How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sross112]

I saw this map on John Helin's twitter and thought it would be a valuable reference for the topography around Popasna. 

If the RA controls those heights the MSR for Severodonetsk is compromised and it might be time to pull out of there to the other side of the Siversk. Maybe the UA has sufficient forces to hold and/or take back Popasna or some to the area around it but it doesn't look like very good tank country. Maybe that works in the UA's favor? I was hoping for a armored counter offensive to cut off and destroy Wagner and others around there but it doesn't look very promising. Who knows though, the next few days should solve this dilemma one way or another. 

[chuckdyke]

Best for German speakers but I checked the Google Translation available in settings. It does a decent job. I like this Austrian analysis it is the closest to a neutral position I have. He explains very well the C2 and the Battlefield Command system on the Ukrainian side. Yes, he also addressed their attrition. Sorry but the Russian artillery are not all idiots like the media makes us believe. PS I liked this morning the description by a retired US General of the Russian Terminator AFV. A tank designed by a committee. 

 

Edited May 21, 2022 by chuckdyke

[The_Capt]

5 hours ago, dan/california said:

Would you be so kind as to submit this to the New York Times, as either an op-ed or a letter to the editor? They need a bit of talking around far more than our honored friend LLF. LLF's' heart is in the right place, even if his nerve has gone a bit wobbly. The New York Times' problem seems rather more severe. No offense LLF, none at all, love your stuff.

Fair points and not picking on LLF, opposing views that challenge should be welcome.  That said, I think the issue is that we in the West have not faced this type of war in some time and are not well equipped to deal with it, let alone assess it.  Any multi-star general serving today or recently retired joined up in the 80s and since then we have seen the Gulf War and Iraq 2003 but both of those were no where near the sustained intensity we are seeing in Ukraine.  Further we also had all the superiority and pre-conditions, so they were really "near-peer" and that is being generous.  All the crappy sand-coloured wars we fought were "small" and while entertaining also lacked the same calculus we are seeing here. 

In my own experience this matches what I saw in Yugoslavia but way upscaled.  I talk to generations of young officers who experienced dust ups and IEDs but when you talk about experiencing massed incoming artillery, they draw blanks.  And as bad as central Bosnia was during that war, it did not have UAVs and airstrikes but it was high intensity peer-on-peer warfare.  Ukraine is more akin to WW2 in scope and scale, and it boggles my mind that it would have been a minor action in WW2, let alone the scale of massacre in WWI.  Maybe Vietnam vets saw some action like this at Tet, and a few in Korea but even in those wars high intensity armored warfare did not happen a lot. 

So we collectively lack a framework to draw upon beyond historical theory and best-guesses, and I mean all those experts who show up on mainstream to forecast and predict...based on what?  The only people that really understand this type of war, at this scope and scale with these level of stakes, in the West (with some notable exceptions) are pushing 90+ right now.  So we do what they did, keep our nerves tight, try to see the forest for the trees and learn what we can.

Edited May 21, 2022 by The_Capt

[billbindc]

7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

Fair points and not picking on LLF, opposing views that challenge should be welcome.  That said, I think the issue is that we in the West have not faced this type of war in some time and are not well equipped to deal with it, let alone assess it.  Any multi-star general serving today or recently retired joined up in the 80s and since then we have seen the Gulf War and Iraq 2003 but both of those were no where near the sustained intensity we are seeing in Ukraine.  Further we also had all the superiority and pre-conditions, so they were really "near-peer" and that is being generous.  All the crappy sand-coloured wars we fought were "small" and while entertaining also lacked the same calculus we are seeing here. 

In my own experience this matches what I saw in Yugoslavia but way upscaled.  I talk to generations of young officers who experienced dust ups and IEDs but when you talk about experiencing massed incoming artillery, they draw blanks.  And as bad as central Bosnia was during that war, it did not have UAVs and airstrikes but it was high intensity peer-on-peer warfare.  Ukraine is more akin to WW2 in scope and scale, and it boggles my mind that it would have been a minor action in WW2, let alone the scale of massacre in WWI.  Maybe Vietnam vets saw some action like this at Tet, and a few in Korea but even in those wars high intensity armored warfare did not happen a lot. 

So we collectively lack a framework to draw upon beyond historical theory and best-guesses, and I mean all those experts who show up on mainstream to forecast and predict...based on what?  The only people that really understand this type of war, at this scope and scale with these level of stakes, in the West (with some notable exceptions) are pushing 90+ right now.  So we do what they did, keep our nerves tight, try to see the forest for the trees and learn what we can.

A general officer of my acquaintance likes to talk about this. His father fought in the Bulge and would describe to him what it was like to be under a sustained 12 hours of bombardment. He'd say "Nobody in a modern military has any idea what that's like". Now, they are finding out. 

[dan/california]

I think the "just win the bleeping war faction" in the Whitehouse has won, if this is true.

[dan/california]

So I count ~5 BMP/MTLB with maybe five guys each. That isn't enough infantry to run a couple of forward listening posts, Much less attempt any sort of actual perimeter around those tanks. maybe there re some more up the road somewhere?

[danfrodo]

27 minutes ago, dan/california said:

I think the "just win the bleeping war faction" in the Whitehouse has won, if this is true.

F- YES!   Get some payback, Ukraine!!

[LongLeftFlank]

8 hours ago, dan/california said:

LLF's' heart is in the right place, even if his nerve has gone a bit wobbly. The New York Times' problem seems rather more severe. No offense LLF, none at all, love your stuff.

None taken mate! and no, I'm not wobbly I was just reacting to the 'ah, don't worry, the Ivans are sure to eff this up as well' statements.

While meanwhile @Haiduk is reporting some very real consternation from the ground there.

So I popped some red smoke, people responded and I think we are all now looking at this more soberly. Cheers!

[Battlefront.com]

About the doom-and-gloom...

I think The_Capt did a nice job responding, so I'll just point out how this war has gone so far:

Russia invaded Ukraine with a fresh force that outnumbered and out equipped the defending Ukrainian forces.  Large amounts of territory were taken within days.  Significant forces were cut off and cities besieged.  In the south Ukraine was completely caught off guard and the Russians advanced against only scattered resistance.

On paper it looks pretty doom-and-gloom for Ukraine, doesn't it?  Certainly many were predicting doom, including Putin.  And that was all wrong.

Roughly speaking, here is the first two months of the war:

The northern part of the Russian offensive collapsed and had to retreat back to Russia.  The north central part of the Russian offensive collapsed and what wasn't withdrawn to Russia went on the defensive.  The western front ran out of energy and to retreat back to the Dnepr.  The south central part of the Russian offensive took TWO MONTHS to achieve a single breakthrough (Izyum) at tremendous cost.  The southern front didn't move hardly at all except for one minor breakthrough that bogged down and hasn't moved sense.  The great-big-terror never landed ashore to seize Odessa because the land forces never got close enough to make it viable.  Mariupol tied up and bled Russian forces white.  In total, the Russians lost about 20% of their initial force and a mountain of equipment.

Wow... all that doom-and-gloom about Ukraine's chances after the first days of the war looks pretty foolish now, doesn't it?  Yup, very foolish.

How about the month since the great Donbas (Easter) Offensive started up?

The north central Russian defenses were broken through by Ukraine and retreated back to and towards Russia, leaving a major supply route to Izyum and elsewhere under direct threat of being severed or, at the very least, significantly undermined.  A major push against light Ukrainian defenses quickly bogged down and hasn't moved much.  More importantly, a series of river crossings, essential for breaking the back of Ukraine's defensive line, failed in spectacular way.  The grinding offensive against the rest of the central front has resulted in massive Russian losses without any gains except for one place (Popasna), which is currently being exploited by a combination of mercenaries, local militias, and the remains of the VDV.  The southern front hasn't moved at all, the western front is pouring concrete bunkers.  Partisan activities in the southern area are beginning to become more than a nuisance.  Mariupol surrendered, but most of Russia's forces had already been withdrawn for the big offensive, thus freeing up very little to put back into the battle.

As things stand right now, I don't see why we should be running around with our heads cut off or talking about the sky falling.  Especially when one starts to take note of the condition of both sides' forces.

Russian forces are exhausted and all of Russia's tricks to pretend that it's able to replace losses are nearing its inevitable dead end.  Ukraine's forces, on the other hand, are just about done training it's first wave of new units.  Some apparently are already moving into the line.  Unlike Russia, Ukraine's new units are trained and properly equipped (mostly light infantry, but not all).

Strategically, Russia is a total mess.  It's defense industry is all but shut down, it's immediate manpower reserves nearly completely tapped out, it's airforce on the defensive, and its navy has to keep its distance from Ukrainian land positions or risk getting sunk.  Ukraine, on the other hand, has friends who are flooding it with aid of all kinds, including plenty of equipment that is superior to what Russia fields.  And the gap is growing, not shrinking.

Even if it somehow manages to surround Ukraine's forces in Donbas, the record of this war so far shows that they're going to have a tough time destroying them. Chernihiv and Sumy were totally cut off, but did not surrender.  Mariupol held out for almost 3 months and did not surrender.  Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv withstood weeks and months of attacks and didn't let the Russians in.  And even if Russia somehow manages to pull off something larger than it has ever been able to do in the war so far, it doesn't change the strategic picture at all.  Russia lost the war months ago.  There is just no way it can fight its way out of that reality.

Sorry if I don't see now to be the time to sink into doom-and-gloom mode.  Russia is spent.  But like Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in WW2, that doesn't mean it is incapable of causing pain or even achieving some battlefield successes before succumbing to reality and the fighting stopped.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

The Red Army was total pants from the 1940 winter war through URANUS as well, but that was cold comfort to the forces trapped in the Korsun pockket.

I have heard, and contributed to, all the arguments that Russia cannot 'succeed' or endure a long draw. But if they dig in in Donbas and the land bridge, and the UA can't readily dislodge them cuz reasons, there's a clock ticking for both teams. Ukrainian will to fight 1917 is not infinite and Western will to sustain the bloodshed is not a given either. 

And in time, do BTGs kitted out with Chinese 99 tanks and gun systems begin appearing?

[Battlefront.com]

I keep saying this over and over again... the question of whether or not Ukraine can mount large, complex, sustained offensive operations is interesting to contemplate, but it's not really relevant.  Russia could totally destroy Ukrainian forces in Donbas tomorrow and Russia would still loose the war even without a large scale Ukrainian offensive.

Let's say the line is frozen and Russia starts suing for peace, but Ukraine doesn't go along.  Let's also say Russia stops all its foolish attacks and just digs in for an undefined, but probably long, period of time.  What is Ukraine to do about this?

1. keep doing what it's been doing the whole war... hammer Russian logistics and frontline forces to cause casualties and disruption.  Wait for tactical areas of weakness to manifest themselves and attack with very limited territorial goals.  Ukraine has been doing this since a couple of weeks into the war with quite a lot of success.  Way too many examples to count.
2. do the above, but add to it an operational plan that is designed to exploit the growning number of weak points in a large area with a goal of cleaning them out completely .  This is why the Russians retreated from the north and then later around Kharkiv.  Especially Kharkiv since it does not appear the Russians intended to retreat from there, unlike the deliberate retreat from the north.
3. instead of an operational plan, develop a strategic plan that has multiple phases that build upon each other to achieve the total defeat of the Russian ground forces.

Evidence so far is that Ukraine is absolutely capable, even superior at, conducting local offensive action.  So far it has also shown itself to be very capable of conducting large, though limited, operational counter offensives.  What we have not yet seen is a coordinated strategic offensive, so the jury is still out on that one.

What have we not seen?  So far we have not seen Ukraine suffer any significant defeats of counter attacks.  We have seen a few places where the local counter attacks ran into too much opposition and they had to pause, but I can't think of any that were defeated in the way Russian attacks have been on a very regular basis.

We have also not seen Ukraine fail in operational level counter offensives.  So far it has launched only two and both of them were successful.  Largely, I think, because Ukraine didn't launch them until they had a fairly good idea they would succeed.

I think Ukraine can defeat Russia with nothing more than uncoordinated local counter attacks because Russia can not afford sustained losses.  But this will take a long time, so Ukraine is likely to at least try out some more operational counter offensives.  Track record on these is very good.  This will speed up Russia's defeat, for sure, but it carries a little more risk.  A strategic offensive would speed up Russia's defeat even morel, but it is quite risky for many reasons.  Which is why I think it might be a good idea to hold off any thoughts of a strategic offensive until the situation is even more favorable than it is today.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

  

18 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

The Red Army was total pants from the 1940 winter war through URANUS as well, but that was cold comfort to the forces trapped in the Korsun pockket.

It was cold comfort for the nearly 1 million Soviet soldiers that died taking Berlin.  Or the tens of thousands of US casualties suffered along the West Wall battles in the Fall and Winter of 1945.  So if your point is that war is messy all the way to the end, then agreed.  If you're instead saying that the Soviets were able to bounce back, think again.

If you want to compare things now to the WW2, it's better to swap Nazi Germany out for Russia and the Soviet Union out for Ukraine.  Germany invaded Russia's home turf with a materially superior force and got defeated after initially making record breaking successes.  In this war Russia invaded Ukraine's home turf with a materially superior force and secured no victories of any significance and suffered horrendous losses to the point where it had to retreat not once but twice.

Comparing apples to oranges isn't really helpful anyway, but it is even less so if you don't look beyond superficiality of both.

18 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

I have heard, and contributed to, all the arguments that Russia cannot 'succeed' or endure a long draw. But if they dig in in Donbas and the land bridge, and the UA can't readily dislodge them cuz reasons, there's a clock ticking for both teams. Ukrainian will to fight 1917 is not infinite and Western will to sustain the bloodshed is not a given either. 

Sure, the clock ticks for everybody.  But Russia has vastly less time on its clock than Ukraine does.  So if this comes down to a war of the clocks, Russia is totally screwed.

The Soviet Union and Russia have fought only two major conflicts since WW2, one each (Afghanistan and Chechnya).  Two.  And guess how many of those were victorious?  Zero.  Casualties was a big part of both defeats.  So while you are right to say that Ukraine doesn't have infinite time and blood to invest, pretending that Russia does is simply contrary to historical facts.

18 minutes ago, LongLeftFlank said:

And in time, do BTGs kitted out with Chinese 99 tanks and gun systems begin appearing?

Never.  That's just crazy talk.  What isn't crazy talk is all the Western weapons that are already in Ukraine and continually being added to the mix.  I'd take Ukraine's reality over Russia's fantasy any day of the week.

Steve

[LongLeftFlank]

30 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

About the doom-and-gloom.... 

As things stand right now, I don't see why we should be running around with our heads cut off or talking about the sky falling.  

...Said absolutely nobody on this board.

I can't speak for the NYT editorial board.... 

But good posts, Steve. Let's see how it plays out.

 

[dan/california]

The thing I respect the Ukr General Staff for the most is not getting sucked into a rescue operation in Mariupol that would  certainly have failed. They did the math and said no Mr President it won't work, CAN"T work. It is even more to the Ukrainians credit that not one bit of the back and forth that had to have happened over this has seen the light of day.  They might have been able to do it if outside support had moved a lot faster, but that was just too big a lift for various countries political systems. 

[Kinophile]

Ref BSF submarines- like all things Russian it seems, their weak point is logistics and resupply. 

Out on the sea they are dangerous and very difficult for UKR to defeat. But they have only one port for resupply, refit and (most importantly) repair.

Destroy the repair facilities, staff and drydocks and inevitably subs will start sinking, crews wont want to leave in leaky boats and Sebastopol will become a useless albatross.

To defeat the BSF kilo force the UKR doesnt need ASMs, it needs to strike the Sebastopol docklands, repeatedly and with great force. It must break all the drydocks, kill the skilled and experienced maintenance crews, destroy crew landward accommodation and level the supply warehouses.

UKR needs ASMs to limit BSF surface vessel movements at sea and operational reach, but to defeat the BSF be as a whole they must hit its logistics, the port of Sebastopol.

 

Edited May 21, 2022 by Kinophile

[LongLeftFlank]

Good summary here by Schlottman:

Situation map by DefMon3.

 

Edited May 21, 2022 by LongLeftFlank

[Gpig]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

As things stand right now, I don't see why we should be running around with our heads cut off or talking about the sky falling.  Especially when one starts to take note of the condition of both sides' forces

I recognize its an emotional argument, but part of the reason I worry is because Russia is such a contemptable, murderous, corrupt, dishonest, unprincipled and immoral foe that I fervently hope and anticipate nothing good to happen for them. At the same time I hope for exceptionalism and unending successes to the Ukrainians battling for their lives and homeland.

Any success for the Russians is too much. They deserve none. And it's frustrating when they do find some, here and there. That's war, of course.

Hats off to those of you that can remain objective.

Question. Haiduk reported on the unexpected/un-ordered retreat of a territorial defense unit that may have unhinged part of the front lines and allowed for the most recent Russian gains. What would happen to a unit in the UAF after pulling off a move like that? What size unit are we talking about? Battalion sized?

[LongLeftFlank]

Hey, nobody here is arguing that the UA has lost its mojo!

East of Izyum, since early May!

So 'Partisans With Panzerfausts' is still very much a thing! 

 

 

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

...Said absolutely nobody on this board.

I can't speak for the NYT editorial board.... 

Yeah, that was a general shot across the bow of people, wherever they are, that have forgotten 3 months of this war.  Be they here, there, or anywhere.

I didn't see anything alarmist over at NYT today.

1 hour ago, LongLeftFlank said:

But good posts, Steve. Let's see how it plays out.

It will be interesting to say the least.

Steve

[Holien]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-61529877

Quote

Meanwhile, the office of Russia's prosecutor general has asked the country's Supreme Court to declare the unit a "terrorist organisation" in an apparent attempt to prevent its fighters being treated as conventional prisoners of war.

Let's hope the deals made behind the scenes hold.

Gpig sums up my feelings and I just despair for what is happening. 

10 minutes ago, Gpig said:

Any success for the Russians is too much. They deserve none. And it's frustrating when they do find some, here and there. That's war, of course.

 

[Battlefront.com]

16 minutes ago, Gpig said:

I recognize its an emotional argument, but part of the reason I worry is because Russia is such a contemptable, murderous, corrupt, dishonest, unprincipled and immoral foe that I fervently hope and anticipate nothing good to happen for them. At the same time I hope for exceptionalism and unending successes to the Ukrainians battling for their lives and homeland.

Any success for the Russians is too much. They deserve none. And it's frustrating when they do find some, here and there. That's war, of course.

Well said.  If the world worked the way it should, there wouldn't have been a war in the first place.  Best case is that the war goes so poorly for Russia that it can't do anything like this again within our lifetime.  Hopefully forever.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Here's an interesting thread about topography (already posted here):

While I think it is overall better to have the high ground than not (harder to attack uphill), the big benefit in the past has been for observation.  This is what the author above focuses on.  I have to question this still holding true, or at least as true, as it has since warfare was invented (Thog got some buddies together to whack Gog's tribe when they came out of their cave).  One word...

Drones and Satellites

Wait sorry... two words

Anybody that has climbed a wooded hill knows that high ground visibility to a given point can be tricky to obtain.  Aerial observation doesn't have this sort of problem because LOS between two ground points is not necessary.  Being directly overhead gives a far better view than from the ground.  All CMers know this!  While you might not know if you have LOS from one point to another, that's not really relevant to spotting the enemy from above.  That's more of a "can X hit Y from Z location" situation.

So the question in my mind is... Russia takes high ground, they become harder to dislodge for standard ground fighting reasons.  But does it give them any sort of advantage other than that? 

Theoretically putting your artillery up on a hill gives some advantages.  In particular you can park your artillery behind a friendly hill and use it to block spotting while your artillery is firing away.  Drones don't care about intervening hills, so that doesn't seem to be a big deal.

Getting artillery up on a hill helps with targeting over intervening hills, but at these ranges and with the artillery being used I'm not sure that really comes into play.  Maybe with 81mm mortars and short range things like AGS, but I don't think it matters much for bigger stuff.

It's yet another interesting ripple effect of drones, or so it seems.

Steve

[dan/california]

This is purely a gee whiz video. There is a frame with a pretty good view of the missile before impact. 

[chrisl]

High ground will slightly ease some of Russia's operational weaknesses because they have extremely limited satellite capability and their drone capability seems to be limited to mostly observation.  So a little elevation might help them see a little farther.  But you're probably right that it no longer offers much advantage if your opponent isn't coming at you on the ground.  And it may create some disadvantage if it has limited supply routes that your opponent can attack.  Given the tactics that the UA has been using, they aren't likely to be charging battalions of troops up the hill at Russian strong points, anyway.

 

[chrisl]

19 minutes ago, dan/california said:

This is purely a gee whiz video. There is a frame with a pretty good view of the missile before impact. 

Better aim and they would have blown some fish out onto the shore so they could at least get some lunch from it.