How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Battlefront.com]

Updated theory on Dugina's assassination is as follows:

Background Facts

1. Ukraine has been the most important foreign policy priority for Putin arguably for his entire reign in the Kremlin, but particularly for the last 8 years. There's many versions of this policy over the year, however it has always boiled down to subjugating it.
2. In 2014 Putin invaded Crimea and gave the green light for the RU Nats to move into Ukraine and create Novorossiya.  Surkov provided Putin's blessings, Dugin provided the philosophy, Malofeev the money, Girkin military leadership, and Borodai political leadership.  Of course there were many others, but these guys were the core of the movement while most of the others were opportunists, adventurists, or something other than Novorossiya fanatics.
3. Even though the Novorossiya concept was officially abandoned shortly after it started, the Donbas has remained a primary focus of Russian foreign policy since.  So much so that it twas the foundation for the "Special Military Operation" 
4. Just prior to the war's start, Putin expanded the original Novorossiya concept to include other long dead political entities.  Even though Novorossiya was not mentioned like it was in 2014, the Donbas remains the focus for the new war even after other objectives have been dispensed with or downplayed.

RU Nationalists

1. RU Nats are fully invested in the concept of Novorossiya and other expansionist concepts, therefore enthusiastically support the war.  They also follow the war closely, especially what is going on in the Donbas. Their motivations and connections have allowed them to see the war more-or-less realistically.
2. From the RU Nats' vantage point they can see their dream of Novorossiya increasingly slipping away from them.  They blame Russian military incompetence and Putin's unwillingness to fully mobilize the nation more than anything else.  It is their belief that full mobilization and getting rid of the top echelon of the Russian military can still deliver their dream.  IMPORTANT -> they truly believe that the war can be won if changes are made to Russian leadership.  This gives them motivation to push for the changes they believe are necessary for victory.
3. Criticism coming from the RU Nats is getting more frantic and bold as they realize time is running out to turn things around.  Their voice has a certain amount of influence and power, much of it originating from the same people that started Novorossiya (Malofeev, Dugin, and Girkin at the very least).
4. We don't know the exact details, but we do know that power/s within the Kremlin have tried to quiet the RU Nats' rhetoric.  The steps taken up until now have shown some immediate effect, however it seems to only last until the next major military disappointment and then they become bolder than they were before.

Underlying Concerns

1. We've seen a lot of evidence that there's trouble in the DLPR's military and political establishments.  All is not well there and there is ample evidence that the troubles seems to be getting more extreme and more obvious to observers.
2. The political and military importance of DLPR on the overall Russian war effort can not be understated.  Without them the central reason provided to Russians (and the world) for going to war is gone.  Also lost is a huge quantity of motivated fighters and a population base that can be turned into cannon fodder without much objection within Russia itself.
3. If the DLPR revolts, breaks down, or otherwise ceases to be functional it will likely make the military situation in Ukraine's other areas completely untenable, possibly to the point of military collapse.  A military collapse would likely erode the military's influence within the Kremlin to a point never before seen since Putin's time.  And that is the best case.
4. The worst case is a military collapse followed by regime change in the Kremlin.  If this happens the military will go into the fight for power weaker than it has probably ever been.  It's chances of coming out on top are low.  Worse still, it would likely remain weak for a very long time.
5. The GRU exists, in large part, to make sure the military retains power and influence within the Kremlin.  The more the military feels threatened, the more likely the GRU will take action.  The more threatened, the more extreme the GRU's actions.

The Military

1. The greatest threat to the military's standing is the inability to retain the land it has taken, not failing to take more land.  This means the expansion of the Donbas is not a priority for the military at all.  Preventing the loss of Kherson or the rest of the south is. 
2. The Russian military knows better than any of us that it's chances of expanding the Donbas are small and going down at the same time it's risk of losing the south is high and going up.  Pragmatism dictates that the military's focus be shifted from the Donbas to the south.  I suspect that Putin sees this as well.
3. We've already seen many weeks of Russian military pragmatism at work as Russian forces have been drained out of the Donbas to beef up the south.  The DLPR has been left to fight pretty much on its own to keep up the illusion that the war is still moving along as planned.
4. The RU Nats have seen this shift and are critical of it.  They've become even more critical since it's clear that the DLPR forces are spent as an offensive force.
5. The abandonment of prioritizing the Donbas is tantamount to treason in the eyes of the RU Nats, yet that is exactly what the military planned to announce on the 24th of August.  A proactive GRU would seek to make sure the RU Nats were warned ahead of time to keep their opinions to themselves.  A message needed to be sent proportional to the threat of increased RU Nat criticism or worse (e.g. power plays).

The Dugin Assassination

1. The core of the Donbas support comes from the RU Nats, in particular the ones who started the whole thing in 2014.  Therefore, it seems the GRU decided that this core group needed to receive the message directly. A high profile killing is consistent with a message of this importance.
2. Darya Dugina was chosen because she is a protege (possibly a girlfriend) of Malofeev and the daughter of Akeksander Dugin).  Killing her in such a dramatic and public way sends a strong message that both need to watch what they say and do, including influencing their followers to also keep quiet.  Girkin in particular seems to be an important one to quiet down as he himself has influence and standing to leverage.
3. The GRU used a Ukrainian agent (Natalya Vovk) for some unknown purpose, but unlikely planting the bomb itself.  They did what was needed to get her into position at the RU Nat conference on the 20th of August.  At a minimum I think the GRU wanted to ensure there was a Ukrainian to be blamed for the attack, but it could be more complicated than that.
4. Whatever the case, the agent got out of the country before the FSB could grab her.  No doubt that was the GRU's intention as they wouldn't want the FSB to interrogate her.  Whether they wanted the FSB to flounder around for a little longer, but the FSB caught a break, is debatable. 
5. The FSB is making the best out of a bad situation, however it is obviously improvised and sloppy.  Blaming Ukraine is the obvious "go to" for any and all FSB nonsense.

Immediate Aftermath

1. Aside from some rather mild accusations and threats against Ukraine, it's been pretty quiet.  If Dugina's assassination was part of some grander false flag scheme there's no signs of it as one would expect from a killing that was planned well in advance.
2. Three days after the assassination Shoigu made the shift away from the Donbas official.  I see the timing as being linked to the killing.
3. The RU Nats appear to be unusually quiet and subdued.  At the very least they didn't go ballistic after Shoigu's announcement, which is what should have happened.

We'll have to see how the RU Nats respond given more time and distance from Dugina's assassination, but at the moment it appears "message received".

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2022/08/419_334960.html

Samsung, SK, Hyundai Motor and LG have been called out for their failure to denounce Russia's invasion of Ukraine by a London-based corporate watchdog.

The Moral Rating Agency (MRA), set up to urge global enterprises to cut their ties with Russia, said that it has measured corporate statements to release its "Courage Index."

It put together a list of 88 companies that have been avoiding denouncing Russia, among the 122 largest companies that were active in trading or investment there at the time of its Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine.

According to the agency, there were 34 denouncers among the 122 companies, although three of them have continued their operations in Russia.

While most of the cowards among Western companies opted for 'mealy-mouthed' statements, East Asian companies ― Chinese, Korean and Japanese ― tended to opt either for silence, making excuses or even 'reverse boycotting.... [the source doesn't explain what this is]

Edited August 26, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[chuckdyke]

Come on US even an amateur like me can do it lol. First time ever this happened Zero Casualties. 

[Hapless]

Some footage of pontoon construction and ferry close alongside the Antonovsky Bridge:

Not exactly new stuff, but a closer look than I think we've seen before. No clue on the date. Might be some indication of damage (ie. things sticking out) at about 0:24 looking along the bridge, but the angles seem tightly controlled to avoid showing anything particulalry interesting.

Does give a good idea of how much bridging equipment is necessary for this though- given that these are higher level assets you have to wonder how much this construction is reducing Russian river crossing options elsewhere.

[Huba]

12 minutes ago, Hapless said:

Some footage of pontoon construction and ferry close alongside the Antonovsky Bridge:

Not exactly new stuff, but a closer look than I think we've seen before. No clue on the date. Might be some indication of damage (ie. things sticking out) at about 0:24 looking along the bridge, but the angles seem tightly controlled to avoid showing anything particulalry interesting.

Does give a good idea of how much bridging equipment is necessary for this though- given that these are higher level assets you have to wonder how much this construction is reducing Russian river crossing options elsewhere.

I'm no (bridge) engineer, but how is this supposed to be more resistant to damage than the regular bridge? These sections are floating, right? After being punctured it will just sink, and river flow will break it into pieces and that will be all she wrote. Given GMLRS at non-max distance hit literally vertically, achieving a hit shouldn't be a problem too. Or am I missing something?

[kraze]

12 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'm no (bridge) engineer, but how is this supposed to be more resistant to damage than the regular bridge? These sections are floating, right? After being punctured it will just sink, and river flow will break it into pieces and that will be all she wrote. Given GMLRS at non-max distance hit literally vertically, achieving a hit shouldn't be a problem too. Or am I missing something?

After Snake Island and Chornobaivka?

Throw everything at a problem until it eventually resolves itself (or doesn't).

But floating remnants of this junk in Dnipro will certainly delay watermelon deliveries after Kherson liberation.

[Hapless]

24 minutes ago, Huba said:

I'm no (bridge) engineer, but how is this supposed to be more resistant to damage than the regular bridge? These sections are floating, right? After being punctured it will just sink, and river flow will break it into pieces and that will be all she wrote. Given GMLRS at non-max distance hit literally vertically, achieving a hit shouldn't be a problem too. Or am I missing something?

The advantage the pontoon has over the bridge is that it's modular- so if one section is damaged, you just cut it loose, it floats off and you slot a new one in. I'd guess all the sections are compartmentalised too, so if one springs a leak and fills up with water, the pontoon as a whole has enough bouyancy to stay afloat long enough for the engineers to try and fix it.

I'm sure there are people on here who know more than me about pontoon bridges etc. though.

The issue for the Russians is probably more along the lines of having a finite amount of those chunky, really-big-river-capable pontoon sections (and having to transport them to the bridge and/or stockpile them nearby without getting them blown up) and trying to keep their specialist engineers alive when trying to fix stuff.

Edited August 26, 2022 by Hapless

[Huba]

11 minutes ago, Hapless said:

The advantage the pontoon has over the bridge is that it's modular- so if one section is damaged, you just cut it loose, it floats off and you slot a new one in. I'd guess all the sections are compartmentalised too, so if one springs a leak and fills up with water, the pontoon as a whole has enough bouyancy to stay afloat long enough for the engineers to try and fix it.

I'm sure there are people on here who know more than me about pontoon bridges etc. though.

The issue for the Russians is probably more along the lines of having a finite amount of those chunky, really-big-river-capable pontoon sections (and have to transport them to the bridge and/or stockpile them nearby) and trying to keep their specialist engineers alive when trying to fix stuff.

Hmm, that makes some sense. I assume each section is anchored separately (to the main bridge too), so switching the damaged ones should be relatively easy. So the next question is - how many rockets can one section eat before it becomes unusable? If GMLRS can be set up to explode inside the pontoon, it would probably demolish it thoroughly, compartmentalization or not. Unless the pontoons are filled with some floating foam? This would make singing them a lot harder I think.

Edit:

I just looked closer at the video - these are not pontoons, they just combined together a number of river barges and built a crossing on top of them. Now this means that there's no significant compartmentalization in them at all, as these are purely civilian vessels. And if one sinks, raising it ans moving out of the line won't be that easy for sure, these are massive. I'm really looking forward to seeing what happens after the first strike on them.
Oh, and I wonder if with the delay fuse set to max, could GMLRS go through the entire barge and explode underneath it? It would be crazily devastating I think...

Edited August 26, 2022 by Huba

[FancyCat]

A opposition activist who worked for the Navalny Foundation and former low level informer of the FSB spoke to the Guardian as he awaits a decision for asylum in the Netherlands.

Looks like the scale for those people caught in Albania is leaning towards spies. Replies to the tweet note it might be Russia attempting to get them extracted back to Russia, where pretense will drop and Russia will happily faunt their spies returning, just like prior cases have shown.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/26/there-were-hundreds-of-us-navalny-ex-staffer-tells-of-being-fsb-informer

 

 

[Huba]

This is so awesome that I'm going to re-post it. Reportedly Taiwanese company is exporting these to Poland in considerable numbers. I didn't see any combat footage yet, but it will come soon I'm sure:

 

[Ultradave]

8 hours ago, JonS said:

You might want to contact the IAEA, telling them to stand down and stop fretting. They seem quite exercised about it.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/26/zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-ukraine-russia-europe-radiation-disaster

https://www.iaea.org/contact

 

You might want to read over again what I wrote.

Two subjects - cutting off electrical supply FROM the plant to Ukraine's power grid, which was what I was originally replying about, and cutting off grid supply TO the power plant which they need for cooling, which I also addressed. 

Dave

PS - the condescending tone is quite unnecessary, especially considering things change day by day. You could even go read the IAEA report I linked to YESTERDAY  instead of cherry picking something from a few days ago. 

Edited August 26, 2022 by Ultradave

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Huba said:

Hmm, that makes some sense. I assume each section is anchored separately (to the main bridge too), so switching the damaged ones should be relatively easy. So the next question is - how many rockets can one section eat before it becomes unusable? If GMLRS can be set up to explode inside the pontoon, it would probably demolish it thoroughly, compartmentalization or not. Unless the pontoons are filled with some floating foam? This would make singing them a lot harder I think.

Edit:

I just looked closer at the video - these are not pontoons, they just combined together a number of river barges and built a crossing on top of them. Now this means that there's no significant compartmentalization in them at all, as these are purely civilian vessels. And if one sinks, raising it ans moving out of the line won't be that easy for sure, these are massive. I'm really looking forward to seeing what happens after the first strike on them.
Oh, and I wonder if with the delay fuse set to max, could GMLRS go through the entire barge and explode underneath it? It would be crazily devastating I think...

 

Hmm, I wonder what kind of flood could be induced without destroying the dam outright?

And turning the entire south bank into muck and stranding two armies north of the river.  Hmm....

P.S. that old WW2 photo is NOT the dam in question; it's the much bigger one upstream.

Edited August 26, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Huba]

2 hours ago, Huba said:

I'm really looking forward to seeing what happens after the first strike on them.

Didn't have to wait long:

And another short video, showing actual hit on the bridge span:

And a third video - looks like UA again hit only the main bridge - pontoon construction can be seen in this vid, it is under construction, reaching about half of the river width at the moment, looks like it wasn't attacked yet:

 

Edited August 26, 2022 by Huba

[Beleg85]

Interesting story of Russian soldier- insider of warcrimes they committed in Ukraine. Good read if someone want to imagine mentallity of this army. Bloody 1920 or 1945.

 

[Grigb]

Fresh post from Agent Murz. While it is big and tedious and contains few relevant facts, I decided to translate it in full. Because it shows the mood of sober and hardcore part of RU Nats from the L-DPR frontline + projection of what is going to happen based on experience with RU commanders.

Here is the summary: 

• Russian leadership prefers to turn a blind eye to problems during SMO, hoping that because of that the problems will disappear
• Russian Federation ruined all available forces in the spring with which it was possible to conduct large encircling operations
• Instead of the normal replenishment of the already belligerent troops, a program has been launched to form new units "from scratch".
• There will be the slaughter of this wave of "volunteers" on Ukrainian fortifications in the fall
• Without mobilization, there will be no full-fledged replenishment of troops. There will be only waves of poorly trained troops who will be slaughtered at the front by artillery
• Already at Mariupol L-DPR forces were fighting with sergeants instead of officers. Now they are fighting with experienced soldiers instead of officers
•  Many RU Nats in the rear do not understand that the main danger of total mobilization - sending poorly trained troops into the battle is already happening
•  L-DPR are already fighting with sick, aged, recovering wounded, anyone who gets caught on the street
• L-DPR battalions lack even basic training in tactics
• Mobilization could reduce the "flow of funerals" even if some of flow will go to RU families instead of L-DPR. [Debatable opinion. I feel he assigns magical qualities to Total Mobilization, that it triggers Fatherland War i discussed previously]
• All these years RU establishment preferred to soar in clouds instead of doing real preparation.
• The slaughter of the next "volunteers" wave will be much faster than the current one. Then there will be a pause and humiliating attempt at negotiations [probably he means that after next slaughter RU will try to negotiate ceasefire that UKR will not accept]
• Then finally will come Total Mobilization but it will be disastrous as the same men will implement it. At around anniversary the poorly trained RU mobilized will run toward UKR machine guns and will be slaughtered as well
• If there is no RU mobilization the front will stop and then roll back under the sound of RU missiles still hitting UKR rear. 
•  [In RU Nat opinion] This is a war to destroy Russia, so no one will conclude any compromise peace, and current RU government will lose this war
• Yet hardcore volunteers will not give up. They will continue to fight slowly improving situation with training and supply
• They will provide necessary training and equipment to other units to fight this war regardless of anything including RU government actions

 

Quote

Six months of "SMO"
As already mentioned, the Russian leadership prefers to turn a blind eye to problems during SMO, hoping that because of that the problems will disappear. The leadership of Russia is moving into another reality (and after it - the Republics). The problems do not disappear, and then we hear amazing explanations for the low pace of the offensive - "we are deliberately advancing so slowly so that fewer civilians die."

The reality is that the Russian Federation in the spring ruined all those forces with which it was possible to conduct large encircling operations. [If] There are no encirclement operations - there will be no decisive turning point in the course of hostilities. I've already written about it. The enemy will slowly retreat in those places where the artillery will  press [him] quite powerfully, but at the same time he will retreat to prepared positions occupied by the transferred reserves.  We can "grind" their cheap infantry in this way (while not having [our] own infantry in abundance)  for a very long time and without much successes.

As already mentioned, instead of the normal replenishment of the already belligerent troops, a program has been launched to form new units "from scratch". We will observe the slaughter of this wave of "volunteers", including the next three-month "BARS" [Combat Army Reserve of the Country] on Ukrainian fortifications in the fall. If there is no mobilization, there will be no full-fledged replenishment of troops. In the conditions of a general shortage of personnel and a lack of communication, you are forming new units, aren't you? They will initially turn out to be uncontrollable, roll out in dense columns to the front line and will be hammered by enemy artillery and MLRS.

Well, the remnants of experienced infantry personnel are now trying to storm the Ukrainian positions around Donetsk in completely wild conditions.

As one officer of the DPR NM said, by the beginning of Mariupol, most of the platoon and company officers who had been officers before February 24, 2022 had died. In Mariupol, there were more or less experienced sergeants in their place, they dragged Mariupol on themselves, and died or dropped out due to severe injuries there. Now most of the platoon and company officers in the Republics are simply the most experienced ordinary soldiers or, if lucky, sergeants who do not have any officer training.

I read Natalia Kurchatova, a military reporter who is not inclined to waver along with the party line:

There are, so to speak, serious doubts about the expediency of mobilization. It is unlikely that poorly trained reserves are capable of radically improving the situation at the front, but the river of funerals can overflow the cup of patience of Russian society, which, let's be honest, is not too inclined to sacrifice private interests for the sake of victory.

This means that even many of those who say what they think, and who at the same time have something to think about, do not understand what is happening. We are already fighting with poorly trained or untrained people like Donetsk and Lugansk "mobilized" and all kinds of "volunteers" who are not really trained to work with heavy weapons. We are already fighting with sick, aged, recovering wounded, anyone who gets caught on the street. And the earlier the mobilization in the Russian Federation is announced, the more time there will be to prepare these mobilized for combat.

Recently, one veteran of the Lugansk militia and the "Ghost" in particular, receiving from me a pair of binoculars for his mentees from one of the line battalions, said: "It would be good to get textbooks...  tactics, topography, "It is a rare case when a person understands that untrained people will not be able to do anything. Especially by untrained officers.

Mobilization could reduce the "flow of funerals" on the contrary, even at the cost of the fact that some of them will not come to Donetsk or Lugansk families, but to Russian ones. But mobilization in the Russian Federation is a responsibility for the fate of the mobilized. And our collective Russian Zep Branigan really does not want this responsibility.

However,... I'm ****ing tired of arguing. I argued for seven years, worked my ass off, explaining that we should not soar in the clouds, it was necessary to prepare for a serious fight. Prepare seriously, thoroughly. Nobody cared. Now I just don't have time for these arguments anymore. You'll see for yourself.

The slaughter of the next "volunteers", formed already from a completely unsuitable contingent (which will begin to scatter after the first battles) will be much faster than the first sets. Then there will be an awkward pause to come up with an explanation for why we began to advance even more slowly. Then humiliating attempts at negotiations. Then, after all, there will be the mobilization in the Russian Federation [that will be] even more monstrous than the current "recruitment of volunteers", because the same people will do it. And yes, [there will be] the race of the unprepared mobilized [toward] Ukrainian machine guns at the first anniversary of the beginning of the SMO. Again without communication, without personal armor, without normal training, without normal management...

"Go, there's no one there!" [Memetic phrase of RU regular officer-advisor who sent the L-DPR unit toward UKR fully manned strongpoint with disastrous result]

[If] There will be no mobilization in the Russian Federation - the front will not just stop but will slowly roll back in places in the opposite direction. To the sounds of "Calibers" sweeping over the heads of the UKR somewhere to their rear.

This is a war to destroy Russia, no one will conclude any compromise peace, unless the very fact of its conclusion is included in the mechanism of a coup in the Russian Federation. And this war, with excellent chances of victory [RU Nats believe they can win this war if Kremlin does as they say], our leadership has every chance to lose.

As for me personally and our movement as a whole, no one from the KTSPN  or the OPSB [Volunteer groups] is going to give up, retreat, or change the stated goals. The goal is the same - the complete military defeat of Ukrainian Nazism. The fact that we will have to do a lot of work for this has been clear all these years, nothing new has been brought to this understanding by the events of 2022. At least for me.

It turned out very symbolically that exactly on the six-month start date of the "SMO", photos of the long-awaited purchase, which I asked for some time ago, were posted in the telegram channel of the KCPN. Finally, two sets of KPPOs [Device to test and adjust rifle sights without shooting] arrived to Akela [Volunteer] to bring small arms to the right "shooting".

How exactly to work with this kit and what other useful things are there for teaching simple shooters the simplest things, I wrote last year. We already have such a set in the "Ghost", it has not gone anywhere in a year, so [the phrase] "they will go to the "Ghost" [means] this is an intermediate address, not the final one. Two new devices will be issued by me to the commanders of two battalions of reservists, one in the LPR, the other in the DPR. Where there are people really interested in engaging in combat training and where there are personnel and conditions for this.

Then there will be more sets of KPPOs. There will be textbooks, including our favorite "samizdat". There will be training of UAV operators, there will be gradual digitalization of communications in units where this is not the case. There will be a solution to many tasks abandoned and missed by our state, such as the manufacture of homemade transitional devices for installation in armored vehicles and integration with TPU [Tank intercom] of modern basic digital radio stations. There will be a lot of work.

As for the texts, I will try to finish the text about communication in the foreseeable future, about why there is no communication, and, hopefully, I will somehow have time to write a text about drones that we do not have. And so, in general, there is nothing to argue about, there is nothing to prove. There are people who understand in what an *ss we are in, and people who have moved to another reality, as well as their informational service [RU propaganda].

Discussion:

Looking at Murz mood and what they are doing I got a feeling that out models do not give enough weight to what RU volunteers are doing. I mean look at what RU regulars achieved, for example in Kherson and what RU volunteers achieved in Donetsk.

The difference is noticeable.

What's if our models of RU army collapse are current in principle but missing crucial details - effect Ru Nats hardcore volunteers are having on the war.  What if RU army already lost it? What if it is actions of RU hardcore volunteers in L-DPR allows to prolong the war and keep RU in the fight?

From where came mid-summer successes that gave RU the general feeling that everything is fine? Severodonets and Lisichansk capture with heavy involvement of RU hardcore units. Late summer sucess? Capture of Pisky, capture outskirts of Bakhmut and Soledar. In terms of psychological impact Kherson, Kharkiv, Zaporojie is just a periphery for RU psyche.

War is not lost for RU psyche while in Donbass is fighting and pushing UKR out.

So, this is where I start disagreeing that Kherson for example is critical for war. It is probably critical for RU command and Putin but for ending this war quickly I believe Donbass front is much more important. RU command might run completely from Kherson but RU Nats will not stop fighting in Donbass. And as long as they are fighting the war will continue.

[Taranis]

13 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Interesting story of Russian soldier- insider of warcrimes they committed in Ukraine. Good read if someone want to imagine mentallity of this army. Bloody 1920 or 1945.

 

With english subtitles

[billbindc]

21 minutes ago, Grigb said:

Fresh post from Agent Murz. While it is big and tedious and contains few relevant facts, I decided to translate it in full. Because it shows the mood of sober and hardcore part of RU Nats from the L-DPR frontline + projection of what is going to happen based on experience with RU commanders.

Here is the summary: 

• Russian leadership prefers to turn a blind eye to problems during SMO, hoping that because of that the problems will disappear
• Russian Federation ruined all available forces in the spring with which it was possible to conduct large encircling operations
• Instead of the normal replenishment of the already belligerent troops, a program has been launched to form new units "from scratch".
• There will be the slaughter of this wave of "volunteers" on Ukrainian fortifications in the fall
• Without mobilization, there will be no full-fledged replenishment of troops. There will be only waves of poorly trained troops who will be slaughtered at the front by artillery
• Already at Mariupol L-DPR forces were fighting with sergeants instead of officers. Now they are fighting with experienced soldiers instead of officers
•  Many RU Nats in the rear do not understand that the main danger of total mobilization - sending poorly trained troops into the battle is already happening
•  L-DPR are already fighting with sick, aged, recovering wounded, anyone who gets caught on the street
• L-DPR battalions lack even basic training in tactics
• Mobilization could reduce the "flow of funerals" even if some of flow will go to RU families instead of L-DPR. [Debatable opinion. I feel he assigns magical qualities to Total Mobilization, that it triggers Fatherland War i discussed previously]
• All these years RU establishment preferred to soar in clouds instead of doing real preparation.
• The slaughter of the next "volunteers" wave will be much faster than the current one. Then there will be a pause and humiliating attempt at negotiations [probably he means that after next slaughter RU will try to negotiate ceasefire that UKR will not accept]
• Then finally will come Total Mobilization but it will be disastrous as the same men will implement it. At around anniversary the poorly trained RU mobilized will run toward UKR machine guns and will be slaughtered as well
• If there is no RU mobilization the front will stop and then roll back under the sound of RU missiles still hitting UKR rear. 
•  [In RU Nat opinion] This is a war to destroy Russia, so no one will conclude any compromise peace, and current RU government will lose this war
• Yet hardcore volunteers will not give up. They will continue to fight slowly improving situation with training and supply
• They will provide necessary training and equipment to other units to fight this war regardless of anything including RU government actions

 

Discussion:

Looking at Murz mood and what they are doing I got a feeling that out models do not give enough weight to what RU volunteers are doing. I mean look at what RU regulars achieved, for example in Kherson and what RU volunteers achieved in Donetsk.

The difference is noticeable.

What's if our models of RU army collapse are current in principle but missing crucial details - effect Ru Nats hardcore volunteers are having on the war.  What if RU army already lost it? What if it is actions of RU hardcore volunteers in L-DPR allows to prolong the war and keep RU in the fight?

From where came mid-summer successes that gave RU the general feeling that everything is fine? Severodonets and Lisichansk capture with heavy involvement of RU hardcore units. Late summer sucess? Capture of Pisky, capture outskirts of Bakhmut and Soledar. In terms of psychological impact Kherson, Kharkiv, Zaporojie is just a periphery for RU psyche.

War is not lost for RU psyche while in Donbass is fighting and pushing UKR out.

So, this is where I start disagreeing that Kherson for example is critical for war. It is probably critical for RU command and Putin but for ending this war quickly I believe Donbass front is much more important. RU command might run completely from Kherson but RU Nats will not stop fighting in Donbass. And as long as they are fighting the war will continue.

Well...so much for the idea that all the Rus Nats are too cowed to critique the Kremlin.

[Hapless]

Bit more on the same bridge strike at the end of this twitter column that looks like it shows more. I count 8 big hits on the bridge- plus something hitting the river near the start and something smaller that might be a cook-off towards the end.

Also a windy day down in Kherson, so maybe the guy reporting on the pontoon and ferry linked earlier missed a rendezvous with destiny.

[Haiduk]

@sburke

Major Vasiliy Lushnikov, tank battalion commander of 291st MRR of 42nd MRD. On 23rd of Aug personally led the attack of own tanks, but his tank was knoked out and his body was left in tank. 

There are some unclear information about heavy clashes in Orikhove area (Zaporizhzhia oblat) in several past days, so probably this is from there and Russian attacks were repelled.

Interesting, that 291st MRR had no tanks in own composition as far as in 2021, but division in uncommon way had own tank battalion on T-72B3. Likely this batalion was included to 291st regiment. Also this MRR use rare MTLBM-6BM with BTR-82A turret.

 

Edited August 26, 2022 by Haiduk

[Battlefront.com]

32 minutes ago, billbindc said:

Well...so much for the idea that all the Rus Nats are too cowed to critique the Kremlin.

Heh.  Of course my theory about message sending is only a theory, but honestly I was kinda expecting this.  At least it's logical that the movement is made up of a lot of people and some are either too stupid to get the message or they are too fanatical to pay attention to it.  Could be that Murz is of the latter type.  Could be the message was not intended for Murz's tier of the movement, but instead for ones moving against the regime in a more deliberate manner.

This is sobering for us in the West.  We're used to freedom loving intellectuals being brave enough to stand up to repressive governments in order to bring about their downfall.  In Russia we see the exact opposite!  It is people even more aggressive than the repressive government that is brave enough to stand up to the regime.  Normally that group is the one in power, but in Russia they aren't because the ones in power are kleptocrats while the hardcore railing against it are nationalists.  They look the same in many ways, but since their motivations are different they are in fact two separate groups.

As I said in previous post, it seems that whatever measures are taken against the RU Nats they are so fanatical that they risk further retributions (sometimes after cooling things down for a short period).  I do not expect that they will fully shut up.  I don't know if there is a way to silence the hardcore RU Nats except to round them up and arrest them as they're doing the anti-war people.

Steve

[pavel.k]

Still i like the version of hitman hired by Malofeev wife Irina the most. It is a comedy of life. Irina has 3 kids with Konstantin, she gave all her life to the family and now the b*tch Dugina is trying to destroy everything. So here it is. FSB think it is GRU work. GRU think it is FSB work. RU Nats think it is message for them keep down. Kremlin doesn't care and just use the situation. And pope Francis call Dugina a victim of war. Perfect murder. 

[Huba]

Oh Dear Lord... Solovyov did Scholz/ austrian painter impression in his program last night. I'm speechless:

 

[The_Capt]

3 hours ago, Hapless said:

The advantage the pontoon has over the bridge is that it's modular- so if one section is damaged, you just cut it loose, it floats off and you slot a new one in. I'd guess all the sections are compartmentalised too, so if one springs a leak and fills up with water, the pontoon as a whole has enough bouyancy to stay afloat long enough for the engineers to try and fix it.

I'm sure there are people on here who know more than me about pontoon bridges etc. though.

The issue for the Russians is probably more along the lines of having a finite amount of those chunky, really-big-river-capable pontoon sections (and having to transport them to the bridge and/or stockpile them nearby without getting them blown up) and trying to keep their specialist engineers alive when trying to fix stuff.

Hmm, yes and no.  The primary advantage of the pontoon is crossing speed and weight - it is pretty slow driving but still faster than a ferry, and you can traffic more vehicles continuously as opposed to discrete crossings.  As to survivability, the ferry is likely better as it is moving and can traffic from multiple sites, the pontoon bridge is fixed.  They both use the same sections, which are not really designed to take too many hits before bad things start to happen.

This whole effort by the RA shows that the strikes on the existing bridge infrastructure have been effective - in case anyone was wondering.  They have sighted the pontoon bridge very well, butted up against the existing concrete bridge superstructure gives it a lot of anchors against current (which is pretty slow) and some indirect fires.

They have also set it up correctly, on the downstream side of the bridge, so if a section gets hit too badly they can disconnect and let it simply float downstream, and replace.

If I were the UA I would wait until it had some decent traffic it on it - knowing the Russians they will be sloppy in crossing management - and then hit it with DPICM.  You will likely bag some vehicles, which will have to be cleared and do damage all along the length of the bridge.  This significantly raises the repair and maint bill while also stressing the entire structure.  Alternately the UA have already demonstrated what they can do with PGM artillery so simply hit the thing along its length - the RA will run out of pontoons before the UA runs out of ammo.

[LongLeftFlank]

1 hour ago, Grigb said:

What's if our models of RU army collapse are current in principle but missing crucial details - effect Ru Nats hardcore volunteers are having on the war.  What if RU army already lost it? What if it is actions of RU hardcore volunteers in L-DPR allows to prolong the war and keep RU in the fight?

From where came mid-summer successes that gave RU the general feeling that everything is fine? Severodonets and Lisichansk capture with heavy involvement of RU hardcore units. Late summer sucess? Capture of Pisky, capture outskirts of Bakhmut and Soledar. In terms of psychological impact Kherson, Kharkiv, Zaporojie is just a periphery for RU psyche.

War is not lost for RU psyche while in Donbass is fighting and pushing UKR out.

So, this is where I start disagreeing that Kherson for example is critical for war. It is probably critical for RU command and Putin but for ending this war quickly I believe Donbass front is much more important. RU command might run completely from Kherson but RU Nats will not stop fighting in Donbass. And as long as they are fighting the war will continue.

[MURZ] However,... I'm ****ing tired of arguing.... Now I just don't have time for these arguments anymore. You'll see for yourself.

Yeah, well you're not the only one, boychik.

Harking back to one of the very early comments from our esteemed host: 

....Ukrainians merely have to keep killing Russians.

If the UA can't solve for a combined arms offensive and encirclement, the next best option for them is to *sharply* step up the pace of killing and maiming of Russians. Until the invaders simply run out of bodies.

And if the 'volunteers' are indeed the SS formations keeping Russia in this war, they need to be brought to their Cherkassy and Elsenborn Ridge, asap. Screw the vehicles, target men. Bleed them white.

Don't depend on human wave attacks in the fall making it easy. Ukraine and its allies should begin prepping large purpose designed kill zones.  Select places (to quote that old Chinese guy) the enemy is obliged to attack.  I believe brother @Grigblately listed a few in Donbas. 

...The Geneva Convention left this highway several exits ago. Keep the bunkers formidable looking but thinly manned. Fill them, along with every road, track, bush and  house with millions of tiny mines and CBUs. Bombardment won't clear them. Let the Bayraktars and SoF teams prioritise killing their demining vehicles. Snipe and drone their pioneer troops, whatever renders them ineffective.  Keep blowing the legs off their infantry in the hundreds, day after day. They will eventually go home.

None of this gives me any pleasure or satisfaction personally. But it looks to me like the surest path to victory at present.

[billbindc]

37 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Heh.  Of course my theory about message sending is only a theory, but honestly I was kinda expecting this.  At least it's logical that the movement is made up of a lot of people and some are either too stupid to get the message or they are too fanatical to pay attention to it.  Could be that Murz is of the latter type.  Could be the message was not intended for Murz's tier of the movement, but instead for ones moving against the regime in a more deliberate manner.

This is sobering for us in the West.  We're used to freedom loving intellectuals being brave enough to stand up to repressive governments in order to bring about their downfall.  In Russia we see the exact opposite!  It is people even more aggressive than the repressive government that is brave enough to stand up to the regime.  Normally that group is the one in power, but in Russia they aren't because the ones in power are kleptocrats while the hardcore railing against it are nationalists.  They look the same in many ways, but since their motivations are different they are in fact two separate groups.

As I said in previous post, it seems that whatever measures are taken against the RU Nats they are so fanatical that they risk further retributions (sometimes after cooling things down for a short period).  I do not expect that they will fully shut up.  I don't know if there is a way to silence the hardcore RU Nats except to round them up and arrest them as they're doing the anti-war people.

Steve

It's also important to remember that the Ru Nat movement is pretty much the opposite of a bloc. Some will be fanatical, some will be simply opportunists. Sort of like the Bolsheviks in 1916 when you think about it.