How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[Bearstronaut]

2 hours ago, dan/california said:

Did some people get a lot closer to revealing sources and methods than they were supposed to?

Sounds like it to me.

[LongLeftFlank]

5 hours ago, akd said:

 

I heard from a source I deem reliable that a 'Train the Trainer' program in the fine points of modern IATGW tank killing was held in the US Northwest (I assumed Yakima) for several hundred UA NCOs. This tracks very nicely with that.

What's interesting (ht @billbindc) is the date this training was conducted:  March 2021.

Note also though that the program was greenlit the previous fall.

...Now I understand this gets USA-political, and I can't document it, but it seems that by 2019, POTUS would only be briefed  (i.e. given an option to intervene) on certain defence and mil assistance decisions. Everything else was kept vague and merely presented for signature. And in practice, the former were solely matters where (a) US personnel might come home in body bags on camera, or (b) Israel had an interest. Pence and Mnuchin were the filters.

Beyond that, the policy establishment was left mainly to its own devices.

[OldSarge]

20 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

...Now I understand this gets USA-political, and I can't document it, but it seems that by 2019, POTUS would only be briefed  (i.e. given an option to intervene) on certain defence and mil assistance decisions. Everything else was kept vague and merely presented for signature. And in practice, the former were solely matters where (a) US personnel might come home in body bags on camera, or (b) Israel had an interest. Pence and Mnuchin were the filters.

Beyond that, the policy establishment was left mainly to its own devices.

For the most part agencies run autonomously once they receive their funding. with competent leadership at agency level there is little need for the upper politicos to become involved in day to day affairs unless something becomes 'Breaking News'.

[G.I. Joe]

17 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Agreed, although there is one horrible full colour sequence I won't link from Saipan 1944 ("Hell in the Pacific" series), where a Japanese hetai emerges on fire from his bunker and runs around for a bit before lying down in a ditch to expire. The poor guy's body language expresses less agony than embarassment, as if he had been caught outside naked.

And then there's this non-explicit but nonetheless poignant sequence of a US tanker on Okinawa, a young skinny kid, likely sole survivor of his crew. His body language alone tells the tale.

....These are the kinds of stories a good friend of mine at USVA hears on a daily basis from veterans ever since they began offering extra PTSD benefits.

The stories invariably begin, "I always thought I'd take this story with me to the grave with me, because who the hell would want to hear it, except my wife who wonders why I wake up screaming at night."

We are all human.

Very well said. That emotional buffering of time definitely seems to be a thing for impersonal shots of aircraft, ships or structures exploding where one is aware on an intellectual level that people are dying. However, there is a threshold of obvious human suffering past which it never gets easy to watch, no matter how old and grainy the footage. Nor should it...

16 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:

LOL.

@BlackMoria is also the playtester who demolished -- no really, chewed and effing spit out! -- my CMSF1 Ramadi JOKER 3 urban hellscape (back a decade ago), taking only a single casualty! 

IIRC, he end ran the QRF column around the (obvious) insurgent kill zone, linked up the forces (replenishing ammo, which is key) and then brutally straight punched into the heart of the ghetto to relieve the cut off Marines.  Freeking legend! (I had to make quite some design tweaks to the scenario after that, I can tell you)

Canucks by and large are a peaceable people, but we do have hidden talents for war when put to it.  My uncles in the South Scotias and Seaforths told quite some stories  #TommySS

I recall hearing that during World War II, it was often said that "the Canadians dress like the British, talk like the Americans and fight like no one else on Earth."

[Gpig]

11 minutes ago, G.I. Joe said:

I recall hearing that during World War II, it was often said that "the Canadians dress like the British, talk like the Americans and fight like no one else on Earth."

There has always seemed to be a large amount of Canadian fans/players/contributors to Combat Mission. Seems to me it was partly because the Canadian forces were included in that very first CMBO game. Til Steve and Charles came along, I'd always had trouble finding wargames with Canadians on stage.

[Machor]

Intelligently contrarian article by David Johnson on WOTR - I will underline some parts for the sake of promoting discussion with TLDR folks:

"WOULD WE DO BETTER? HUBRIS AND VALIDATION IN UKRAINE"

https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/would-we-do-better-hubris-and-validation-in-ukraine/

First, a warning about Ukraine's control of the information sphere in the West:

"The Russians have, however, conducted several successful river crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River to position forces for offensive operations against Izyum. These crossings enabled the Russians to posture forces for offensive operations in the region south of the river.

These crossings, as well as other successful Russian operations, receive scant media attention. Nor do Ukrainian failures figure prominently in reporting from the war. This is likely the result of a sophisticated all-media Ukrainian information campaign, reinforced by positive stories from journalists whose access is carefully managed by the Ukrainian government. This control of information is reinforced by their military’s excellent operational security. Indeed, it was the Ukrainian government that distributed the video of the botched Siverskyi Donets River crossing."

Sizzling take on how Western militaries' prioritization of force protection [See all the folks bragging about protecting their pixeltruppen above  ] may well be counter-productive in a near-peer conflict like the war in Ukraine:

"Western militaries are also conditioned by what Jeffrey Record calls “casualty phobia.” He traces this phenomenon to the Vietnam War, but notes that its modern implications were manifested in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. His thesis is that U.S. policymakers and senior military officers believe that the “use of force in situations of optional intervention should be prepared to sacrifice even operational effectiveness for the sake of casualty avoidance” and that in the war against Serbia, “force protection was accorded priority over mission accomplishment.” To support this conclusion, Record cites then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton to support this conclusion: “The paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the well-being of our people must remain our first priority.”

Consequently, Western militaries have focused heavily on force protection. This was possible because of the discretionary nature of most operations—the types of operations most serving military members have experienced almost exclusively during their careers. There also is an ever-present concern behind most operational decisions that the perceived public aversion to casualties could unhinge policy. This is not to say that the irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not brutal and deadly. They certainly were at the soldier, squad, platoon, and company levels. That said, operations rarely involved the employment of battalion or larger formations in combined arms operations.

In over 20 years of war in Afghanistan, not a single platoon position was lost in combat. Casualty levels were extraordinarily low by even Vietnam War standards and medical attention was prompt and comprehensive. Finally, combat was deadly only at the ground level; aircraft largely operated with impunity outside the range of limited adversary air defenses. Aviation losses were in low-altitude operations and almost exclusively helicopters.

The war in Ukraine has starkly demonstrated the high human costs of large-scale, high-intensity warfare. Russian casualties at the Siverskyi Donets River and in other battles show that these are wars where company, battalion, and even larger formations can be annihilated in the blink of an eye, resulting in large numbers of soldiers killed in action and wounded, as well as significant materiel losses.

Consequently, in Ukraine, we are seeing the return of the imperative for force preservation, rather than force protection. This is currently beyond the consciousness of Western militaries and current combat casualty care capacity.

Changing the mindset from “force protection” to “force preservation” borders on heresy in current Western military culture. In Ukraine, Russia is learning the necessity of force preservation the hard way — in the unforgiving crucible of combat. A reasonable question is whether or not Western governments have prepared themselves, much less their citizens, for a conflict that could result in thousands of deaths and many more casualties in just a few weeks. Would this butcher’s bill awaken the passion of the people described in Carl von Clausewitz’s On War trinity, even in countries with volunteer militaries? Could this level of casualties challenge, if not unhinge, policy?

The fact that the Russians are reconstituting units from fresh troops and remnants of units decimated in combat is the reality of protracted, high-intensity combat. Our own history from World War II shows the potential cost of peer warfare. The 1st Infantry Division, in 443 days of total combat in North Africa, Sicily, and Europe, suffered 20,659 casualties. This figure is greater than the authorized strength of 15,000 for a World War II U.S. infantry division.

Importantly, these levels of casualties in the Ukraine war also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate fighting strength in other than short wars with modest casualties. Much is being made of the Russians relying on hastily mobilized reserves to replace losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, the levée en masse is a requirement for protracted state warfare at this level. The Russians and Ukrainians both have systems in place to conscript their citizens; the practice has been abandoned, along with its supporting infrastructure, in most Western countries. Perhaps this is a case of prudent preparation, rather than an act of desperation?"

He's with @The_Capt in arguing that there's nowhere to hide with modern ISR:

"While many aspects of the Ukraine war echo past major wars, such as World War II and, to a lesser degree, the Korean War, there are several new dimensions. One in particular, likely explains the Siverskyi Donets River crossing debacle: ubiquitous surveillance of the battlefield. The Ukrainians reported that they had discovered the Russian crossing operation via aerial reconnaissance. The potential sources of this information are much more diverse and numerous now than in even the most recent conflicts. They include a wide variety of drones, commercially available satellite imagery, intelligence from Western sources, and other means.

This new reality essentially means that there is nowhere for a relatively large formation to hide. Surprise, particularly at a limited number of potential crossing points on a river, may not be possible. Thus, these types of physical deception operations may also be pointless. Finally, given the sophistication of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past.

This new reality renders those criticizing the Russians not only wrong but dangerous. They are clinging to a doctrine that may be completely outdated in the current operational environment. That they persist in the view that Russian incompetence is mostly due to untrained and poorly motivated soldiers, led by corrupt and incompetent leaders, gives them a comfortable answer that does not invalidate their expertise or current practices."

And he follows up with a knock-out punch:

"The U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s looked to the World War II Wehrmacht for lessons about how to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win. After all, the Germans had actually fought the Red Army. Former Nazi officers, such as Gen. Hermann Balck and Gen. Friedrich von Mellenthin, explained their system and its importance during conferences and meetings with U.S. officers and officials. Americanized versions of German professional military education practices, officer professionalism, and encouraging subordinate initiative through Auftragstactik, which became U.S. mission command, were adopted in the U.S. Army as best practices. But we should well remember that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, grinding war of attrition supposedly suffered from the similar centralized leadership and hastily trained soldier maladies as today.

Furthermore, a revisionist history, not unlike that of the Lost Cause narrative about the Confederate defeat in the U.S. Civil War, was peddled by the Germans. Robert Cittino wrote that they

described the Soviet army as a faceless and mindless horde, with the officers terrorizing their men into obedience and dictator Josef Stalin terrorizing the officers. It had no finesse. Its idea of the military art was to smash everything in its path through numbers, brute force, and sheer size.

Thus, just like the Union Army, “‘quantity had triumphed over quality.’ The better army lost, in other words, and the elite force vanished beneath the superior numbers of the herd.”

These perceptions shaped U.S. views about Russian forces during the Cold War and, despite being disproven in the 1990s, are echoed in assessments today. As retired Army colonel and diplomat Joel Rayburn said in an interview with the New Yorker, “A bad army was ordered to do something stupid.” While officers are now promoted based on patronage, this is not all that dissimilar from the requirement for political reliability in the Russian military in World War II. What should have been considered then and now is why the German forces were crushed by such an inferior adversary? Perhaps enough people, materiel, and an indomitable will to fight despite privations and setbacks are exactly what are really necessary to endure and win in peer warfare."

In his conclusion, he questions the widespread notion that the Ukrainian military is doing well because it had been 'Westernized':

"These views are dangerous in Western assessments of the Ukrainian military. Currently, the prevailing narrative is that the Ukrainian edge is that they have evolved into a modern Western military, trained for over a decade in Western methods. They are professionals. Therefore, they will prevail. Just as we would. Again, nothing to learn here.

However, the actual evidence is unclear; the assessments of the prowess of Ukraine’s military may be wishful thinking and hubris. The title of a Wall Street Journal article epitomizes this view, saying it all came down to “years of NATO training.”

One should recall that Western initiatives to reform the Ukrainian military did not even begin until after the 2014 Russian invasion. Although they have progressed, many of the senior officers were raised in the Soviet system. When I visited the National Defense University in Kyiv in 1996 on an exchange visit as the director of academic affairs at our National University, all of the senior leaders were former Soviet officers. Some were also Russian citizens who chose to stay in Ukraine because there was nothing in Russia to go home to after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Consequently, a deeply entrenched Soviet-style bureaucracy and training model permeated the Ukrainian military. Thus, their rehabilitation is fundamentally a bottom-to-top institution rebuilding and culture-changing endeavor that will take time. In particular, initiatives to create a merit-based and proficient officer and noncommissioned officer corps are decades-long efforts that are just taking root at the lower- and mid-levels of the Ukrainian military. Consequently, many of the tactics above the small unit look more Russian than American, as does most of the equipment.

An indication that there is some way to go beyond the NATO training is that there is little evidence that the Ukrainians are executing joint and combined arms offensive operations. This capability will be important if the transition from the defense and attempt offensive operations to restore territory lost to Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine also appears to be ceding ground in the Donbas to a slow, grinding Russian advance.

Consequently, the analysis of the Ukraine war needs to address another unasked question: What if this view that quality people and leaders are the most important ingredient in modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was correct that quantity has a quality all of its own? If that is the case, then the Ukrainians may need much greater assistance if they are to survive a Russian-style grinding war of attrition.

Additionally, as the United States plans for how it will compete and potentially fight China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and an intense desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts, and capabilities, rather than to validate current approaches.

As it did for Russia, it could happen to us, and we need to fully understand what “it” is."

[G.I. Joe]

35 minutes ago, Gpig said:

There has always seemed to be a large amount of Canadian fans/players/contributors to Combat Mission. Seems to me it was partly because the Canadian forces were included in that very first CMBO game. Til Steve and Charles came along, I'd always had trouble finding wargames with Canadians on stage.

I've noticed that too, and I think you're right about the reason... I do remember the old Jane's/EA Fighters series flight sims back in the 90s had Canada as a selectable nationality (I'm trying to remember, but I think the correct national insignia actually showing on the aircraft was a new feature with the NATO Fighters expansion for ATF) and the F-18 was a flyable in it. But all the Canadian aircraft I had in Strike Fighters 2 were (fortunately very good) freeware mods off of CombatAce. The current smartphone game spinoff of the SF2 series does feature a CF-18, however. Beyond that, things are better on the naval side as both the Harpoon and CMANO/CMO franchises have done pretty well on including Canadian units.

[Machor]

This WOTR article by Michael Kofman and Rob Lee was already posted above, and there isn't much to learn from it for anyone following this thread, but I will underline four parts of special interest:

"NOT BUILT FOR PURPOSE: THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S ILL-FATED FORCE DESIGN"

https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/

Of crucial importance to scenario designers - @Haiduk already posted how the seven-man squad has become standard in both Russian and Ukrainian forces:

"The new motorized rifle platoon has three squads of seven soldiers without a platoon headquarters. Only the platoon commander isn’t part of one of the squads, and the first squad is led by the deputy platoon commander. A seven-man squad would mean that each BMP or BTR vehicle would have four available dismounts not including the crew of three. But many of these squads only have five or six soldiers. In practice, this means that many Russian motorized rifle squads only have enough soldiers to operate their vehicles, but not to dismount and fight on foot. Indeed, there have been cases where Russian BTR and BMPs only had a crew of three, without any dismounts."

Following from above: With such a dire shortage of manpower, it might have been better to leave the IFVs behind:

"The Russian military especially lacks sufficient light infantry forces for many of the situations it has faced in Ukraine. Even with motorized rifle, airborne, or naval infantry units, armored vehicles are organic at all levels. Thus, entire platoons or companies, including NCOs and officers, cannot dismount as cohesive units because they have to man the vehicles in situations where light infantry units with a mobile unit in support might be preferable. Airborne battalions face the same problem. Indeed, the heavy losses sustained by airborne units near Kyiv in the Bucha, Irpin, and Hostomel areas may partially be a result of this lack of infantry. Russia is compensating for this infantry shortage in motorized rifle units by leaning heavily on its naval infantry, as well as separatist militia forces, which did most of the fighting in Mariupol. Arguably Russian naval infantry, a small component of its armed forces, has been the best performing element within the ground force, but they have also sustained heavy losses. Mobilized militia fighters from Donetsk and Luhansk were also deployed to regions beyond the Donbas, and Wagner private military contractors have reportedly played a critical role in the fighting. Indeed, it is fair to ask whether some Wagner detachments and separatist permanent readiness units are in fact more elite and capable than regular Russian motorized rifle units, at least when operating as a dismounted force."

And given the very high officer-to-grunt ratio in the Russian forces, their lack of skilled NCOs may not really be a thing:

"Many commentators have focused on the lack of NCOs as the key personnel weakness of the Russian military. This is unsurprising since they feature prominently in Western militaries. The Russian armed forces have contract NCOs, but these soldiers do not have leadership roles with responsibilities and a division of duties vis-à-vis the commanding officer. These differences are important, but overemphasized. For example, Ukraine had not built an effective NCO corps by the time of this war — it was at best nascent and aspirational. Some of the supposed differences between Russia and Ukraine, brought up in popular discourse, are simply not explanative of the divergent performance between these militaries. It will take time to have a more informed conversation on what mattered, and what did not, in this war.

Instead, the greater personnel problem is the lack of contract privates. Indeed, the reduced-size companies mean that NCOs are less critical because officers are leading fewer soldiers. In many cases, Russian lieutenants led platoons that were approximately the same size as a 13-man U.S. Marine rifle squad, which is led by a NCO. The smaller battalion tactical groups indicate that Russia is failing to recruit enough contract servicemen to properly man maneuver battalions."

Finally, an intriguing point that Russia 'cannibalizing' the remnants of its professional military may create a point of no-return for mobilization, since there will not be enough cadres left to train the conscripts:

"Russia’s manning issues suggest that future mobilization will face serious problems. In the Russian military, conscripts are sent to units where they receive most of their training, instead of centralized schools. However, the training officers and non-commissioned officers from units either either were deployed in some cases or are likely to be used to form additional battalions. This means the remain-behind element for Russian regiments and brigades might not have the personnel to properly train the conscripts currently arriving. The longer this war continues, the greater the disruptive effects will be on training and recruitment. At this stage, it appears Russia is attempting piecemeal solutions by creating reserve battalions on the basis of officers and NCOs allocated to the tentative “third” battalion remaining in current formations. This is a form of partial mobilization, but it cannibalizes an important training component of these units."

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I heard from a source I deem reliable that a 'Train the Trainer' program in the fine points of modern IATGW tank killing was held in the US Northwest (I assumed Yakima) for several hundred UA NCOs. This tracks very nicely with that.

What's interesting (ht @billbindc) is the date this training was conducted:  March 2021.

Note also though that the program was greenlit the previous fall.

...Now I understand this gets USA-political, and I can't document it, but it seems that by 2019, POTUS would only be briefed  (i.e. given an option to intervene) on certain defence and mil assistance decisions. Everything else was kept vague and merely presented for signature. And in practice, the former were solely matters where (a) US personnel might come home in body bags on camera, or (b) Israel had an interest. Pence and Mnuchin were the filters.

Beyond that, the policy establishment was left mainly to its own devices.

The US (and many other NATO countries) training Ukrainians in Ukraine for a long time, though Yanukovich threw a monkey wrench into it as he did all things Ukrainian military, during his stint as President.  This article says that the US has trained roughly 22,000 Ukrainian soldiers since the program started (no start date):

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3020199/dod-leaders-say-training-ukrainian-forces-is-paying-dividends/

After the 2014 invasions the training intensified.  National Guard units were rotated in as trainers.  Special attention was paid to NCO training.  Eons ago in this thread we had some discussion about how far Ukraine got towards creating true NCOs.  Short of it is they got a long ways towards setting up the basics, but it will take another generation for it to really gel.  I know there were some Ukrainian officers coming to the US for training as well, but I hadn't heard about the NCOs out in Washington.

The point of all of this is that the programs were already in high gear by the time the admin changed over from Obama to Trump and from Trump to Biden.  In fact, there was quite a bit of training done even earlier than that,

This is not the sort of thing that a President would know much about nor likely to interfere with under most circumstances.

Steve

[Machor]

11 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

My key takeaway from this war is this: When predicting the course of a war, do not let the perception of the aggressor's strength or competence make you second guess the actual numbers on the ground and historically tested rules of thumb. Yes, in training and wargames you should assume that your enemy is competent. But, when it comes to the real world, remember that just because it's a stupid idea doesn't mean they won't do it. And just because they are doing it doesn't mean that it isn't a stupid idea.

All my life I've been told to empathize with people, put myself in their shoes, etc. Then, I had to undertake training here in Canada for law enforcement work, and we were told to not put ourselves in criminals' shoes and try to second-guess their future actions, because, "Criminals make bad decisions." It was a growing-up moment.

[Fenris]

Something to add to teh TOE of the next module.  I've been wondering about the apparent prevalence of suppressors I've been seeing - what's the reason for this?  I'd have thought range and hitting power would still be important, especially with body armour being more common.  Or is staying concealed considered more important now?

 

Edited June 3, 2022 by Fenris

[chuckdyke]

12 minutes ago, Machor said:

Criminals make bad decisions.

Do you stop him from making a bad decision or let you let him get on with it? Never stop an enemy making a mistake.

[chuckdyke]

2 minutes ago, Fenris said:

what's the reason for this? 

1911s predated WW1. In IPSC you had Aimpoints and suppressors. Which gave the shooter an advantage of less perceived recoil and with a sight picture in which you could have in focus both the target and the sight. I think this will achieve something similar. 

[Battlefront.com]

Another example of Russian troops not learning much.  Video of three drone bombers with the first two being in the same exact place but at different times.  Ya know, if the enemy has figured out where you are once, they can probably figure it out again.  They seem to be sequentially ordered:

https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/v2irkd/impressive_drone_bombing/

Note in the first strike the bomb sets off what appears to be the propellant of three mortar rounds.

Steve

[kraze]

The first strike also quite clearly sets off the "tower" flying

[LongLeftFlank]

 

In Tonawanda NY, the industrious but too- perfectly-named Amigone family operated both a restaurant and a funeral home.

****

Another company of DPR conscripts are petitioning Putin, saying they had been made to fight with no food, ammo or medical supplies.... and that some members of their company are not eligible for military draft because of chronic health conditions or family situation, yet they were forced into service. Now they are asking Putin to restore justice.

...Good luck with that, boychiks.

Edited June 3, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[LongLeftFlank]

These are 3 quite intense fights (DefMon3), 2 of them primarily infantry.

Frankly, if Ukraine can't yet deliver the necessary 'shove' to precipitate the Collapse© using combined arms, they may be able to accomplish it by consuming the Russian assault infantry. Ah, the historical irony of basing a strategy on running *Russia* out of men....

(yes, it's not actually Asia, but you can almost see it from here)

 

Edited June 3, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[kraze]

57 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

Another company of DPR conscripts are petitioning Putin, saying they had been made to fight with no food, ammo or medical supplies.... and that some members of their company are not eligible for military draft because of chronic health conditions or family situation, yet they were forced into service.

Aren't they independent republic, people's republic even, says so on the tin. Don't they have a leader elected by said people? Why are they petitioning some guy in a foreign country?

[Cederic]

19 hours ago, Armorgunner said:

The automatic rifles, seems to be the Barrett M82.

Confused. Isn't that a semi-automatic weapon?

[Cederic]

15 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

Another example, talked about a little here and there, of the major advantage Ukraine had thanks to US intel and leadership... Russian cyber attacks and propaganda campaigns were also anticipated well ahead of time.  New interview confirms US Cyber Command engaged in proactive defensive and offensive activities to thwart Russian activities:

https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/3508639-cyber-command-chief-confirms-us-took-part-in-offensive-cyber-operations/

Steve

That was stupid to admit.

The US considers cyber attacks to be an act of war*. If the US has attacked Russian interests then the US has started any subsequent war with Russia, which means that if a Russian submarine now cuts the internet cables to the US or sinks a US carrier, the US may well find many European nations declaring their NATO obligations not triggered, as Russia didn't initiate hostilities.

In practice I do think that the US has little (non-nuclear) to fear from Russia but responding to any Russian attack without going through or overflying European NATO members would be much more difficult.

 

* e.g. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/International_Strategy_Cyberspace_Factsheet.pdf

[Calamine Waffles]

The US considers cyber-attacks to potentially be an act of war depending on their seriousness

https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2017/10/war-cyberspace/

Quote

“Specifically,” wrote then-Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence) Marcel Lettre, “cyber attacks that proximately result in a significant loss of life, injury, destruction of critical infrastructure, or serious economic impact should be closely assessed as to whether or not they would be considered an unlawful attack or an ‘act of war.'”

Also, nowhere in that PDF you posted does it even mention the words "act of war".

There's also a very strict definition for offensive cyber operations in US military doctrine:
https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2014/10/offensive-cyber/

 

Edited June 3, 2022 by Calamine Waffles

[SteelRain]

Interview with Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Eberhard Zorn on the delivery of the PzH2000 / Gepard and why its taking so long.

In short:
Regarding the PzH 2000, they focused on the 120 States of different errors of the system and how to remedy or circumvent them. The delivery includes ammo, spare parts and special tools.

English auto translation works well so nobody should have a problem watching the full video if interested.

 

[Cederic]

'Mainstream media' acknowledgement of what's been discussed on here for weeks:

"The Russian soldiers refusing to fight in Ukraine"

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

15 minutes ago, SteelRain said:

Interview with Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Eberhard Zorn on the delivery of the PzH2000 / Gepard and why its taking so long.

In short:
Regarding the PzH 2000, they focused on the 120 States of different errors of the system and how to remedy or circumvent them. The delivery includes ammo, spare parts and special tools.

English auto translation works well so nobody should have a problem watching the full video if interested

I presume this means PzH2000 is going in fully capable and integrated to Ukraine systems?

[Cederic]

21 minutes ago, Calamine Waffles said:

The US considers cyber-attacks to potentially be an act of war depending on their seriousness

The challenge is that because the US has stated that cyber attacks qualify as an act of war, Russia and reluctant NATO members can now choose how to interpret the US cyber attacks.

Can you see France joining a war against Russia if there's a usable excuse of 'you started it'?

It's easy to justify providing intelligence to Ukraine, helping Ukraine defend against cyber-warfare, doing the intelligence gathering regarding threat sources and vectors. Responding aggressively against non-military non-Government Russian 'private' actors (and those are the primary source of Russian cyber attacks) can be argued as not attacking Russia, and indeed helping Russia control its criminal community.

But imagine if Russia provide credible evidence that one of their unfortunate industrial accidents was caused by a hostile cyber attack by the US..

(Sorry, this is all hypothetical and off-topic, so I'll read further replies but not respond)