How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[danfrodo]

Eulogy on the BTG, doomed from the start.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/26/2155061/-Ukraine-Update-Russia-s-BTG-was-always-a-joke-and-now-it-s-dead

 

[The_Capt]

50 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

Eulogy on the BTG, doomed from the start.

https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/2/26/2155061/-Ukraine-Update-Russia-s-BTG-was-always-a-joke-and-now-it-s-dead

 

I have seen a few of these and frankly they are kinda big celebrations of confirmation biases.  There is nothing inherently wrong with the BTG, it lies somewhere between Combat Team and Battlegroup in organizational constructs. I think the theory was that the unit would really heavily on quick response firepower linked directly into the tactical level C2.  Add UAS and this sort of unit worked and saw some success when facing mounted manoeuvre units back in 2014.  

In some ways the BTG has advantages in lower size and profile, and logistics requirements.  In the right hands and fully enabled the BTG looks a lot like some sort of ACR/ACS concept.  Lighter, faster and carrying a lot of boom-boom.  Obviously the BTG runs into problems in infantry heavy fight requirements, but so do ACRs - not designed for it.  The RA actually had several BTG types if you look them up and some look more manpower heavy.  I think the intent may have been to make the modular but it looks like it did not pan out. Overall the thing looks like a self contained raider unit with a lot of integral firepower.

The BTG failed not because it was a bad design, it failed because so many other aspects of the Russian military system failed.  A BCT without air superiority and under constant illumination and deep strike PGM is not going to fair well either. The second problem is that a BTG is fine so long as you only ask it to do what a BTG can do.  If you ask it to do too much any unit organization will fail.  The third problem was what looks like a serious lack of peer-coordination.  These sorts of units will need to work together a lot and provide mutual support - this is very MC and self-synchronization stuff, which we have seen that the Russian doctrine on C2 does not support.  And finally on support, this organization will work fine if it has a formation over it to C2 all the enablers.  And we know that was a serious issue.

I mean the BTG didn’t work in the same way that asking an ACR to do a heavy urban assault unsupported, after losing air superiority etc, would not work.  Focusing on the organization as the “reason” for Russian failure is missing the much larger issues at play here and frankly highlights some incorrect lessons.

Edited February 27, 2023 by The_Capt

[NamEndedAllen]

4 hours ago, sburke said:

if the dems had voted for McCarthy it would have been a blowout on the first vote.  McCarthy only has to worry about votes where the Dems will vote against.  This isn't one of those.  Gaetz, Boebert and Greene may get some tv airtime but if the GOP house members want to pass Ukraine aid there is nothing to stop them.  A year ago the House voted 361-69 for a 1.5 trillion-dollar bill that included Ukraine aid.

That was then, this is now. Remember, this Party just changed a LOT of the House Rules. If you are saying aid will be passed, you are agreeing with my belief. But if you are betting on it sliding through quickly,  in as large or larger amounts, and no demands for ideological concessions attached just to get out of committee…we’ll, we’ll have ringside seats. The vote you mentioned was legislation with a different majority Party. This is now. The “other Party”. With the Speaker warning of putting on the brakes, “no blank checks”, etc. He has bizarro members that you mentioned. This Party is different, prefers to put forward only legislation it can pass with its own votes. Using the other Party’s is considered compromising. And betrayal etc. As I said, I believe Ukraine aid will indeed pass. But watch for it taking longer, for vicious debates and the extraction of ideological concessions in order to make it so. I’d rather you were right! But…that was then. This is now.

Edited February 27, 2023 by NamEndedAllen

[dan/california]

Quote

The West only understood late that Putin wants to win. Military expert Gustav Gressel explains what has changed since then and why a Rheinmetall truck is almost as valuable to Ukraine as HIMARS and the Gepard anti-aircraft tank.

Good article. Makes a case that the CIA chiefs meeting with the Russians in Turkey was a decisive point in the war. NATO finally realized Putin was not going to have an attack of common sense. The Russian army was just going to have to be beaten. I think most of the board realized that in July...or earlier.

[chuckdyke]

NATO doesn't want to liquidate Russia, it wants to liquidate the Mafia Syndicate in the Kremlin. My apologies to the Mafia I didn't want to insult them. 

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I have seen a few of these and frankly they are kinda big celebrations of confirmation biases.  There is nothing inherently wrong with the BTG, it lies somewhere between Combat Team and Battlegroup in organizational constructs. I think the theory was that the unit would really heavily on quick response firepower linked directly into the tactical level C2.  Add UAS and this sort of unit worked and saw some success when facing mounted manoeuvre units back in 2014.  

In some ways the BTG has advantages in lower size and profile, and logistics requirements.  In the right hands and fully enabled the BTG looks a lot like some sort of ACR/ACS concept.  Lighter, faster and carrying a lot of boom-boom.  Obviously the BTG runs into problems in infantry heavy fight requirements, but so do ACRs - not designed for it.  The RA actually had several BTG types if you look them up and some look more manpower heavy.  I think the intent may have been to make the modular but it looks like it did not pan out. Overall the thing looks like a self contained raider unit with a lot of integral firepower.

The BTG failed not because it was a bad design, it failed because so many other aspects of the Russian military system failed.  A BCT without air superiority and under constant illumination and deep strike PGM is not going to fair well either. The second problem is that a BTG is fine so long as you only ask it to do what a BTG can do.  If you ask it to do too much any unit organization will fail.  The third problem was what looks like a serious lack of peer-coordination.  These sorts of units will need to work together a lot and provide mutual support - this is very MC and self-synchronization stuff, which we have seen that the Russian doctrine on C2 does not support.  And finally on support, this organization will work fine if it has a formation over it to C2 all the enablers.  And we know that was a serious issue.

I mean the BTG didn’t work in the same way that asking an ACR to do a heavy urban assault unsupported, after losing air superiority etc, would not work.  Focusing on the organization as the “reason” for Russian failure is missing the much larger issues at play here and frankly highlights some incorrect lessons.

Great post, TheCapt.  I did understand that the BTG could do things, but as you said it was very much not a tool that could do the job for which is was asked.  What do you think of the point that the BTG was a ripe for corruption, since one could keep just 1 of 3 in the regiment working and use the other two for personal profit?  Seems like just about any organization would be vulnerable to this? 

[sburke]

54 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

That was then, this is now. Remember, this Party just changed a LOT of the House Rules. If you are saying aid will be passed, you are agreeing with my belief. But if you are betting on it sliding through quickly,  in as large or larger amounts, and no demands for ideological concessions attached just to get out of committee…we’ll, we’ll have ringside seats. The vote you mentioned was legislation with a different majority Party. This is now. The “other Party”. With the Speaker warning of putting on the brakes, “no blank checks”, etc. He has bizarro members that you mentioned. This Party is different, prefers to put forward only legislation it can pass with its own votes. Using the other Party’s is considered compromising. And betrayal etc. As I said, I believe Ukraine aid will indeed pass. But watch for it taking longer, for vicious debates and the extraction of ideological concessions in order to make it so. I’d rather you were right! But…that was then. This is now.

That vote was across party lines so I don't get why the change in the majority party is as relevant.  The issue is McCarthy allowing a vote, that may get easier because with the new rules anyone can offer an amendment and the votes will be there.  The issue of a 'blank check" can be addressed, in fact Portman just spoke to that issue on the AEI/ISW broadcast.  You are entitled to your opinion, but I don't share the skepticism.

The real key is the Biden administration needs to force the issue.  Right now the majority of Americans support US backing Ukraine.  Biden needs to make a more forceful argument as to how important this is, he can start with the statement Portman made today.  Make Mccarthy realize that not throwing in his support will hurt the GOP.  There are enough GOP members in the house and Senate who would back an initiative.

Edited February 27, 2023 by sburke

[NamEndedAllen]

4 hours ago, JonS said:

I must be missing something here. If all or most Dems vote for aid, plus - say - 50% Republicans, how can the remainder block them?

That is an excellent question. Unfortunately it isn’t a simple answer, and Congress’s rules are often irrational. The process starts in committees, has to be voted out of committee to be considered by the Speaker (or the Senate Majority leader) for a vote by the full Chamber. But bitter debate and horsetrafing to get the bill in shape in committee will be even worse with the new House Rules. Same when a bill reaches the House floor (if!). Any member can then offer amendments far more easily under the new rules. Whatever passes has to go to the Senate. Different Party majority there. They will not pass the House version. Then the bill goes to Conference Committee, for work by both Chambers to try and get something the fommittee agrees on. Lots of crap and horsetrading because members know there are those in both House and Senate who will demand either more of this, or less of that. If they can pass a joint bill out of Conference, both Senate and House have to debate and vote again.

Plus, the debt limit will have to be raised by summer when Treasury can no longer juggle paying the past due bills and default looms. Want to get on whether foreign aid is going to be part of that fight? 

[JonS]

19 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

very much not a tool that could do the job for which is was asked. 

I think the point is that it's a tool that *could* have done the job, with a number of organisational pre-requisites in place (MC, ISR, mutual-trust, effecive air support, etc), but those are probably things the Russian state in it's current form will struggle to produce.

There's nothing inherently 'wrong' with the BTG, but the BTG isn't the entirety of the invading forces, and those other elements matter. A lot.

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, sburke said:

yep, they specifically highlighted seeing the training staff being dispatched to the front then showing up on the list of losses.

Good.  Then we shall see more Russian soldiers breaking poor quality bricks on their heads instead of learning practical drill.

Seriously though, I'm happy to hear this bit of information.  It seemed that the primary reason Russia shipped mobiks to Belarus was there simply weren't enough functional training centers in Russia to engage about 2x their normal influx on top of their normal biannual conscript induction.  I'm sure a big part of it because if it was just about trainers it would be far easier/cheaper to send Belarusian trainers to Russia than the mobiks to Belarus.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

I have seen a few of these and frankly they are kinda big celebrations of confirmation biases.  There is nothing inherently wrong with the BTG, it lies somewhere between Combat Team and Battlegroup in organizational constructs. I think the theory was that the unit would really heavily on quick response firepower linked directly into the tactical level C2.  Add UAS and this sort of unit worked and saw some success when facing mounted manoeuvre units back in 2014.  

In some ways the BTG has advantages in lower size and profile, and logistics requirements.  In the right hands and fully enabled the BTG looks a lot like some sort of ACR/ACS concept.  Lighter, faster and carrying a lot of boom-boom.  Obviously the BTG runs into problems in infantry heavy fight requirements, but so do ACRs - not designed for it.  The RA actually had several BTG types if you look them up and some look more manpower heavy.  I think the intent may have been to make the modular but it looks like it did not pan out. Overall the thing looks like a self contained raider unit with a lot of integral firepower.

The BTG failed not because it was a bad design, it failed because so many other aspects of the Russian military system failed.  A BCT without air superiority and under constant illumination and deep strike PGM is not going to fair well either. The second problem is that a BTG is fine so long as you only ask it to do what a BTG can do.  If you ask it to do too much any unit organization will fail.  The third problem was what looks like a serious lack of peer-coordination.  These sorts of units will need to work together a lot and provide mutual support - this is very MC and self-synchronization stuff, which we have seen that the Russian doctrine on C2 does not support.  And finally on support, this organization will work fine if it has a formation over it to C2 all the enablers.  And we know that was a serious issue.

I mean the BTG didn’t work in the same way that asking an ACR to do a heavy urban assault unsupported, after losing air superiority etc, would not work.  Focusing on the organization as the “reason” for Russian failure is missing the much larger issues at play here and frankly highlights some incorrect lessons.

Yup.  Also, it's not clear to me how often a BTG was even utilized as it was intended.  If a tool breaks because it was improperly used, look to how and why it was used that way first before casing blame on the tool itself.

To paraphrase the old saying... "a craftsman never blames his tools for his own mistakes".

Like so many things in this war, Russia half assed so many things it is hard to know how bad any one thing is.  Whether that be doctrine or equipment, there's just so much wrong with the Russian military as a whole it's sometimes tricky to assess relative importance of different aspects of failure.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, NamEndedAllen said:

That is an excellent question. Unfortunately it isn’t a simple answer, and Congress’s rules are often irrational. The process starts in committees, has to be voted out of committee to be considered by the Speaker (or the Senate Majority leader) for a vote by the full Chamber. But bitter debate and horsetrafing to get the bill in shape in committee will be even worse with the new House Rules. Same when a bill reaches the House floor (if!). Any member can then offer amendments far more easily under the new rules. Whatever passes has to go to the Senate. Different Party majority there. They will not pass the House version. Then the bill goes to Conference Committee, for work by both Chambers to try and get something the fommittee agrees on. Lots of crap and horsetrading because members know there are those in both House and Senate who will demand either more of this, or less of that. If they can pass a joint bill out of Conference, both Senate and House have to debate and vote again.

Plus, the debt limit will have to be raised by summer when Treasury can no longer juggle paying the past due bills and default looms. Want to get on whether foreign aid is going to be part of that fight? 

It is complicated, for sure.

On top of all this there's also the Gingrich Rule (just learned that Hastert, the predecessor, actually came up with it but Gingrich made it more known), which says a Republican Speaker will never bring up something for a floor vote which the GOP caucus can't pass purely with GOP votes.  There's a couple of underlying reasons for this, the biggest one is to ensure the Democrats are never able to pass legislation of their own making while the Republicans control the House.  If the Democrats come up with a piece of legislation that 100% of their caucus and 10% of the Republican caucuses want, then the Republican Speaker makes sure it never comes to a vote even though ~60% of the House supports the measure.

The other purpose is to deny giving Democrats any credit for passing legislation when the GOP is in control.  If Democrats votes are necessary to get something passed, the logic goes that the Republicans will have given in to some Democrat demand.  Therefore, better to have nothing pass than have the Democrats claim any credit.

The House GOP has largely stuck with this concept and they have shown they aren't afraid to abandon it even when under immense pressure.  For example, government shutdowns.  The Discharge system only works in theory, not in reality.  It's a very undemocratic system. 

All the Beltway watchers are very, very curious to see how this tradition plays out given the small GOP majority and the weakening of the Speaker's authority.

Steve

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

It is complicated, for sure.

On top of all this there's also the Gingrich Rule (just learned that Hastert, the predecessor, actually came up with it but Gingrich made it more known), which says a Republican Speaker will never bring up something for a floor vote which the GOP caucus can't pass purely with GOP votes.  There's a couple of underlying reasons for this, the biggest one is to ensure the Democrats are never able to pass legislation of their own making while the Republicans control the House.  If the Democrats come up with a piece of legislation that 100% of their caucus and 10% of the Republican caucuses want, then the Republican Speaker makes sure it never comes to a vote even though ~60% of the House supports the measure.

The other purpose is to deny giving Democrats any credit for passing legislation when the GOP is in control.  If Democrats votes are necessary to get something passed, the logic goes that the Republicans will have given in to some Democrat demand.  Therefore, better to have nothing pass than have the Democrats claim any credit.

The House GOP has largely stuck with this concept and they have shown they aren't afraid to abandon it even when under immense pressure.  For example, government shutdowns.  The Discharge system only works in theory, not in reality.  It's a very undemocratic system. 

All the Beltway watchers are very, very curious to see how this tradition plays out given the small GOP majority and the weakening of the Speaker's authority.

Steve

Very difficult, not impossible.

Quote

In October 2015, a bipartisan group successfully used a discharge petition to force a vote on a bill to re-authorize the Export-Import Bank of the United States.^[11][12]

The right wing nuts that year wanted to let the Export_import bank go away. There were many billions of dollars and many thousands of jobs at stake, in lot of different districts. It got done. Given that the Ds only need to peel five votes in districts that don't like McCarthy, and can't bear to think about MTG, it should be doable after enough shouting. Fingers crossed!

 

[Battlefront.com]

Politico has a few interesting war related articles on their front page.  This one is VERY interesting:

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/02/25/ai-russians-feel-war-putin-ukraine-00084145

This is about using AI to scour content on the Internet to determine how Russians might really feel about the war since something like 90% of them won't answer normal polling.  Here's the most important bit:

Quote

The data suggest that the Russian government could be more fragile than it would like to admit. Corruption and weak institutions have contributed to state fragility in Russia for decades. The war appears to be exacerbating that trend.

In effect, our analysis suggests that the social contract between Russians and the Putin regime is fraying. Bankrolled by high energy prices over the last two decades, the public has acquiesced to Putin’s autocratic rule in exchange for improved living standards and functional public services.

It's got to be even worse than they suspect because Russia pays people to say nice things about it and/or to attack critics.  I don't think AI is sophisticated enough to sort out that sort of bias, though it can probably sort out bots because they are repetitious.

The other two I've only had a chance to skim:

More insights into the last minute attempts to get Putin to call off the war:

https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/02/24/russia-ukraine-war-oral-history-00083757

Discussion about Zelensky as a President of a nation rather than a wartime leader:

https://www.politico.eu/article/strength-weaknesse-ukraine-president-volodymyr-zelenskyy/

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Very difficult, not impossible.

The right wing nuts that year wanted to let the Export_import bank go away. There were many billions of dollars and many thousands of jobs at stake, in lot of different districts. It got done. Given that the Ds only need to peel five votes in districts that don't like McCarthy, and can't bear to think about MTG, it should be doable after enough shouting. Fingers crossed!

 

Yeah, except even that wasn't ultimately successful because of the discharge process:

In 2003, the Congressional Research Service reported that between 1931 and 2002, Members had filed 563 discharge petitions and voted in favor of 26 motions, but only 2 became law. Since 2002, we calculated that there were 100 more discharge petitions filed, but the House only voted on one of them, relating to the 2015 Export-Import Bank reauthorization. The House voted in favor of the October 2015 motion to discharge, and then for special rule and legislation that were brought to the Floor in its wake, but that particular bill was not enacted as a stand-alone measure. The Export-Import Bank was reauthorized since former Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois offered an amendment during debate on the FAST Act, a highway bill, in July 2015. About a week after the discharge petition succeeded, the House passed the Senate’s transportation bill without changing the Export-Import Bank provisions. This means that while the Export-Import Bank was reauthorized, it was not directly because of the discharge petition.

https://www.congressionalinstitute.org/2018/06/12/how-the-house-discharge-petition-works-the-2018-immigration-debate/

The important point here is that in 85 years it has been successful only 2 times, which is less than 0.3% success rate.  So yeah, not impossible only in the scientific sense of it.

And now we're straying too much into the weeds of domestic politics.  The takeaway from all of this is that there is significant GOP opposition to supporting Ukraine, in full or in some significant way, that may be strong enough to cause disruption at some point.  However, at present the GOP is under enormous pressure to not let this happen, so for the short term (at least) things aren't likely to change much.  But long term?  It's not looking good.

Steve

[sburke]

51 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

But long term?  It's not looking good.

Steve

Hey look, a Chinese balloon in use by Russia over Ukraine!

[kevinkin]

https://www.barrons.com/news/us-poland-and-germany-may-hold-joint-manoeuvres-minister-f8c6edf

"Men, synchronize your watches, we are going in ... "

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I have seen a few of these and frankly they are kinda big celebrations of confirmation biases.  There is nothing inherently wrong with the BTG, it lies somewhere between Combat Team and Battlegroup in organizational constructs. I think the theory was that the unit would really heavily on quick response firepower linked directly into the tactical level C2.  Add UAS and this sort of unit worked and saw some success when facing mounted manoeuvre units back in 2014.  

In some ways the BTG has advantages in lower size and profile, and logistics requirements.  In the right hands and fully enabled the BTG looks a lot like some sort of ACR/ACS concept.  Lighter, faster and carrying a lot of boom-boom.  Obviously the BTG runs into problems in infantry heavy fight requirements, but so do ACRs - not designed for it.  The RA actually had several BTG types if you look them up and some look more manpower heavy.  I think the intent may have been to make the modular but it looks like it did not pan out. Overall the thing looks like a self contained raider unit with a lot of integral firepower.

The BTG failed not because it was a bad design, it failed because so many other aspects of the Russian military system failed.  A BCT without air superiority and under constant illumination and deep strike PGM is not going to fair well either. The second problem is that a BTG is fine so long as you only ask it to do what a BTG can do.  If you ask it to do too much any unit organization will fail.  The third problem was what looks like a serious lack of peer-coordination.  These sorts of units will need to work together a lot and provide mutual support - this is very MC and self-synchronization stuff, which we have seen that the Russian doctrine on C2 does not support.  And finally on support, this organization will work fine if it has a formation over it to C2 all the enablers.  And we know that was a serious issue.

I mean the BTG didn’t work in the same way that asking an ACR to do a heavy urban assault unsupported, after losing air superiority etc, would not work.  Focusing on the organization as the “reason” for Russian failure is missing the much larger issues at play here and frankly highlights some incorrect lessons.

Many thanks for this.

I also recall that a major problem for the BTGs during the 'mobile phase' of the war was that they were massively short of infantry to do things, oh, like screening AFVs and LOCs, or later the gaps between fortified villages.

Part of that was (what turned out to be) a weakness in the TO&E itself. 

But ISTR it was even more a function of most 'contract' (i.e. career) soldiers having graduated from ordinary grunt into specialty arms (e.g. gunners, mechanics). 

On the legacy Red Army pattern, the infantry units, as well as the skeleton 'third battalions' of each MRD, were expected to be fleshed out during mobilisation with lower skilled conscripts (мелкота) and reservists.

....BUT said mobilisation never occurred prior to Putin's 3 day 'SMO'. So except for the VDV and marines, the BTG infantry mainly rolled into Ukraine with skeleton staffs.... and quickkly consumed what starshini and junior officer cadres they did have.  Along with whatever specialists could be poached from other parts of the unit, issued rifles and told to learn on the job.

Next genius move, as I recall, was cannibalising their training units for experienced infantry (so they now have to find their DI's in brick-bashing Belarus).

In the waning days of the Kherson bridgehead, Afgantsy-Chechnya veteran General Surovikin began attaching VDV platoons to mech BTGs to beef them out. This visibly helped their effectiveness on defence and let them dish out some nasty tactical defeats to the Ukrainian mech. Not least, I suspect, because the paras felt free to tell their  officers to eff the eff off when given suicidal or nonsensical instructions. So they could fight a little like Ukrainians.

....By fall, as we know, they were finally getting mobiks in volume.  Without many veterans left to show them the ropes though.

Or it went something like that, anyway.

[Aragorn2002]

48 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

https://www.barrons.com/news/us-poland-and-germany-may-hold-joint-manoeuvres-minister-f8c6edf

"Men, synchronize your watches, we are going in ... "

Excellent, I think Germany and Poland have more in common than they think and could form a firm foundation for a stronger NATO. 

[chuckdyke]

Kriegsmarine in Gdansk (Dantzig) and everything looks normal again. What is the modern name of the German Navy?

[AER0mat]

6 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

Kriegsmarine in Gdansk (Dantzig) and everything looks normal again. What is the modern name of the German Navy?

Marine (lit. navy) or occasionally Bundesmarine

[DesertFox]

 

 

[LongLeftFlank]

Posting the bigger topo from HeliosRunner here, for those who like poring over maps....

 

Edited February 27, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[TheVulture]

There are some very differing maps and reports on Bakhmut, which range from Russia continuing to gain ground (at high cost to themselves) to Ukraine having almost created a kessel of the Russians north of the town. Would it be fair to say at this point that the best versions are rather over-optimistic? We've seen that a few times before when Ukraine has some success, but some sources can be seen to have over-hyped and mis-represented it when more solid data is available a few days later?

[LongLeftFlank]

Yes, either my usual OSINT go to sources are honouring OPSEC, or the source report on this counterattack is a little over the skis. ...That said, the UA wouldn't blow a weir if they had nothing at all in mind.