How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[The_Capt]

6 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

now I feel better   So maybe once UKR has sufficient trained, highly mobile infantry backed up by sufficient artillery and AD, that's mostly what they need given the nature of the battlespace?  Is that your point?  

That, backed up with deep strike and ISR might just cause the Russian system to buckle under it own weight again.  Fog eating snow until we get systemic failure. Then a modest amount of highly mobile mech/armour might bring the whole rotten house down.  Massed mech/armour before that condition is met could just leave it as vulnerable as the Russian systems were on the offence.

Or at least that is the working theory.  We are talking about a battlefield where a principle of war, “surprise” does not seem to exist, at least for the Russians.  And as we have noted from early on, Mass is also behaving weirdly.  However, it is really hard to determine if both sides are fighting this way because it is all they can do with what they have.  Or is it all they can do because that is how things are now.

It is likely in between those statements but how much is key.  Right now no one knows the answer, the UA and RA are trying to figure it out (Russia is failing badly) and they are closest to the problem.  Its why I really do not listen to pundits, experts and analyst that try and say what the answer is, or is not.  I know enough to know that we are kinda off the map here and it is going to be a bit before things become clear.  The analysts to listen to right now are the ones asking the best questions, in my opinion.

I am not worried about Ukraine because they appear to have the learning advantage here.  They have access to all the western expertise and data.  They have some brilliant leadership, and they have shown they can adapt as fast as we can send them stuff.  

News for Russia not so good.  They were unable to really adapt or learn from Phase 1.  Many pointed to Phase 2 as some sort of Russian brilliant re-think when it was in fact a devolution back to an even older form of warfare.  One that did not produce results anywhere near fast or as far as they would need to.  So here we are entering Phase 3, Russia is in worse shape and Ukraine is starting to dance circles around them.

[dan/california]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am growing more and more convinced of the idea that operational manoeuvre is becoming deep strike.  I am not sure giving the UA a bunch of metal is the right way to go.

I am still attached to my theory that next big military technology is going to be a VERY high tech Ghillie suit.

Edit: I drop words like crazy when I try to type too fast...

Edited August 15, 2022 by dan/california

[danfrodo]

2 hours ago, The_Capt said:

That, backed up with deep strike and ISR might just cause the Russian system to buckle under it own weight again.  Fog eating snow until we get systemic failure. Then a modest amount of highly mobile mech/armour might bring the whole rotten house down.  Massed mech/armour before that condition is met could just leave it as vulnerable as the Russian systems were on the offence.

Or at least that is the working theory.  We are talking about a battlefield where a principle of war, “surprise” does not seem to exist, at least for the Russians.  And as we have noted from early on, Mass is also behaving weirdly.  However, it is really hard to determine if both sides are fighting this way because it is all they can do with what they have.  Or is it all they can do because that is how things are now.

It is likely in between those statements but how much is key.  Right now no one knows the answer, the UA and RA are trying to figure it out (Russia is failing badly) and they are closest to the problem.  Its why I really do not listen to pundits, experts and analyst that try and say what the answer is, or is not.  I know enough to know that we are kinda off the map here and it is going to be a bit before things become clear.  The analysts to listen to right now are the ones asking the best questions, in my opinion.

I am not worried about Ukraine because they appear to have the learning advantage here.  They have access to all the western expertise and data.  They have some brilliant leadership, and they have shown they can adapt as fast as we can send them stuff.  

News for Russia not so good.  They were unable to really adapt or learn from Phase 1.  Many pointed to Phase 2 as some sort of Russian brilliant re-think when it was in fact a devolution back to an even older form of warfare.  One that did not produce results anywhere near fast or as far as they would need to.  So here we are entering Phase 3, Russia is in worse shape and Ukraine is starting to dance circles around them.

Now that I've thought about Perun video and TheCapt's response, things are more clear to me (clearer?  more cleary?).   Tt's not as bad as it first seemed after watching Perun.

1.  Perun is doing a lot of math about armor.  But armor hasn't been a deciding factor in this conflict so far -- it's better than not armored, but not crucial.

2.  Perun mentions RU advantage in arty tubes.  But RU artillery intensity & effectiveness has dropped significantly over last couple months.  UKR artillery systems are playing outsized role in degrading RU capabilities.  Also, UKR systems are much more accurate, so don't need so many tubes nor as many shells nor as much tube wear & tear.

3.  Perun mentions the UKR  issue of having so many kinds of vehicles and wishes UKR had just one or a few basic IFVs.  This is of course a mess, logistically.  But the flip side of this is that UKR vehicles fleet (tanks, APC, IFV) are generally becoming newer while RU is getting older.  I say this while aware that some vehicles, like M113s, are not new.  But all those MRAPS are.  And a lot of the T72 variants coming in from eastern europe are relatively new.  But RU is going backwards in time at fast clip and doesn't seem to have supply of new stuff.  RU has a logistics mess also in the fact that their old stuff is often very unreliable.

As TheCapt mentioned, UKR can't mass because of RU artillery & lack of surprise.  So a big pile of armor might be more of a target of opportunity for RU than a schwerpunkt for UKR. 

And the above is just at the tactical level, mostly.  At the strategic level RU's economy is going downhill pretty fast.  UKR economy is awful also, but they are fighting for survival so the whole mindset is completely different.

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

Looks like poor OPSEC directly led to the Wagner HQ hit:

 

Click on the link to see the pics the numbnuts uploaded.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Looks like supplies into the entire southern front just took a significant hit.  According to Def Mon, bridges for the two rail lines coming out of Crimea are down:

 

[Battlefront.com]

8 hours ago, DesertFox said:

 

 

Interesting that professionals with access to more information and analysis time have come to the same conclusion about the airport destruction... no firm handle on what the heck happened!

Interesting that some are keeping drones in the mix.  I still think it's not very likely.

Also interesting that the WaPo is not ruling out that this was the result of some Russian accident.  I don't think it's likely, but then again we've seen how they store ammo and we know the Russians aren't big fans of sticking to good safety practices. .

Steve

[chuckdyke]

Maybe a Russian Romeo who wants to impress his Ukrainian girlfriend. The epic of the Trojan horse didn't happen far away from this venue. More to the direction of Turkey. This is the stuff for the movies.

[Aragorn2002]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Looks like poor OPSEC directly led to the Wagner HQ hit:

 

Click on the link to see the pics the numbnuts uploaded.

Steve

[poesel]

6 hours ago, danfrodo said:

And the above is just at the tactical level, mostly.  At the strategic level RU's economy is going downhill pretty fast. 

It is going down, but unfortunately not fast. Russian businesses have long known that things can go bad, and therefore have greater stockpiles of stuff than their western counterparts. That's not lasting forever, but the Russian economy has been more resilient than expected.
I guess we will at least have to wait another 6 months until the hurt really reaches the average Russian. Even then, it is not sure that there is a political effect. Russians have gone through quite a lot of hardships in the past and tended to bear it silently. Unless we find another Mr. Uljanov in Switzerland.

[poesel]

9 hours ago, The_Capt said:

We are an entitled/spoiled set of generations that have had a fraction of a percentage of its youth who have had to fight and die for it, in small low stakes wars on the other side of the world.

I understand what you are trying to say here, but only a few having to fight is not a bad thing. I hope we can find other ways to make people appreciate the advantages of democracy and freedom.

[chuckdyke]

Bankrupt!

Russia fails to pay military reservists, civilian laborers brought into Ukraine (msn.com)

[FancyCat]

A soldier present and took part in war crimes at Bucha confesses to it to Russian opposition news, apparently to try and save what remains of his unit from being sent back to the frontline. There is both a article and YouTube video but I speak no Russian so I can't say if the tweet below is correct.

 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, poesel said:

I understand what you are trying to say here, but only a few having to fight is not a bad thing. I hope we can find other ways to make people appreciate the advantages of democracy and freedom.

All war is sacrifice.  It is a bad thing if people forget that sacrifice for a greater good is an ongoing requirement in order to sustain their way of life.  

Or they could use a “great peace” to completely forget that, get rich off human insecurities and raise generations of “me-centric” entitlement (i.e. “sacrifice is for others) who believe that their last selfie is a great work of art and they should get a participant medal for everything.

Now I know this is a gross oversimplification, plenty of the last generations are doing great things.  However, after watching democracy wither largely because people don’t bother to show up, and now an egregious embolden act of war against the west by Russia that is becoming “boring”; I am concerned to say the least.

I too hope for a Rousseau-like state and an end to war but until that day comes we all need to be ready to pay the bill when it comes due.

[Battlefront.com]

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Very big assumption, and not surprising coming from a western analyst, is that “more metal” will work.  Russia had all the metal and we saw how that worked out.

The corollary that you are implying here should be stated flat out.  Ukraine was completely outclassed in all forms of hardware, quantitatively and in some cases qualitatively, and yet it defeated Russia (Ukraine has effectively won the war already).  SOME of this was due to gross incompetence and structural failure on the Russian side, but at the tactical level Ukraine still bested Russia more than the pre-war bean counters thought possible due to Russia's material advantage.

Let's keep in mind that Ukraine took back most of its territory in 2014 with very little "metal".  That strategy only partially failed when Russia invaded with a very large mech force.  Partially because Russia quickly ran out of easy victories and decided to go with the Minsk concept instead of continuing to fight.

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

Now I am not sure if the problems with mech would go the the other way against the Russians but I have my suspicions.  The problem with metal is its support chain and here Ukrainian might be as vulnerable as Russians.  

Ukraine's mech forces are not as vulnerable as Russia's are for several reasons:

• Ukraine has shown vastly more patience and competency on the battlefield than Russia did.  No unrealistic timelines, no pushing into places to satisfy a detached command, no inclination to do suicide attacks for any reason, etc.  Amazing how much armor you can retain if you don't use it stupidly
• Russia does not have the infantry AT weapons that Ukraine has.
• Even if Russia did have such infantry AT weapons, it doesn't have much in the way of infantry to use them.
• Russian losses to date mean that its armored forces are spread thin and in penny packets.  Concentrated Ukrainian armor, therefore, is likely to have local numerical superiority despite strategic imbalance in favor of Russia.
• Ukraine has infantry to accompany its armor, something Russia rarely seemed capable of doing.  Russia lost a LOT of its armor because it didn't have infantry and Ukraine did.
• Morale is still very high on the Ukrainian side, very low on the Russian side.  As Ukraine starts to push back Russian forces, it's only going to get more favorable for Ukraine.  We know what it means when an armed force loses the will to fight against a force that is motivated.

And this applies even to Ukraine''s current "metal" capacity.  Which is important because...

14 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I am growing more and more convinced of the idea that operational manoeuvre is becoming deep strike.  I am not sure giving the UA a bunch of metal is the right way to go.

At least for this situation, as it is now, I'm definitely thinking this.  Whatever material advantages that Russia started with have been squandered.

The way I see things now is that Ukraine has enough armor and infantry to overwhelm any well chosen sector of front.  Local superiority matters in this war because Russia lacks the strategic capacity to suffer even minor losses of territory and forces.  "Death by a thousand cuts" is not even the situation here.  It is more like "death by a dozen cuts".

Kherson is the most advantageous sector on the front right now.  Ukraine's ability to sever Russia's supply capabilities through "deep strikes" is decisive.  All Ukraine has to do is push Russia into expending ammunition and fuel to the point where defending itself becomes physically impossible.  Like the defenders of Mariupol, even the best positions manned by skilled, determined fighters ultimately means nothing if there's no ammo.  And Russia's forces are, at a minimum, not motivated to die in place.  Skills are also likely lacking for most of the forces there.

What this all means is Ukraine could attack Russian forces in Kherson with a minimum of "metal" and it will, eventually, win.  Whatever "metal" Russia has on the western side of the river won't matter once the fuel starts dwindling.  Ukraine's ability to deploy armor will help speed that along and make the casualty count even more favorable, but pure infantry backed by ISR, artillery, drones, and deep strikes (including partisans) will be enough to get the job done.  Fortunately for Ukraine, they have the 5th Tank Brigade sitting in reserve a few miles away.  That's way more than Ukraine needs to win.

Steve

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

The corollary that you are implying here should be stated flat out.  Ukraine was completely outclassed in all forms of hardware, quantitatively and in some cases qualitatively, and yet it defeated Russia (Ukraine has effectively won the war already).  SOME of this was due to gross incompetence and structural failure on the Russian side, but at the tactical level Ukraine still bested Russia more than the pre-war bean counters thought possible due to Russia's material advantage.

Let's keep in mind that Ukraine took back most of its territory in 2014 with very little "metal".  That strategy only partially failed when Russia invaded with a very large mech force.  Partially because Russia quickly ran out of easy victories and decided to go with the Minsk concept instead of continuing to fight.

Ukraine's mech forces are not as vulnerable as Russia's are for several reasons:

• Ukraine has shown vastly more patience and competency on the battlefield than Russia did.  No unrealistic timelines, no pushing into places to satisfy a detached command, no inclination to do suicide attacks for any reason, etc.  Amazing how much armor you can retain if you don't use it stupidly
• Russia does not have the infantry AT weapons that Ukraine has.
• Even if Russia did have such infantry AT weapons, it doesn't have much in the way of infantry to use them.
• Russian losses to date mean that its armored forces are spread thin and in penny packets.  Concentrated Ukrainian armor, therefore, is likely to have local numerical superiority despite strategic imbalance in favor of Russia.
• Ukraine has infantry to accompany its armor, something Russia rarely seemed capable of doing.  Russia lost a LOT of its armor because it didn't have infantry and Ukraine did.
• Morale is still very high on the Ukrainian side, very low on the Russian side.  As Ukraine starts to push back Russian forces, it's only going to get more favorable for Ukraine.  We know what it means when an armed force loses the will to fight against a force that is motivated.

And this applies even to Ukraine''s current "metal" capacity.  Which is important because...

At least for this situation, as it is now, I'm definitely thinking this.  Whatever material advantages that Russia started with have been squandered.

The way I see things now is that Ukraine has enough armor and infantry to overwhelm any well chosen sector of front.  Local superiority matters in this war because Russia lacks the strategic capacity to suffer even minor losses of territory and forces.  "Death by a thousand cuts" is not even the situation here.  It is more like "death by a dozen cuts".

Kherson is the most advantageous sector on the front right now.  Ukraine's ability to sever Russia's supply capabilities through "deep strikes" is decisive.  All Ukraine has to do is push Russia into expending ammunition and fuel to the point where defending itself becomes physically impossible.  Like the defenders of Mariupol, even the best positions manned by skilled, determined fighters ultimately means nothing if there's no ammo.  And Russia's forces are, at a minimum, not motivated to die in place.  Skills are also likely lacking for most of the forces there.

What this all means is Ukraine could attack Russian forces in Kherson with a minimum of "metal" and it will, eventually, win.  Whatever "metal" Russia has on the western side of the river won't matter once the fuel starts dwindling.  Ukraine's ability to deploy armor will help speed that along and make the casualty count even more favorable, but pure infantry backed by ISR, artillery, drones, and deep strikes (including partisans) will be enough to get the job done.  Fortunately for Ukraine, they have the 5th Tank Brigade sitting in reserve a few miles away.  That's way more than Ukraine needs to win.

Steve

A lot of the pace of the offensive will depend the current balance of Ukrainian air defense, and the Russian air force. If western help, Russian casualties, and the strike on the Saki air base have swung the balance enough?  The Ukrainian offensive can try to go high tempo and much more metal intensive, and try cut the Kherson pocket in half, or even into thirds, in a day at some point. If the Ukrainians confidence is not high enough in their AA capability it will be fog eating snow all the way through. You need to copyright that phrase Capt.

Another factor in Kherson that will matter if the resolution takes longer than I hope it will, water temperature. At the moment a Lot of Russians are lying to themselves that they can swim the Dnipro if it comes down to it. That delusion is going to get a lot harder to maintain when it gets cold. The Russians are all from places that have winter, they will understand that half a kilometer in COLD water is a very different thing.

[Battlefront.com]

Interesting vignette.  Russian T-72 and BMP-2 are moving along, some sort of high velocity round from Ukraine misses the BMP then something blows up the tank.  Mine?  At least two of the tank crew run for cover in the direction of Ukrainian forces, perhaps indicating that they had no idea about Ukraine's positions.

 

[fireship4]

You can see a launch from just to the right of the tank in the trees, which misses the BMP.   I don't know what hit the tank.

EDIT: There are a couple of flashes in the video whose source isn't immediately obvious, the first between the camera and the trees at the location of the miss, I would guess is a lense-flare due to the explosion, the other is in the bottom right and seems co-located with a third vehicle.

Edited August 15, 2022 by fireship4

[Battlefront.com]

Another source of friction within the Russian forces is using LPR and DPR cannon fodder outside of their territorial boundaries.  Here we see a bunch of LPR guys refuse to fight in Donetsk.  We've seen this sort of thing before, so it's not a first.  However, I'm wondering now that Luhansk is now "secure" if the motivation is even lower for LPR soldiers instructed to go elsewhere:

https://censor.net/en/news/3360880/mobilized_from_lpr_refuse_to_fight_for_dpr_video

Steve

[dan/california]

We might get an answer to the AA question soon...

[Bil Hardenberger]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Interesting vignette.  Russian T-72 and BMP-2 are moving along, some sort of high velocity round from Ukraine misses the BMP then something blows up the tank.  Mine?  At least two of the tank crew run for cover in the direction of Ukrainian forces, perhaps indicating that they had no idea about Ukraine's positions.

 

That looks like an anti-armor ambush to me... first round missed the BMP, second, from a different launcher, takes out the tank.

[hcrof]

29 minutes ago, Bil Hardenberger said:

That looks like an anti-armor ambush to me... first round missed the BMP, second, from a different launcher, takes out the tank.

My guess is a RPG shot at the BMP but it was rushed because he wanted to fire before the mine blew up (which would kind of throw your aim off). Most definitely an ambush though.

[Cederic]

It may be highly capable but if this is true, it's a bit too fragile:

 

What works on the range with all the time in the world to follow procedures and do maintenance still needs to work in the field.

[Cederic]

Rumint - the Mirror is a 'left wing' tabloid but despite that I do find its journalism is very credible.

https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/vladimir-putins-panic-stricken-officials-27738405

Quote

A highly placed Kremlin official has secretly approached the West to help end the Ukraine invasion, it was claimed last night.

The secret member of Vladimir Putin ’s elite is said to have revealed the Kremlin is in panic and desperate for the bloody war to end.

 

[The_Capt]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Ukraine's mech forces are not as vulnerable as Russia's

Here the question of Russian AirPower comes into play.  We have heard of the Russia Air Force being able to hit concentrations of UA (rumoured on twitter but I have seen no actual proof of this, mind you).  If the Russian are still able to gain air superiority, at least locally then heavy concentrations of UA mech/armour have a problem.  AD is the obvious answer but that needs to extend the entire length of the UA LOCs or they risk running out of fuel and ammo as well.

My guess is that Russia has been trying hammers of different varieties.  Ukraine has been this weird rubber anvil that can push a lot of energy back on the hammer and damage it, while resisting.  Question is that when the Russians have broken enough hammers and wrists, can a Ukrainian stiletto finish the job? Or are we looking at something else?
 

[danfrodo]

1 minute ago, The_Capt said:

Here the question of Russian AirPower comes into play.  We have heard of the Russia Air Force being able to hit concentrations of UA (rumoured on twitter but I have seen no actual proof of this, mind you).  If the Russian are still able to gain air superiority, at least locally then heavy concentrations of UA mech/armour have a problem.  AD is the obvious answer but that needs to extend the entire length of the UA LOCs or they risk running out of fuel and ammo as well.

My guess is that Russia has been trying hammers of different varieties.  Ukraine has been this weird rubber anvil that can push a lot of energy back on the hammer and damage it, while resisting.  Question is that when the Russians have broken enough hammers and wrists, can a Ukrainian stiletto finish the job? Or are we looking at something else?
 

Also sounds like a great way to pull RU airpower into a trap.  Which I hope is what is happening w the WarMonitor report posted by DanCA above.  Secretly mass a bunch AD then show RU a mech force to attack, as RU probably expects.  Maybe UKR air force also jumps in on it.