How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[BletchleyGeek]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

 

I hope the forum software behaves and doesn't eat my response... Thanks very much for your very detailed answer. It is appreciated, even if I am not 100% sure it was written with the purpose of inviting ideas to be exchanged. 

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Kofman has been hit or miss in a lot of ways.  He started out this war within the mainstream assessments, which all turned out to be built on some pretty shaky assumptions.  They then spent the early part of the war trying to somehow line up reality with their assessments, as opposed to just looking at what was actually happening.  Back last early summer we heard the exact same narratives on how the RA was taking hits but its grinding offensives were in fact signs of success and a shift in the war.  We here on this forum disagreed vehemently, mainly because based on the reported RA mass they should have been seeing much larger gains, and the big one - still no actual break throughs.  In order to make an operational assessment one really has to see operational level evidence or build a framework that links tactical observations to operational ones consistently and effectively. 

Well, as you admitted in a few posts up, we can all say that we all have been wrong to a certain degree. How much more wrong is someone or another still needs to be adjudicated?

I am ESL and perhaps we understand different things for the expression "to break through". Yet I do not think one can classify how the initial phase of the war played out as anything other than breaking through all axis but one, which has barely moved since February 2022. The Russian Army penetrated deeply into Ukrainian territory, became overextended, and when it became clear to them that they were being defeated in detail, they pulled back from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy axis. No major retrograde movements were appreciated in the south (the biggest success of the Russian armed forces, until they tried to reach out to Mikolayev and Kryvyi Rih, and became hopelessly overextended) and the NE (where they flanked the JFO forces covering the DNR and LNR proxies). Mariupol was devastated, surrounded, besieged, and conquered.

That was what the first Russian Army achieved in Feb-May 2022. Certainly everyone, including Michael Kofman, you, me, and the Russian command, were expecting that their initial forces (which are no more I think we agree) would achieve much more than that. Still significant, as they did severe damage to, yet did not destroy, the Ukrainian state. Slava Ukraini!

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We saw what happened last summer and what actually unfolded in the Fall.  The UA went from "barely holding on" to being able to conduct two successful simultaneous operational offensives over 500km apart.  I do not think most people realize just how hard that is to do and that the UA was nowhere near collapse, in fact all that time during Severodonetsk it would have been force generating and putting in place the architecture to make Kharkiv and Kherson happen.

On this last bit, I wholeheartedly agree. There was clearly a consensus being formed around the narrative that Ukraine was being defeated, slowly but relentlessly. This if anything was being amplified by the harrowing accounts of what was going on in Mariupol and evocations of that great "disaster" that was the evacuation of Kabul. 

The Russian Army was still overextended after their initial retreats (or rout, I don't know it seemed quite touch and go)... and the dangerous thing for them was that they weren't aware of it. So they were surprised in Kharkiv and routed in what I consider was a masterful demonstration of the very same warfighting principles that lead to the smashing victory of the German army in very much the same area in May 1942. But, and this is a big one, the Russian Army managed to evacuate most of its personnel (yet not their material).

On the campaign for Kherson, I have mixed opinions. To my mind, that one clearly did not meet its most immediate objectives. The Russian Army was better entrenched and had (for the most part) better troops. But the logistics were not workable: it just took nearly two months for the Russian Army to realize that, aided by the progressive crumbling of their right flank, which was anchored on the Dnipro. 

I have the sense that the secondary offensive (Kharkiv) turned out to be the one that exceeded expectations. I think it is indicative that the Ukrainian forces didn't have reserves to further exploit all the way to Starobi'lsk. Which did indeed seem doable for a fleeting moment in September.

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But lets say, ok, we here got lucky - broken clock is right twice a day.  So what has happened since then to shift the calculus?  Well the RA did mobilize and now has somewhere in and around 350k troops in country - but this is not all about mass - we keep coming back to this.  Mass as we know it is not working in this war.  So once again we see the RA playing smash face on a tactical objective that is has been trying to take for months.  Their estimated losses at the low end are staggering.  They bled out Wagner, they are bleeding out their mobilized troops.  They are losing equipment they cannot get back - see tank production.  They have not shown any evidence of creating the C4ISR, logistics or deep precision fires needed to turn into a force that can fight this war on even ground with the UA.

Yes, that is a fact that can be duly appreciated.

I'd rather say that the question is about what hasn't happened. I think it is fair to say that there was a wide expectation of Ukraine launching some form of an offensive in Winter as the ground conditions improved. That didn't happen, instead, the Russian Army went again on the offensive, with very little success, but a lot of fanfare. 

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So here we are back at "Russia re-gaining its feet" and UA on the ropes. 

I am sorry, but I am not sure anybody is claiming that the Ukrainian Army is "on the ropes". That the Russian Army got back on its feet is a fact, as they were the ones attacking, no matter how unsuccessfully.

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Firstly, Kofman is not going to see what he needs to at Bakhmut - this is war tourism and showboating (gawd we saw a lot of that in the day).  The actual data he needs to see to make accurate assessments are in strategic and operational HQs buried on hard drives and talking to the staff who work this problem. 

That was an over-the-top remark, Captain. We have no idea about what the activities were, and I think it is likely that there were a lot of interviews with the planners and managers of the battle for Bakhmut.

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Second, the UA has been able to violate the historic force ratio losses attacker to defender, the RA has not shown any evidence of this.  I would need to see this before even listening to any "1:1" loss rations. 

Could you please state clearly what you mean by "historic force ratio losses attacker to defender"? Like showing a curve of the historical versus what you think the open source info evidences for this conflict? If you are quoting a document, could you please provide it?

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The steady stream of tactical anecdotes we see here do not support it, nor does open source intel collection.  So I am pretty convinced the RA is losing at some pretty high force ratios compared to the UA, and on stuff that really hurts.

As we have discussed many times in the past, one can only count what comes to the surface of the open-source arena. Recently I saw clearly an episode where a Ukrainian mechanized platoon was pretty roughly handled by Russian artillery. They seem to be rarer events... but they happen.

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Third, there is no evidence of UA bleeding out.  Force generation is going on in full swing in places like the UK and Poland.  There have been zero reports of shortages of manpower on the UA side, accept maybe right on the line units that in the teeth of this thing.

On this, I think I can't be other than in agreement. I am not sure who is saying that the Ukrainian Army is "bleeding out". That the casualties accumulate and degrade forces over time I think it is self-evident. Clearly as well, this is not happening at the same rate for every unit, everywhere.

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Fourth.  I do not care if Russia could mobilize a million men, they do not have the operational system to actually turn that into effective military capability in time for this war.  People keep pointing to WW2 and the re-emergence of the Russian bear.  Newsflash, war has changed a lot in the last 80 years.  Sure you can stick a teenager into a uniform and give them a rifle, point them at the enemy and hope for the best.  But today you need a lot of enablers in order to create decision.  Again stuff like C4ISR, logistics, engineering, force protection and projection.  You do not create these in the middle of a war this size without a lot of signaling.  These things also take years to build up to a 21st century competitive level.  The UA has, largely because they have plugged directly into western architectures - from force sustainment to generation.  All indications of what I have seen show the RA going the exact opposite direction. 

Just consider for a moment a scenario in which the US (or NATO) practically loses ~50% of its professional forces, very much as the Russian Federation has. Do you imagine us coming back from that, like Britain in 1940-42? The answer to that question is the whole point of this "long game" discussion.

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Fifth.  China.  Sending a few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots is also not going to change things.  Much in the same way a few dozen western tanks won't.  China has been working on the C4ISR architecture to actually challenge the US but by all accounts it is 1) not there yet, 2) pointed in other directions - see Taiwan, and 3) China likely is not going to give away its actual C4ISR capability arc on saving Russia's dumb @ss. 

Let me remind you that exactly a "few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots" was a significant chunk of the contribution of NATO to the defense of Ukraine... back in February '22. The question is, how much farther can the PRC go to match like for like? 

Regarding the C4ISR the "not there yet" is I think based on too many cozy assumptions about incapability (see the Balloon saga and so-called "domain awareness gaps"), and pivoting C4ISR doesn't seem that hard (just as the US has done probably from the Pacific and the Gulf as well...). So let's not talk ourselves into a safe space, Captain.

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If China goes all in and somehow can link in the RA we will start seeing evidence.  Much more precise fires and campaigns - UA logistics nodes exploding instead of RA ones, up to and including the operational level.  Much more dynamic manoeuvre.  Far more streamlined logistics.  A lot more UA dislocation and disruption.  Levels of actual SEAD and air superiority.

Agreed. This is indeed the benchmark.

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So What?  I will not only draw a link to the UA spring-summer offensive, I will predict it will be catastrophic for the RA unless we see some real operational level indicators otherwise. 

I recently finished reading B. A. Friedman "On Operations", and he made a very compelling case about the so-called "operational level" being something that has no purchase as an idea (that's now coming out with some balls). Clearly, in what respects the "operational level"  (planning, sustainment, command & control, inter-service co-ordination, that is, all the "scientific" military disciplines) the Russian Federation sucks very, very hard. And this is very surprising. But it is not clear to me that you need to master all of those things all the time to avoid losing completely this war or prolong for a significant amount of time.

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If the RA was smart, it would have dug in along the lines they really want to keep, hard. They would have dug in those mobilized troops, mined everything and tried to drag this thing out. 

From all the news I have that's what has been going on in the south (where they now know their logistics are weak) and Luhansk oblast to some extent (as there we're seeing a mixture of offensive-defensive stance).

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Instead that went for a tactical objective and smashed thousands of forces against it. They lost several medium sized national militaries worth of equipment (https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html) - that is just insane by 2023 standards.  Good thing the T-34 takes a day to make because before this is over they may be driving them.  At this point they must have pulled from all down the line to try and take Bakhmut, their force density on that frontage was pretty thin, it is likely cut full of holes right now.  Once that mud dries they have a real problem covering it off.  And meanwhile the UA can see all those holes because they are linked into real time multi-spectral satellites being flown out of Vandenburg.

I am not sure about the Russian Army having had to weaken their positions elsewhere, Captain. If anything, a spoiling counterstroke would have followed, I have only seen what I would qualify as Ukrainian probes. 

Edited March 7, 2023 by BletchleyGeek

[LongLeftFlank]

16 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Putin: "so you're saying there's a chance?  And with just this one little trick?"

Well, as Galeev pointed out many moons ago (perhaps more credible Russia threat analysts did as well) that, in addition to selling off a lot of the 'warehoused' kit and downsizing divisions to brigades to save money and focus on Chechnya-sized expeditionary wars, Serdyukov and the Kremlin also dismantled, or at least allowed to decay, the Soviet mass social mobilisation system.  So the folks who remember how to do that are all dead or retired, and the general population is out of the habit.  Not totally of course, but it's not a highly functional machine, and Putin can't simply will it back into being.

Edited March 7, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

This is also mine reading as well (at least for early and middle stages of this months-long battle) and a reason guy get it heated in comments. However, let's still remember the artillery usage and heavy droning on both sides (not all UA positions were conviniently held in urban areas); add airforce, which seems to be active particulary in last weeks, deadly long-distance sniping utilitized by both sides, Russian termobarics and phosporus weapons, atgms used against infantry, frequent ammo shortages on Ukrainian behalf and finally constant,  raw firepower advantage on muscovite side for duration of whole battle. Perhaps defender/attacker ratio in this exteremely deadly environment is also different from what we are used to, at least from the time when moskals really contentrated their efforts in this area (aka. circa from December).

Still not buying it   If the Russians had such devastating advantages they would have rolled up Ukraine's lines a long time ago OR would not themselves be saying they've suffered heavy losses.

Nope, I just don't see how it is physically possible to have recent losses being near parity, not to mention the months of fighting up until this point.

Steve

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Big Serge's pro-Russian Looking Glass War: 'Moderate But Not Catastrophic Disorder' edition! 

Setting aside the usual topsy turvy "Tis But a Scratch" stuff, the Serge does discuss one rather interesting point that I don't recall being discussed much here, although it may have been in the ISW papers or Perun....

that in addition to canning the BTG, the Russians have been attempting to move back from a brigade to a division-centered structure. This reverses a downsizing of most post-Soviet army divisions to brigades (which in turn concentrated their peacetime manpower into BTGs) that occurred under Serdyukov in 2008.

https://bigserge.substack.com/p/russo-ukrainian-war-schrodingers

Big Serge is the anti-Steve. Time is on Russia's side. A complete reorganization of the Russian military is a mere six months work, and in the mean time it is the Ukrainians bleeding at a rate they cannot tolerate. One of them is very wrong, lets just say I am betting on Steve. it does seem to be a coherently argued alternate view. LLF does he have stuff alll the way to 2/24/2022? I am very curious what he thought before the war kicked off?

Edited March 7, 2023 by dan/california

[danfrodo]

40 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Still not buying it   If the Russians had such devastating advantages they would have rolled up Ukraine's lines a long time ago OR would not themselves be saying they've suffered heavy losses.

Nope, I just don't see how it is physically possible to have recent losses being near parity, not to mention the months of fighting up until this point.

Steve

Once again we are faced w the choice between an evidence based reality and a faith based reality.  We could be wrong but thinking other than we currently do might actually require some...... evidence.

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

I'd rather say that the question is about what hasn't happened. I think it is fair to say that there was a wide expectation of Ukraine launching some form of an offensive in Winter as the ground conditions improved. That didn't happen, instead, the Russian Army went again on the offensive, with very little success, but a lot of fanfare. 

Don’t disagree here, not sure why a UA offensive did not happen.  Ground conditions, or maybe they simply were not ready yet?  Or maybe the UA figured it was a better deal to let them smash out at Bakhmut.  Regardless the signs are definitely there that they are planning an offensive this spring or summer.

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

That was an over-the-top remark, Captain. We have no idea about what the activities were, and I think it is likely that there were a lot of interviews with the planners and managers of the battle for Bakhmut.

Having been the guy who has had to babysit battlefield tourists, it is nowhere near over the top.  In fact it was the main point they were bragging about and are now going to use it as “cred currency”.  If Kofman had written “been to Kyiv and met with strategic staff” I would be a lot more willing to lend credibility.  But I have seen this too many times in person to not call it what I think it is.  Even if Kofman et al had come back with tactical observations, but no we get “loss ratio was 1:1”, which sounds more like a conclusion they had going in as there is no way to determine that on the ground at Bakhmut.

Trust me this happens a lot more than people realize.  These guys show up for a weekend.  We get told in no uncertain terms “do not get them killed”.  They glad hand, maybe get mortared once or twice, and then get on the chopper and go back home to stick it on their Facebook page.  We watch them fly off and do another ramp ceremony.

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Could you please state clearly what you mean by "historic force ratio losses attacker to defender"? Like showing a curve of the historical versus what you think the open source info evidences for this conflict? If you are quoting a document, could you please provide it?

Seriously?  So you want me to prove that attacking is more costly than defending?  Look this is what I call “an obtuse flanking”, where in a debate/argument someone demands that one has to prove first principles.  This is a lot of legwork and frankly drifting into unpaid labour. 

So instead why don’t you go on your own learning journey.  Start here: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA302819.pdf and then use an internet search engine.

We build entire military offensive doctrine around the idea that we need to concentrate more force at the point of attack to overcome the benefits of the defence.  We also expect to take more losses in the short term, to achieve breakin, through and out, which sets up for annihilation through dislocation (some more stuff you can go look up).  The UA broke this rule regularly in this war by being either upside down or near 1:1.  How they did this is still a big question.

The RA has not demonstrated the same ability, in fact quite the opposite, they have had massive force ratio advantages (e.g. 12:1) and still failed.

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

On this, I think I can't be other than in agreement. I am not sure who is saying that the Ukrainian Army is "bleeding out". That the casualties accumulate and degrade forces over time I think it is self-evident. Clearly as well, this is not happening at the same rate for every unit, everywhere.

This has been the underlying argument of pro-Russian “experts” (go online and Google anything by Col Macgregor) and the fears of mainstream analysts.  The narrative is that the UA cannot fight a war of attrition with Russia for various reasons.  We have repeatedly seen people point to tactical battles of attrition as proof that the Russian “strategy is working”.  Yet the UA keeps getting stronger while the RA erodes.  You can scan these pages to see it echoed at times.

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Just consider for a moment a scenario in which the US (or NATO) practically loses ~50% of its professional forces, very much as the Russian Federation has. Do you imagine us coming back from that, like Britain in 1940-42? The answer to that question is the whole point of this "long game" discussion

Not really sure what you mean here.  I think we are agreeing loudly.  I am stating that Russia is not coming back from its losses in this war.  In fact some of this is not losses, it is shortfalls it had at the start of the war that it would need to build from scratch.

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Let me remind you that exactly a "few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots" was a significant chunk of the contribution of NATO to the defense of Ukraine... back in February '22. The question is, how much farther can the PRC go to match like for like? 

Regarding the C4ISR the "not there yet" is I think based on too many cozy assumptions about incapability (see the Balloon saga and so-called "domain awareness gaps"), and pivoting C4ISR doesn't seem that hard (just as the US has done probably from the Pacific and the Gulf as well...). So let's not talk ourselves into a safe space, Captain.

No it wasn’t. The significant contribution was C4ISR that allowed those munitions and boots to be used to effect.  Russia can get fancy self-loitering munitions, and they will make life difficult in some localized regions, but they do not have the operational level ISR to plug them into.

So the balloon saga was hilarious and an example of ISR pivoting going very wrong.  Pivoting strategic ISR is incredibly hard unless you have constructed a global architecture upon which to pivot from.  Take space based, those satellites are in specific orbits designed to fly over specifics target areas, reorientation is not easy or free - it spends fuel on birds that do not have unlimited supply.  So the answer is put enough up that you need only swing feeds to a different bird.  So China may have some ISR constellations up there but their orbits are aimed at covering the South China Sea.  

Other Strat platforms such as high altitude aircraft or UAS are pretty limited and need to be supported, so now we are talking about extending their range, so more fuel and support with the infrastructure to back it up.  China is still regionally focused so asking it to retask platforms designed to focus on Asia all the way over to Eastern Europe (and not get detected) is well outside of any capability they have demonstrated - perhaps you can do some legwork on that and come back.

Finally, even if China could pivot there is not evidence that the RA can plug into their systems.  A lot of this is crypto and link systems.  The UA trained with the West for 8 years and likely got a backbone up and running quickly.  Not so sure China and Russia are tight enough to be getting that intimate with highly classified systems.

But hey, trying not to talk myself into “safe spaces”.

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Clearly, in what respects the "operational level"  (planning, sustainment, command & control, inter-service co-ordination, that is, all the "scientific" military disciplines) the Russian Federation sucks very, very hard. And this is very surprising. But it is not clear to me that you need to master all of those things all the time to avoid losing completely this war or prolong for a significant amount of time

Then I would say you have a lot more reading to do.  One of those “things” is logistics and sustainment and Russia’s failure to master that led to the entire northern front collapsing.  

Seriously, every now and then some clever academic poses that the operational level “is not a thing”, which sounds cool until you ask “ok, so who is going to do all the operational level stuff”?  Most of the operational level is marshalling and distribution of enablers that provide and sustain tactical advantage, linking tactical actions together into a coherent campaign and shaping effects to set overall battlefield conditions - but hey, what do I know?

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

From all the news I have that's what has been going on in the south (where they now know their logistics are weak) and Luhansk oblast to some extent (as there we're seeing a mixture of offensive-defensive stance).

So what I want you and everyone to do is measure the length of the RA front, from the tippy tip of that thing past Kherson to the far right flank at the border in the north of Luhansk. Now take that number and divide the number of Russian troops in-country by it.  Now take that number and divide it in half.  Ok, now that number is the total number of troops per km the RA has to defend what it has taken. That number includes any troop rotations and counter move forces.

Now take 20k off the overall number of the RA and plug it in.  What does it do to that troop density per km? Now do 30k.  Now 40k.  This is the RA problem.  Now before anyone pipes up - no, it is not that linear.  The line will need to be much denser in close terrain and less in the open.  Water obstacles will help as well.  But if you want to get technical this also does not allow for a lot of depth, and a 50-50 tooth to tail ratio is extremely generous.

Further, the RA does not have ISR that allows them to leave part of the line unmanned - the UA does because they can see and react before the RA crosses the start line.  So the RA has to sustain that troop density, they have to enable it.  The UA needs only to find the holes and make them worse.

1 hour ago, BletchleyGeek said:

I am not sure about the Russian Army having had to weaken their positions elsewhere, Captain. If anything, a spoiling counterstroke would have followed, I have only seen what I would qualify as Ukrainian probes.

Once you have done the math in the previous step, rethink this last part.  

And this is a military that was very badly mauled last year.  It does not have a western-backstop.  It was missing what it needed for a job this size from the outset.  It has not solved for AirPower (that is a big one).  It has not been able to attack UA C4ISR directly in any meaningful way.  It has not been able to erode UA LOCs.

So, yes, I am sure things are very bad at Bakhmut but until we see something that say all that is changing, or failing more quickly on the UA side, this thing is still going in one direction.

Edited March 7, 2023 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Still not buying it   If the Russians had such devastating advantages they would have rolled up Ukraine's lines a long time ago OR would not themselves be saying they've suffered heavy losses.

Nope, I just don't see how it is physically possible to have recent losses being near parity, not to mention the months of fighting up until this point.

Steve

To do it would mean Russia is managing its own form of corrosive warfare. It is able to attrit with precision on the front and in depth while throwing human waves forward.

And we are back to ISR, we know they do have some, but we also get reports they do not have enough.  And of course if they have that level of resolution, why throw in human waves?  Instead they could poke, prod and hammer being able to see.

As far as we can tell the RA does not even have the firepower advantages it had last summer.  We know the AirPower situation has not changed.

Someone is going need to really unpack this with some proof.

[chuckdyke]

Some good background information.

 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

I hope the forum software behaves and doesn't eat my response... Thanks very much for your very detailed answer. It is appreciated, even if I am not 100% sure it was written with the purpose of inviting ideas to be exchanged. 

I'll jump in here even though this is directed at The_Capt's comments because, if you read my previous posts, we hold very similar positions.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Well, as you admitted in a few posts up, we can all say that we all have been wrong to a certain degree. How much more wrong is someone or another still needs to be adjudicated?

For the war as a whole?  Sure, time will tell.  However, for the early part of the war the jury is already in on that.  The mainstream experts got it wrong.  REALLY wrong.  I had to stop listening to Kofman a couple of weeks in because, honestly, I thought it was the most respectful thing I could do.  He stuck to his badly aimed guns.

For me, I predicted before the war started that Russia would lose in the end, but thought they would do much better during the first phase.  Day 2 of this war I declared in this thread (you can go back go Feb 25/26 and see for yourself) that Russia had lost the first phase.  Kofman, and others, were still yammering on about Russia just getting started.  Just before Russia was forced to retreat from around Kyiv I remember Kofman saying that the war had stalemated.

Seriously, just go back and reread the first couple of weeks (a few hundred posts) of discussing this war.  Or look at what Kofman was saying a week before the Russian Army retreated from northern Ukraine:

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/21/michael-kofman-russia-military-expert-00018906?fbclid=IwAR2qbMFb7RS-awk3-r52FMQbFjjPCZk0R96QQ6bjx5e1752FHBEtxkk9edI

Here are some quotes that show what I'm talking about:

What is clear is that the Russian military doesn’t stand a good chance of achieving its initial political aims...

"Good chance"?  Might have been relevant to say that in the first days of the war as we were saying here, but late March?  There was NO chance at all.  None.  Later on he seems to acknowledge this, yet he still felt he had to give Russia some benefit of the doubt when there really was no doubt to give.

...the Russian military probably only has a couple of weeks left in terms of combat effectiveness left inside Ukraine.

Frankly, the same is true for Ukrainian forces. I can’t guess what their losses are, but they’re not in any better shape.

Yesh.  That didn't age well.  In fact, Russia was already spent at this point and Ukraine was just getting started.  We saw it here, he missed it.

So one of two things is likely to happen over the next couple of weeks: We will either see a significant operational pause and some kind of ceasefire that will lead to a settlement, or that pause will introduce a rearming period where Russia will introduce a number of units that they’re bringing up to the border right now. They have more forces, they have more materiel. Their losses are significant, but their rate of attrition as a share of the force is likely not as bad as Ukraine’s

Wow, that aged even worse   Again, he was saying this on the cusp of an operational collapse of Russian forces.  We saw it happening, we called it correctly ahead of time, so why didn't he?  Other military experts had shifted gears and were saying that Russia was on the verge of collapse, but not Kofman.

The one thing I think we can tell right now is that it’s not possible for the Russian military to take Kyiv. The best they can try is to encircle it in the coming weeks.

He just didn't understand what was going on around Kyiv as surrounding it was already long since off the table. Though he did have a sense that Russia was running out of immediate options for success when he said this:

I think they need to take a pause to reorganize. I suspect the reason we haven’t seen them make substantial advances is because they’ve had setbacks and have taken a pause and they might try to make one more push to see how far they can get along some of these axes of advance. You can’t predict the churn of battle, but I suspect that they have a couple more weeks left before they’re going to have to make major shifts in this operation.

So he got this right, he just didn't get right what would happen after the "operational pause"...

And if it then gets into a war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine, it’ll be a much bloodier war. It’ll be dragged out. And that’s where I’m a lot less sanguine about Ukraine’s prospects, I’ll be honest. Wars of attrition come down to manpower and materiel and Russia has both. I’m a lot less optimistic about Ukraine’s prospects in that regard.

Here we see the argument that Russia's superior numbers will crush Ukraine.  Didn't work up to that point, but Kofman felt it would eventually get there.  Here, in this thread, we held the opposite view.  Our predictions aged quite well

Then there was this baffling statement:

We don’t know why exactly it failed, we have to be honest. I see a lot of criticism of the operation, but which part failed? Was it the ground reinforcements, was it the airborne reinforcements? Was it because the Ukrainians had much thicker air defenses around Kyiv than the Russians expected? Or is it because Ukrainian National Guard units reacted faster than the Russian military expected to retake the airport? I don’t know. I’m being frank with you.

Holy crow, it was screaming obvious to us here what Russia tried to do and why it failed.  No wonder he wasn't predicting the collapse we saw coming.  I suspect his prewar biases conflicted with the information and so it confused him instead of informing him as it should have.

To his credit, much of the article wasn't all that bad.  The problem is his extension of befit of the doubt to the Russians, with some holding back benefit for Ukraine, continued the pattern of misinforming people about what was really going on in this war.  Specifically, that Russia had already lost it.

So there.  Just a sample of why I soured on Kofman.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

The Russian Army penetrated deeply into Ukrainian territory, became overextended, and when it became clear to them that they were being defeated in detail, they pulled back from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy axis.

Actually, it took them weeks to figure this out.  They only pulled back when they were on the cusp of collapse.  Ukraine had forced them to choose between a humiliating withdrawal of its shattered forces or risk losing them all in an even more humiliating rout.  Not really strategic Russian genius at work here.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

That was what the first Russian Army achieved in Feb-May 2022. Certainly everyone, including Michael Kofman, you, me, and the Russian command, were expecting that their initial forces (which are no more I think we agree) would achieve much more than that. Still significant, as they did severe damage to, yet did not destroy, the Ukrainian state. Slava Ukraini!

I disagree with this only because you are painting it as too black and white.  I (and others) expected Russia to lose, but we were surprised by how quickly and thoroughly they lost the initial phase.  Others (like Kaufman) thought Russia was going to succeed and defeat Ukraine.  We were all wrong to degrees, but some way more than others.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

On this last bit, I wholeheartedly agree. There was clearly a consensus being formed around the narrative that Ukraine was being defeated, slowly but relentlessly. This if anything was being amplified by the harrowing accounts of what was going on in Mariupol and evocations of that great "disaster" that was the evacuation of Kabul. 

The consensus, as you put it, was coming mostly from people who fundamentally weren't drawing the right conclusions from the war's early phase.  Those who did a better job with analysis were not part of that consensus.  They were, in fact, in direct opposition to it.  Still are

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

I'd rather say that the question is about what hasn't happened. I think it is fair to say that there was a wide expectation of Ukraine launching some form of an offensive in Winter as the ground conditions improved. That didn't happen, instead, the Russian Army went again on the offensive, with very little success, but a lot of fanfare.

I have a feeling that Ukraine was always intending on the winter being quiet for them so they could prep for the warmer campaign season.  However, they certainly did want us to think they were going to do something big sooner rather than later.  Good chance that was deliberate disinformation.

The other possibility is that Ukraine decided that because Russia was Hell bent on attacking that it should focus on defense.  A wise move.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

 I am sorry, but I am not sure anybody is claiming that the Ukrainian Army is "on the ropes". That the Russian Army got back on its feet is a fact, as they were the ones attacking, no matter how unsuccessfully.

For sure there are some that are saying that Ukraine has been drained at Bakhmut and that it's prospects for this summer are dimmer now because of it.  Couple this with people who repeatedly claim that Russia has all kinds of resources to throw into this fight.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

That was an over-the-top remark, Captain. We have no idea about what the activities were, and I think it is likely that there were a lot of interviews with the planners and managers of the battle for Bakhmut.

I doubt it.  Ukraine's higher staffs have been completely off limits to reporters.  Ukraine's allies, who do have high level access, are keeping tight lips.  I doubt very much Kofman got some exclusive scoop.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Could you please state clearly what you mean by "historic force ratio losses attacker to defender"? Like showing a curve of the historical versus what you think the open source info evidences for this conflict? If you are quoting a document, could you please provide it?

As we have discussed many times in the past, one can only count what comes to the surface of the open-source arena. Recently I saw clearly an episode where a Ukrainian mechanized platoon was pretty roughly handled by Russian artillery. They seem to be rarer events... but they happen.

Sure, but see my previous post as well as The_Capt's.  OSINT without analysis is pretty pointless, which is why we analyze here.  The notion that casualties are in the range of parity is not reasonably plausible based on the things we do know.  Sure, we don't know everything, but we know enough to make such conclusions.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Let me remind you that exactly a "few hundred self-loitering munitions and boots" was a significant chunk of the contribution of NATO to the defense of Ukraine... back in February '22. The question is, how much farther can the PRC go to match like for like? 

We heard the same arguments when Russia started getting drones from Iran.  "Oh boy, this is a game changer for Russia!".  Didn't turn out that way.  Didn't turn out that way for Germany's V-Weapons either.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Regarding the C4ISR the "not there yet" is I think based on too many cozy assumptions about incapability (see the Balloon saga and so-called "domain awareness gaps"), and pivoting C4ISR doesn't seem that hard (just as the US has done probably from the Pacific and the Gulf as well...). So let's not talk ourselves into a safe space, Captain.

Nobody wants to be complacent, but the whole frustrating and (frankly) maddening part analysis by some is that just because we don't know everything we should presume we know nothing.  It is extremely dangerous to overestimate one's abilities, but it is also extremely harmful to underestimate them.  A critical thinker tries to figure out what the most likely case is, not play the role of optimist or pessimist.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

Clearly, in what respects the "operational level"  (planning, sustainment, command & control, inter-service co-ordination, that is, all the "scientific" military disciplines) the Russian Federation sucks very, very hard. And this is very surprising.

Why?  It wasn't surprising to me at all and I do this part time without being paid for the time I do spend on it.  The evidence that Russia sucks at this was plain to see in 2014/2015 for those who were looking hard enough.  And anybody that made a career out of studying Russian military capabilities should have seen this with far more clarity.  Yet people like Kofman somehow didn't correctly assess what the real state of Russia's ability to wage war really was.

2 hours ago, BletchleyGeek said:

I am not sure about the Russian Army having had to weaken their positions elsewhere, Captain. If anything, a spoiling counterstroke would have followed, I have only seen what I would qualify as Ukrainian probes. 

It is too soon to say, agreed, however it is what's happened in all the previous Russian offensive activities.  Specifically, a narrow section of front draws away resources from other sectors leaving them either vulnerable or at least operationally incapable of doing more than sitting in place.  For sure Russia has invested the remains of its VDV, Marine, and Spetsnaz units that were withdrawn from Kherson instead of rebuilding them.  That is not likely going to bode well for them this summer.

Steve

[dan/california]

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/06/world/europe/russia-soldier-casualties.html

A long sad story about how Putin's war is wrecking Russia utterly. 

[Mattias]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

A better and just world?

The legal aspects of warfare have been evolving for thousands of years.  I don't think we've reached the end of that evolution.

It was pretty much irony on my part, but I guess I wasn’t crystaly on that

 

It will indeed be interesting to see where he lands. Personally I think instigators of war have gotten way to much of a pass in the past, because of their exalted status and them being engaged in the noble pursuit of politics by all means (irony).

 

[chrisl]

46 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

So the balloon saga was hilarious and an example of ISR pivoting going very wrong.  Pivoting strategic ISR is incredibly hard unless you have constructed a global architecture upon which to pivot from.  Take space based, those satellites are in specific orbits designed to fly over specifics target areas, reorientation is not easy or free - it spends fuel on birds that do not have unlimited supply.  So the answer is put enough up that you need only swing feeds to a different bird.  So China may have some ISR constellations up there but their orbits are aimed at covering the South China Sea.  

Other Strat platforms such as high altitude aircraft or UAS are pretty limited and need to be supported, so now we are talking about extending their range, so more fuel and support with the infrastructure to back it up.  China is still regionally focused so asking it to retask platforms designed to focus on Asia all the way over to Eastern Europe (and not get detected) is well outside of any capability they have demonstrated - perhaps you can do some legwork on that and come back.

Finally, even if China could pivot there is not evidence that the RA can plug into their systems.  A lot of this is crypto and link systems.  The UA trained with the West for 8 years and likely got a backbone up and running quickly.  Not so sure China and Russia are tight enough to be getting that intimate with highly classified systems.

I'm going to pick a little nit here.  

China has a metric buttload of earth observing satellites (i.e. spy capable)of various flavors in a variety of orbits.  A little googling shows most of them in high-inclination sun-sync orbits (keeps the illumination of the spots they can see consistent) so that they can basically cover the whole earth regularly at roughly uniform resolution, with the revisit rate and max latitude dependent on their altitude.  By having side-looking capability they get a higher revisit rate than strict down-lookers, though at different viewing angles.  These kind don't cost much to task - adjust orientation without using propellant to look at different angles as they fly over a region.  There are a fairly small number in very elliptical orbits - those are the ones that cost you to retask because you have to move the perigee to where you want it.  They don't have a lot of them, and I agree it's unlikely they're spending propellant on Vlad.  Even the optical observing satellites seem to mostly be in moderate altitude sun-sync orbits.  But there are quite a few, and they probably in totally have pretty good revisit rates with some kind of observation or other.  They can't really have a bunch of unknown satellites in highly elliptical orbits - it's hard to hide satellites because any punk with a telescope can sit around in the dark and track them. And there are hobbyists who do.  All you can really do is try to hide their function - we don't necessarily know what all the Chinese satellites do.

But it doesn't really affect your overall argument - even if China sets up a terabit/s pipe to the RA, Russia doesn't have the C4 or the precision to take advantage of it.

[BletchleyGeek]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

Seriously?  So you want me to prove that attacking is more costly than defending?  Look this is what I call “an obtuse flanking”, where in a debate/argument someone demands that one has to prove first principles.  This is a lot of legwork and frankly drifting into unpaid labour. 

So instead why don’t you go on your own learning journey.  Start here: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA302819.pdf and then use an internet search engine.

We build entire military offensive doctrine around the idea that we need to concentrate more force at the point of attack to overcome the benefits of the defence.  We also expect to take more losses in the short term, to achieve breakin, through and out, which sets up for annihilation through dislocation (some more stuff you can go look up).  The UA broke this rule regularly in this war by being either upside down or near 1:1.  How they did this is still a big question.

The RA has not demonstrated the same ability, in fact quite the opposite, they have had massive force ratio advantages (e.g. 12:1) and still failed.

Really is that the best answer you can offer to a honest technical question? How is that "obtuse flanking"? 

For your information, I have been in that journey for a number of years.

Seeing your source now I understand your confusion. There is plenty of data that shows barely any correlation between force ratio and engagement result when considering large datasets of engagements. Factors such as force employment and surprise/shock trump superior numbers almost always. Chapter 2 of Steven Biddle's "Military Power" contains an extensive literature review addressing the point of view in the paper you shared and many others.

What a disappointment.

[Huba]

JDAM-ER are reportedly being used in Ukraine for a few weeks already. The Drive quotes Gen. James Hecker, head of USAFE.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/winged-jdam-smart-bombs-are-now-operational-in-ukraine

And a first video that probably shows their use at the frontline:

 

Edited March 7, 2023 by Huba

[Haiduk]

Meanwhile silent small war on islands near Kherson is continuing. Recently Russian milbloggers blamed commander of 126th coastal defense brigade that he didn't establish proper defense of islands and now is grindering personnel, trying to hold them and didn't evacuate bodies of killed, who lay there by weeks.

Yesterdey in Russian TG appeard this

Bol'shoy Potyomkin. We are loosing control over the island.

 

[JonS]

32 minutes ago, Huba said:

 

I really like their music choice for this video.

Edited March 7, 2023 by JonS

[Haiduk]

Two days ago, allegedly, UKR troops have withdrawn from eastern side of Bakhmut and now eastern frontline inside the city goes along Bakhmutivka river.

[Haiduk]

52 minutes ago, Huba said:

JDAM-ER are reportedly being used in Ukraine for a few weeks already. The Drive quotes Gen. James Hecker, head of USAFE.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/winged-jdam-smart-bombs-are-now-operational-in-ukraine

And a first video that probably shows their use at the frontline:

 

Air Force Command made a statement that Russians have used newest guided bomb UPAB-1500 on some object in Chernihiv oblast several weeks ago. 

UPAB-1500 is a new ordnance, introduced in 2019 and adoted next year, which should substitute Soviet KAB-1500 family. It has approx the same combat capabilities, but equipped with satellite/inertial guidance systen and can be dropped from 40-50 km. Though, for this the jet has to do it from 14 km altitude.

Russia also probably has newer UPAB-500 bombs, having 390 kg warhed (UPAB-1500 has 1010 kg warhead)

 

Edited March 7, 2023 by Haiduk

[The_MonkeyKing]

55 minutes ago, Huba said:

JDAM-ER are reportedly being used in Ukraine for a few weeks already. The Drive quotes Gen. James Hecker, head of USAFE.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/winged-jdam-smart-bombs-are-now-operational-in-ukraine

And a first video that probably shows their use at the frontline:

 

I wonder how far and high they have to drop from to hit a target on the frontlines 

[Haiduk]

An article (in English) about newest Russian version of Kh-101 cruise missiles (izdeliye 540AP), equipped with jamming systems and new navigation system. Russians tried to breakthrow Ukr AD with theese missiles since autumn, but it's claimed they didn't achieve any significant sucsess in that. 

https://en.defence-ua.com/industries/since_november_2022_the_russians_wanted_to_defeat_ukrainian_air_defense_with_izdelye_504ap_missiles_but_failed-5969.html 

Reportedly first downed upgraded Kh-101 was identified in November 2022 (on the photo)

 

[Maciej Zwolinski]

10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I absolutely can not conceive of how this could be 1:1 or even 1:2 overall.  Attackers often suffer higher casualties absent advantages which Russia doesn't appear to have.  We also know that Wagner was pushing untrained and unsupported convicts and Mobiks at Ukrainian positions in "recon by death" tactics.  Even the RU Nats have aknowledged this.  On top of this, these attacks have not yielded anything resembling a breakthrough or overrun of any size, which is usually where the attacker evens up the loss ratio.

To think that this would result in just as many Ukrainian deaths is incomprehensible to me.

That said, I have no clue where the actual loss ratio is.  However, I would bet it is closer to 1:7 than it is 1:1.

Steve

Many Ukrainian reports discuss huge advantage in artillery on RUS side - like 10:1 advantage in tubes, plus resurgence of shell shortage on UKR side.  How serious it is in proportion to RUS shell shortage, impossible to guess, but it is there on the UKR side as well. Also mortar shortage and mortar shell shortage - this is just on the UKR side.

Advantage in artillery fires is how RUS achieved favourable loss ratios in Donbas in spring 2022  before the great HIMARSing- I think it is not disputed by now that UKR were losing more men at that time, despite RUS being on the offensive. Also, WW I research shows that in "bite and hold" attacks the atttackers were inflicting more casualties overall if they had more artillery. So in principle it is possible.

Additionally, RUS have gained in positional terms. They are on the 3 sides of Bakhmut on the high ground so crossfire opportunities are available. Also all kinds of fire over the voie sacree from Chasiv Yar are possible - films show crashed cars around the road. Moreover, there are in the city now fighting block by block with less cover differential between the attacker and defender. While that kind of fighting is technically difficult for the attacker, the research shows that after the dust settles the overall casualty ratio tends to be closer than in open country fighting. Finally, the sacrificial zeks are not used anymore/all dead by now so those casualty rich zek/zerg rushes do not happen so often.

Summing up, there are reasons why the casualty ratio reported by Muzyka may be accurate now. Depending over what period you want to calculate it. 

Anecdotally, on the films released recently by Bakhmut defenders the narrators seem to me like they were consciously describing the fighting in a more positive way than it is really warranted.Telling white lies to maintain the morale at home. Cannot point to anything specific, but something in the choice of words, the non verbal posture, etc. So I think Muzyka is correct

[Grigb]

13 hours ago, Butschi said:

Um... Very fitting definition from Collins Dictionary: an unconfirmed report, story, or statement in general circulation

Not sure what you mean - the rumor I reported is unconfirmed. That's why I call it rumor.

I say it again - it was not confirmed that why it is rumor. But this is not the same type of rumor that you usually operate.

You unwisely call any unconfirmed information a rumor. I call only credible unconfirmed information a rumor. That's why it is confusing for you. 

13 hours ago, Butschi said:

I'm sorry, but I'll go with the official defintion which is not based on your folders.

Except you do not understand neither defenition nor my system. But you are free to do whatever you want.

 

13 hours ago, Butschi said:

This is either very dry humor or a big assumption.

I am not joking at all.

[Maciej Zwolinski]

9 hours ago, The_Capt said:

To be fair to us, Kofman and others were all sounding the drums of doom back then as the Russian military was "just getting started" and drawing big red lines all over Donbas.

So who was less wrong in that little situation?

Pre-HIMARS he was justified to drum those drums. I think that everybody then was laughing at snail's pace of Russian offensive, but only because we were not getting accurate asessments of UKR losses. Russians were not getting land, but they were killing a lot of UKR - that was the moment before their getting M777 and after they started to run out of 152/122 mm ammo. UKR were trading people for artillery shells.

The surprising arrival of HIMARs gave UKR some breathing space, and quick deliveries of Western guns and ammo stabilised the situation.  So I would say Kofman's early predictions got HIMARSed together with RUS ammo depots. To his credit, Kofman was correct in pointing out what the Russian weakness was (lack of infantry) and that it will hurt RUS heavily. In essence, after HIMARS he correctly predicted the mechanism, if not the precise location, of the Kharkiv-Izium-Lyman counterattack. 

[Huba]

37 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

wonder how far and high they have to drop from to hit a target on the frontlines 

AFAIK the claimed 70+km range is achievable when dropping the bomb at the altitude of 15km, but it will cover half of that distance when tossed from a pop-up maneuver by an low flying aircraft. This seems to be the most logical, safest way to employ these weapons in the UA context.

Edited March 7, 2023 by Huba

[Maciej Zwolinski]

17 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Many Ukrainian reports discuss huge advantage in artillery on RUS side - like 10:1 advantage in tubes, plus resurgence of shell shortage on UKR side.  How serious it is in proportion to RUS shell shortage, impossible to guess, but it is there on the UKR side as well. Also mortar shortage and mortar shell shortage - this is just on the UKR side.

To clarify the above - this pertains to the Bachmut area only. In Vuhledar and Maryinka sectors the RUS are bitching about paucity of shells, tubes and worn out barrels. Seems like the artillery was exceptionally concentrated in Bachmut. Possibly Prigozyn won the battle over resources for some time