How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[JonS]

17 hours ago, The_Capt said:

But….

That's kind of always been true though. Consider the trend of what is "high" density from the crimean war, wwi, wwii, gw1, and gw2. The trend is inexorably down as lethality and range both go up. Even during wwi there was a noticeable thining out of the lines, over quite short periods sometimes, such as during the passchendale campaign. Having a solid line of muskets to repel the tommies as they stagger across no man's land is all well and good, but it doesnt count for much when those musketeers all get smooshed by the supporting artillery.

I think the big thing shorter lines will give RU is not higher density (unless you include getting their densities back up to something sane, rather than just a section every km or two  a'la Kharkiv), but the ability to designate and constitute effective reserves. The reduced tactical options for the Ukrainians is a nice bonus, as is having solid flanks anchored by the pre-2014 border.

Edited November 5, 2022 by JonS

[Huba]

10 hours ago, danfrodo said:

You think he's not rolling in his grave??? (full disclosure, my first pres vote was actually for reagan)

Serial mass murdering, child kidnapping, city destroyer, wrecker of world economy.  One would think that would put everyone on the same side, no?  And yet here we are.

Wasn't he already  plugged into the power grid? Wasting all this rotational energy is, well, very  wasteful. 

8 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

I wonder, if somebody would foot the bill to buy some older western tanks from smaller countries that might be willing to sell them, would they be of any use to Ukraine? 

M48, M60, Challenger 1, Leopard 1, AMX-30, etc.

If they got a few of them maybe it would open the door to other western tanks that up until now seem to be taboo to supply to Ukraine?

Leo1 stands out of this list. Ukraine already operates a lot vehicles on Leo1 chassis like Gepard or assault bridges. Expertise in servicing them is being built. L7 guns and ammo also arrived there recently with the Slovenian T-55 derivatives. All that is left is a political decision to send the German ones, and then to buy more from the Greeks. Leo1 should still be perfectly adequate against T-62s. 

Edited November 5, 2022 by Huba

[Bulletpoint]

What's your current best take on the timetable for retaking of Kherson? Are we talking days, weeks, "home before christmas" or longer?

 

[Haiduk]

8 hours ago, Sojourner said:

Although not a tank...

"In just nine hours, the Prytula Foundation raised $5.5m from private donors to buy 50 FV103 Spartans used by the British Army"

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/nov/03/a-joke-that-went-out-of-control-crowdfunding-weapons-for-ukraines-war

Prytula Foundation has planned to raise money for 50 FV103, but has raised for 60. 

[Haiduk]

.

 

Edited November 5, 2022 by Haiduk

[acrashb]

15 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

20 attacks a day with even 10 casualties per attack is 200. 

From the recent ISW report: " on November 4 that Russian forces have tripled the intensity of hostilities in certain sections of the front with up to 80 daily assaults"

So that's up to 800 casualties.

The UA numbers may be somewhat inflated - it would be surprising if they weren't - but they aren't in a different universe.  

[Haiduk]

Russians attacked with Tornado-S or Smerch MLRS (also was info about several Shakheds strikes) something like ammo dump in Pokrovsk town, Donetsk oblast. This is rear of Donetsk oblast, close to the boundary with Dnipropetrovsk oblast and to this time was rlatively calm place. Locals tell in twitter, this strike is 100 % because of somebody of pro-Russian population has been sending information to Russian side. 

[kevinkin]

20 hours ago, Huba said:

I was wondering if increased troops density along the shorter front would be more advantageous for Ukrainians or for Russians?

Increasing mass is much more about increasing firepower than troop density. Massing troops (as others have mentioned) is dangerous in modern warfare. What we are seeing over the decades is a decrease in troop density, while firepower continues to increase. Hence the advent of distributed warfare. Which is not new. In the US Civil War they learned that they could throw out parade ground order and move to loser skirmish style tactics. Not in all cases, but the trend was there. The UA has been rightfully successful with their light infantry / skirmish style tactics. That does not mean they can't mass firepower at key points. Just that the mass in troops to make that happen is more within the logistics and intel functions which are not in direct contact with the enemy.

 

Edited November 5, 2022 by kevinkin

[Haiduk]

UKR troops of 3rd mech.battalion of President's brigade repel Russian assault. Russians shell from three sides, their sniper work. At the end of video drone appeared over positions and soldiers ask each other is this one our or enemy and decide to shoot at it. 

President's brigade is a special unit, subordinated directly to President. Before the war it was President's regiment and consisted of two special light battalions (initially they had BTR-80, but later they were moved to other units, and what was received instead I don't know), honor guard company and honor guard orchestra. Main tasks were guarding and defense of president's administration and other government buildings, ceremonies, meeting of delegations etc. Despite such rear service 240 servicemen of regiment participated in ATO/JFO, particularly in the battle for Debaltsevo in 2015. Since 24th Feb, the regiment became a brigade, all battalions became mechanized and the 3rd battalion was added.  

 

[dan/california]

 

2 hours ago, JonS said:

Is that before or after the Bradley full of 40mm and the bde set of heavy armour. Oh, wait. You said top of the list.

Ok boys, down tools. The priority list has changed. What's that? Oh, yes, I know it changed yesterday. Yes and the day before. Oh, and the day before that too. Yes, I know the priority list now runs to 10 closely typed ... look, just stop what you're doing and start working on [checks notes] ... uh ... a sort of an anti drone thing but not really for drones. Yeah, the specs are a bit vague, but it's really important, ok? Ok. Let's get going.

Well to a fair extent that is how it works. German U Boats were a very large problem, then some smart guys figured out a microwave radar that would fit on an maritime patrol plane, and they became a much smaller problem. The Germans never solved microwave radar countermeasures, and it is not the least of the reasons they lost the war. Not THE reason, but it is on the list. Is this lancet drone an issue at that level? I don't know. If the Chinese are are suddenly making thousands of them and shipping them west, they could be. If the Russians are managing 20 a month by ripping apart laptops and washing machines for parts, probably not. But that is only half the question. How hard is the countermeasure? Does this drone have a really good jam resistant communication link? So good it will take a huge effort to build a brand new jammer to counter? or is it a simple case of needing to add a little code to one the vast array EW and counter EW systems already out there, and 80% of them just fall out of the sky?  

Both sides in every war have a list, the side that makes better choices about how to prioritize their list unusually does better. I am quite open to hearing what you think the lists for both sides ought to be.

Edited November 5, 2022 by dan/california

[Haiduk]

2 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:

What's your current best take on the timetable for retaking of Kherson? Are we talking days, weeks, "home before christmas" or longer?

 

Some Russian source told about 15th November date as a time of full withdrawal from right bank of Dnieper

[dan/california]

15 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

At the end of video drone appeared over positions and soldiers ask each other is this one our or enemy and decide to shoot at it. 

Better IFF for drones is on a list somewhere.....

[MSBoxer]

Seems that last mobilization went so well that RU is asking more citizens to join the party.

 

Quote

Putin signs law to mobilize Russian citizens convicted of serious crimes 

From CNN's Uliana Pavlova

 

Russian soldiers under the partial mobilization train in Rostov, Russia on October 21. (Arkady Budnitsky/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law Friday that allows for conscripting citizens with un-expunged or outstanding convictions for various serious crimes.

Russians convicted of murder, robbery, larceny, drug trafficking and other grave offenses under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation can be called up for military service, according to the law.

That makes it possible to mobilize hundreds of thousands of people who have been sentenced to probation or have recently been released from colonies who were previously forbidden to serve.

The only group of criminals exempted from the decree are those who committed sex crimes against minors, treason, spying or terrorism. Also excluded are those convicted of the attempted assassination of a government official, hijacking an aircraft, extremist activity and illegal handling of nuclear materials and radioactive substances.

The Kremlin has already mobilized an additional 18,000 soldiers above its goal of 300,000 to fight in its war in Ukraine from the general male population of Russia, Putin said Friday.  

 

[dan/california]

11 minutes ago, MSBoxer said:

Seems that last mobilization went so well that RU is asking more citizens to join the party.

 

 

Russia is doing an interesting experiment in how far you can reduce the quality of your army before it just dissolves. Also, what is then sentence if they are ALREADY at the front?

[Battlefront.com]

12 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Well that is an interesting question.  The conventional answer is the advantage would go to the defender.  A defender with high troop density along a shorted line forces the attacker to create higher force ratios with less manoeuvre room.  But….

In this war, especially against the UA as they are currently capable, high troop/force density looks like more of a liability.  Firstly large troop concentrations are highly visible and therefore vulnerable to PGM as you note.  And their logistics, which will need to be larger, is also vulnerable.  My guess is that large lower quality troop concentrations are going to suffer a lot of attrition without really doing much back at their opponent,  this is the same problem with obstacle belts - high density, resources intensive that gets cut to pieces by observation and PGM.  Lastly, high troop density = high attrition = plummeting moral, especially with a poor medical system.

So like a lot in this war, it is likely the reverse of what we are used to as the value of high density mass appears to have changed.

Like a few others above, I think the advantage is being able to have a better ability to maintain operational and even strategic reserves away from the front.  Rotations, manpower for planned offensives, replacing losses, and the usual sundry of things that are possible with spare troops.

While Russia will get some of these benefits by shortening the line, they are so understrength already I'd say Ukraine will get the most benefit from shorter lines.  It also allows Ukraine to concentrate it's Western systems (in particular artillery) to a degree not possible at the moment.  These systems are less susceptible to being attacked even when their density is increased simply because they don't take up much battlespace.  Lots of places to hide a HIMARS even if a full battalion was put in one sector.

Sure, Russia gets to concentrate its systems as well, but with the ISR and PGM advantage being solidly on Ukraine's side, I'd put consolidated lines decidedly as being more beneficial for Ukraine.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

 

11 hours ago, chrisl said:

Things like Shahed don't really have sensors other than GPS antennas as far as I can tell - they're given GPS coordinates and they fly to them and blow up.  At shorter ranges (<93 km) they can be programmed to loiter and then be given an updated set of coordinates.  But it doesn't appear that they have any kind of target sensors.

Something that has optical or IR sensors could be blinded by a laser as long as it's in whatever passband the optics have.  If it's not laser guided, an operator might consider putting a filter for common laser wavelengths to prevent being blinded.  If it's laser guided you at least have to let the guide laser wavelength through.

Here's where the weaponry needs to have layered capabilities as well.  We've seen Western PGMs do this for a long time, where they have multiple guidance systems so that if one fails the other one (hopefully) picks up the slack.  Not only does this allow the PGM to be fired with two different means of target designation, but it also allows for a backup in some situations.  One of the earliest combos was laser designation and GPS.

The challenge is, as always, involves the disparity between the difficulty/practicality/expense of making a weapon better versus the counter to it.  The go-to favorite, of course, is Javelin.  Relatively cheap to make tons of Javelins, with very little in the way of practical employment, compared to defending against them.  The Javelin can be made even smarter and more lethal far easier than it is to make something that can defend against it.  Which is why "the tank is dead" argument is a pretty easy one to make.

Putting aside technology and, to some extent cost, there is the problem that absolutely anything and everything can be a target.  It is absolutely impossible to effectively cover all fixed military and civilian installations, vehicles, improvised defensive positions, bridges, road junctions, coastline, etc.  It is simply not possible to do.  The more a defensive strategy relies upon fixed point defenses (e.g. kinetic), the less effective the overall defensive strategy will be.

I think the most likely solutions to drones is the ability to obligate them to be launched from far away, detect them, and launch area based countermeasures.  Ground based jamming and missiles for sure, however cheap and effective drone based counters will be critical.

Think about it this way.  What is the best thing about a drone as an offensive weapon?  Cheap and easily deployed.  If you don't have a defense that is also cheap and easily deployed, you're going to lose the contest.

Steve

 

[Aragorn2002]

13 hours ago, danfrodo said:

You think he's not rolling in his grave??? (full disclosure, my first pres vote was actually for reagan)

Serial mass murdering, child kidnapping, city destroyer, wrecker of world economy.  One would think that would put everyone on the same side, no?  And yet here we are.

Very worrying, Dan. And one of the reasons why Germany tries to keep it's options open. The world can change within 24 hours. 

[kevinkin]

Ideally, you keep the matches (armed drones) away from the kids(Iran et. al.).

Here's an article re: Ukraine's path forward economically:

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/11/interview-with-ukraines-former-economic-minister-how-much-will-it-cost-to-defeat-russia-and-rebuild-ukraine/

Grab an oar and start rowing. But it'd doable given sufficient Ukrainian security. 

[danfrodo]

1 hour ago, dan/california said:

Russia is doing an interesting experiment in how far you can reduce the quality of your army before it just dissolves. Also, what is then sentence if they are ALREADY at the front?

So in RU if you are drafted and commit a crime does that mean they just re-draft you as a criminal based on the new law posted above?  Fun circle there.  Draft-crime-draft-crime.....

 

[Battlefront.com]

25 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

Ideally, you keep the matches (armed drones) away from the kids(Iran et. al.).

Yup, and even though that ideal (obviously) isn't obtainable, it still limits the scope of the problem. 

The primary challenge is that one actor with the means and intent to cause problems can do so on a large scale in multiple places concurrently.  Iran is supplying drones to multiple parties in large quantities concurrently.  Even if we managed to keep the problem narrowed down to Iran and only Iran (not possible, of course), it's already a big problem and it will get worse over time.

Steve

[dan/california]

10 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Yup, and even though that ideal (obviously) isn't obtainable, it still limits the scope of the problem. 

The primary challenge is that one actor with the means and intent to cause problems can do so on a large scale in multiple places concurrently.  Iran is supplying drones to multiple parties in large quantities concurrently.  Even if we managed to keep the problem narrowed down to Iran and only Iran (not possible, of course), it's already a big problem and it will get worse over time.

Steve

It seems like the very best solution to Iran is to help the younger half of the country defeat its current decrepit excuse for a regime. Note I didn't say it was easy. But the thought of MBS having to deal Iran's first woman Prime Minister is worth taking real risk for.

[Seedorf81]

2 hours ago, MSBoxer said:

Seems that last mobilization went so well that RU is asking more citizens to join the party.

 

 

Hmm, you would almost consider the following..

Although not as bad as 20 years ago, USA prisons are still pretty much overcrowded.

Why not giving Putin payback with an offer for US-inmates to join the international legion in Ukraine?

[Haiduk]

During "phase 2" Russian superiority in artillery allowed them to fire with whole artillery battalions like by classical Cold War time doctrine.

Almost full-strength battalion of 16 (from 18) Msta-S howitzers on position near Izium area in April

 

Example, how much arty Russians involved at the beginning of battle for Lyman in May:

 

 

Edited November 5, 2022 by Haiduk

[Maciej Zwolinski]

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Regarding the last part - I was wondering if increased troops density along the shorter front would be more advantageous for Ukrainians or for Russians? Especially in the Zaporizhya sectore, where RU logistics are really strung compared to Ukrainian.

Surely they cannot be less advantageous than in Kherson. Yet Russians did manage to supply critical materiel and even rotate troops by ferries and the Kahovka dam bridge hastily filled in with rubble and earth to the extent necessary to hold on for what, four months?

And the defended area is not going to be so small, to prevent dispersing of units and cause Russians to mass excessively. They basically have the square  Vasylivka -Volnovakha - Mariupol- Melitopol at their disposal, which is a lot of real property. So yes, getting additional troops from Kherson and Berislav areas to strengthen the Zaporizhe direction will be beneficial to the RUS.

After the RUS withdraw from the Kherson bridgehead (actually, I think they will not withdraw fully, but will rotate most of regular units with heavy equipment out and leave mobiks in Kherson city to die fighting; I think they are going to do basically a reenactment of the defence of Severodonetsk but on the defender side; provided they do not care about mobik casualties - and they do not -this would be optimal for both political and military purposes ) I think the Ukrainians will not attack in the Zaporozhe front in the foreseeable future, there is a reason why they have not done so until now.  They will keep using the potentially decisive character of this sector as means to keep as many valuable units as possible off other areas of the front.

I think the Ukrainians will keep trying to succeed in the North Luhansk sector throughout the rest of the autumn and winter or (if RUS loose control over how many people they spend in frontal attacks near Bachmut) possibly attack straight to Doneck, if the Russian lines get thinned there during the winter. Zaporizhia is actually the last place I would expect the Ukrainians to try and mount a winter offensive. They have no purchase there and would have to start developing the battlefield for breakthrough, only to attack into the teeth of relatively best enemy units. Not particularly attractive option.

[dan/california]

1 minute ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

Surely they cannot be less advantageous than in Kherson. Yet Russians did manage to supply critical materiel and even rotate troops by ferries and the Kahovka dam bridge hastily filled in with rubble and earth to the extent necessary to hold on for what, four months?

And the defended area is not going to be so small, to prevent dispersing of units and cause Russians to mass excessively. They basically have the square  Vasylivka -Volnovakha - Mariupol- Melitopol at their disposal, which is a lot of real property. So yes, getting additional troops from Kherson and Berislav areas to strengthen the Zaporizhe direction will be beneficial to the RUS.

After the RUS withdraw from the Kherson bridgehead (actually, I think they will not withdraw fully, but will rotate most of regular units with heavy equipment out and leave mobiks in Kherson city to die fighting; I think they are going to do basically a reenactment of the defence of Severodonetsk but on the defender side; provided they do not care about mobik casualties - and they do not -this would be optimal for both political and military purposes ) I think the Ukrainians will not attack in the Zaporozhe front in the foreseeable future, there is a reason why they have not done so until now.  They will keep using the potentially decisive character of this sector as means to keep as many valuable units as possible off other areas of the front.

I think the Ukrainians will keep trying to succeed in the North Luhansk sector throughout the rest of the autumn and winter or (if RUS loose control over how many people they spend in frontal attacks near Bachmut) possibly attack straight to Doneck, if the Russian lines get thinned there during the winter. Zaporizhia is actually the last place I would expect the Ukrainians to try and mount a winter offensive. They have no purchase there and would have to start developing the battlefield for breakthrough, only to attack into the teeth of relatively best enemy units. Not particularly attractive option.

We don't know the balance sheet on Kherson. If Russia has burned the last of the pre war VDV to hold Kherson for another six weeks it was a VERY bad trade. The average quality of the Russian army started out low, but it is currently falling very quickly towards some level that is so low I am struggling for words for it. Sooner or later that is going to cost the Russians dearly.