational, the second one was depressing.  Not just for the Ukrainians fighting, but for everybody following the war even a little bit.

Ah, but it isn't limited at all.  It would be more territory than was retaken last year.  Roughly 29,000 km2 vs. something like 15,000 km2 last year. 

Liberating that much area and trashing Russia's forces in the process is a good enough goal all on its own, but it is far better than that.  Sealing off Crimea would take the *only* land based goal Russia achieved since this horror show of a war started.  Namely, establishing a land bridge and providing territorial security for Crimea.  That would be GONE through the direct action of the Ukrainian military.  It would be a huge defeat that Russians would care more about than zinc coffins.

Then there's the divide and conquer concept of destroying purely Russian formations instead of hybrid Russian/DLPR.  Far more bang for the buck smashing forces in the south as they are mostly Russian.

Plus, I see some limited counter offensives in Donbas being feasible once Russia drains its forces there to go fight in the south as it did last year.

Steve

A weak point in your suggestion is still that there's no simple,  clear geopolitical "Win"  for Zelensky to point to and,  critically,  use to shore up Western support for 2024. An operation that doesn't give that, no matter how militarily effective, will be a geopolitical waste. 

Mariupol,  though,  would do a LOT to remind the West of Why They Fight. Can you imagine the power of a Zekensky visit to the Mariupol theater?  That horrific event probably did more to active western support than anything else. 

[battlefront.com fixed editing problems]

[kimbosbread]

12 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

A weak point in your suggestion is still that there's no simple,  clear geopolitical "Win"  for Zelensky to point to and,  critically,  use to shore up Western support for 2024. An operation that doesn't give that, no matter how militarily effective, will be a geopolitical waste.

The great thing about the plan is even partial success directly threatens the railroad to Crimea, putting huge pressure on Russia. Obviously there's a question of cost, but geopolitically besieging Crimea seems like a big deal to me. It is huge for the domestic audience, puts enormous pressure on Putin, and isolates a major portion of Russia's forces.

Best case: I think the most successful outcome- pushing Russia back to the 2014 Crimea border, dropping the bridge, and taking back Melitopol is a huge win. It's a ton of territory and might well lead to a Russian military or political collapse. Crimea is the only part of Ukraine Russia wanted in 2014 enough to formally annex it.

Medium case: Let's say Melitpol is not retaken, and only the western side of Kherson. That still doesn't increase Ukranian frontage much, and puts tons of pressure on Crimea.

Worst case: Either Vasylivka or Tokmak or Polohy are the only places retaken, that barely increases frontage for Ukraine and still threatens Russia's rail line to Crimea. And then the pivot to Luhansk north is easy.

Suppose Ukraine is able to barge/bridge at Kherson rapidly and build a 10km bridgehead. Does Russia have any weapons that could threaten a crossing once established, especially if there's distraction at Tokmak?

 

Edited April 11, 2023 by kimbosbread

[Kinophile]

Nah,  I'm still not convinced.  Bottle up Crimea creates a "situation",  not a media win. No one in the general public knows or cares about Melitopol.  It's a purely military objective. Western People hear "Melitopol"  and they say,  "oh,  that horrible theatre bombing* and Ukraine says, " nono that's Mariupol",  and then Western pundits will say:

Zelensky, and the Ukrainian war effort,  needs a clear, easily messaged and instantly understood geopolitical &  moral win that they can use to shore up Western support and,  ideally,  beat Putin over the head with. 

Bottling Crimea and putting Melitopol (no,  not Mariupol)  under a logistics interdiction campaign does not fit that nominal criteria. It's too vague,  there's no immediate emotive effect and it takes too long to explain. 

Thinking that the 2023 ZSU offensive(s)  will be purely military in nature is a fallacy,  I personally believe. 

Edited April 11, 2023 by Kinophile

[Vanir Ausf B]

50 minutes ago, Fenris said:

Some not so pleasant reading from the intel leak (if true)

I feel this is even more concerning, if true.

________

However, according to a secret purported Pentagon slide dated Feb. 28, Ukraine will have completely depleted its stock of Buk missiles by April 13, and of S-300 missiles by May 3, at current consumption rates.

If true, the alarming assessments in the leaked presentations shed new light on the urgency with which Kyiv has been lobbying the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to speed up deliveries of Western-made air-defense systems and to provide Ukraine with Western-made jet fighters, such as F-16s, so that it would be able to prevent incursions by Russian bombers.

According to one of the documents, a likely consequence of the looming air defense crisis is that Ukraine will lose its ability to mass ground forces near the front lines, and to conduct a counteroffensive.

_________

https://www.wsj.com/amp/articles/ukraine-may-run-out-of-air-defenses-by-may-leaked-pentagon-documents-warn-b96b0655

Edited April 11, 2023 by Vanir Ausf B

[MikeyD]

This is the reason why Ukrainians are currently training on Patriots in Oklahoma (10 week crash course), to  give them an alternative to S-300. The reason why the Pentagon produces these reports is to forestall predictable problems.

[sross112]

48 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

Nah,  I'm still not convinced.  Bottle up Crimea creates a "situation",  not a media win. No one in the general public knows or cares about Melitopol.  It's a purely military objective. Western People hear "Melitopol"  and they say,  "oh,  that horrible theatre bombing* and Ukraine says, " nono that's Mariupol",  and then Western pundits will say:

Zelensky, and the Ukrainian war effort,  needs a clear, easily messaged and instantly understood geopolitical &  moral win that they can use to shore up Western support and,  ideally,  beat Putin over the head with. 

Bottling Crimea and putting Melitopol (no,  not Mariupol)  under a logistics interdiction campaign does not fit that nominal criteria. It's too vague,  there's no immediate emotive effect and it takes too long to explain. 

Thinking that the 2023 ZSU offensive(s)  will be purely military in nature is a fallacy,  I personally believe. 

I think it really depends on who the audience is. If it is for western support then a large chunk of real estate that preferably has something the western populace will recognize (I'm with you on Mariupol). If it is to stir up problems in Russia then they should focus on cauldrons eliminating RA units. If the UA could nab a couple brigades with hundreds or thousands of POW's being marched to the rear, I'd expect there to be significant internal backlash in Russia. More than that, it would have a very demoralizing effect on the RA. The bigger the hit to the RA, the quicker the morale drops. That is the biggest condition that needs to be set for any kind of collapse. The snowball effect could really end up being devastating to the MOD and maybe even the Kremlin.

The biggest variable for any of these plans though is how much the UA can commit to them. If they have 10 brigades they could probably make it happen. If they don't, then Steve's general offensive is probably the most doable. Until we know what they have waiting in the wings all we can do is speculate. I like the idea of going for the coast as it physically splits their southern forces. Drop the Kerch bridge once they reach the coast and everything to the west is bottled. I'd expect a Kherson redux within 30 days if the UA keeps those forces under the fog eating snow and opportunistic advances. Having those forces cut off gives the RA a very large dilemma; a) try to keep them supplied by ship and air b) withdraw everything they can while they can or c) eventually (60 days?) surrender. 

I also expect the RA to attack as hard as they can everywhere they can to try to take the pressure off of wherever the UA decides to strike. Lots of troops in the Kremina area and along the eastern front. I don't expect them to be able to do a lot, but the UA won't be able to strip too much without taking a pretty big gamble in some of those areas. Or maybe the RA will finally whip out MacGregor's magic wand and surprise us all. 

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Melitopol has had partisan activity since it fell, no? Despite multiple sweeps increasingly severe repression the activity has continued. This implies a fundamental and widespread resistance no matter what the occupiers do, and suggests that a reinforced, well lead, sustained and timed surge in partisan activity could amplify local ZSU successes. Reviewing the Resistance prep for the Normandy lanndings would be a good example. 

Same was true in Kherson.  Neither has had any significant impact on Russia's ability to either administer the territories or conduct its military operations.  The partisan activity, in fact, has been disappointingly small scale.  Kherson gives me absolutely no reason to think that Meltiopol can be significantly impacted by partisans.

If I were in charge of Ukrainian ops, I would chalk this up as a "would be nice, but I'm not going to count on it" sort of thing.

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

That wasn't classic partisan though. They fought a traditional urban fight with very army-like force structure. 

Which is what it takes to liberate a large urban area.  Obviously Melitopol is much smaller, but so too is the known amount of resistance.  With what we know of this, if I were in charge I'd promptly have his/her ears of anybody who suggested to rely upon partisan activity for anything other than side effects.  I would then send that person to manage the HQ's copier room where hopefully no harm would be done.

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

This is true,  and idea's fatal weakness Tbh.

It's the fatal weakness of many alternatives, which is why everybody who has looked at Ukraine's options has concluded the attack will be in the south.

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

A weak point in your suggestion is still that there's no simple,  clear geopolitical "Win"  for Zelensky to point to and,  critically,  use to shore up Western support for 2024. An operation that doesn't give that, no matter how militarily effective, will be a geopolitical waste. 

Wrong.  Taking back 50% of what Russia still holds since 2022 *and* cutting Crimea off is a HUGE F'N WIN.  The land bridge is the one thing, the ONLY thing, that Russia has achieved that was probably on its list of goals for this operation.  The ONLY thing.  Everything else has utterly failed.  Taking away the land bridge removes the last pseudo success from the equation.

Beyond that, however, is the fact that you still aren't taking into consideration what happens if things go badly.  A highly risky, and frankly unnecessary, direct assault down towards the coast of the Sea of Azov is extremely prone to disastrous failure.  As in, Ukraine is out of the war even if the West's resolve isn't shaken at all.  The sort of operations Ukraine did last year and the one I am proposing does not put Ukraine into mortal peril should things go anything less than perfectly.

So, no fatal flaw in the concept I proposed.  If it is fully successful it achieves strategic level rewards, if it is less successful it gives Ukraine a means to keep the war going with some degree of gain depending on how things play out.  The alternatives you propose are unlikely to achieve the goals you set for it, and failure probably means either being worse off than they are now or possibly even out of the war completely.

3 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Mariupol,  though,  would do a LOT to remind the West of Why They Fight. Can you imagine the power of a Zekensky visit to the Mariupol theater?

Sure, I can also imagine the power of Zelensky in Red Square reviewing Azov as it marches past him as part of a victory parade.  It's a really nice thought, but it's almost as likely to happen as taking Mariupol as a main objective and holding it long enough for Zelensky to thumb his nose at Putin.

On the other hand, imagine the power of Ukraine's vaunted 2023 counter offensive having no net gain, leaving 20,000 dead Ukrainians on the battlefield, and losing a hundreds or thousands of soldiers cut off from an over extended thrust to a dream.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, sross112 said:

I think it really depends on who the audience is. If it is for western support then a large chunk of real estate that preferably has something the western populace will recognize (I'm with you on Mariupol).

I disagree with you here.  Starting in the summer Ukraine launched it's counter offensive to retake Kherson.  All eyes in the West were focused on that and they were adequately informed about it.  Then all of a sudden a sector of front, where most people couldn't name one significant location (maybe Izyum), went from RED to BLUE color.  Those in the West didn't have to know what the towns were that Ukraine was liberated, they just knew that every time someone said Ukraine might stumble (Kupiansk, Izyum, and Lyman) it didn't.

Think about it this way.  If Kherson had gone exactly as it did last year, but Kharkiv didn't happen, would the West be so excited about Ukraine's chances for this year?  I doubt it.  Personally, I know I wouldn't be.

2 hours ago, sross112 said:

If it is to stir up problems in Russia then they should focus on cauldrons eliminating RA units. If the UA could nab a couple brigades with hundreds or thousands of POW's being marched to the rear, I'd expect there to be significant internal backlash in Russia. More than that, it would have a very demoralizing effect on the RA. The bigger the hit to the RA, the quicker the morale drops. That is the biggest condition that needs to be set for any kind of collapse. The snowball effect could really end up being devastating to the MOD and maybe even the Kremlin.

Absolutely. 

The thing is destroying a large number of Russians in a dramatic engagement is unlikely to happen by accident.  The one thing Russians have shown any skill at is running away without being caught.  So if the primary objective is to destroy Russian forces, then the entire offensive must be planned around this concept.  That means foregoing any plans to recapture large amounts of territory or achieving some dramatic wedge type attack.

Going with this concept for a bit, where are there opportunities to destroy large amounts of Russian forces in some sort of dramatic way at an acceptable cost?

The Donbas is extremely unlikely to produce this sort of event.  So far neither side has been able to pull off more than a few dozen captives at one time, including Ukraine's awe inspiring Fall offensive from Kharkiv.  The terrain is too difficult and the Russians have good internal lines of communications.

A dramatic slice southward to the coast of Azov is a land grab operation, not a destruction mission.  A successful drive will likely push Russian forces to the east and west instead of trapping them in the path, which not only means failing to get large scale destruction of Russian forces, it also means Russia having even more possibilities for slamming into the flanks of such a drive.

2 hours ago, sross112 said:

The biggest variable for any of these plans though is how much the UA can commit to them. If they have 10 brigades they could probably make it happen.

It's not so much troop numbers that will determine a big bag of Russian forces, it's making that the plan at the expense of all other plans.  10 brigades can either do a deliberate capture of a large amount of Russians *or* go after large swaths of territory.  It is unlikely to do both.

2 hours ago, sross112 said:

I also expect the RA to attack as hard as they can everywhere they can to try to take the pressure off of wherever the UA decides to strike. Lots of troops in the Kremina area and along the eastern front. I don't expect them to be able to do a lot, but the UA won't be able to strip too much without taking a pretty big gamble in some of those areas. Or maybe the RA will finally whip out MacGregor's magic wand and surprise us all. 

Yes, we can expect Russia to try and take the pressure off of the south by doing something in the Donbas.  However, that's what they attempted this winter and it failed pretty horribly.  I don't think they will suddenly get better results while also trying to deal with the southern front coming unhinged.

Most likely Russia will attempt to fight off Ukrainian attacks and limit the damage of penetrations, as they did with Kherson.  They will fall back only when they are either wiped out or sense encirclement.  This is something we've seen consistently with Russians in this war, be it Kyiv, Kharkiv (the first time), Kharkiv (the second time), Izyum, Lyman, and smaller locations.

The thing I like about my idea the most is that it leverages probable Russian behavior to maximum advantage.  Don't fight for positions along the Dnepr, drive behind them far enough that their fixed positions become useless.  At that point the Russians will have to decide to wait for Ukraine to eventually come to them AFTER they've been fully cut off, or they will have to get out of their positions and attack or retreat.  They will likely retreat as attacks take time to form up and if you're cut off, time isn't something you usually have to spare.  If they retreat, territory switches hands to Ukraine without being devastated or costing lots of combat power.

I'll say this again... I think the goal of the Spring/Summer offensive should be to eliminate Russia's land bridge, fully liberate Kherson Oblast, and basically liberate the majority of the 2022 terrain Russia temporarily stole.  The Russians will lose huge amounts of men and material in the process even without any dramatic encirclements.  Which means Ukraine will achieve several goals at once.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Fenris said:

Some not so pleasant reading from the intel leak (if true)

I don't see anything in that report that we didn't already know as it was happening.  Also remember that the timing of these reports was a while ago and the situation has changed somewhat since then.  Not favorable for Ukraine yet, but  it is headed in that direction.  The "catastrophe" that was warned about appears to not have happened.

2 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

I feel this is even more concerning, if true.

This is logical and I think, again, is nothing we've not seen before this report.  As MikeyD just pointed out, Ukraine has been yelling very loudly for air defenses from the West and Patriot is nearing operational readiness because of it.  We also know that Russia is itself running out of things to throw at Ukraine, so estimates of Ukraine's dwindling stocks of missiles may be too conservative.

Now, if we had no hints of these problems *and* the reports were more current *and* there was nothing in the pipeline to address them... well, I'd be worried.  I'd also be worried if there were concerns raised in these reports we weren't already well aware of.  As it is, all I see in these leaked reports is that the real time OSINT reporting we've been consuming every day of this war has been pretty accurate.  I wasn't worried (too much) before these things were discovered, so I don't see any reason to be worried (too much) now.

The thing that has concerned me all along this year is how much of Ukraine's Spring/Summer resources have been consumed at Bakhmut.  We've always known it was greater than zero, but we've also know that very large formations are still behind the lines waiting for the counter offensive to start.  I highly doubt Russia's failed offensive drew enough away to scuttle Ukraine's plans, but they may have to scale back something.  No way to know at this point.

Steve

[MikeyD]

We have no information (or I've seen no information) on the use of US Sea Sparrow missiles fired by Ukrainian BUK AA. No info on missile number imported, launcher platforms modified, missiles fired or success rate. They may have gone a long way towards redressing Ukraine's AA missile crisis since the leaked documents were produced. I imagine US has enormous stockpiles of Sea Sparrows to spare.

[Battlefront.com]

Did someone say that Russia is running out of tank crews?  I do believe a certain Canuk did just that, and Forbes' reporting agrees:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/04/07/the-russians-arent-just-running-out-of-tanks-theyre-running-out-of-tank-crews-too-and-its-going-to-get-worse/?sh=5a8142624ba3

One interesting point made in this article is that a side benefit of dusting off very old tanks is that they are much easier to train crews on because there's less electronics and fancy stuff that has to be maintained (auto loader is mentioned).  However, the author posits this:

Quote

In ‘solving’ their tanker-shortage by equipping crews with obsolete tanks, the Russians might end up creating an even deeper tanker shortage—by getting a bunch of four-man T-55 and T-62 crews killed in lopsided fights with better-equipped, better-trained Ukrainian forces.

Meaning, Russia might be able to get more tanks and tank crews into the fight quicker if they use older tanks with shortened training cycles, but in the end they will likely wind up getting killed in short order, making the next round of replacements even more difficult and time consuming.

Steve

[MikeyD]

The debate over Ukraine's next move reminds me of Montgomery versus Eisenhower on the Western Front 44-45. Eisenhower was wed to the 'broad front' strategy, gradually steamrollering the Germans before him basically along all points of the front. Montgomery lobbied for a deep stabbing knockout blow that would throw the allies across the Rhine before the Germans could respond. The idea of a deep strike to grab Mariupol this summer does seem it could be 'a bridge too far' for Ukraine. The Russians would need to be in full rout, fleeing for their lives for it to succeed. Maybe they will be, or maybe they'll stand their ground with their backs to the sea and trade blow-for-blow.