How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Huba]

2 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

What do y'all think of this?  Are we happy?  Do we like strykers for UKR?  I have used them a lot in CMBS.  They are better than M113s & pickup trucks for sure, but what big advantages do we expect to get from these?  What firepower packages would be sent??

There should be around 100 MGS that are just being withdrawn from US service, right? These are armed with full power 105mm guns with very modern FCS, nothing to sneeze at I guess. Also there are TOW launchers, mortars, command vehicles, basically a whole ecosystem based on these vehicles (if US is willing to supply these too). Not proper heavy mechanized force, but I'm sure Ukrainians will find a great use for them

[danfrodo]

32 minutes ago, sburke said:

damn you.  Now I can't sleep wondering if my yard gnome is actually Kadyrov...

There's an easy test.  Just yell "we're under attack!"  If the yard gnome wets its pants and flees, it's Kadyrov.

[Beleg85]

Other account mentioned this time Russians attack not only in mass, but smartly- they put pressure along the frontline nort and south, where reportedly elements of VDV 106 Div. are making assaults and holding actions. Seems like largest action in this sector thus far.

[danfrodo]

1 minute ago, Beleg85 said:

Other account mentioned this time Russians attack not only in mass, but smartly- they put pressure along the frontline nort and south, where reportedly elements of VDV 106 Div. are making assaults and holding actions. Seems like largest action in this sector thus far.

So sky is falling?  (joking)   As was mentioned in this forum many times, UKR is working a flexible defense and can bend a lot w/o creating a crisis.  In RU world this will be the equivalent to taking the reichstag, of course, but I don't see how it matters much.  Especially if it allows UKR to do some counter punches to cause heavy RU losses, even if RU does retain the town.

[dan/california]

13 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

What do y'all think of this?  Are we happy?  Do we like strykers for UKR?  I have used them a lot in CMBS.  They are better than M113s & pickup trucks for sure, but what big advantages do we expect to get from these?  What firepower packages would be sent??

By far the most useful variant would be the new SHORAD version, which is what is actually in that picture. I have always been under the strong impression that the MGS is pretty much regarded as a failure. Even the base infantry carrying version with 40mm grenade launcher does a great job of supporting infantry if the ATGM threat is suppressed. Not as good as more Bradley's but well worth sending if the Pentagon has them to give.

 

[dan/california]

4 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

So sky is falling?  (joking)   As was mentioned in this forum many times, UKR is working a flexible defense and can bend a lot w/o creating a crisis.  In RU world this will be the equivalent to taking the reichstag, of course, but I don't see how it matters much.  Especially if it allows UKR to do some counter punches to cause heavy RU losses, even if RU does retain the town.

Not necessarily buying it. Ukraine can run an information OP when it really wants too.  They especially like look at me, over here, when the real deal is somewhere else.

[Beleg85]

3 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

So sky is falling?  (joking)   As was mentioned in this forum many times, UKR is working a flexible defense and can bend a lot w/o creating a crisis.  In RU world this will be the equivalent to taking the reichstag, of course, but I don't see how it matters much.  Especially if it allows UKR to do some counter punches to cause heavy RU losses, even if RU does retain the town.

Perhaps, however I think this time it is different, if only by heavy presence of the VDV and scale of coordination with arty and airforce. Elements of at least 4-6 UA brigades, including three Armoured are holding the area and already counterattacking (some claimed 1st Armoured is also somewhere there; even subunits of 93rd were spotted). Last such action was successfull partly due to better night fighing on Ukrainian side, but this time they seem to be against much better prepared enemies.

Ofc. I don't believe it will be crisis or punching of the frontline, but Russians may finally score some significant terrain points by capturing Soledar. They fight to controll supply route with fire, which in turn will make Bakhmut situation worse.

[danfrodo]

8 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Not necessarily buying it. Ukraine can run an information OP when it really wants too.  They especially like look at me, over here, when the real deal is somewhere else.

Ah yes, good point.  Giving RU hope of a big breakthrough at Soledar in order to draw lots of resources there, that would be classic UKR trick.

But we will see over the next couple weeks what this actually mean.

Edited January 9, 2023 by danfrodo
edit

[Battlefront.com]

Article from Rob Lee and Michael Kofman that summarizes Russia's manpower problem.  Nice overview of how the war has gone on thus far:

https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/12/how-the-battle-for-the-donbas-shaped-ukraines-success/?campaign_id=249&emc=edit_ruwb_20230109&instance_id=82277&nl=russia-ukraine-war-briefing&regi_id=77867169&segment_id=122059&te=1&user_id=06eb42ecc9056dd32ea63af0c30707b6

Steve

[Beleg85]

Translation of latest Butusov post:

 

[billbindc]

1 minute ago, Beleg85 said:

Translation of latest Butusov post:

 

 

Now that they are throwing in the VDV, are we at the point yet where we can say that the real strategic goal at Bakhmut is that Wagner wants to gain position back at the Kremlin while Soledar is about the MOD making Prigozhin look bad? 

Because there's no strategic/military goal that comes close to justifying this expenditure of ammunition and blood. 

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Here's a partial abstract of a recent book (2021) that I think is now going to be at the top of my reading list:

Fridman is good, read his “Russian Hybrid Warfare” too.  I have no doubt Russia undertakes different strategies and concepts in pursuits of its interests.  However, the components of strategy are largely universal.  That is because we all live under the same rules of physics, in linear time and have finite resources.  Strategies can take many different approaches, but the essential components need to be present to constitute a strategy in itself.  An end state/vision, method or approaches and resources remain at the core of any strategy.  Overlaying things like narrative, position and posture - context and buy in, these are all the qualitative manoeuvre room one has in developing strategy.

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

It has been fumbling around for a Plan B ever since.

This.  It is that fumbling that constitutes a lack of coherent strategy.  There is no Plan B and they are waiting/hoping for something to work.  A bad strategy is at least a plan. It appears Russia is waging a strategy of exhaustion but is exhausting itself faster than its opponent.  

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yes, as I keep saying Putin made two dramatic errors with implementing the Russian method of war.  First is he didn't have viable plans if the first plan failed.  Second, the plan he went for offered no options to back out and regroup.  So now Russia is desperately trying to fix this and the only option it seems to have is to play for time.  That is now the new strategy, as bad as it may be.

But, we have repeatedly noted, they do not have time.  And if they are playing for time then why exhaust so many resources in useless displays?  Strategies of exhaustion tend to be asymmetric and extremely defensive.  Slow cuts and nips to drag things out.  But Russia is exploding all over the place.  This is not “bad strategy” it is broken.

I think @billbindc’s point is the closest to one that makes sense to be honest.  The strategy, if we can call it that, is scrambling for regime survival and frantically trying everything in the hopes it will work.  It is not deliberate, it is reactionary and impulse driven.  It is a strategy in the same sense lighting one’s self on fire and running through the woods is a strategy.  Why are you running?  Because I am on fire!

I think to call what Russia is doing as strategy is to stretch the definition to the point of breaking.  Technically any human venture can be viewed as a strategy but when we are talking about a war I think the bar is slightly higher.  Russia continues to demonstrate that “fumbling around for Plan B” is Plan B.  Which would be hilarious if it wasn’t for all the people dying.  

 

[Beleg85]

7 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Now that they are throwing in the VDV, are we at the point yet where we can say that the real strategic goal at Bakhmut is that Wagner wants to gain position back at the Kremlin while Soledar is about the MOD making Prigozhin look bad? 

Because there's no strategic/military goal that comes close to justifying this expenditure of ammunition and blood. 

They may also be  fighting for revenues from Salt Mines as strategic resource. So 300 b.c. in style, but I already met "uberrealist"-type people who take it seriously...

 

On serious note however, I think Russian command imagine they are doing attritional operation against best UA brigades. This type of one "Pawn for pawn" exchange suits their mentallity.

Edited January 10, 2023 by Beleg85

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Article from Rob Lee and Michael Kofman that summarizes Russia's manpower problem.  Nice overview of how the war has gone on thus far:

https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/12/how-the-battle-for-the-donbas-shaped-ukraines-success/?campaign_id=249&emc=edit_ruwb_20230109&instance_id=82277&nl=russia-ukraine-war-briefing&regi_id=77867169&segment_id=122059&te=1&user_id=06eb42ecc9056dd32ea63af0c30707b6

Steve

And more to my point, from this piece:

Instead, the Kremlin’s thinking was increasingly characterized by strategic procrastination and wishful thinking. Moscow appeared to focus on its minimal war aims, without an understanding of how they would lead to achieving long-term strategic goals, or how the war might end. Despite a structural mismatch of military means to political ends, and no war termination strategy, Russian leadership committed to a campaign focused on occupying more territory in the Donbas, while trying to hold everything else. This approach consumed Russian manpower and ammunition at an unsustainable rate, setting the stage for successful Ukrainian offensives in the fall, and may well prevent the Russian military from restoring offensive potential even after this winter.
 

[LongLeftFlank]

12 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

On serious note however, I think Russian command imagine they are doing attritional operation against best UA brigades. This type of one "Pawn for pawn" exchange suits their mentallity.

Well, it remains possible that they are in fact doing so, albeit at a ratio well above 1 for 1.

[Kraft]

22 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Russian command imagine they are doing attritional operation against best UA brigades. This type of one "Pawn for pawn" exchange suits their mentallity.

3 or 4 high security convicts for 1-2 ukrainians is not a trade in favor of Ukraine I'm afraid.

Himars don't help when some conscript throws a grenade in your room,.. those street battles are far more even in losses sadly.

[potato4212]

How many Bradley's could the u.s send before the war stock is seriously affected?

what about Abrams? isn't there 400 reasonably modern ex marine m1a1s sitting around? + thousands of others in various stages of obsolescence in storage?

 

[Beleg85]

24 minutes ago, Kraft said:

3 or 4 high security convicts for 1-2 ukrainians is not a trade in favor of Ukraine I'm afraid.

Himars don't help when some conscript throws a grenade in your room,.. those street battles are far more even in losses sadly.

Today it is not convicts who fight, at least not predominantly- Wagnerite League assaults town in the centre while flanks are stormed by VDV and other regulars. Definitelly they concentrated elite forces for this assault, signals were already for several days. Even heard (unconfirmed) rumours both sides used heavily and lost more than one air assets today. And this is just several kms of front.

Yup, in wider strategic sense they are unfortunatelly blooding Ukrainians. Never said it will not do some job for Russians, however scale is extremelly difficult to assess now.

Speaking of which:

 

Edited January 10, 2023 by Beleg85

[dan/california]

30 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Good idea Fridman is good, read his “Russian Hybrid Warfare” too.  I have no doubt Russia undertakes different strategies and concepts in pursuits of its interests.  However, the components of strategy are largely universal.  That is because we lol live under the same rules of physics, in linear time and have finite resources.  Strategies can take many different approaches, but the essential components need to be present to constitute a strategy in itself.  An end state/vision, method or approaches and resources remain at the core of any strategy.  Overlaying things like narrative, position and posture - context and buy in, these are all the qualitative manoeuvre room one has in developing strategy.

This.  It is that fumbling that constitutes a lack of coherent strategy.  There is no Plan B and they are waiting/hoping for something to work.  A bad strategy is at least a plan. It appears Russia is waging a strategy of exhaustion but is exhausting itself faster than its opponent.  

But, we have repeatedly noted, they do not have time.  And if they are playing for time then why exhaust so many resources in useless displays?  Strategies of exhaustion tend to be asymmetric and extremely defensive.  Slow cuts and nips to drag things out.  But Russia is exploding all over the place.  This is not “bad strategy” it is broken.

I think @billbindc’s point is the closest to one that makes sense to be honest.  The strategy, if we can call it that, is scrambling for regime survival and frantically trying everything in the hopes it will work.  It is not deliberate, it is reactionary and impulse driven.  It is a strategy in the same sense lighting one’s self on fire and running through the woods is a strategy.  Why are you running?  Because I am on fire!

I think to call what Russia is doing as strategy is to stretch the definition to the point of breaking.  Technically any human venture can be viewed as a strategy but when we are talking about a war I think the bar is slightly higher.  Russia continues to demonstrate that “fumbling around for Plan B” is Plan B.  Which would be hilarious if it wasn’t for all the people dying.  

 

I have been saying for months that everything the Russians are doing in Ukraine is about Russian politics after Putin, and after Ukraine. As The_Capt has so elegantly put it the Russians have already lost this war and an d the only question is how bad. But NOBODY in he Russian power structure care about Russia as a whole, at all, the war is now a zero sum points scoring exercise for power and position within the regime. Prighozin had hoped to take Bakmuht, even as the Regular Russian forces got hammered into dog meat  on the right bank of the river, and use this to take Shogui's job and make himself Putin's successor. The regular army responds by retreating from the right bank in time, and cuting wagners logistics to the point where they CAN'T take Bakmuht. I am not sure that AFU was ever in danger of losing Bakmuht, but they surely aren't losing it while Wagner is short on shells.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, The_Capt said:

And more to my point, from this piece:

Instead, the Kremlin’s thinking was increasingly characterized by strategic procrastination and wishful thinking. Moscow appeared to focus on its minimal war aims, without an understanding of how they would lead to achieving long-term strategic goals, or how the war might end. Despite a structural mismatch of military means to political ends, and no war termination strategy, Russian leadership committed to a campaign focused on occupying more territory in the Donbas, while trying to hold everything else. This approach consumed Russian manpower and ammunition at an unsustainable rate, setting the stage for successful Ukrainian offensives in the fall, and may well prevent the Russian military from restoring offensive potential even after this winter.
 

There's something about these pieces I find unsatisfying though; not quite Monday morning quarterbacking, but something akin.

It isn't about Moscow's offensive potential any more; everyone not named McGregor pretty much agrees that is defunct.

Can Ukraine finally find a way to dismantle an army-sized Russian formation that is positioned for defence? 

****

....Especially now that Russian bayonet strength and overall combat effectiveness at the infantry squad level is showing signs of improvement, or at least stabilisation.

Has anyone else here noticed that at a CM scale, pretty much all the (drone videoed) combats these days resemble clusters of Tiny to Small scenarios, with seemingly little synergy among them?  They look more like patrol actions and trench raids than battalion assaults. Now and then a mech force of 5 or so AFVs moves against a tree line, or a couple of tanks move up to bombard a building while everyone else watches. And then artillery zeroes in and everyone scuttles back to cover (or brews up).

(and yes, I know drone footage doesn't see everything going on, jump cuts to just the big bangs, is often edited to be misleading, etc. As a lifelong ASL/CMer I have been watching out very carefully for clips that are tactically coherent)

...So if this war is now atomised at that level, what's happening to the effective man or vehicle killing power of the Russian squads (and their company-level supporting arms) over time? And what's the future trajectory for that, up or down or both?

****

https://ukrainevolunteer297689472.wordpress.com/2023/01/08/it-got-all-but-one-of-them-killed/

P.S.  All that stuff about adhering to the mine warfare treaties? Yeah, whatever.  AP mines are just too useful to take a pass on.

On skis, the enemy can follow faster in your tracks and catch up with you, so you mine your tracks. But, in frozen snow AP (anti-personnel) mines do not always work well, so you cut out a piece of track, set the mine, then place the cut piece back. Lot of common-sense stuff like painting claymores to match trees or snow, and painting the forks of bounding mines white for snow. 

Great stuff here on winter warfare, at foxhole level....

One of the things we assume, is as we get closer to the main enemy forces, the use of drones with thermals imaging will be more prevalent. Our only real defense is the heavy clothing we are wearing, the use of wool and mylar blankets, and natural stuff like leaves and limbs. 

Edited January 10, 2023 by LongLeftFlank

[fireship4]

On 1/8/2023 at 8:02 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Science appears to disagree with you   I was listening to a study that was done with subjects in MRI.  When asked about various things they noted parts of the brain lighting up and how strongly they lit up.  The more the questions were about the future and abstract concepts (e.g. the planet vs. you personally), the more distant and the more abstract the less the brain lit up compared to nearer and more personal topics.

This makes sense if you think about it.  How many people are managing their day to day finances reasonably well compared to planning for retirement?  Government spending is also notoriously short term thinking.  Government's priorities are almost always a fair reflection of people's short term thinking.  Etc.

In a totalitarian system it makes a lot of sense for someone to be more concerned about being arrested tomorrow for something they do today than concern for what may happen a year from now.

Steve

Without wishing to begin a discussion outside the topic, I will simply say I have not read anything thus far by Mr. Science on the subject and will have to get by refuting unsubstantiated theory on it's own merit.

In considering the conjecture 'Humans are biologically tailored towards short term thinking', on the basis of the supplied anecdote, I refute it thus:

#  I understand fMRI can be used to measure areas of the brain where oxygen is being consumed at a higher rate, with an approximate resolution of 1 second.  These images are I suspect compared with models of the brain which are averaged between different subjects to produce maps showing where similar inputs produce activity.

#  The brain is neither a tabula rasa nor can it accomplish anything much lacking long term interaction with environment and culture.  I believe we know very little about how the brain is programmed by these things.

#  The extent to which the planetwide and personal are more or less abstract seems a question of culture and complexity, not of biology (assuming you are programming something like a Turing complete machine, presumably linked with biological systems computing in more specialised and less reprogrammable ways).  Our distant ancestors, with the same equipment, would not have understood the question, were they able to communicate and have it translated for them.

Furthermore, short-term legislation by government, and the financial planning of people are systemic and cultural (even moral) subjects also, unless someone can point me toward the section of our DNA encoding pension funds.

The last point would depend on who you are in the system.  A totalitarian system may plan far into the future, and furthermore have that plan actualised more readily and directly than a democratic one. 

However, were you to post some screen-shots of a new CM3 engine I might agree to disagree.

[The_Capt]

24 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Has anyone else here noticed that at a CM scale, pretty much all the (drone videoed) combats these days resemble clusters of Tiny to Small scenarios, with seemingly little synergy among them?  They look more like patrol actions and trench raids than battalion assaults. Now and then a mech force of 5 or so AFVs moves against a tree line, or a couple of tanks move up to bombard a building while everyone else watches. And then artillery zeroes in and everyone scuttles back to cover (or brews up).

I have seen this before in the Balkans.  It the the grinding of two great machines against each other.  These little vicious fights are sparks as the edges make contact.  We have become enamoured with sweeping advances and bold thrust; however, warfare is a lot more vicious little fights punctuated by impersonal death from afar that does not care how brave you are, or how many push-ups you can do.

Then one side or the other will try for a big push, which more often than not turns into a bloody mess.  The description of 21st century WW1 is not far off, but now with a corrosive twist.  Corrosion is a form of manoeuvre, it takes more time but can lead to rapid erosion of an opponent to the point of collapse.

As to Russian small unit trajectory.  Well the conventional wisdom is that it is downward - “how steep?”  Is the question.  Russia does not have training centres in Poland, the UK and elsewhere being run for free by western nations.  They do not have a nearly unlimited arms industry to keep them in supplies.  And they definitely do not have a US based ISR system feeding targeting data at a rate that would make Schwarzkopf blush.

So essentially everything a Russian small unit needs for an upward trajectory is pointing in the other direction, from generation and training, to support, to enablers, to command.  The only thing that Russian small unit has is more bodies to stuff into it when it gets shot to pieces.  However, the quality of those bodies is also going on a downhill slope.  More conscripts who likely do not want to be there, worse moral and fewer and fewer trained veterans.

So what?  This war will be bloody and grinding until something gives, then it will be fast…just like the previous times.  And one of these times the RA will be pushed hard enough in the right places that it cannot recover.  Or it taps out.  Or the West loses interest and pushes for a stop.  Or least likely, Ukraine decides it has had enough.

[Kinophile]

5 hours ago, Huba said:

AFV floodgates are opening up even more:

 

If there's any vehicle I find innately appropriate to the new UKR way of war, it's the Stryker family. I cannot WAIT to see what they could do with these beasts. Sure,  the Bradley's,  yay.  But the Strykers are a perfect match for the Kossak mentality. 

Edited January 10, 2023 by Kinophile

[kevinkin]

https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-fights-russian-assault-salt-mining-town-along-eastern-front-2023-01-09/

The length a bad short order cook goes to get a pinch of salt amazes me. 

[Vet 0369]

4 hours ago, danfrodo said:

What do y'all think of this?  Are we happy?  Do we like strykers for UKR?  I have used them a lot in CMBS.  They are better than M113s & pickup trucks for sure, but what big advantages do we expect to get from these?  What firepower packages would be sent??

Please refer to my previously response above.