How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[DesertFox]

9 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yes, either my usual OSINT go to sources are honouring OPSEC, or the source report on this counterattack is a little over the skis. ...That said, the UA wouldn't blow a weir if they had nothing at all in mind.

If Google translator doesn´t fail me, he (Wolski) warns to be overly optimistic:

I caution against treating this counterattack as a breakthrough. If it succeeds, at best, the situation for the AU will return to the state it was before February 19. This is a local counter-attack, not an AU offensive, but of course even such a tactical victory for SZU is very satisfying.

 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

Ukrainian EOD bro.  Stay cool, light fingered and safe mate!

P.S.   Yes, Vladimir V. Putin does literally use ''quote fingers" in this interview!

 

Edited February 27, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Kinophile]

15 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Yanqui go home lol

 

 

Thats actually pretty informative, as an analogy - not from a military pov but a political. With losses this bad, and a situation deteriorating this relentlessly, to be able to hide, obfuscate and suppress the impact on society requires an enormous domestic investment. Can you imagine how ruined the US gov would be by now? Massive political rioting, Congress going insane, Presidential impeachments left, right and center, Supreme Court assassinations, militia combat with National Guard, etc etc. This is the kind of enforced and prolonged disaster and losses that would cause a civil war in the initiating 'democratic 'society.  

But Russian society is not democratic in any sense of the word. Autocrats always think they have limitless domestic power, that they should just keep buttoning down. In many countries that has limits that fairly quickly start to show up - but the apathy at large in Russian society is delaying that crisis point. Putin is doing enough to suppress and things are nowhere near bad enough at home for average Russians to risk everything and everyone they know in open rebellion. 

I personally never bought the idea that Putin's system would fall due to this war, as the Russian Army has the strategic safe haven of its own borders. Putin himself, possibly. But not the system. At its primary mission, suppression of domestic disagreement, the System is operating smoothly, well funded, has coherent leadership and is unthreatened by external forces.

[Kinophile]

7 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I have seen a few of these and frankly they are kinda big celebrations of confirmation biases.  There is nothing inherently wrong with the BTG, it lies somewhere between Combat Team and Battlegroup in organizational constructs. I think the theory was that the unit would really heavily on quick response firepower linked directly into the tactical level C2.  Add UAS and this sort of unit worked and saw some success when facing mounted manoeuvre units back in 2014.  

In some ways the BTG has advantages in lower size and profile, and logistics requirements.  In the right hands and fully enabled the BTG looks a lot like some sort of ACR/ACS concept.  Lighter, faster and carrying a lot of boom-boom.  Obviously the BTG runs into problems in infantry heavy fight requirements, but so do ACRs - not designed for it.  The RA actually had several BTG types if you look them up and some look more manpower heavy.  I think the intent may have been to make the modular but it looks like it did not pan out. Overall the thing looks like a self contained raider unit with a lot of integral firepower.

The BTG failed not because it was a bad design, it failed because so many other aspects of the Russian military system failed.  A BCT without air superiority and under constant illumination and deep strike PGM is not going to fair well either. The second problem is that a BTG is fine so long as you only ask it to do what a BTG can do.  If you ask it to do too much any unit organization will fail.  The third problem was what looks like a serious lack of peer-coordination.  These sorts of units will need to work together a lot and provide mutual support - this is very MC and self-synchronization stuff, which we have seen that the Russian doctrine on C2 does not support.  And finally on support, this organization will work fine if it has a formation over it to C2 all the enablers.  And we know that was a serious issue.

I mean the BTG didn’t work in the same way that asking an ACR to do a heavy urban assault unsupported, after losing air superiority etc, would not work.  Focusing on the organization as the “reason” for Russian failure is missing the much larger issues at play here and frankly highlights some incorrect lessons.

I do wonder what the US Mil concluded from OPFOR testing the BTG in the NTC, ie what effective counters (assuming decent OPFOR C2 and air parity).

Edited February 27, 2023 by Kinophile

[LongLeftFlank]

Sobering read from Adam Tooze (whom I have actually met, briefly); one of the better strategists out there IMHO.

I can't get to his FT piece (paywall), but this support is on his blog Chartbook:

https://adamtooze.substack.com/p/chartbook-197-the-ukraine-aid-reality

We [Westerners] have not only a cynicism problem (bad faith) and a problem of means and ends (a policy problem), but something deeper: A reality problem....

The figure proposed by Kyiv for its [nonmilitary] financial needs is in the order of $3.5 billion per month. The United States and Europe have committed to providing enough to cover that. But as the monthly data show, those payments do not arrive in a steady or reliable fashion. 

The modesty of the support provided by its Western allies, leaves Ukraine’s war effort precariously balanced and the course of the war in 2023 highly uncertain.

Ukraine may pull through. Its military are fighting remarkably well. Perhaps Russia will crumble. But if it does not, we should likely expect the “reality gap” to close in the direction of greater financial and military aid.  

More like this at Chartbook.

[LongLeftFlank]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Posting the bigger topo from HeliosRunner here, for those who like poring over maps....

 

French analyst HeliosRunner (who is pretty reliable) confirms nothing especially transformative is going on in Bahmut. See thread.

****

But it looks like "Official Social Media War Influencer Chuck P" didn't get the memo lol.

Here's an Indication and Warning for you:  give this self-promoting shill a wide berth.  Also, his maps are filled with what (self-promoting shill who at least knows something) Edward Tufte calls 'chartjunk'.  The kind of crap you used to look at in Newsweek (when there wasn't much other way to know what was going on outside Khorramshar) and know it was BS.  LIke I really need to see all the highway route markers? WTF?  I miss @Grigb.

[Removed]

Edited February 27, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[poesel]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Isn't this an offer that some ethnics would like to take? A dangerous and careless offer.

Bonus question: isn't there some AI program that can verify if it is really Putin who talks? I can put Putin's head and voice on any body (digitally). Then the reverse should also be possible???

[Butschi]

9 minutes ago, poesel said:

Isn't this an offer that some ethnics would like to take? A dangerous and careless offer.

Bonus question: isn't there some AI program that can verify if it is really Putin who talks? I can put Putin's head and voice on any body (digitally). Then the reverse should also be possible???

Should be doable, sounds like a job for a GAN: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generative_adversarial_network

Putin certainly talks enough to produce ample training data.

[ZPB II]

43 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

.... And speaking of self-important Social Media Influencers, this is totally OT (and nothing at all racy, just a... civil disagreement), but I think it will strike a chord with pretty much everybody on this board! I am still laughing! 

The channel that produces these videos specializes in manufactured rage-bait and they are very successful with it. It may be funny but it's also fake.

[LongLeftFlank]

9 minutes ago, ZPB II said:

The channel that produces these videos specializes in manufactured rage-bait and they are very successful with it. It may be funny but it's also fake.

 

Ah ok, got it thanks. I'm miles off my baseline.

Buy the fake and sell what's real....

Been doing the rounds trying to validate this 'backhand blow' at Bakhmut (General Sirsky was just there, so I want it to be real), hence the flurry of posts. I'll just leave you with this one and stand down for a bit:

https://turcopolier.com/tales-from-the-witch-of-ukraine-ttg/

We learned how to use our M-60 machine guns in an indirect fire mode during an exchange tour with the Royal Australian Regiment. They used a standard mortar sight attached to a tripod mounted M-60, aiming stakes and a firing table. It was the same technique used in firing mortars. I haven’t seen that taught in any US military schools, although it’s not a new technique. It was used with Vickers guns in WWI, WWII and elsewhere.

Edited February 27, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[Pete Wenman]

Interesting perspective on Putin's and Russia's view of the (endless) war.

https://meduza.io/en/feature/2023/02/25/russia-ends-nowhere-they-say

P

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

 

This is encouraging!  One of the Soviet Union's and Putin's most consistent things to do is blame the West for doing something to it that is in fact being done by Russia against someone else.  In this case it would mean Russia blaming the US for breaking up Russia because Russia's actions are breaking itself up

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

Putin is doing enough to suppress and things are nowhere near bad enough at home for average Russians to risk everything and everyone they know in open rebellion. 

Correct, however there's two things to keep in mind.  First, we don't really know how bad things are inside of Russia right niw and nobody knows how bad they will get within the next year or two.  Second, a previously successful autocracy always looks like it will continue on forever.  Until, that is, it collapses. 

There are definitely exceptions to the collapse inevitability, however they tend to be those that are less complex.  Especially in terms of culture, religion, and ethnicity.  The also tend to avoid collapse because the autocrat takes care to line up the successor before he becomes incapacitated.  The two best examples of all of this are North Korea and Communist Cuba.

2 hours ago, Kinophile said:

I personally never bought the idea that Putin's system would fall due to this war, as the Russian Army has the strategic safe haven of its own borders. Putin himself, possibly. But not the system. At its primary mission, suppression of domestic disagreement, the System is operating smoothly, well funded, has coherent leadership and is unthreatened by external forces.

All indications out of Russia are that the system is not running smoothly.  It is operating at a high level of stress and is gradually reducing/removing the means of society to vent it's frustrations "safely".  It's like taking a steam system and bypassing or plugging up pressure relief valves because they are leaky or making too much noise.  Eventually something will happen to build up a critical amount of pressure and the ability to vent it or suppress it again won't be there.  It is inevitable, though highly unpredictable as to when, what, and how bad.

Serbia is also a good example to look at because it shares a lot of common cultural traits as Russia.  It's path from multi-ethnic autocratic state to much smaller democratic leaning country shares many of the same elements we've seen happen with Russia so far.  And at each stage someone could have easily said "Serbia's ruthless enough to keep things going indefinitely".  Anybody who thought that was later proven wrong.

Today Serbia still hasn't totally given up on its historical role as the regional drag on democratic progress.  However, I'd much rather have the troubled Serbia of today than the one from the 1990s, thank you very much.  Anybody who thinks Russia might transform into a happy and kind state is delusional, but those who think we could get a Serbia type result are not.  Eventually I think it will happen.

Steve

[FancyCat]

 

 

[TheVulture]

An overview of recent goings on in Moldova / Transnistria and how they affect the situation in Ukraine, from geopolotical futures:

 

In Moldova, Ukraine Buys Time

By Antonia Colibasanu -February 27, 2023

A war of words has troubled Moldova for more than two weeks. It started when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a Russian coup plot against Moldova on Feb. 10. Two days later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu said that Ukraine sent intelligence to her government, according to which the Russians had a plan to destabilize the country by organizing protests and by employing “violent actions.” It would have been the perfect cover for inciting a coup in a country that is prone to violent protest-induced governmental change.

In fact, Moldova had been on high alert even before Zelenskyy’s warnings. Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – in a not-so-veiled threat – accused the West of “having its sights” on Moldova as a country that might “follow Ukraine’s path.” Even before that, Sandu enraged Moscow in January by implying Moldova might consider joining NATO. Two influential Russian lawmakers responded by saying Moldovan membership in NATO could lead to the country’s destruction. Following the threat, Sandu requested that the parliament pass draft legislation to provide the Prosecutor's Office and the State Information System with tools to combat risks and threats to the country's security more effectively.

News of the coup added to the already high anxiety in Moldova and triggered a change in government. Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita resigned and was replaced by Sandu’s security adviser and National Security Council secretary – a signal that the government was prepared to operate from a mandate to protect Moldova from Russian threats. This is no small thing for a country usually committed to a policy of neutrality. Sandu and the new prime minister promptly issued statements on the shortcomings of neutrality and a potential constitutional change to join a “larger alliance” – that is, NATO.

These kinds of statements, meanwhile, have stirred up domestic partisan activity. Pro-Russia factions are expected to object, while nationalist factions seek to double down on their own agenda, which includes petitions to the EU to add Moldovan oligarchs and other sympathetic politicians to sanctions lists.

Moscow has responded to Moldova in kind. On Feb. 21, President Vladimir Putin canceled a 2012 foreign policy decree that committed Moscow to peacefully resolving the border crisis of Transnistria. The region is a narrow strip of land in eastern Moldova that has been controlled by a Russian-backed government since a war in 1992 fought between Transnistrian separatists and Moldova. And for 30 years, some 2,000 Russian soldiers have been stationed there. (The separatist region is said to host the largest weapons depot in Europe – about 20,000 tons of ammunition and military equipment, albeit likely from the Soviet era.) In 2012, Moscow agreed to help find a way to peacefully resolve the conflict, but that was at a time when Russia was seeking closer relations with the EU and the U.S. Clearly, that is no longer the case. In other words, Transnistria is a European region in which Russia has citizens to protect and military assets already in place to protect them.

This is why fears are well-founded that Russia’s escalation in Ukraine could embroil Moldova. And it explains the most recent exchanges between Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. On Feb. 23, Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed that Ukraine was planning an operation to invade Transnistria. Moldovan media reported that the claim was merely Russian psyops. Still, Kyiv went out of its way to say it would act to help Moldova if Russia ever attacked.

These statements paint a picture of escalation that Russia would benefit from. Moscow’s frontal attacks in Ukraine haven’t been especially successful, so logic dictates the execution of a flanking maneuver. Belarus – helmed by a staunchly pro-Russia government – and Moldova are the only places in which Russia could launch such a maneuver. The cancellation of the Moldova decree, then, is meant to force Moldova to accept Russian dominance and influence. It does not indicate an attack, but it does make it clear that one is a very real possibility.

Imagine a scenario in which Moldova got militarily involved in the Ukraine war and opened a second front. Considering how quickly Kyiv responded to a potential Russian threat in Moldova, Ukraine could spare some soldiers along with weapons they received from the West to fight in Ukraine. This would allow Kyiv to ask for even more Western help. The U.S. and its allies may not want the conflict to escalate further – in fact, NATO has already urged Ukraine to use its arsenal for defensive operations, not for offensive ones – but if Moldova were attacked, and if Ukraine rushed to its aid, they would have little choice but to continue their support.

For Russia, sustaining an offensive in both eastern Ukraine and southern Ukraine, where the country borders Transnistria, would be a logistical nightmare. Opening a new front might be worth the effort so long as it doesn’t spread itself too thin, doesn’t lose territory it has gained, and doesn’t upset the U.S. so much that it needs to intervene directly. Ideally, it would lead to negotiations. The fact that U.S. President Joe Biden mentioned Moldova in a recent speech in Warsaw shows that a new front is the last thing Washington wants. With that in mind, Russia may determine it is better served by opening a new front in Belarus rather than Moldova. If Russia dominates Moldova, it would imperil NATO’s southern reach, and would thus draw in the United States. Belarus would be easier to ignore.

Meanwhile, the tension inside Moldova has benefited its pro-Europe governing party. The coup rumors helped Sandu and her party consolidate their position. Had it not been for the warning Ukraine delivered to Moldova, Sandu’s government would have likely fallen by the end of the month due to protests driven by general discontent with the country's poor economic performance. Installing a new government during what appears to be a security crisis has allowed Sandu to avoid further political instability.

The mere prospect of a Russian threat against Moldova allowed the government to establish better relations with the West, giving Sandu direct access to Western leaders like Biden with whom she met during his visits to Munich and Warsaw. Engaging with the U.S. and EU leaders directly makes it more likely for Moldova to obtain security guarantees and funding to improve its economy. Moreover, Russia’s cancellation of the 2012 decree has freed Moldova up from the negotiation process Russia had forced it into. De facto, the negotiating format set forth by the decree was already doomed; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine essentially put an end to the “5+2” setup in which Moscow and Kyiv, in addition to the Organization for Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe, sat next to each other as “mediators” and “guarantors” vis-a-vis Chisinau and Tiraspol, with the United States and European Union reduced to “observers.” It could no longer function, and Moscow’s cancellation only confirmed as much. If anything, through this cancellation Russia acknowledged its weakened position.

For Ukraine, the situation in Moldova buys much-needed time. It could help Kyiv negotiate more help from the West, and it could forestall another Russian offensive. It’s possible that none of this will come to pass, but the potential can’t be ruled out. For Russia, opening a new front, either in Belarus or Moldova, would give it a strategic advantage. If current anxieties lead to the destabilization of either country, Poland or Romania could be next.

[Seminole]

On 2/26/2023 at 5:49 AM, DesertFox said:

3)  Too much attention is being paid to GOP doubts--the Dems are rock solid.

Party with the White House tends to support the war. 
 

I’d suggest focus on the independents as they make up about 1/3rd of electorate and don’t carry the pro/con White House party cudgel to their consideration.  
 

Watch how Democrat support for Iraq grew when they had the White House:

[Huba]

New update from Mateusz Lachowski. He's not in Bakhmut itself, but nearby, and is in contact with soldiers in the city:
- UA recaptured parts of Jahidne in the yesterday's counterattack, overall UA situations has improved
- he has confirmed information that blowing up the dam was done to facilitate the counterattack
- there still is one road to the city that isn't blocked by the russians
- there is bloody fighting everywhere
- UA has to counterattack more, or withdraw from the city soon, this hasn't changed

 

Edited February 27, 2023 by Huba

[billbindc]

29 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

An overview of recent goings on in Moldova / Transnistria and how they affect the situation in Ukraine, from geopolotical futures:

 

In Moldova, Ukraine Buys Time

By Antonia Colibasanu -February 27, 2023

A war of words has troubled Moldova for more than two weeks. It started when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a Russian coup plot against Moldova on Feb. 10. Two days later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu said that Ukraine sent intelligence to her government, according to which the Russians had a plan to destabilize the country by organizing protests and by employing “violent actions.” It would have been the perfect cover for inciting a coup in a country that is prone to violent protest-induced governmental change.

In fact, Moldova had been on high alert even before Zelenskyy’s warnings. Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – in a not-so-veiled threat – accused the West of “having its sights” on Moldova as a country that might “follow Ukraine’s path.” Even before that, Sandu enraged Moscow in January by implying Moldova might consider joining NATO. Two influential Russian lawmakers responded by saying Moldovan membership in NATO could lead to the country’s destruction. Following the threat, Sandu requested that the parliament pass draft legislation to provide the Prosecutor's Office and the State Information System with tools to combat risks and threats to the country's security more effectively.

News of the coup added to the already high anxiety in Moldova and triggered a change in government. Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita resigned and was replaced by Sandu’s security adviser and National Security Council secretary – a signal that the government was prepared to operate from a mandate to protect Moldova from Russian threats. This is no small thing for a country usually committed to a policy of neutrality. Sandu and the new prime minister promptly issued statements on the shortcomings of neutrality and a potential constitutional change to join a “larger alliance” – that is, NATO.

These kinds of statements, meanwhile, have stirred up domestic partisan activity. Pro-Russia factions are expected to object, while nationalist factions seek to double down on their own agenda, which includes petitions to the EU to add Moldovan oligarchs and other sympathetic politicians to sanctions lists.

Moscow has responded to Moldova in kind. On Feb. 21, President Vladimir Putin canceled a 2012 foreign policy decree that committed Moscow to peacefully resolving the border crisis of Transnistria. The region is a narrow strip of land in eastern Moldova that has been controlled by a Russian-backed government since a war in 1992 fought between Transnistrian separatists and Moldova. And for 30 years, some 2,000 Russian soldiers have been stationed there. (The separatist region is said to host the largest weapons depot in Europe – about 20,000 tons of ammunition and military equipment, albeit likely from the Soviet era.) In 2012, Moscow agreed to help find a way to peacefully resolve the conflict, but that was at a time when Russia was seeking closer relations with the EU and the U.S. Clearly, that is no longer the case. In other words, Transnistria is a European region in which Russia has citizens to protect and military assets already in place to protect them.

This is why fears are well-founded that Russia’s escalation in Ukraine could embroil Moldova. And it explains the most recent exchanges between Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. On Feb. 23, Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed that Ukraine was planning an operation to invade Transnistria. Moldovan media reported that the claim was merely Russian psyops. Still, Kyiv went out of its way to say it would act to help Moldova if Russia ever attacked.

These statements paint a picture of escalation that Russia would benefit from. Moscow’s frontal attacks in Ukraine haven’t been especially successful, so logic dictates the execution of a flanking maneuver. Belarus – helmed by a staunchly pro-Russia government – and Moldova are the only places in which Russia could launch such a maneuver. The cancellation of the Moldova decree, then, is meant to force Moldova to accept Russian dominance and influence. It does not indicate an attack, but it does make it clear that one is a very real possibility.

Imagine a scenario in which Moldova got militarily involved in the Ukraine war and opened a second front. Considering how quickly Kyiv responded to a potential Russian threat in Moldova, Ukraine could spare some soldiers along with weapons they received from the West to fight in Ukraine. This would allow Kyiv to ask for even more Western help. The U.S. and its allies may not want the conflict to escalate further – in fact, NATO has already urged Ukraine to use its arsenal for defensive operations, not for offensive ones – but if Moldova were attacked, and if Ukraine rushed to its aid, they would have little choice but to continue their support.

For Russia, sustaining an offensive in both eastern Ukraine and southern Ukraine, where the country borders Transnistria, would be a logistical nightmare. Opening a new front might be worth the effort so long as it doesn’t spread itself too thin, doesn’t lose territory it has gained, and doesn’t upset the U.S. so much that it needs to intervene directly. Ideally, it would lead to negotiations. The fact that U.S. President Joe Biden mentioned Moldova in a recent speech in Warsaw shows that a new front is the last thing Washington wants. With that in mind, Russia may determine it is better served by opening a new front in Belarus rather than Moldova. If Russia dominates Moldova, it would imperil NATO’s southern reach, and would thus draw in the United States. Belarus would be easier to ignore.

Meanwhile, the tension inside Moldova has benefited its pro-Europe governing party. The coup rumors helped Sandu and her party consolidate their position. Had it not been for the warning Ukraine delivered to Moldova, Sandu’s government would have likely fallen by the end of the month due to protests driven by general discontent with the country's poor economic performance. Installing a new government during what appears to be a security crisis has allowed Sandu to avoid further political instability.

The mere prospect of a Russian threat against Moldova allowed the government to establish better relations with the West, giving Sandu direct access to Western leaders like Biden with whom she met during his visits to Munich and Warsaw. Engaging with the U.S. and EU leaders directly makes it more likely for Moldova to obtain security guarantees and funding to improve its economy. Moreover, Russia’s cancellation of the 2012 decree has freed Moldova up from the negotiation process Russia had forced it into. De facto, the negotiating format set forth by the decree was already doomed; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine essentially put an end to the “5+2” setup in which Moscow and Kyiv, in addition to the Organization for Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe, sat next to each other as “mediators” and “guarantors” vis-a-vis Chisinau and Tiraspol, with the United States and European Union reduced to “observers.” It could no longer function, and Moscow’s cancellation only confirmed as much. If anything, through this cancellation Russia acknowledged its weakened position.

For Ukraine, the situation in Moldova buys much-needed time. It could help Kyiv negotiate more help from the West, and it could forestall another Russian offensive. It’s possible that none of this will come to pass, but the potential can’t be ruled out. For Russia, opening a new front, either in Belarus or Moldova, would give it a strategic advantage. If current anxieties lead to the destabilization of either country, Poland or Romania could be next.

Not so enamored of the analysis in this. Should Russia launch a coup attempt and/or military intervention in Moldova is doesn't complicate anything at all for the US, EU or Ukraine. It proves every claim of Russian adventurism and imperialism yet again, it's a military commitment Moscow cannot afford or succeed in and in fairly short order, the Transnistrian forces would be ovewhelmed by Ukrainian intervention. Putin is rattling this particular cage because he wishes to demonstrate the supposed reach of Russian power. Don't buy it. 

Edited February 27, 2023 by billbindc

[hcrof]

16 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Not so enamored of the analysis in this. Should Russia launch a coup attempt and/or military intervention in Moldova is doesn't complicate anything at all for the US, EU or Ukraine. It proves every claim of Russian adventurism and imperialism yet again, it's a military commitment Moscow cannot afford or succeed in and in fairly short order, the Transnistrian forces would be ovewhelmed by Ukrainian intervention. Putin is rattling this particular cage because he wishes to demonstrate the supposed reach of Russian power. Don't buy it. 

Agreed, those Russian troops in transnistria are utterly isolated from Moscow and can't be resupplied or reinforced. I seem to remember they have to use an airport in Moldova proper to rotate troops! There is a military airport in tiraspol but it is 7km of flat fields from the Ukrainian border...

[hcrof]

I will add that there are likely to be some local "national guard" type units to support the 1500-2000 Russian soldiers but the territory is so narrow they have zero way to manoeuvre and the best they can hope for is a bloody siege of tiraspol and blowing up the arms dump if the Ukrainians intervene.

Edit: the cobasna arms dump appears to be 2km from the Ukrainian border so a coup de main type attack is definitely a possibility 

Edited February 27, 2023 by hcrof
Added info

[dan/california]

 

30 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Not so enamored of the analysis in this. Should Russia launch a coup attempt and/or military intervention in Moldova is doesn't complicate anything at all for the US, EU or Ukraine. It proves every claim of Russian adventurism and imperialism yet again, it's a military commitment Moscow cannot afford or succeed in and in fairly short order, the Transnistrian forces would be ovewhelmed by Ukrainian intervention. Putin is rattling this particular cage because he wishes to demonstrate the supposed reach of Russian power. Don't buy it. 

100% agree, Russian forces in Moldova are just this side of  a joke. NATO/EU would rather not deal with the mess, but if Russia pushed it over the edge Ukraine would deal with the actual Russian forces in week. I suspect the following week they would withdraw, and Romanian "peacekeeping troops"  would move in. Oddly enough that huge ammos dump would be mysteriosly empty.  After that it would merely be question on how many years it took for the diplomatic process to digest that Romania had a new province.

Edit: Cross posted, Hcrof said it better.

Edited February 27, 2023 by dan/california

[Seminole]

21 hours ago, danfrodo said:

Yeah, I agree.  NATO is not losing its will.  Reading between the lines of every single statement made by every single official and journalist every hour is nonsense.  And there was just a UN vote that went insanely wrong for Putin, yet everyone is talking how so much of the world is pro-putin. 

Better not to think of the ‘rest of the world’ as pro-Putin, they’re clearly not.  What they are showing is an unwillingness to become anti-Russian and join the western alliance.  Do we have a new name for the ‘non-aligned movement’ of the Cold War, or should we just dust that one off?

[kevinkin]

Hot in Belorussia (War Zone last night)

The Russian A-50 was “blown up at the Machulishchi military airfield,” by drones operated by Belarusian partisans opposed to the current Lukashenko government, according to the Telegram channel of BYPOL, an organization of Belarusan military dissidents opposed to the current Lukashenko government.

“As a result of two explosions (the places are indicated in the photo), the front and central parts of the aircraft were damaged, the avionics and the radar antenna were damaged,” the BYPOL Telegram channel reported. “The damage is serious, the plane will definitely not fly anywhere.”

The incident “occurred while snowplows were working near the aircraft. Probably, as has repeatedly happened at Russian military facilities, someone again did not comply with fire safety measures and smoked near the side. Belarusian partisans are consistent in expelling the Nazis from their land.”

The attack was carried out with drones operated by Belarusian partisans, the BYPOL Telegram channel reported.

"These were drones,” BYPOL reported. “The participants of the operation are Belarusians, participants of the ‘Victory’ plan, they are now safe outside the country."

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Politico has a few interesting war related articles on their front page.  This one is VERY interesting:

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/02/25/ai-russians-feel-war-putin-ukraine-00084145

This is about using AI to scour content on the Internet to determine how Russians might really feel about the war since something like 90% of them won't answer normal polling.  Here's the most important bit:

It's got to be even worse than they suspect because Russia pays people to say nice things about it and/or to attack critics.  I don't think AI is sophisticated enough to sort out that sort of bias, though it can probably sort out bots because they are repetitious.

The other two I've only had a chance to skim:

More insights into the last minute attempts to get Putin to call off the war:

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/02/24/russia-ukraine-war-oral-history-00083757

Discussion about Zelensky as a President of a nation rather than a wartime leader:

https://www.politico.eu/article/strength-weaknesse-ukraine-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy/

Steve

I know we have to be very careful not to see what we want to see, but there have been some weird sounds coming out of Russia (even by their standards).  This whole Chinese play is the latest - weird wishful thinking reports on NATO.  I am starting to wonder just who really needs to tie this war off right now.  I am starting to think it is Russia, not the West or Ukraine.

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

I know we have to be very careful not to see what we want to see, but there have been some weird sounds coming out of Russia (even by their standards).  This whole Chinese play is the latest - weird wishful thinking reports on NATO.  I am starting to wonder just who really needs to tie this war off right now.  I am starting to think it is Russia, not the West or Ukraine.

Very slowly, then all at once....

[The_Capt]

Just now, dan/california said:

Very slowly, then all at once....

Right.  Weird signals coming out of their economy.  Putin is starting to sound desperate in his narratives.  I am thinking he is running out of runway.  But I guess we will see.