How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Butschi]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'm concerned that Ukraine needs to do more than not f this up.  Some are expecting this is the year Ukraine takes Russia out of the war, if not literally then at least practically.  I'm not so sure that's practical.  So for some it might not matter if Ukraine buries and wounds another 200,000 Russians and reduces the Russians to fighting with pointy sticks if Russia somehow manages to keep up the facade that it is able to fight long term.  Support for keeping the war hot will wane in certain quarters if that happens.

I agree. In order to retain western support Ukraine needs provide a clear perspective that winning in the near future is possible.

Again, from my German perspective: The government is under increasing pressure to get out of permanent crisis mode and start delivering on their promises. The current hot topic is transformation from fossil energy to renewable and H2 based. It is absolutely clear this is going to cost an insane amount of money especially if it is socially balanced. Add to this the still high inflation, increasing housing costs and a number of other issues that require throwing money at them (or having balls and actually reform a few things...) and it is clear to me that continued support for Ukraine requires them to prove they can end this in closer to 1-2 years than 10-20.

In addition they need to prove that after all the fuzz the Leopard 2s can make a change and not just evaporate if they want more tanks or even talk about aircraft.

Not an ideal situation and I fear Russia may still be able to win by not outright losing if winning includes a frozen conflict - which at least prevents Ukraine from joining NATO.

 

 

[DesertFox]

4 hours ago, Kinophile said:

 

This is a lot more like what I'd hope to see.... 

What's that IFV? YPR from the Netherlands armed with Oerlikon 25mm cannon?

[Grossman]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

The problem is that the Russians had even less going for them last Fall and they managed to do pretty well.  Kherson slowly folded in large part because of the ridiculously difficult supply situation.  The Kharkiv offensive was stalled out by relatively isolated and slapdash Russian forces, most notably allowing them to retain Kreminna.

In many ways Russia is going into this next campaign season materially weaker than at any point in this war, so that is favorable for Ukraine.  Maybe even decisive.  However, Russia has more bodies to throw into the path of Ukraine's offensive and it has had time to establish some semblance of fortifications (more akin to Kherson than Kharkiv at the very least).

Don't bet me wrong, my money is still very much on Ukraine achieving something very significant in the coming months.  However, I'm not betting on a knock out punch this year even though it for sure is possible.

Absolutely agree.  The issue is timing.  Ramping up production and moving around mothballed stuff takes time.  Coming into the fight too late to impact 2023's fighting might be extremely problematic, even if it ensures that Ukraine has another shot in 2024.

I'm concerned that Ukraine needs to do more than not f this up.  Some are expecting this is the year Ukraine takes Russia out of the war, if not literally then at least practically.  I'm not so sure that's practical.  So for some it might not matter if Ukraine buries and wounds another 200,000 Russians and reduces the Russians to fighting with pointy sticks if Russia somehow manages to keep up the facade that it is able to fight long term.  Support for keeping the war hot will wane in certain quarters if that happens.

A possible ace up Ukraine's sleeve is causing Putin to push Russians too far in order to keep the war going.  Having good success, but not brilliant results, on the battlefield this year could potentially do that.  Russia will need ample bodies to throw at Ukraine to stop them from taking back significant territory.  If Ukraine does what it has done in the past, namely 200ing and 300ing huge numbers of Russian forces, then Russia will either have to do an official mobilization again or risk collapse.  If that happens then the possible ace may come into play.  As this is the only way I see Russia getting out of the war, I sure as Hell hope this is the way it goes.

Steve

In my mind UKR will want to punch down to the Sea of Azov, take out the Kerch Bridge, and isolate Russian forces to the west, including Crimea.. Then hold that line, and start the attrition of the Russian forces to the east. The Russians would be caught in a massive envelopment, disastrously so to cause political repercussions in Russia.  

[Grossman]

Just now, Grossman said:

In my mind UKR will want to punch down to the Sea of Azov, take out the Kerch Bridge, and isolate Russian forces to the west, including Crimea.. Then hold that line, and start the attrition of the Russian forces to the east. The Russians would be caught in a massive envelopment, disastrously so to cause political repercussions in Russia.  

should be "attrition of Russian forces to the west"

[poesel]

26 minutes ago, Grossman said:

should be "attrition of Russian forces to the west"

You can edit your posts. Just click on the 3 dots in the top right. There might be a time limit, however.

[Grigb]

On 4/2/2023 at 9:12 PM, Beleg85 said:

It's highly doubtful if they indeed play this dangerous game, they officially announce it on YT. Perhaps @Grigb will have more info, but from what can be read it looks like girkinoids may try to rally other nationalists under banners that Kremlin can somewhat controll. Let's not forget- he is most probably somebody's asset in these circles. Neutralizing or controlling negative sentiments there beforehand is in vital interest of FSB.

They are trying to establish themselves as alternative Patriotic aka Nat political power. Because right now there are only two credible patriotic aka Nat political actors - Put himself and Prig. They want to create a political alternative that is not associated with these two guys and rally people to them instead of Put or Prig. They feel The End is getting close and closer. 

They belive Put will not touch them becasue they position themselves as his political allies against future Liberal coup. It might work - Put might need dirty guys for dirty work. Or might not.

[Grigb]

I don't have much time, but I noticed something interesting - I'm not sure if you discussed it, but there are rumors that UKR successfully pushed back RU at Avdiivka and Maryinka in the last few days. Furthermore, the RU is said to have did a tactical withdrawal at Vuhledar (retreated to better defensive positions). The claim is that this is not the offensive, but rather an improvement of local situation before the offensive elsewhere. 

It is extremely unreliable, but Girkin today declared that At Avdiivka, our offensive choked [suddenly stopped with negative connotation].

Let's monitor the situation closely. 

[Beleg85]

Zelensky is in Warsaw, fortunately protesting farmers move away somewhere else.

Duda finally give precise numbers of given planes- 4 MIG-s 29 several months ago, 4 several weeks ago that are still refurbished (probably in UA), and 6 more soon. Together 14 planes, the NATO-avionics rest is needed for airpolicing here but can be given "as soon as they are replaced in line". Not great, not terrible.

Overal visit was curtous and about civilian topics rather than with some breaking military news.

 

Thse guys have luck it was a dud:

6 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Prig's behavior is reinforcing the probability that the hit was conducted by one of Prig's many Russian enemies, not Ukraine.  The young woman Trepova, the FSB nabbed, so quickly was probably "set up" as her husband claimed.  For example, she might have thought she was working for a resistance group and followed instructions to give Fomin something that was bugged.  Or she could have known it was a bomb, but again thought she was doing it on the behalf of a resistance group.

Some of the footage that the FSB released showed Trepova going into the club with the box.  The video of her was apparently taken by a hand held recording device.  This indicates that the FSB at the very least had this meeting staked out by agents.

Whatever the case is, there's no chance Trepova was the mastermind of this, yet I've not see the FSB talk about their efforts to find the bomb maker.  Seems they are quite happy to pin this on Trepova alone, which is suspicious.

This is very interesting - Prig takes a lot of public effort to convince everybody it was directed at him. Clear sign of bulldogs fighting under carpet.

 

 

Edited April 5, 2023 by Beleg85

[Harmon Rabb]

I feel we have been neglecting posting LOTR references for a while.

The Gulf of Finland now has the Gates of Argonath.

[Thomm]

In the middle of the following news page (German) there is a nice slider-image showing new trench systems in Crimea:

https://orf.at/stories/3311424/

[The_Capt]

32 minutes ago, Thomm said:

In the middle of the following news page (German) there is a nice slider-image showing new trench systems in Crimea:

https://orf.at/stories/3311424/

Some oddities there.  My guess is they are only about half built.  The white bundles everywhere are likely field defence stores, so the trenches have been dug but not revetted or sandbagged.  That takes a lot of manpower.

Weird stuff going on with sighting.  The long stretch facing the lake looks like they are worried about an amphib. Then there are this small sections, looks like they are incomplete but also a bit strange.  No sign of minefields or obstacles.  The lack of vehicle tracks suggests that these are not manned yet.

Biggest thing, and a problem for a defender, is just how visible these are.  

[billbindc]

13 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Some oddities there.  My guess is they are only about half built.  The white bundles everywhere are likely field defence stores, so the trenches have been dug but not revetted or sandbagged.  That takes a lot of manpower.

Weird stuff going on with sighting.  The long stretch facing the lake looks like they are worried about an amphib. Then there are this small sections, looks like they are incomplete but also a bit strange.  No sign of minefields or obstacles.  The lack of vehicle tracks suggests that these are not manned yet.

Biggest thing, and a problem for a defender, is just how visible these are.  

More than anything, the trench lines look like make work for mobiks that couldn't be properly armed and put in the line a la the Imperial pososhniye iyudi. It's "look busy" as a strategic decision. 

[The_Capt]

Just now, billbindc said:

More than anything, the trench lines look like make work for mobiks that couldn't be properly armed and put in the line a la the Imperial pososhniye iyudi. It's "look busy" as a strategic decision. 

Another weird thing is that whole vehicle park/bivouac on the bottom.  Pretty administrative for being in a warzone.  This picture must be well back from the front.  If that were a logistics node it is a prime target. 

[billbindc]

6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Another weird thing is that whole vehicle park/bivouac on the bottom.  Pretty administrative for being in a warzone.  This picture must be well back from the front.  If that were a logistics node it is a prime target. 

There *may* be some misdirection at work. I mean, if you have a bunch of chaps sitting around who you can't really get into the fight while you are getting HIMARS'd then maybe you add dummy...or back up...nodes whereever. It might complicate enemy ISR/targeting and it looks good when you have to do a self assessment at the long table with the boss.

I don't think any of this is at all sophisticated or particularly useful to win the war, mind you, but analyze the motivations at work in the Russian army at this point and you can see where it leads.

[FancyCat]

Let's not forget pure government contracting corruption. More defensive works means more opportunity to skim money. Happens anywhere, but this is Russia.

[hcrof]

35 minutes ago, billbindc said:

More than anything, the trench lines look like make work for mobiks that couldn't be properly armed and put in the line a la the Imperial pososhniye iyudi. It's "look busy" as a strategic decision. 

On 3/27/2023 at 10:38 PM, Battlefront.com said:

 

Trenches are easy to dig with an excavator, even easier with an entrenching machine. Looks like a "reserve" position that can be improved quickly if/when they decide to man it with mobiks

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Another weird thing is that whole vehicle park/bivouac on the bottom.  Pretty administrative for being in a warzone.  This picture must be well back from the front.  If that were a logistics node it is a prime target. 

Things make a little more sense when you look at where these specific emplacements are:

45°54'07.2"N 34°34'19.5"E

They are guarding one of the two roads from the mainland to Crimea.  There are at least 2 lines of defense against Ukrainians coming in from the north.  As there is a bridge to the north that can (and no doubt will) be blown, they should anticipate some sort of waterborne attack (even if infiltration teams).

But as you say, the problem for the Russians is that these positions are easily identified and offer no secondary protection.  We already know that if Ukraine see something it wants to hit, it can do so precisely.  These positions will not offer much in the way of real protection against a determined Ukrainian attack, however they will make anything less than that improbable.

Ukraine's obvious strategy for taking either road onto Crimea is to destroy the fortifications with artillery, drones, and for all we know air air attacks.  No ground activity, not even concentration of force on the mainland side, until this is accomplished.  Otherwise Ukraine risks getting shot up like fish in a barrel from Russia's artillery and air assets.

Steve

[Maciej Zwolinski]

15 hours ago, paxromana said:

His adopted heir, Augustus, didn't, either -- he was Princeps -- 'first man' or 'first speaker' (he got to speak first in the Senate so the other Senators would know which way to vote - if they wanted to survive) and had 'maius imperium' and 'tibunician potestas' ('superior command' and 'tribunician immunity & veto') which made extremely powerful, but he very carefully did not declare himself Rex/Emperor.

He was also a proconsul of the border provinciae, and therefore the commander of the  legions located in them. Since the Republic at that time tended to distribute the legions around its borders, in that indirect (but very transparent to everyone) way Augustus controlled the army.

[FancyCat]

I am unconcerned about Ukrainian grain drawing down Polish support, end of the day Ukrainian membership to the EU should be a long drawn out process of harmonization and integration, and protests and inter-national wrangling is part of such processes and speaks to the idea that Ukraine will get into the EU once the normal process concludes in like 15 years or whatnot.

It's still muddy in Ukraine. Russia is still trying desperately to take Bakumut and now that it looks uncertain Russia can encircle, the decision to remain and fight it out for every corner of the city looks sound. For comparison, tho different wars, different times, consider the outlook of the Soviet defense of Stalingrad, at 35:00 you can see how little of the city is held by the Soviets, turned into multiple pockets very much backed into the Volga.

Obviously we have no real idea of the Ukraine intent of a counter-offensive, but forcing Russia to commit to costly urban combat of personnel and equipment that could be used to blunt a offensive seems quite sound to me. 

I will echo those saying Ukraine will probably attempt to cut the land bridge between Crimea and the Donbas, if Ukraine gains the ability to choose to invade Crimea or attack into the Donbas, the ability to force Russia to supply either fronts via one rail/highway, will make further Ukrainian operations have more chance of success.

There is risk of drawing Russian nuclear warnings increasing with all the Western cold feet potential with Crimea under potential invasion, but the ability to force Russia to prioritize either Crimea or Donbas is essential.

 

[sburke]

Putin sacks top general over disastrous failed assault (yahoo.com)

Vladimir Putin has fired one of the top generals leading Russia's forces in Ukraine, after an attack on the eastern town of Vuhledar ended with dozens of tanks being destroyed.

General Rustam Muradov was sacked in the aftermath of the failure, the Moscow Times reported, citing officials in the Russian defence ministry.

Michael Kofman, a military analyst, told the newspaper: “Muradov had the Russian military repeatedly attacking in small mechanized formations through minefields, across open terrain. And they accomplished nothing in Vuhledar.”

The battle for Vuhledar, some 100 miles south west of Bakhmut, is said to have been one of the most embarrassing defeats suffered by Moscow in the entire war, with Russian forces reportedly losing 130 armoured vehicles.

[FancyCat]

Someone I recall saying Ukraine has time on their side, I disagree then and now. At the prior time, I argued that economic devastation of Ukraine multiplies as time goes on. Now, I want to mention international outcomes, as the war drags on, the calculus for intervention in support of Russia increases favorable for Russia. Take for example, the notion that NATO is seeking to sap Russian strength via Ukraine, and that idea that is best achievable over a drawn out slugfight. I've already pointed out how this does not help the West as much as one might first see, but I want to emphasize now the danger of a prolonged fight with a economically damaged Ukraine being supported by the West.

One, the longer the conflict lasts, the more Ukraine must rely on the West for economic, military support, at some point we will hit the cold war stock limit and like Russia, hunt around, and use new equipment for Ukraine. Same applies economically, Russia has economic levers, and the recent Saudi-Iranian detente, OPEC+ cuts illustrate that whatever our levers for the Middle East, our allies there have no reason to accommodate the West economically.

China is keen to stay on the sidelines lest it is given major blowback for supporting the loser in the war, but if Russia shows ability to stalemate, Chinese support can and I believe will increase, especially if the West decides on prolonging the conflict thru not trying to achieve a knock out blow.

Chinese industrial power has not been activated to support Russia and to be frank, I don't want China wondering if they want to test out mass vs precision via Russia as a useful proxy.

Better to give Ukraine what it needs to achieve decisive results. Whether it's fear of being too bold in supporting Ukraine, or keen not to "escalate", if Putin is intent on winning a long term fight, like the short term fight, the West must show Putin he cannot win. Instead of conceding defeat and coming to the peace table, Putin doubled down.

The small amount of tanks, IFVs, sure....Ukraine isn't ready to man more tanks....mehhh, im not going to pretend Ukrainians aren't familiar with Western equipment or ignore supply issues or whatnot but I think a significant political factor influences Western aid to Ukraine, and to suggest that this small number of tanks, IFVs, is enough or a full provision of the potential of the West, nah.

Oh sure Gulf War, precision over mass, etc, etc, the Coalition amassed a massive military force to not just equal the Iraqi military, but amassed a numerical advantage.

And of course valid reasons for restraint exist, including not spooking Putin but still, western support is way under what it could be.

We should not be under illusions that Western aid is at even moderate limits reached. This concern for results for more aid as if the West has given it's all and is overburdened and not a smattering of the left overs is entirely political and not a reflection of western capability or potential.

[The_MonkeyKing]

On 4/1/2023 at 2:23 PM, Huba said:

Announcing that on April 1st is definitely a kind of meta-humor, given that it is not a joke in any way. Some clarification/ details:

- vehicles will come from PL army stock, and the new-builds will backfill the stripped units in due time
- there was no info about the versions being sent, but the PL milnet seems to agree that it will be the IFV versions mostly. These sport a two-man OTO Melara turret with 30mm Bushmaster. It has thermals, but not a full hunter-killer setup usually  found in more contemporary IFVs. These vehicles were initially purchased as urgent need during GWOT period and were liked so much that finally we got almost a 1000, including 300 IFVs. Unfortunately the initial deal with OTO was, let's say, suboptimal, and the army  beancounters would surely be happy to get rid of them. Rosomaks are still being purchased, but armed with indigenous unmanned ZSSW30 turret.
- given the announced number, it will probably mean equipment for 2 or 3 UA battalions with some support vehicles. I'd love to see a Rak company to be sent with them, to combat prove the whole concept of turreted  120 mm mortar and the PL implementation of it:

 

Seems you were correct:

 

 

[Huba]

21 hours ago, Huba said:

Sorry for late reply, drive-by posting is all I can afford lately. You were of course right, the information about timing was a conjecture, not something stated explicitly. And while it remains unspecified, Sebastian Chwałek, the CEO of PGZ mentioned in the interview today that we are ready to deliver them "on an expedited schedule" - which means either directly from the Army stock, or the ones already manufactured by the plant and waiting for integration with turrets/ mission equipment, of which AFAIK there's at least 70. He also said that the details are not decided yet (at least officially), both IFVs with Hitfist30P AND ZSSW30 turrets are on the table, as well as (implicitly) Rak mortars and HMG RWS armed variants. 
My gut feeling is that the training on these is already ongoing for some time (there were leaked pictures of Ukrainian soldiers posing with Rosomaks a few months ago) and we'll see them in UA very soon.
Here's the source video with the interview (in Polish only).

Zelensky is visiting Warsaw today, and there was a new arms deal announced:
- PGZ will cooperate with UA Artem consortium in 125mm tank ammunition production
- UA will purchase additional 100 Piorun MANPADS
- the number of purchased Rosomaks is increased to 150 from the initial 100. It will include 3 Rak 120mm mortar companies, for a total of 24 plus support and command vehicles (that is assuming they will keep our TO&E).
- there was no information about the configuration of remaining Rosomaks, but the fact that the announcement was made with 2 Hitfist30P armed vehicles in the background, one can at least take it as a hint.

Below chart shows the organization of PL Rak company:`

[Haiduk]

12 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is a reedited version of footage that was posted here a million pages ago (i.e. last week or two )  The original video showed more of the trench clearing and dead Russians.

And yes, this is much better tactics than what we saw in the trench crushing video.

Steve

Here is video "T-shape. AAR", where tank commander tells why he was forced to crash Russians in the trench and some datails, which weren't seen on teh video (ENG subs can be turned on):  

 

In short - turned out Russians had 28 men in the trench instead 10 estimated. Tank wasted 21 shells of 22 onboard, when commander have seen, that Russians "don't running out". Tankers had an order completely supress enemy in order to do not allow direct engaging of UKR infantry with Russian entranched infantry, so he received an order from operation commander to crash the enemy by tracks. 

Also Russians set minefield on the road behind own position and had 3 Fagot ATGMs, two of which were hit for 30 minutes before operation, but one, which remained fired at BMP (missed), which harrased Russian trench.  

UKR infantry to dig out Russian mercenery since 20 hours as it was burried. Probably he had access to air and didn't suffocate, so when he came to his senses, he has moaned and was heared by UKR soldiers.

Edited April 5, 2023 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

8 hours ago, DesertFox said:

What's that IFV? YPR from the Netherlands armed with Oerlikon 25mm cannon?

FV103 Spartan