How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

7 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I assume someone will geolocate this street eventually and establish which side of the lines it was filmed on...

But at the moment, I'm inclined to believe it's real, since GirkinGirkin doesn't tend to knowingly circulate Russian prop.

Looks and sounds real to me.  Haven't seen one of these from Ukraine in a while, but oh boy were they common early on.

Haiduk no doubt has some details on this unit that might shed light on the situation.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Sooo... let's talk some more about the concern (certain concern in his mind) that General Zaluzhny expressed about a Russian winter offensive.  The man is certainly an authority to take seriously, so I do.

We've already theorized that a fairly large chunk of the partially mobilized men have not gone into Ukraine, but instead are in Belarus and other locations.  We've theorized that in part it's due to shortages of weaponry, which is what General Zaluzhny himself stated.  His thinking is that they've held back these guys to allow new production and scavenging (from Belarus, Iran, and elsewhere) to procure enough equipment to outfit these guys.  Then, in one move, they'll be committed to (probably) a single effort.  Taking on Kyiv again or trying to bust up Ukraine's positions in the south are his two guesses.

If Russia tries for Kyiv again they are going to run exactly the same risks they ran the first time, but much worse because Ukraine has already done this once successfully and Russia hasn't changed the variables in its favor for a second go around.  Even if somewhat successful, it should be clear to Russia that taking Kyiv will not stop the war.  That might have been possible in February 2022, but it won't be in 2023.  It will distract Ukraine, for sure, but the likely end result is Russia gets slaughtered in the north and the lines remain largely the same elsewhere.

On the other hand, Ukraine has made it clear that next year the emphasis will be on moving towards Crimea.  As General General Zaluzhny pointed out, they only need to get to Melitopol to effectively neutralize Russia's land bridge.  Pushing Ukraine further north along the Dnepr makes it less likely Ukraine will get within HIMARS range of Crimea in 2023.  Further, if things are wildly successful then the rest of Donetsk could be up for the taking.  This is not a realistic scenario, but I think it's more realistic than taking and holding Kyiv. 

Trying to retake Luhansk is also possible, but... it's not a big prize.  However, it could be more doable and therefore more attractive.

So if Russia is planning something (which they probably are), the rational bet is on an action in the south.  But this is Russia we're talking about, so if the last year is any indication of what is to come next, then it will be Kyiv again.  Because it is that stupid.

Steve

[chrisl]

The additional complicating factor of any Russian attempt at a major offensive is that unlike in Feb, Ukraine has no reason not to pre-emptively destroy any concentrations of Russian military force that it can detect and hit, no matter which side of the border it's on.  And anything vaguely like a big offensive will require a lot of stuff that will be very easily detected.  So any time Russia starts to accumulate anything like a useful mass of men and materiel, it's going to get hit before it can be used in an offensive.

[LongLeftFlank]

1. So about that upcoming winter offensive.

 

2. Mobiks gonna be mighty uncomfortable after sunset. And the Ukies may be able to smell them from a distance.

3. For the CMBS2 terrain files. Urban ground tiles gonna need a lot more ambient litter: paper, plastic, wood scrap.

 

[Bulletpoint]

Maybe the new Russian Kyiv offensive is just intended as misdirection to draw defenders away from Donbas?

And Zaluzhny speaking to the media about it is a way of pretending to believe in it?

[Haiduk]

9 hours ago, Huba said:

The rumored what? @Haiduk @Zeleban are there really such rumors floating around ? It's the first time I hear it...

 

Theese rumors are continously throwing in information space by followers of former president Poroshenko. They believed that Zaluzhnyi and AFU fight with Russian on own mind, when Zelenskiy and President's administration are hidden traitors and Russia-lovers, which wanted to "piss off" Ukraine in first days, but when they have seen hard position of Zaluzhnyi (and of course Poroshenko, lol) and the will of people to fight, they scared and weared the masks of patriots. But indeed as if they do all to interfere Zaluzhnyi to beat Russia, because afraid that popularity of Zaluzhnyi can threaten to Zelenskiy re-election perspectives aftyer the victory.  So they want to dismiss Zaluzhyi for less talented, but completely loyal Syrskiy, in order to UKR army don't achieve successes and receive an occasion to say "we did all what we can, but we can't fight Russia anymore, we need to negotiate".  This is pure clinic.

Alas, this sh...t western jouranlists each time took as real insides and more contribute in "uncertainity", making among part of UKR society and army. And give to Pororshenko-followers an occasion to shout on each corner: "Aha! You didn't believe us, but look - western media write about the same! They are traitors and want to dismiss Zaluzhnyi". Sometime I think this speeches in wartime conditions have nothing common with free of speech and theese are dirt politic intrigues of one very offended potentially authocratic leader, who imagine himself as Ukrainain Messiah, but lost elections to "clown".  

Edited December 17, 2022 by Haiduk

[Haiduk]

5 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I assume someone will geolocate this street eventually and establish which side of the lines it was filmed on...

But at the moment, I'm inclined to believe it's real, since GirkinGirkin doesn't tend to knowingly circulate Russian prop.

@Battlefront.com

This is unit of 57th mot.inf brigade. Under the GirkinGirkin post there was discussioan about this episode, and some of UKR soldiers told many hard-hitting things about this brigade. I also read many such s...t about 57th as far as before a war. Soldiers say "God forbid you to get in any 5x brigade". Means brigades of "second wave" - 56th, 57th, 58th, 59th motorized and 53rd, 54th mech, established at beginning of 2015 mostly from former territorial defense battalions. Of course, not all 5x brigades showed themselves so terrible - according to readings throughout theese years I would be placed them by effectiveness rating in such order - 54th, 56th, 53rd, 59th, 58th, 57th. 57th by many feedbacks is a complete asshole. Many  soldiers of 5x brigades and 57th especailly, have been complaining on incompetence of command staff and their attitude to soldiers like to slaves. It's imagination as if all worst, what was in Soviet and early Ukrainain army have been using in theese brigades control. 

This is the same about what I wrote about new formed rifle batatlions. Vicious circle - incompetent commanders - bad training - bad supply - low cohesion - poor motivation - low rigidity - abandoning of positions - filming a videos anboud bad commanders. 

57th defends part of southern Bakmuth sector. Not surprisingly Wagners had most success in this sector

[The_Capt]

8 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

All of this points to the realities of limited stocks of weaponry lying around.  It's one reason I think freeing up Leo1s and Marders for Ukraine is a lot more realistic than Leo2s and Boxers.

Buuuuuut... I am not sure the General was saying he needs that much NEW stuff.  Might he be saying that is what he needs in total to maintain in operation to get the job done?  Viewed from that perspective his numbers sound a lot more reality based.

Steve

Hmm, well if he is talking that much equipment to sustain current pressure that would be another story.  That is a lot of hardware so we are talking significant losses in the current UA structure are expected.  Then this becomes more of a Force Generation problem.

I guess the big question will be “what do you plan to do with them?” because that will drive a lot of requirements.  

Edited December 17, 2022 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

So if Russia is planning something (which they probably are), the rational bet is on an action in the south.  But this is Russia we're talking about, so if the last year is any indication of what is to come next, then it will be Kyiv again.  Because it is that stupid.

Where and how Russia attempts to re-gain strategic offensive initiative will be a key indicator of just how much they understand the situation, as well as what their overall strategy is, or is not.

An offensive aimed at blunting or dislocation of the UA in order to freeze this war is their best play - not saying it will work, the RA has still failed to establish pre-conditions for operational success anywhere.  However a spoiling offensive in the south to buy time and options would be a sign Russia has finally figured out what is actually happening.  

A second attempt at Kyiv and a northern offensive is insane.  RA logistics are already stressed just to keep what it has in the field.  Some northern adventure on a whole new front?  The RA managed 12:1 force ratio advantage in Feb 22 up at Kyiv and got nowhere. The UA is better armed, trained, experienced and integrated into western ISR that it was back then.  The RA has eroded - no signs of Russian ISR improvements, air picture, logistics or tactical improvements.  It has lost an entire military’s worth of equipment and an estimated 75k-ish troops. It bought UAVs from Iran and …?  Do we have any other indications of any new RA military capability?

Unless the RA has been hiding something extremely well, any offensive is likely to resemble what they are already doing - tactical leg humping in the south.  Big losses of dumb mass for very little gain while the UA continues to hammer the critical nodes and connectors in the RA operational system.  I don’t see an RA offensive this winter as a threat, it is an opportunity.

In other news - the UA is signalling heavily at Melitopol, which makes me think they are going to push somewhere else.  Up on the left flank maybe? Or cut the land bridge further East, make a push for Mariupol maybe?  Or Berdyansk?

[paxromana]

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/russia-putin-war-failures-ukraine.html

Extensive and detailed report on just how downright bad the entire Russian side of the 'SMO' has been ... behind a paywall, unfortunately, but worth reading.

[Battlefront.com]

Girkin video newly posted and translated.  Short of it is he sees no attempts by Russia to win the war.  He said that war is won by planning in the rear, but there is nothing happening.  He said that if the Soviet Union kept the leaders it had in 1941, the Germans would have got to the Urals.  Russia is not replacing it's flawed leadership.  A great quote was him saying that so far "nobody is to blame" for the disaster.

Steve

[FancyCat]

There is probably a good benefit to massing on Kiyv again, logistics is probably easier to mass since Ukraine must be careful to not hit Russian and Belarusian territory unlike any occupied Ukrainian territory.

You should read the NYT article just linked, just a stunning read at how stupid Putin is.

[The_Capt]

1 minute ago, FancyCat said:

There is probably a good benefit to massing on Kiyv again, logistics is probably easier to mass since Ukraine must be careful to not hit Russian and Belarusian territory unlike any occupied Ukrainian territory.

You should read the NYT article just linked, just a stunning read at how stupid Putin is.

The RA has not seen benefits massing anywhere.  Honestly looking at the map, let ‘em come.  Even restricting targetS to occupied Ukrainian territory that is over 100km of tight terrain that will be lit up by ISR and hammered by PGM.  The F ech in the front could effectively be cut off by deep strike, and the. The UA could eat them in small bites while they freeze - it could be a better operational ambush then last time.  For the RA to even have a shot at this they would need to: blind the entire western ISR architecture in that region, establish air superiority/unmanned superiority, and somehow take out the UA’s deep strike capability.  This is before dispersed and hybrid UA forces, now well armed with wickedly effective ATGMs, start to work on them.  Oh, and the RA would need to build its own ISR architecture in the region to gain cognitive superiority.

At this point the RA and UA are hardly the same species, let alone competitive in the cognitive domain.

[Huba]

6 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

There is probably a good benefit to massing on Kiyv again, logistics is probably easier to mass since Ukraine must be careful to not hit Russian and Belarusian territory unlike any occupied Ukrainian territory.

You should read the NYT article just linked, just a stunning read at how stupid Putin is.

The "not hitting RU territory" part pertains only to GMLRS apparently. Excalibur + L52 guns are good up to 60km at least, and were already used around Belgorod. If RU attempts to seriously mass men and materiel around Kyiv, I don't think there will be much hesitation to whack them. 

[Taranis]

 

↓
the flaws we all know. Lack of CITV (Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer)

[FancyCat]

The picture painted in the NYT article (it's very good detailed reading), is that of a Putin who if he orders a 2nd offensive on Kiyv, will get it. Of course, perception and reality are often different but certainly this invasion occurred with nearly no internal Russian pushback.

Also that hyperbole about Putin being a Tsar and the Russian people merely being serfs, well the article does not disspell that hyperbole.

No reason to hope internal issues will toss Russia out of the war.

[pintere]

9 hours ago, Zeleban said:

 

Just a little military humor.

 

Right… do you have any posts/interviews where Ukrainian soldiers talk about that kinda thing? I’ve heard some people comment they’re just trolling the Russians, but haven’t seen any actual evidence that suggest that’s the case.

[FancyCat]

Mind you, every military, police force, has a far-right component, U.S included. Especially Russia.

[Battlefront.com]

9 minutes ago, pintere said:

Right… do you have any posts/interviews where Ukrainian soldiers talk about that kinda thing? I’ve heard some people comment they’re just trolling the Russians, but haven’t seen any actual evidence that suggest that’s the case.

Oh, I'm sure they are trolling the Russians.  There are no examples I know of, anywhere in this war, of Ukrainian vehicles driving around with WW2 German symbology on them.  Note also that the controversial symbols are on two captured Russian BMP-3s.

That said, there isn't as much symbology as you might suspect.  The first BMP has the new tactical marking that has been adopted to replace the previous solid cross.  Not the best choice, but there it is.  The second BMP looks to have a Azov marks on them.  WW2 German in origin, but that's well established and nothing new.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Where and how Russia attempts to re-gain strategic offensive initiative will be a key indicator of just how much they understand the situation, as well as what their overall strategy is, or is not.

...

Unless the RA has been hiding something extremely well, any offensive is likely to resemble what they are already doing - tactical leg humping in the south.  Big losses of dumb mass for very little gain while the UA continues to hammer the critical nodes and connectors in the RA operational system.  I don’t see an RA offensive this winter as a threat, it is an opportunity.

Agreed.  This has been the situation since about April when it became evident to the clear headed that Russia just doesn't have the means to command the battlefield in any meaningful way.  Time and time again Russian offensives have been mentioned and sometimes even attempted.  All failed, mostly with massive casualties on the Russia side and not much to show for it.

The only true threat I think Russia can pose to Ukraine (other than nukes, of course) is to do a full spectrum mass mobilization with an eye committing it in 12-16 months.  They could have enough warm bodies at one time to swamp Ukraine's defensive lines.  Even then, I think it wouldn't go well and ultimately the best Russia could hope for is Ukraine agreeing to a cease fire simply because of the scale of death of Ukrainian forces.

Fortunately, this mobik doomsday scenario is not going to happen.  Putin seems to know better than anybody else that attempting such a thing means revolution before it even gets to the field.  Or, best case, soon after it starts.

Russia has been out of viable options since about February 25th, so I don't expect them to come up with something now.

Steve

[Huba]

35 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

Mind you, every military, police force, has a far-right component, U.S included. Especially Russia.

Can't find a link right now, but I recall a scandal when M1 crew during OIF  decided it will be funny to draw Afrika Korps palm trees on their vehicles.

Edited December 17, 2022 by Huba

[Astrophel]

2 hours ago, paxromana said:

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/russia-putin-war-failures-ukraine.html

Extensive and detailed report on just how downright bad the entire Russian side of the 'SMO' has been ... behind a paywall, unfortunately, but worth reading.

This a good long read and worthwhile, thanks.

Surprising to me that Russian troop morale is holding up sufficiently to hold a front line of a few hundred kilometres and keep on attacking daily with heavy losses.  While propagandists in Moscow talk passionately about defending the motherland against Nato, surely the soldiers on the ground are able to see through the rhetoric.  Why should they continue to risk their lives for Putin’s mad dreams of conquest?

At the beginning of this war many people thought that Russian morale would not survive contact with reality, retreats would turn into routs, and surrenders would be large scale.  The Russian homefront would turn against the war and maybe, even, change might start in Russia itself.  It has not happened.

There is a worthwhile article in the UK Guardian today by Timothy Garton Ash

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/dec/17/ukraine-greatest-threat-russian-world-vladimir-putin

According to Timothy, Russia is disintegrating.

None of the neighbours, including Ukraine, will sleep soundly until Russian hearts and minds change, beginning with those soldiers in the front lines who are continuing to die rather than surrender.  I just don't get it.  If Ukraine can win over the Russians doing the fighting then the war will end quickly - forget Wagner, they are just there for the money ... 

[danfrodo]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I don’t see an RA offensive this winter as a threat, it is an opportunity.

That's my feeling also:  Yes, Putin, please mass you troops and push them out of their trenches toward UKR defenses & artillery, it will make ending this war so much easier.

8 minutes ago, Astrophel said:

Surprising to me that Russian troop morale is holding up sufficiently to hold a front line of a few hundred kilometres and keep on attacking daily with heavy losses.

I really wonder whether morale is holding up.  Maybe it hasn't been sufficiently tested lately because of the mud.  And in some places 'morale' just means the unit is more fearful of being gunned down by RU blocking units than by UKR forces.

[Battlefront.com]

18 minutes ago, Astrophel said:

At the beginning of this war many people thought that Russian morale would not survive contact with reality, retreats would turn into routs, and surrenders would be large scale.  The Russian homefront would turn against the war and maybe, even, change might start in Russia itself.  It has not happened.

It has happened here and there for sure.  We've seen plenty of reporting on the extensive measures Russian "barrier troops" have used to round up deserters, including makeshift dungeons and in a couple of cases firefights resulting in death.

What we haven't seen is collapse on an operational or strategic scale.  However, I've argued we would have seen it in northern Ukraine if Russia didn't pull its forces back when it did.  It probably happened in Izyum on a fairly large scale and the proactive retreat in Kherson was likely informed by that.

The lesson here is that the collapses are happening, but slow enough that Russian commanders have (so far) correctly gauged when to retreat and to (largely) pull it off without systemic collapse in the process.  I don't have much good to say about the Russians in this war, but THIS is something I think they are doing very well.  Retreating isn't easy to pull off, but the Russians are pretty good at it.  I say this without being snarky (though snarky is appropriate too!).

What is astonishing to watch is how SLOWLY this has been building.  I have said many times now that I gave the Russians way too much credit for being "civilized".  On the whole, Russian mindset is still deeply rooted in obedient serf.  We know from Russian history that even obedient serfs will eventually revolt, so there is a limit for Putin maintaining control.  We'll know when that time comes, but not likely until it is already easily detectable.

18 minutes ago, Astrophel said:

According to Timothy, Russia is disintegrating.

All indicators are that it has been disintegrating for many years.  The only thing that has changed since this war is the pace has increased and the chances of it ending in catastrophe go up every day the war continues.

Steve

[sburke]

Russia's Bakhmut Problems Show Putin 'Overestimated' His Forces: Commander (msn.com)

Quote

Roman Kostenko—one of the famous "cyborg" Ukrainian troops who defended Donetsk airport in 2014, a veteran of the years-long fight against Russian-directed forces in the Donbas and now a member of Ukraine's parliament—told Newsweek from close to the southern front around his home city of Kherson that the area around Bakhmut "is where the hottest action is happening at the moment."

Quote

 

"They are already short of officers and commanders, so they have to stick to very simple battle plans," Gressel explained. "I think that will be something we will see also if they commence offensives in other portions of the front; it will go down sort of in a very similar way."

"They are in dire need of officers," Gressel said. "They're shortened officer training to get the cadets out to the troops to the mobilized troops. But, of course, you can't expect much from very hastily trained officers."

 

Quote

 

Russian forces are training in Belarus, with Ukrainian leaders warning Minsk's forces might join their Russian allies in a renewed drive south and west towards NATO borders. Such a plan would be highly risky and likely costly for both Putin and President Alexander Lukashenko.

"Where they will strike with the remaining 200,000 guys that are still undergoing training, that's the million-dollar question," Gressel said. "There is a lot of preparation on the northern border, opposite Kharkiv Oblast. I've seen Ukrainian news of a lot of saboteurs and reconnaissance teams trying to infiltrate that part of the border."

"I would not be surprised if the next offensive the Russians are planning is going to be a northern offensive; they reopen Sumy Oblast, Kharkiv Oblast, and try to push down from the north," Gressel said, noting an attack in this area would have the benefit of short supply lines back across the border into Russia.

"The Russian military buildup is far from complete and they're still undergoing training," Gressel added. "We of course can't know for sure, but that would be the guess from my side."