How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

20 minutes ago, kluge said:

Melitopol is the best option insofar as it is the point where Russian supply lines are the longest in the south in all directions, both via the land bridge in the east and via Crimean railway in the south. It is also closest to the current front line.

That being said, the bulk of defensive fortifications in the south are concentrated on the avenue of approach from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol. So it's more likely that Ukraine will attempt to bypass them using the open terrain somewhere to the east of Melitopol before swinging back west.

I would bet on an initial broad push that goes halfway to the sea- cutting off the only railroad that connects Melitopol and Mariupol and thus imposing a limit on the number of reinforcements that can be moved in to the area.

They should either go east of Melitopol, and the then straight for the approaches to Crimea, which would threaten to cut off all the Russian forces in Melitopol, and all of the forces along the Dnipro. Or, attack from near Vuhledar to one side or the other of Mariupol. That brings the Kerch bridge into HIMARS range and would make life very unpleasant for ALL the Russian forces in Crimea and the land bridge. Of course if they are strong enough, do both. It would leave the Russian forces in three different pockets with supply situations that would range from very bad to nonexistent. The Russians could retreat of course, it is the only thing they are good at. But that would mean the only thing the Russians have gained in this war is bits of Northern Luhansk.

[Battlefront.com]

44 minutes ago, kluge said:

Melitopol is the best option insofar as it is the point where Russian supply lines are the longest in the south in all directions, both via the land bridge in the east and via Crimean railway in the south. It is also closest to the current front line.

That being said, the bulk of defensive fortifications in the south are concentrated on the avenue of approach from Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol. So it's more likely that Ukraine will attempt to bypass them using the open terrain somewhere to the east of Melitopol before swinging back west.

I would bet on an initial broad push that goes halfway to the sea- cutting off the only railroad that connects Melitopol and Mariupol and thus imposing a limit on the number of reinforcements that can be moved in to the area.

When we've discussed a drive eastward of Malitopol is that it provides Ukraine no protection to its flanks. 

To me any southern push of any depth needs to have at least its right (western) flank secured.  The closer the attack is to the Dnepr, the easier that is to achieve.  The problem is all of this area is, probably, well fortified.

The problem for us speculating here is we don't know what Ukraine has to push into this offensive.  I don't think it has enough to do a broad frontal attack along the southern line *and* have what it needs to do a deep penetration.  So I think it's better off slogging through a more direct line southward that offers decent flank protection than it is to try and drive a significant distance southward through open fields and crappy roads and then swing westward.

I'd look at going directly south to Tokmak and then spill westward to clear out the upper bend of the Dnepr while also trying to force some bridgeheads further south as (at the least) a distraction.  Most of the interior area is unlikely to be well defended and the defenses along the Dnepr itself undefendable once the interior is taken.

This is a huge amount of territory to go after, but if taken it would be defendable.  If things go really well this year or next, push from the west to seal off Crimea.  Melitopol becomes pretty much worthless if Novooleksiivka is taken.

Here is a crude mockup:

Steve

[keas66]

2 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Report that I never ran into before:

https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/GENRAL BLACK AND VON MELLINTHIN TACICS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE.pdf

Posted here because of quotes and the end of page 40 and the top of 41 - and overall interest. 

Small units + technology is preferred. Large units are to be avoided. Sounds familiar even today. Not to mention the role of strong leadership and that unit training and cohesion is also vital. Small units can win vs larger force if well led and synchronized if the larger force is disorganized. Sounds familiar. No mention of ISR, which wound have been useful. 
The generals come across as very arrogant; as if they should have won the war if not for the USSR rolling snake eyes all the time. 

 

 

General of Panzer Troops Balck was probably the Germans best  Field Commander in WW2 based on results  I think is the  normal consensus ?

His  "Order in Chaos "  Memoirs is highly recommended .

[fireship4]

2 hours ago, keas66 said:

His  "Order in Chaos "  Memoirs is highly recommended .

This thesis on "Auftragstaktik" takes its title (Order out of Chaos) from it:

https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36719003.pdf

 

Edited April 9, 2023 by fireship4

[chris talpas]

7 hours ago, kevinkin said:

Report that I never ran into before:

https://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/GENRAL BLACK AND VON MELLINTHIN TACICS IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO MILITARY DOCTRINE.pdf

Posted here because of quotes and the end of page 40 and the top of 41 - and overall interest. 

Small units + technology is preferred. Large units are to be avoided. Sounds familiar even today. Not to mention the role of strong leadership and that unit training and cohesion is also vital. Small units can win vs larger force if well led and synchronized if the larger force is disorganized. Sounds familiar. No mention of ISR, which wound have been useful. 
The generals come across as very arrogant; as if they should have won the war if not for the USSR rolling snake eyes all the time. 

 

 

Thanks for posting that.  Interesting analysis from the past that still has some relevance today.

[Battlefront.com]

NY Times has a nice summary article of the most current known information about the Nordstream explosion.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/07/world/europe/nord-stream-pipeline-sabotage-theories.html

The end is the most interesting bit about this.  An excellent explanation of why international incidents like this can be far more complicated than people like to think:

Quote

Privately, Swedish, German, and Danish officials argued that investigators have reasons not to share findings, which can reveal their intelligence capabilities. Allies have also grown wary after a string of Russian espionage and infiltration cases in Europe — including one within Germany’s spy agency.

Nor may it be in anyone’s interest to share: Naming a culprit could set off unintended consequences.

Claiming Russia was behind the attack would mean it had successfully sabotaged major critical infrastructure in Western Europe’s backyard, and could spark demands for a response.

Blaming Ukrainian operatives could stoke internal debate in Europe about support for their eastern neighbor.

And naming a Western nation or operatives could trigger deep mistrust when the West is struggling to maintain a united front.

Some of the known pieces of information cited in the article do hint that Sweden and Denmark most likely know a lot more than they are saying and, probably, some intel agency from some country (perhaps the US, perhaps another) intercepted information about the incident before it happened.  Evidence?  A Danish Navy vessel, a Swedish Airforce fighter, and a Swedish Navy vessel made unusual visits to the location that was sabotaged a day before the event happened.  Seemingly they were trying to find out where 6 Russian Navy vessels were after they turned off their transponders and veered off course from a Russian naval exercise.

Steve

[chuckdyke]

 

[Battlefront.com]

For those who don't understand why the Baltics (and others) requested NATO membership, or don't understand NATO's purpose, just look at the second part of the following and answer Solovyov's question.  Hint, there is only one correct answer:

Steve

[kevinkin]

A generalized view of operations is sometimes explained as presenting the enemy with the horns of a dilemma. You force the enemy to choose between two things, both of which are unpleasant or difficult. This is what the Rebel Army faced trying to defend Atlanta. Sherman attacked in two major columns spaced inconveniently apart for the Confederates to counter both. Delaying actions - tactical battles - were fought, but the Rebels were drawn back to Atlanta, their military base and to their families. Southern generals never knew where the non engaged column was heading, which became unnerving. They were free to cut off the Rebels close in, or go deep since the Feds lived off the land. If the UA could set up a situation that maximizes their strengths in ISR, mobility and logistics, they might be able to alternate between two relatively minor penetrations and create a RA strategic withdrawal toward their base - either Russia, Crimea or both if they split the landbridge. As Steve mentions, flank protection will be critical and perhaps regulate how far and fast the UA can go. Once you get RA formations looking to the rear - and begin shuffling their feet - the UA can set up killing fields, nailing them as they leave their holes. Wouldn’t images like the “Highway of Death '' be oh so rewarding. The terrain becomes just a playing board to maneuver on, pursue, and kill Russians. The re-occupation will fall into place after that. 

[kluge]

A detailed breakdown of how the leaked documents made it out into the public:

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/04/09/from-discord-to-4chan-the-improbable-journey-of-a-us-defence-leak/

Going to bet that the source of the leak will be positively identified by the purchase of the specific make and model of hunting scope in the background of one of the photos.

[Battlefront.com]

44 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

A generalized view of operations is sometimes explained as presenting the enemy with the horns of a dilemma. You force the enemy to choose between two things, both of which are unpleasant or difficult. This is what the Rebel Army faced trying to defend Atlanta. Sherman attacked in two major columns spaced inconveniently apart for the Confederates to counter both. Delaying actions - tactical battles - were fought, but the Rebels were drawn back to Atlanta, their military base and to their families. Southern generals never knew where the non engaged column was heading, which became unnerving. They were free to cut off the Rebels close in, or go deep since the Feds lived off the land. If the UA could set up a situation that maximizes their strengths in ISR, mobility and logistics, they might be able to alternate between two relatively minor penetrations and create a RA strategic withdrawal toward their base - either Russia, Crimea or both if they split the landbridge. As Steve mentions, flank protection will be critical and perhaps regulate how far and fast the UA can go. Once you get RA formations looking to the rear - and begin shuffling their feet - the UA can set up killing fields, nailing them as they leave their holes. Wouldn’t images like the “Highway of Death '' be oh so rewarding. The terrain becomes just a playing board to maneuver on, pursue, and kill Russians. The re-occupation will fall into place after that. 

Sherman's march is an excellent example of the sort of thing the UA can do this campaign season.  Last Summer the Ukrainians did this at both the strategic and operational levels, most likely also tactical to some degree.

Creating operational uncertainty was seen very clearly in Kherson where the Ukrainians varied timing and intensity of fighting in three different areas; directly around Kherson, around the northern rump, and between the two.  We don't know exactly how much of this was planned and how much of it was due to circumstances beyond their control (like the losses they took at Davydiv Brid bridgehead), but the fact was that they were able to press Russian forces in multiple widely spaced locations alternatively and all at once.

Strategically, of course, Ukraine obligated Russia to make a choice between withdrawing from Kherson and shoring up Kharkiv or weakening Kharkiv to keep Kherson.  Russia demonstrated the old adage of he who tries to control everything winds up controlling nothing.  Russia needed to choose, they made the wrong choice, and they paid for it.

I don't think Russia is any better mood to lose territory in 2023 as they were in 2022, so I expect they will once again go with the "let's try and hold everything even if all indications are we can't".

Steve

[Grossman]

10 hours ago, FancyCat said:

Isn't Melitopol the best option for a offensive? take it, you have rail supply from Zaporizhzhia. Push south from a point more easterly, you have Russians pushing reinforcements from both Melitopol and Mariupol no?

 

Best to go as far to the east in UKR territory as possible, ie due south of Donetsk. Shorten the lines. Split the Russian army, have the western parts with their backs to the sea. If UKR go west of Mariupol the Russians would use that city as a defensive base. Best to isolate Mariupol behind UKR lines. Note the Russian troop concentrations are highest in Svatove area, so the Russians would be expected to make a counter move towards Izium to isolate Sloviansk and Bakhmut

[Battlefront.com]

Here's some more details about what I view as a realistic plan for Ukraine to achieve:

1. Major liberation of territory
2. Threatening Russia's ability to sustain Crimea
3. Winding up with a shorter and defensible line when operations end

Phase 1 - make a mess of the logistics going through Tokmak and Vasylivka using artillery and a minimal broad frontal attack in several maneuvers designed to avoid built up areas.

- Tokmak is the major supply hub for the western half of the southern front.  It will take only a modest advance of about 10km towards it in order to use all forms of artillery to directly interdict its 5 major highways and dual rail lines radiating outward from it. 

- Vasylivka is the anchor that holds the eastern most end of the Dnepr defenses.  This has to be wiped out to enable rolling along the Dnepr to use that as the right flank.  Fortunately, the two roads and rail line going through Vasylivka are already within 155 range, which means the forces there can be isolated and pinned without directly assaulting the town.

X = road interdiction, ! = rail interdiction

Phase 2 - breach first line of defense to spill cut off Vasylivka and further advance on Tokmak

- goal here is to bypass defenses where possible and keep the bypassed positions from maneuvering in order to set up conditions for a breakthrough between Mykhalivka and Tokmak.

 

Phase 3 - fully isolate Tokmak and Vasylivka, set up conditions to advance towards the Dnepr and down M-18 southward

- the main goal is to keep maneuvering and avoid getting bogged down breaching defenses or fighting in built up areas.

- secondary goal is to take the bulk of the 1st line defenses from the rear and either obligate Russia retreats or setting them up for annihilation.

Phase 4 - Exploit!

 - main goal is to cut westward and beat the Hell out of anything in the way, which shouldn't be all that much by the looks of it.  There's bound to be very poor prepared defenses manned by very low quality forces.  I'd hope that once the push gained momentum even these might melt away.

- start attacking over the Dnepr opposite Kherson City.  Even if it is artillery and diversion groups, this will screw up attempts to try and use the area as a logistics hub to mount a defense against the main attack coming in from westward towards Kherson.

Phase 5 - isolate Melitopol and advance towards Crimea

- main goal is to move towards the western side of Crimea so as to threaten the line between it and Melitopol which should also be isolated.  This makes everything between Crimea and Melitopol very difficult to defend.

 

Important Supporting Attacks

- hit Kerch bridge as soon as viable

- continue holding Donbas pretty much everywhere and look for LOCAL counter attack opportunities as forces are drawn southward.  Do no do much more than local unless the front collapses.  Don't want to take resources away from advancing in the south and don't want to open up possibilities of over extension

- HIMARS as much as possible in the Donbas to keep things unhappy and uncertain in the rear.  It would be nice for the Russians to not be too sure if there's not something else in the works.

 

 

I'll end here.  This is about as much territory as Ukraine retook in the Kharkiv and Kherson counter offensives, so theoretically it is within known capabilities.  The end result should be a nice firm and defendable line either between Melitopol and Crimea or, if all goes really well, everything north of Crimea and west of Melitopol axis.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, Grossman said:

Best to go as far to the east in UKR territory as possible, ie due south of Donetsk. Shorten the lines. Split the Russian army, have the western parts with their backs to the sea. If UKR go west of Mariupol the Russians would use that city as a defensive base. Best to isolate Mariupol behind UKR lines. Note the Russian troop concentrations are highest in Svatove area, so the Russians would be expected to make a counter move towards Izium to isolate Sloviansk and Bakhmut

See above strategy as a better alternative.  Use the Dnepr as a permanent flank guard, limit directions for Russian counter attacks, clip the few means of supply for a large swath of occupied territory relatively quickly, and wind up with a neutralized Melitopol and cut off Crimea.

If it were up to me, my goal would be to obligate the Russians to leave Melitopol rather than flatting it.  This is what happened with Kherson and it is definitely the desirable outcome.  My concept also limits the amount of urban destruction generally, though for sure it's going to be unavoidable in spots.

Steve

[Yet]

12 hours ago, Grossman said:

My bet, and its only a bet, is for the UKR to punch south east of Mariupol to the Sea of Azov. That is why UKR devoted resources to the Bakhmut defence, as that flank must hold. Then it would be (1) holding the eastern flank (2) taking out the Kerch Bridge, (3) rolling up the Russian on UKR territory to the west. The whole of the Russian position would be perilous. UKR would command any negotiations. If the Russian fought on its army to the west would be annihilated . That has to be the UKR goal. 

add 1 thing to that. Mariupol was all over the news last year. Everyone knows that it belongs to UKR and what happened there. If Mariupol is the frontline over the next mud season/winter it is communicative handy and more likely that western aid will sustain. 

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, Yet said:

add 1 thing to that. Mariupol was all over the news last year. Everyone knows that it belongs to UKR and what happened there. If Mariupol is the frontline over the next mud season/winter it is communicative handy and more likely that western aid will sustain. 

This is an excellent point.  If they roll up everything to the west of Mariupol, then it should be obvious that's next on Ukraine's agenda.  The West would like to see that done.

As a military objective, Mariupol means very little to Russia without Mariupol having freedom of movement.  Russia's land bridge is effectively cut by isolating Melitopol's rail line into Crimea.  Taking Mariupol would also do that, but it means having two flanks to guard and one of them involving DPR's territory.  DPR forces may be technically under Russia's control, but they aren't going to go marching westward to deal with Melitopol's problems, so staying clear of them reduces Russia's practical options.

Steve

[Astrophel]

The war will be won when the russians give up.  The recapture of Mariupol would surely be a massive blow to russian morale and to Putin's reputation.  Putin has made Mariupol into a special project to russify and rebuild.  Putting a halt to this project might just undermine what is left of his credibility at home.  If taking the city would be too costly then a major victory would be achieved by making the military bases russia built there unsustainable.

[Grossman]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

See above strategy as a better alternative.  Use the Dnepr as a permanent flank guard, limit directions for Russian counter attacks, clip the few means of supply for a large swath of occupied territory relatively quickly, and wind up with a neutralized Melitopol and cut off Crimea.

If it were up to me, my goal would be to obligate the Russians to leave Melitopol rather than flatting it.  This is what happened with Kherson and it is definitely the desirable outcome.  My concept also limits the amount of urban destruction generally, though for sure it's going to be unavoidable in spots.

Steve

Steve....I can see your point. Much more do-able and less risk. Of course UKR might try to do both, phased of course. Depending. 

[Grossman]

3 hours ago, kluge said:

A detailed breakdown of how the leaked documents made it out into the public:

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2023/04/09/from-discord-to-4chan-the-improbable-journey-of-a-us-defence-leak/

Going to bet that the source of the leak will be positively identified by the purchase of the specific make and model of hunting scope in the background of one of the photos.

There are so many mind games going on. The US probably organised the leak as a reminder to the Russians " you don't have one iota of a chance". And to the Chinese to say, "get involved, it will be a disaster, this is what the Russians are up against". No UKR plans were leaked. To the Russian mothers, "this is about to happen, why am I sacrificing my son for Putin". I'd be very surprised if this leak, given the security, was accidental. 

[Grossman]

And finally, Bakhmut may go down in history as Ukraine's Verdun, the Soviet Stalingrad. History may show how important it was for UKR to hold their positions ( mainly) while degrading the Russians at a very favourable loss ratio. It's curious how obscure locations evolve to be critical in the waging of warfare. Gettysburg, up in Pennsylvania, or who would have though in 1934 that 10 years later, obscure villages in Normandy would be the location of the most intense battles of WW2. ?  Just musing. Ukraine is making a hell of a fight, all power to them. 

[kevinkin]

12 hours ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

Balck is one of my inspirations and favorite Generals from WW2.

Another longer interview with the General from 1979. Interesting for those who have not seen this:

https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA160703.pdf

 

[DesertFox]

Masters of mocking the Orcs:

 

 

[Beleg85]

Aftermath of previous battle filmed by K2 battalion- Ukrainian soldiers collect bodies of killed comrades.

https://twitter.com/technicznybdg/status/1644720439950704640

Also a lot of empty, open spaces filmed by drone seem to attest to small density of troops per km.

[beardiebloke]

Happy Easter!

Update on drone development:

 

And poor opsec from UKR:

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, DesertFox said:

Masters of mocking the Orcs:

 

 

Very nicely done, of course.  And for once some good background music

Steve