How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[FancyCat]

Let's not forget the same mindset that allowed Russia to invade Ukraine will make it unlikely for it to accept lapdog status to China. 

Also, Russian gas and oil exports, evidence has already emerged of it being resold by China and India for higher prices to Europe.

 

[Zeleban]

The Cabinet of Ministers is deploying 16 ADDITIONAL military educational centers on the basis of its universities.

Putin needs even more ersatz troops ..

[womble]

42 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Oh, I suppose some formal alliance where Russia says "if you attack China we will wipe out Europe and the US" is theoretically possible, but I think highly unlikely.

Partly because China doesn't need Russia to do that (they've got their own strategic deterrent) so wouldn't offer Russia anything for them to officially put their neck on the line in such a way. Assuming there's enough of the Russian nuclear arsenal left under the Kremlin's control at the end of this for it to remain a credible threat anyway.

[Butschi]

6 hours ago, dan/california said:

 

There are clearly quite a few Germans who Understand that Scholz's attempt to find a middle way makes less than no sense. You would think the Russians blowing up their own gas pipelines would get that across. But he is simply immovable. If his own party/coalition is the problem he should resign and let someone else get on with it. 

I get that you hate Scholz. But I think you know that democracy works a little different. Yes, quite a few Germans disagree with Scholz. Quite a few agree with Scholz, though.

And if a few, even influential, members of parliament or even government disagree with Scholz that's no reason to step down. Otherwise the world would have been spared four full years of Trump.

Also, if you have evidence that the Russians blew up the pipelines, please share them with us.

[Butschi]

double post

Edited December 27, 2022 by Butschi
removed, double post

[Offshoot]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Which reminds me, there were reports a few days ago of Ukrainian forces getting into Kreminna's outskirts.  Anybody hear anything since?

The only reports I have seen are about comments by Haidai on Telegram.

The Guardian says: "The regional governor of Luhansk, Serhiy Haidai, said fighters in part of the city controlled by Russian command were forced to retreat to Rubizhne, a town a few miles to the south-east, as a result of Ukrainian military pressure." Also that Haidai says the Russians are heavily reinforcing the area. - https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/27/ukraine-says-its-forces-are-close-to-recapturing-key-eastern-city-of-kreminna

The Kyiv Post reports him as saying "The Russian army has relocated the military command from Kreminna to Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast."  - https://twitter.com/KyivPost/status/1607441610605842433

 

[kraze]

On 12/26/2022 at 11:15 PM, Haiduk said:

Thank you ) Orthodox and Greco-catholics celebrate in Ukraine on 6-7th Jan, because we have difference between secular (Gregorian) and church (Julian) calendars. So, despite all churches celebrate on 25th Dec in secular world we have two weeks of difference. But in Ukraine since past year a discussion has started about western choice demands from churches switching to Gregorian calendar and 25th together with 7th was claimed as an official holiday. This year brought huge support for Christmss on 25th, mostly because "do not have any common with Russia", so Orthodox Church of Ukraine and Greco-Catholic churches made a statement they will establish a workgroup in order to develop proper decisions up to 2025 and prepare own people. Alas, many even pro-Ukrainian believers, especially in western Ukraine roughly stick for 7th Jan, because "this is our tradition", though they just don't want understand why this difference appeared and that their church really celebrates Christmass on 25th, but according to "old style". 

Religion in Ukraine is a part of political life, because more than 60% relate themselves to Christians, so it is matter what words theese people can hear from priests. 

We have two Orthodox churches - pro-Russian UOC MP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchy) and pro-Ukrainian OCU (Orthodox Church of Ukraine), recognized by Konstantinopol Patriarch in 2018, which caused effect of exploded bomb in Russia, because church, subordinated to Moscow was one of element of influence of Russia on Ukraine and keeping it in own orbit. UOC MP still have huge influence in Ukraine not only among usual people, but also among politics and officials. Now SBU raiding and their churches and finds there tons of Russian symbolics, anti-Ukrainian, antisemitic and stupid conspiracy books and other materials, issued by Russian church. 

Also we have Greco-Catolic church, combining Orthodox  rite and subordinating to Pope.  Recently it  considered like mostly western ukrainian phenomenon, but in last years it spread own parishes far to the east. Greco-catholic church in western Ukraine in own time has played the same role that Catholic church in Poland, keeping national identity and spirit. 

Also we have Catholic community, most of their believers are in western Ukraine among ethnic Poles, but in last years Catholic community grows and on other territory, especially in Kyiv. My wife,for example is catholic and works in Catholic Institute, so we are celebrating two Christmass with our parents )

Worth noting that "do not have any common with Russia" has nothing to do with it. When Lenin became the new emperor of Russia - one of his first decrees was to actually not have anything in common with the evil capitalist west - so the decision was made to move to a "new calendar" - and so russians started celebrating Christmas on Jan 7th and New Year on Jan 13th. Yes it was that damn stupid - it was like Jan 12th 1918 and then Jan 13th 1919. So eventually they had to bring back Jan 1st as New Year to make things a little less retarded. But they kept Jan 13th as "Old New Year" day so nice try. And that's how Christmas after New Year came to be which is even more 'nice try'.

So when russians finished occupying Ukraine in 1921 - they forced us to celebrate Christmas on Jan 7th, but most Ukrainians still celebrated it the right way way into the 1930s.

So it's about restoring the Ukrainian way of celebrating Christmas.

Also Stalin replaced Santa with a murderous frost demon in 1937 that killed people left and right instead of putting coal into the sock - but that's just a bonus to underline how messed up things were.

Edited December 27, 2022 by kraze

[potato4212]

When you see Zelenskys security detail they are armed with m4s and acogs. how common are NATO rifles in the Ukrainian army?  How many is NATO and the U.S supplying? 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Prior to this war there were two non-Western suppliers of military equipment to the world; Russia and China.  I don't see how Russia becoming overly dependent upon China is a bad thing.  It makes Russia weaker as it becomes more dependent upon foreign trade.  As we've seen in this war, that dependency can create very big and sudden problems for Russia's ability to wage war.  China is an unreliable trading partner for Russia, so even without Western pressure it could unilaterally restrict supplying Russia.  Oh, say they get into a tussle over energy prices... whoops, your next shipment of military stuff looks to be held up for a few months.  Then there's the fact that China will never be able to replace Europe as an energy customer.  Simply too difficult to move that mass of energy in the eastern direction.  And finally, I don't think Russians will ever trust the Chinese and the Chinese sure as Hell shouldn't trust the Russians.  That sort of relationship tends to be less-than-smooth over time.

As for geopolitical alliances between Russia and China, I don't see it happening.  They have competing interests in Asia and I doubt very much they will agree upon how to split up influence.  Again, a stress point for the relationship that can not be fixed by increased trade. 

If China should decide to act against Taiwan, of course Russia could cause the West a lot of problems.  However, Russia would likely have done that in 2020 just as much as it would in 2030.  Russia has always been an opportunistic parasite, so no real change in terms of threat.

Oh, I suppose some formal alliance where Russia says "if you attack China we will wipe out Europe and the US" is theoretically possible, but I think highly unlikely.

To sum up... if Russia wants to further undermine its domestic capabilities to cause the world pain and suffering by buying key components from somewhere else, I think that's a good thing.  Especially because the West has a lot of real and theoretical leverage it can apply to Chinese trade if necessary.

Steve

I think that the post-war relationship between Russia and China, and how that impacts Chinese power trajectories and the collision between US and China is one of the great unknowns.  We are in a post-pandemic world, which would have been enough to shake things up, but now we have a proxy war between Russia and the US/west.  A war that Russia is losing badly and leaves a lot on the table as far as uncertainty goes.

I am pretty sure China will try to spin the aftermath in its direction.  Russia is facing satellite status depending on how hard the landing is after this war.  It has sees itself as a great global power, and has been in the past, but empires have collapsed after wars like this one.  How many pieces? Whose orbits those pieces wind up in?  What does China stand to gain?  What could it lose?  These are all pretty much in the wind to my eyes.  Until we know the state of Russia after this war it is very hard to predict where things go with China.

The latest US NS strategy is pretty clear, we are in a strategic jockeying situation as we set the conditions for what comes next.  The global power order is in play and the fallout from this war will be part of that landscape.  How much, how big and how far still remains to be seen.

[BlackMoria]

1 hour ago, potato4212 said:

When you see Zelenskys security detail they are armed with m4s and acogs. how common are NATO rifles in the Ukrainian army?  How many is NATO and the U.S supplying? 

I don't know if actual numbers are available but just based on the anecdotal evidence of viewing hundreds and hundreds of videos, I would say, based on said videos, about 60% of videos I have seen have AK styles of weapons and the others show some western non-AK weapons.   Just a completely unscientific guess on my part, it seems like Ukrainian special forces use NATO weaponry and optics.  Foreign Legions uses lots of NATO gear (didn't in the beginning but I am seeing more and more recent Legion videos with NATO gear).   Lots of NATO gear in Kraken, it seems.   I suspect high profile units like the 93rd have lots of NATO gear.  Probably newly stood up formations seem to use more NATO rifles than AKs.   Again, just anecdotal evidence.  Perhaps Haiduk or some of the Ukrainian posters can cast more light on this. 

Edited December 28, 2022 by BlackMoria

[LongLeftFlank]

4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Prior to this war there were two non-Western suppliers of military equipment to the world; Russia and China.  I don't see how Russia becoming overly dependent upon China is a bad thing.  It makes Russia weaker as it becomes more dependent upon foreign trade.  As we've seen in this war, that dependency can create very big and sudden problems for Russia's ability to wage war.  China is an unreliable trading partner for Russia, so even without Western pressure it could unilaterally restrict supplying Russia.  Oh, say they get into a tussle over energy prices... whoops, your next shipment of military stuff looks to be held up for a few months.  Then there's the fact that China will never be able to replace Europe as an energy customer.  Simply too difficult to move that mass of energy in the eastern direction.  And finally, I don't think Russians will ever trust the Chinese and the Chinese sure as Hell shouldn't trust the Russians.  That sort of relationship tends to be less-than-smooth over time.

As for geopolitical alliances between Russia and China, I don't see it happening.  They have competing interests in Asia and I doubt very much they will agree upon how to split up influence.  Again, a stress point for the relationship that can not be fixed by increased trade. 

If China should decide to act against Taiwan, of course Russia could cause the West a lot of problems.  However, Russia would likely have done that in 2020 just as much as it would in 2030.  Russia has always been an opportunistic parasite, so no real change in terms of threat.

Oh, I suppose some formal alliance where Russia says "if you attack China we will wipe out Europe and the US" is theoretically possible, but I think highly unlikely.

To sum up... if Russia wants to further undermine its domestic capabilities to cause the world pain and suffering by buying key components from somewhere else, I think that's a good thing.  Especially because the West has a lot of real and theoretical leverage it can apply to Chinese trade if necessary.

Steve

China has every reason in the world to want first call on the huge resources of Siberia. But given an armed conflict could trigger a nuclear war they have no plans to colonise it a la Tibet, unless over generational timeframes.

It makes far more sense for China to fund, build and maintain all the necessary extractive and export infrastructure and then have an effective lock on the goodies -- all of which are extremely valuable -- paying the goons in the Kremlin a suitable royalty.  This is more of a Saudi situation than anything.

Russia was always wary of this arrangement as it thought of itself as world class at O&G, mining, etc. and wants to sell to the highest bidder. But Putin now has no choice in the matter.

So China will implement its grand buildout,  and I think that will happen far more swiftly than anyone expects given China has been doing this all over the world for a decade plus.

In return, they will shore up Putin's war machine (and economy) with basic kit, not AFVs or planes but lower visibility crucial things Russia can't make for itself any more: spares, electronics and probably (via cutouts) ammo.

Their assumption will be that the economically shaky West is just too addicted to their stuff to do much more than grumble about any of this. And they are almost certainly correct, unless they bring Taiwan into the mix or sumfink.

.... So for purposes of this topic, I see Russia getting a stream of essential kit from China which will grow as months pass.  Well underway already in fact.

Hence part (not all) of my original view (which I've been expressing for many months) that time isn't as much on Ukraine's side as many of you guys seem to think.  If they bide their time until spring to liberate the land bridge, they could well find themselves facing a less mechanised but much more effective (on defence, anyway) army.

Edited December 28, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

https://commons.com.ua/en/intervyu-s-oppozicionnym-rossijskim-izdaniem-doxa/

Interesting piece (in English) on the Russian antiwar movement.

Speaks to, though not resolving, some of the pointed questions raised on here, e.g. isn't silence = acquiescence?

Many people who got politicized during the protest wave of 2011-12, mostly urban middle-class, got disillusioned.

Many leaders of the anti-Putin movement believed that radicalism is bad. The Russian opposition systematically persuaded people that you shouldn’t do anything against the law, defined by the Russian state.... [Organisers] taught people that they shouldn’t give in to “provocations”. Everybody goes home after the rally. And nobody occupies squares.

Many thought that emotional empathy [on social media] is itself an action. But in reality, they were just sitting, worrying and worrying, and emotionally exhausting other people as well.

[After 2014] the leftist part of the movement split, influenced by Putin’s propaganda about “people’s uprising” in Donbas. Many believed those narratives.

The surest way to get the window of your car smashed is putting a “Z” sticker on it, parking a car – and someone will smash your window for sure. There are a lot of anti-war stickers in large cities.

A lot of people essentially became political refugees but at the same time they are the refugees from the aggressor country. Every time we talk about their problems we’re being careful because it might take the spotlight off the Ukrainians who are being bombed. We realize those are not the same things.

One might say the [antiwar] movement is being built now, but it’s being built on a scorched field. Over the last twenty years, anti-Putin opposition in Russia was run over by a bulldozer every time, and every time it had to start over from scratch. Every time new people, with no experience whatsoever, were creating a movement. We [editorial] are 23-25 years old. When Crimea was occupied, our oldest were 17. 

What is Igor’s story? When the war started, he realized he’s radically against it but never understood what he can do about it. He made a living by selling rare items on Amazon, but then his card was blocked due to the sanctions so he couldn’t do that anymore. And he realized he must try to do something. He went to Krasnodar to find work, and in Krasnodar he threw a Molotov cocktail at large Z-banner. He failed, Molotov cocktail just got shattered, no one even saw the fire. But Igor went on and threw Molotov cocktail at the FSB building, painted his cheek the colors of Ukrainian flag and started shouting slogans. He did it consciously, didn’t try to run away. He wanted his action to be demonstrative, to inspire other people. But nobody noticed him.

Perhaps, “radical” action is sometimes safer than peaceful picket now. If you derail a train they might never find you, provided you prepare properly. Surveillance cameras simply don’t cover the whole length of the railroad system.

Sigh.

Edited December 28, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[The_Capt]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

In return, they will shore up Putin's war machine (and economy) with basic kit, not AFVs or planes but lower visibility crucial things Russia can't make for itself any more: spares, electronics and probably (via cutouts) ammo.

As to this war, I am not that concerned…I mean, ok it is not good news for China to be pushing critical commodities into Russia’s war machine.  It will draw out how long Russia can keep this up from technical standpoint e.g. communications equipment.  However, the RA is broken in ways one cannot fix with equipment alone or at least not the stuff we are talking about.  Now if China started to push multi-spectral hi res ISR Russia’s way we could definitely start worrying but I am not sure 1) China has it yet, at least not globally, and 2) not sure they would play that hand and reveal cards if they did, all for Russia…they are not that cosy.  And then there is the complete failure in the cognitive dimension - Russia is not learning fast enough and, as we have noted, is unable to learn what it needs to due to many constraints.  

Chinese radios will be useless if the information being pushed through them is still low grade and the processing of that information is as far behind as it has been so far.  

I guess we will see, but man that is one helluva situation, this whole thing basically becomes a proxy war between the US/west and China with Russia and Ukraine in the middle at that point. 
 

 

Edited December 28, 2022 by The_Capt

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2023/01/02/trapped-in-the-trenches-in-ukraine

Great report from a Foreign Legion recce unit in Pavlivka, Donbas. Reporting a little dated (Aug - Oct) but good tactical colour, on top of the usual human stories....

Pavlivka: the Ukrainians retook the village in June, and since then a stalemate had prevailed. Because of the rural terrain—open farmland interspersed with occasional towns—a breakthrough from either direction would require troops to traverse sprawling fields exposed to enemy fire. Both Russia and Ukraine had focussed their resources on more strategically vital theatres, so neither was equipped to mount such an offensive.

In lieu of major advances, the two sides vied to extend their presence by exploiting a network of parallel and perpendicular tree lines that divided up the no man’s land, or “gray zone,” between their fortified garrisons. “The tree lines offer concealment,” Turtle explained. “Nothing else here offers that ability to skirt around.”

The team’s primary responsibility in Donetsk was reconnaissance: sneaking through the underbrush, probing the gray zone, locating the forwardmost Russian trenches, and establishing new positions for Ukrainian troops to backfill.

“The leaves are falling." Before that happened, he intended to secure one more tree line, which would give the Ukrainians a stronger footing from which to defend any winter assault on Pavlivka. 

The first phase of the mission was to conduct aerial surveillance of the tree line. Herring began preparing two compact drones and several improvised munitions: explosive material packed into short metal pipes that had been augmented with fins made on 3-D printers. An inverted nail emerged from the head of each pipe, serving as a firing pin; the fins caused the pipe to spiral vertically, pushing the nail into a blasting cap on impact. Sometimes, Herring weaponized his drones with disposable plastic cups containing hand grenades. “It’s a risky method, but it’s a method,” he said.

Russian forces use commercial drones, too, but to a lesser extent. They rely more heavily on Orlans....

Incinerated cars sat on the roadside. Missiles and rockets had lodged in the fields, their protruding metal tubes resembling strange bionic crops.

The Ukrainians belonged to a reconnaissance company in the 72nd Mechanized Brigade which had assumed control of the area in August. The trauma of Bakhmut (the unit was reduced from a hundred and twenty-eight men to eighty-two) had unnerved many of the survivors, and they now seemed wary of outsiders. Before that, the foreigners had worked with another brigade, the 53rd, which had fully integrated them into its operations and had furnished them with coveted Javelins. 

The foreigners had acquired much of their equipment on their own.... Their two vehicles—a pickup truck and an S.U.V., both Nissans—had been donated but were forever breaking down, requiring parts and repairs.

...none of the Ukrainians had joined the battle with the Russians. (One of them later told me that their radio had malfunctioned and they had not heard the team’s call for help.)

Turtle wanted to create new positions there, deeper into the gray zone, which would offer better angles for fire support during the impending operation. [CO] Grek was unconvinced that the benefit warranted the risk. They had agreed to take a look, together, at the forwardmost trench.... The path dropped into a narrow trench, and, after slogging through ankle-deep water for ten minutes or so, we arrived at the terminus. A middle-aged soldier was posted there.

“Everything beyond here is mined and booby-trapped with trip wires,” the soldier warned Grek. “Some of our guys were already blown up.”

“We’ll go with de-miners,” Grek said.

“They already tried. That’s who was blown up.”

There were other dangers: the tree line narrowed and thinned significantly, offering scant protection, and it sloped into a defilade, ceding the high ground to Russian snipers.

A soldier with a digital tablet pulled up drone images and provided a detailed overview of the proximate Russian positions, their likely directions of attack, and how to defend against them.

“You’re the commander of this zone?” Grek asked.

“Me?” the soldier said. “I’m just a dancer.”

Even the most disciplined soldier, with the most elaborate foxhole, can fall victim to a well-aimed munition.

The 72nd had assessed that six hundred enemy troops and thirty armored vehicles had entered Pavlivka. The village was divided.... [more]

...Three days later, members of a Russian brigade that was leading the Pavlivka offensive published a letter alleging that about three hundred of their troops had been killed, wounded, or captured, and that half their armored vehicles had been destroyed. 

Great CM-level stuff here [I can't use the quote box feature].  This bit is important:

Many of the professional soldiers in the 72nd had been killed or injured in Bakhmut. Conscripts had replenished the ranks. Some had attended a three-week basic infantry course in the U.K., with instructors from across Europe, but most had received only minimal training....

Attrition is cutting both ways, guys.

****

Short update from grizzled old UkraineVolunteer

We talked a lot about the defensive lines the Russians are building, and pretty much dismissed them as very vulnerable under the right circumstances. Direct fire can pulverize the tank teeth they are placing, and tanks with dozer blades can push what is left into their moats. That would be a lot easier with direct air attacks, but can be done under an artillery screen.

Edited December 28, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I think that the post-war relationship between Russia and China, and how that impacts Chinese power trajectories and the collision between US and China is one of the great unknowns.  We are in a post-pandemic world, which would have been enough to shake things up, but now we have a proxy war between Russia and the US/west.  A war that Russia is losing badly and leaves a lot on the table as far as uncertainty goes.

I am pretty sure China will try to spin the aftermath in its direction.  Russia is facing satellite status depending on how hard the landing is after this war.  It has sees itself as a great global power, and has been in the past, but empires have collapsed after wars like this one.  How many pieces? Whose orbits those pieces wind up in?  What does China stand to gain?  What could it lose?  These are all pretty much in the wind to my eyes.  Until we know the state of Russia after this war it is very hard to predict where things go with China.

The latest US NS strategy is pretty clear, we are in a strategic jockeying situation as we set the conditions for what comes next.  The global power order is in play and the fallout from this war will be part of that landscape.  How much, how big and how far still remains to be seen.

The first thing we have to do is separate out two different scenarios:

1. Russia stays intact
2. Russia splits apart

We have been talking about #1 in recent posts.  If Russia manages to stay in one (or mostly one) piece, then I think China will sucker Russia into being economically dependent on China as its primary trading partner.  Partly because the rest of the countries with something to offer will continue to shun Russia, partly because Russia might think that China is a better bet long term.  As I said, I don't think this is necessarily a bad thing per se.  Yes, China will get more access to Russian raw resources, but I think that's inevitable simply because the West has chosen to take itself out of the equation (mostly, anyway).

The worse scenario for the West is if Russia breaks up into various regional blocs.  China already has massive influence in the "Stans" before this war and clearly it's going to increase no matter what.  If Russia's neighboring provinces break away from Moscow, China will be in an excellent position to reel them into their sphere.  The West is extremely weak in this area, so it's inevitable China will benefit more than the West.  Same for the Russian Far Eastern provinces.  These territories won't be direct extensions of the Chinese state, but they will likely become tightly integrated into the Chinese geopolitical strategy.

Due to the endemic corruption of the current Russian elites who rule these areas, I do not foresee a Vietnam type resistance to Chinese domination.  The Russian areas that China can easily influence do not appear to have that sort of open hostility to Chinese influence.  On the contrary, the elites will be most interested in wealth accumulation.  China can accommodate that very easily.

Either whole or broken apart, China is no doubt going to gain from Russia's weaknesses.

An interesting side effect of Russia breaking apart may be that the European portion of Russia EVENTUALLY decides to side with the West and not China.  But that involves many other things happening first, such as a generally pro-Western government taking power and showing the level of commitment to change that Ukraine has.  20 years is probably what it will take for that to happen, if it ever happens.

Steve

[sburke]

24 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The first thing we have to do is separate out two different scenarios:

1. Russia stays intact
2. Russia splits apart

We have been talking about #1 in recent posts.  If Russia manages to stay in one (or mostly one) piece, then I think China will sucker Russia into being economically dependent on China as its primary trading partner.  Partly because the rest of the countries with something to offer will continue to shun Russia, partly because Russia might think that China is a better bet long term.  As I said, I don't think this is necessarily a bad thing per se.  Yes, China will get more access to Russian raw resources, but I think that's inevitable simply because the West has chosen to take itself out of the equation (mostly, anyway).

The worse scenario for the West is if Russia breaks up into various regional blocs.  China already has massive influence in the "Stans" before this war and clearly it's going to increase no matter what.  If Russia's neighboring provinces break away from Moscow, China will be in an excellent position to reel them into their sphere.  The West is extremely weak in this area, so it's inevitable China will benefit more than the West.  Same for the Russian Far Eastern provinces.  These territories won't be direct extensions of the Chinese state, but they will likely become tightly integrated into the Chinese geopolitical strategy.

Due to the endemic corruption of the current Russian elites who rule these areas, I do not foresee a Vietnam type resistance to Chinese domination.  The Russian areas that China can easily influence do not appear to have that sort of open hostility to Chinese influence.  On the contrary, the elites will be most interested in wealth accumulation.  China can accommodate that very easily.

Either whole or broken apart, China is no doubt going to gain from Russia's weaknesses.

An interesting side effect of Russia breaking apart may be that the European portion of Russia EVENTUALLY decides to side with the West and not China.  But that involves many other things happening first, such as a generally pro-Western government taking power and showing the level of commitment to change that Ukraine has.  20 years is probably what it will take for that to happen, if it ever happens.

Steve

The one item that might throw a wrench in China's relationships to any former Russian territories is their treatment of the Uighur people.  The "stan's" have every reason to be highly suspicious of and likely antagonistic. For the most part the present governments acquiesce for the money, however continued attacks by China on a Muslim minority could easily lead them to become the new great satan.  China's treatment of these people has been extreme, even to the level of competing with Russian barbarity.

[sburke]

Ukraine Latest: Russia’s UN Seat Challenged; Air Base Attacked (yahoo.com)

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, sburke said:

The one item that might throw a wrench in China's relationships to any former Russian territories is their treatment of the Uighur people.  The "stan's" have every reason to be highly suspicious of and likely antagonistic. For the most part the present governments acquiesce for the money, however continued attacks by China on a Muslim minority could easily lead them to become the new great satan.  China's treatment of these people has been extreme, even to the level of competing with Russian barbarity.

I wouldn’t count on that angle too much.  We have Afghan mercs fighting for Russia apparently, deep grudges exist in that part of the world but they tend to be pretty pliable.

[LongLeftFlank]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I wouldn’t count on that angle too much.  We have Afghan mercs fighting for Russia apparently, deep grudges exist in that part of the world but they tend to be pretty pliable.

...Yeah, at the end of the day, money talks.  The Chinese will pay off the local Yakut [et al.] leaders to buy complaisance, plus provide a few low paid jobs like security guards and bar girls (anything remotely skilled will be done by Chinese 'guest workers'). This is the PRC pattern, worldwide; they undercut the market price by half but you get an all-Mandarin black box.

There will be no need for forcible 'Han-ization', unlike minorities living within China itself who are being forcibly Sinicised (not just the Uighurs).

Mongolia will also go permanently into the Chinese orbit btw. Without Russia guaranteeing its security, I'd guess it becomes a near term target for overt Han colonisation. The population of 3 million isn't even a rounding error in the Han ocean.

...Also, only some of the indigenous peoples of Siberia are Muslim, and many of those are Stalin era deportees. Islam never went very deep into the original Khanates.

****

2.  Shell famine, via RU Telegram 'Dva Majora'

https://turcopolier.com/some-considerations-on-the-sufficiency-of-shells-in-the-russian-armed-forces-ttg/

Currently, there are reports that the units are receiving 152mm shells made in 2022, the quality of which raises questions due to the large number of defects in comparison with the old batches. 

The apparent use of a Rapira for indirect fire support coincides with the increased use of Russian tanks in the indirect fire mode, another indication of artillery shell shortages. 

More....

https://wartranslated.com/russian-fighter-topaz-on-artillery-shell-hunger-and-discipline-of-the-mobilised/

70-80% of the mobilised military personnel turned out to be unfit for combat for several reasons.... Yesterday’s factory worker has no idea what denazification and demilitarization of brotherly Ukraine is (I don’t quite understand either). 

[And yet] What to do? Do not lose faith, unity, and honor. Fight to the end, because the Russian people and our homes are behind us. We will definitely withstand it.

3.  Cuz, you know, Strippernomics.

 

 

Edited December 28, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[pintere]

20 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Which reminds me, there were reports a few days ago of Ukrainian forces getting into Kreminna's outskirts.  Anybody hear anything since?

Our friend Denys has that covered in the first couple minutes of his most recent update. Essentially, nothing new but he expects offensive activity in the next few days.

[Billy Ringo]

With regards to Chinese/Russian engagements,  historical, economic, military and even reasonable considerations may become secondary to Xi and Putin's egos, power and self-interests.  

[Huba]

Another great translation from Dmitri. The quoted guy complains about shell hunger and low quality of the mobilized, but does so in quite interesting detail.

 

[TheVulture]

Russia knows that it had a demographic problem even before this was started killing off 20-30 year old men, so in true Russian fashion they've decided to approach a solution from the wrong end by allowing soldiers to freeze their sperm for free. So that when they get killed, their widows can still  have their kids.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64107729

 

[Kinophile]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Another great translation from Dmitri. The quoted guy complains about shell hunger and low quality of the mobilized, but does so in quite interesting detail.

 

Faking battle interactions from safety of the trench.... That is ingenious. 

[Harmon Rabb]

Ex-U.S. General Predicts Ukraine Victory in 2023, 'Momentum' is With Them (Newsweek)

Ben Hodges maintains his optimistic predictions for Ukraine in 2023.