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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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1 minute ago, Kinophile said:

So Leo 1s, they're barely enough, if the RUS bring  T62s. A tank from the sixties. Literally sixty years old base tech.

I posted the same YouTube video before. According to the German narrator The Leo 1 would free other Ukranian armor to engage Russian armor in open maneuver warfare. I could see Leo1 in urban terrain or defensive positions. They could also be equipped with (ATGMs?) like the Russians did with the T55s. Besides the 105mm L7 gun is outdated but still effective against IFVs and the like.  

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1 hour ago, Haiduk said:

Slovakian artist Rado Javor, illustrator of Total War games series issiued two new artworks about the war in Ukraine. Recently he has drew series "seasons in Ukraine" about war of 2014-2015.

Seasons:

Spring in Ukraine (fighting around Sloviansk)

d7t4i0y-634c6dc6-7255-4156-919a-80b159d3611e.jpg?token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1cm46YXBwOjdlMGQxODg5ODIyNjQzNzNhNWYwZDQxNWVhMGQyNmUwIiwiaXNzIjoidXJuOmFwcDo3ZTBkMTg4OTgyMjY0MzczYTVmMGQ0MTVlYTBkMjZlMCIsIm9iaiI6W1t7InBhdGgiOiJcL2ZcLzk4ZDFkN2YyLWFjMzctNDYxYi1hOGZmLTFmMDRlYjE4ZTZlNlwvZDd0NGkweS02MzRjNmRjNi03MjU1LTQxNTYtOTE5YS04MGIxNTlkMzYxMWUuanBnIn1dXSwiYXVkIjpbInVybjpzZXJ2aWNlOmZpbGUuZG93bmxvYWQiXX0.kOQEtQhGa0r2q32RoX3p16PvLC6JqDE8ATPgiedn2F4

Summer in Ukraine (Ukrainian July offensive)

d81crus-7c5d2bc4-d51a-45d6-a367-6d99f671ef66.jpg?token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1cm46YXBwOjdlMGQxODg5ODIyNjQzNzNhNWYwZDQxNWVhMGQyNmUwIiwiaXNzIjoidXJuOmFwcDo3ZTBkMTg4OTgyMjY0MzczYTVmMGQ0MTVlYTBkMjZlMCIsIm9iaiI6W1t7InBhdGgiOiJcL2ZcLzk4ZDFkN2YyLWFjMzctNDYxYi1hOGZmLTFmMDRlYjE4ZTZlNlwvZDgxY3J1cy03YzVkMmJjNC1kNTFhLTQ1ZDYtYTM2Ny02ZDk5ZjY3MWVmNjYuanBnIn1dXSwiYXVkIjpbInVybjpzZXJ2aWNlOmZpbGUuZG93bmxvYWQiXX0.sGtdp9BCxQOeq4Oe6Objdxrd-gybfjbVhy6dM72yRus

Autumn in Ukraine

d9rraf5-7b9e06d7-0509-4f4f-865c-553d0d150dcb.jpg?token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1cm46YXBwOjdlMGQxODg5ODIyNjQzNzNhNWYwZDQxNWVhMGQyNmUwIiwiaXNzIjoidXJuOmFwcDo3ZTBkMTg4OTgyMjY0MzczYTVmMGQ0MTVlYTBkMjZlMCIsIm9iaiI6W1t7InBhdGgiOiJcL2ZcLzk4ZDFkN2YyLWFjMzctNDYxYi1hOGZmLTFmMDRlYjE4ZTZlNlwvZDlycmFmNS03YjllMDZkNy0wNTA5LTRmNGYtODY1Yy01NTNkMGQxNTBkY2IuanBnIn1dXSwiYXVkIjpbInVybjpzZXJ2aWNlOmZpbGUuZG93bmxvYWQiXX0.rnQEHULU7h5aaphwQU9YmoWDQPEXssmwBMLXsGFH6LU

Winter in Ukraine (Donetsk airport)

d8czxa8-daab0723-09bf-40e8-9524-8556a65269dd.jpg?token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1cm46YXBwOjdlMGQxODg5ODIyNjQzNzNhNWYwZDQxNWVhMGQyNmUwIiwiaXNzIjoidXJuOmFwcDo3ZTBkMTg4OTgyMjY0MzczYTVmMGQ0MTVlYTBkMjZlMCIsIm9iaiI6W1t7InBhdGgiOiJcL2ZcLzk4ZDFkN2YyLWFjMzctNDYxYi1hOGZmLTFmMDRlYjE4ZTZlNlwvZDhjenhhOC1kYWFiMDcyMy0wOWJmLTQwZTgtOTUyNC04NTU2YTY1MjY5ZGQuanBnIn1dXSwiYXVkIjpbInVybjpzZXJ2aWNlOmZpbGUuZG93bmxvYWQiXX0.k5XekY9TieuShUxK4MwrdG2JBiHWLbnZuiIAuoBk_xw

Also two other artworks

Sunflower fields (tank ram of sen.lt Abramovych 12th of August 2014)

d9anp7x-39c5b2e1-89c8-475c-aee1-125afa3d6fe3.jpg?token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1cm46YXBwOjdlMGQxODg5ODIyNjQzNzNhNWYwZDQxNWVhMGQyNmUwIiwiaXNzIjoidXJuOmFwcDo3ZTBkMTg4OTgyMjY0MzczYTVmMGQ0MTVlYTBkMjZlMCIsIm9iaiI6W1t7InBhdGgiOiJcL2ZcLzk4ZDFkN2YyLWFjMzctNDYxYi1hOGZmLTFmMDRlYjE4ZTZlNlwvZDlhbnA3eC0zOWM1YjJlMS04OWM4LTQ3NWMtYWVlMS0xMjVhZmEzZDZmZTMuanBnIn1dXSwiYXVkIjpbInVybjpzZXJ2aWNlOmZpbGUuZG93bmxvYWQiXX0.pjpPVUm9Ibj-W9_m7sYi6yI_e0eGdkA6jVH5dy_SnMM

Winter war (campaign of winter 2015)

dayjzxl-3e33abf4-60ac-4a14-9686-a630ea557559.jpg?token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1cm46YXBwOjdlMGQxODg5ODIyNjQzNzNhNWYwZDQxNWVhMGQyNmUwIiwiaXNzIjoidXJuOmFwcDo3ZTBkMTg4OTgyMjY0MzczYTVmMGQ0MTVlYTBkMjZlMCIsIm9iaiI6W1t7InBhdGgiOiJcL2ZcLzk4ZDFkN2YyLWFjMzctNDYxYi1hOGZmLTFmMDRlYjE4ZTZlNlwvZGF5anp4bC0zZTMzYWJmNC02MGFjLTRhMTQtOTY4Ni1hNjMwZWE1NTc1NTkuanBnIn1dXSwiYXVkIjpbInVybjpzZXJ2aWNlOmZpbGUuZG93bmxvYWQiXX0.JUUcnlgcYgbGnYmFYqXK_kPtAzfYyZbw5lqI284covI

And new arts:

The general

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Moskva

df3uwf8-e54d3ac1-8f1c-46f5-814a-cd2dfe2086ed.jpg?token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJ1cm46YXBwOjdlMGQxODg5ODIyNjQzNzNhNWYwZDQxNWVhMGQyNmUwIiwiaXNzIjoidXJuOmFwcDo3ZTBkMTg4OTgyMjY0MzczYTVmMGQ0MTVlYTBkMjZlMCIsIm9iaiI6W1t7InBhdGgiOiJcL2ZcLzk4ZDFkN2YyLWFjMzctNDYxYi1hOGZmLTFmMDRlYjE4ZTZlNlwvZGYzdXdmOC1lNTRkM2FjMS04ZjFjLTQ2ZjUtODE0YS1jZDJkZmUyMDg2ZWQuanBnIn1dXSwiYXVkIjpbInVybjpzZXJ2aWNlOmZpbGUuZG93bmxvYWQiXX0.7ZTip5kEO7zpdpwpxFp5b-MqP9ALseE6b7Te9EIsJSc

More his arts on history, military, game, sci-fi tematics you can find here: https://www.deviantart.com/radojavor

Really well done artwork. I can see some candidates for menu screen mod for BS.

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On 4/15/2022 at 11:27 PM, Battlefront.com said:

Some sense of Ukrainian losses so far came today from Zelensky:

https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/15/politics/tapper-zelensky-interview-cnntv/index.html

Time to crunch some numbers to test out certain concepts of where this war is and where it might be headed in terms of both sides' ability to sustain this war from a casualty standpoint:

Let's take the high number of 3000 KIA and 10,000 WIA (which is an "expected" ratio) for the Ukrainian side.  Ukraine estimates Russia is now up to an estimated 20,000 KIA which would mean an additional 60,000 WIA.  That is 1 Ukrainian lost for every 6 Russians.

I haven't checked extensively for other figures, but one I quickly found from late March by NATO put the total losses at 40,000 KIA/WIA.  Even with NATO's more conservative figure this is more than 3 Russians lost for every 1 Ukrainian. 

Based on the ratios of confirmed lost vehicles, I'm inclined to think the Ukrainian figures for Russian losses is more accurate than NATO's.  But let's say the loss ratio is 1:5 just for the sake of it.  That's 65,000 total Russians lost.

We know Ukraine has at least 100,000 new uniformed personnel forming up.  That's roughly 6 soldiers available to take the place of every 1 casualty. 

For Russia to have the same available replacement level as Ukraine they would need to have nearly 500,000 reservists in training since a month ago.

Is there still anybody left reading this thread that cares to try and explain how Russia's traditional manpower advantage over its enemies applies to this war?  Especially when Ukraine can probably raise another 100,000 if it has to.

I've been loosely following Ukraine General Staff's daily tallies of Russian casualties during this "low intensity" period of the war.  Unscientifically it seems that Russia loses about a company's worth of personnel and equipment every day or perhaps every other day.  This means that every 3-6 days it loses the equivalent of 1 BTG's worth of combat power.  Some estimates are that Russia has 90 BTGs left in the front lines now.  Figure 20% loss makes the entire force combat effective, that's the equivalent of 18 BTGs.  Factor in their daily loss rate and that means in 2-4 months Russia's existing combat formations will be combat ineffective if this "low intensity" level of combat continues.

Of course these are all extremely crude indicators, but they do indicate ;)  What they say to me is that if Russia goes on a big offensive adventure that results in large amount of friendly casualties, then the front will be at risk of collapse pretty soon thereafter.  Days to weeks.  If instead Russia were to just try and hold what they have they'd be looking at not making it through the summer. 

There's a bunch of variables to consider, such as what the loss rate would be for Russia if it stopped making dumb attacks, but it doesn't consider suffering any "pocket" events such as are afforded around Kherson.  It also doesn't take into account the complexities of the biannual loss/gain of conscripts.  So this is only a crude indicator of rough concepts of time.  Taken with the mandatory pinch of salt, this does seem to confirm that Russia can't make it through the summer without throwing in massive numbers of untrained conscripts.  Which, I should add, would simply bump up the daily loss rate and so probably not change the timeframe too much.

Steve

You should discuss your thoughts with Ssnake from ESim Games. 

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2 minutes ago, keas66 said:

Okay obviously I am ignorant of this whole Mike Sparks/Gavin Meme ? Is it a Meme ? - He has for real an actual website and seems to be interested in Mountain Bikes  ( and M113's )

I'd remain ignorant - he's a crank who seems to think the M-113, which he insists on calling the Gavin, is the solution to every tactical problem.

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49 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

I posted the same YouTube video before. According to the German narrator The Leo 1 would free other Ukranian armor to engage Russian armor in open maneuver warfare. I could see Leo1 in urban terrain or defensive positions. They could also be equipped with (ATGMs?) like the Russians did with the T55s. Besides the 105mm L7 gun is outdated but still effective against IFVs and the like.  

It just seems like a barely useful tank with a very different logistics profile and doesn't give UKR anything special or extra. The lead in time and training would be a distraction right now, which is really only when they'd be useful. Plus, why train crews on vehicles that are not used by the main UA? To transition crews upwards you'd need to train them all over again. That makes zero sense. Plus UA infantry seems perfectly capable of snotting BMPs across the country roads and city streets all by itself.

Six months from now, when RuA is covered in its own poop trying to get out of the toilet it built for itself, UA should be upgrading its entire fleet of T64s, plus the 200+ T72s they've now gained. The T64 wagons themselves are perfectly good mechanically (and deeply familiar to UA, not just logistically but also in doctrine, training, familiarity in capabilities and limitations) but they certainly need a significant software & electronics upgrade.  UKRdon't need Leos - they need better tech for what they already have: modern long range FLIR, modern BMS, targeting systems, better ammunition, etc.

That process alone would yield far, far more benefits for a similar ₴ cost than a non-canon logistical load for a 6 decade old tank that brings absolutely nothing they don't already have and has no commonality of parts, training, doctrine, abilities, yadda yadda yadda. 

Leos would be a useless, bacteria-filled appendix in the UA body, when the Army instead needs an upgraded lower bowel to take a bigger, firmer **** on the Putin's face.

Edited by Kinophile
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@sburke @Kinophile

Colonel Mikhail Nagamov, commander of 6th engineer-sapper regiment of 1st Guard tank army of Western military district. Got lost of 13th of April. On the photo he has mayor shoulder strips (writings on the photo says he is colonel), Google search also shows he was a colonel since 2019.

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Edited by Haiduk
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This honestly sounds like misinterpretation or a feint at best.
Edit: he corrects in next tweet that objective is Hulaipole. If not feint, then Russia seems to aim at a "large pincers" scenario. 

 

Edited by Huba
spelling as usual
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I keep seeing the same mistake made when talking about what arms to send or not send to Ukraine.  This latest round had some attempts at reconciling the two, but not said distinctly enough.  I'll take care of that :)

We are talking about two categories of weapons (used loosely to define all military material) and only two categories:

  1. stuff that can be used RIGHT THE F NOW
  2. stuff that can't be used RIGHT THE F NOW

The first category consists of Soviet based systems, or near equivalents, and "soldier proof" things that don't require much in the way of training or logistics to employ effectively.  Soviet caliber ammo, food, body armor, Javelins, towed artillery, SU aircraft, communications gear, and even things like Switchblades all are in this category.  The timeframe from offer to frontline use needs to be measured in days or weeks, not months because months might be too late.

The second category is the sort of stuff that, duh, doesn't fit into the first category.  Anything that requires extensive training, logistics, or broadly new knowledge base isn't useful to the fight going on right now.  Anything that takes weeks, or even months, to simply land in Ukraine isn't useful now, however it will absolutely be useful for either a prolonged war or preparing for the next one with Russia (hopefully there isn't one).

People, including us smart guys here, keep talking about this as if it is an either or type situation.  It really isn't.  Ukraine needs both categories of weapons and they need both flowing into the country now.  However, the focus needs to be on the first category because the quickest way to end the war is to end the war quickly.  That might sound like Captain Obvious material, but I do feel that people still aren't grasping that there is the possibility of this war being ended within 1-2 months if Russia is hit hard enough.

For the second category I think there should be no talk of outdated weaponry.  Leo 1s shouldn't even be discussed, Abrams should be.  Why Abrams?  Because the US has plenty of them in stock, they are a proven system, and it seems they tend to beat out the competition when evaluated by militaries (Poland didn't just buy a whole bunch of Leo2s, for example).  Sure, the most up-to-date variants don't have to be sent over as any M1 still running is better than what Russia has and can be upgraded later.

Same for things like SP howitzers.  They are in the second category and whatever is chosen needs to be able to provide Ukraine with enough of ONE TYPE to fill out their needs.

Even longer term there needs to be thinking about how to transition Ukraine off of legacy Soviet weapons such as small arms, mortars, etc.  That's for another day.

Steve

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5 minutes ago, Huba said:
This honestly sounds like misinterpretation or a feign at best.

 

Not necessarily.

A push along the east/west Dnepr-Donetsk line helps draw Ukrainian reserves and supplies away from fighting in the primary area.  True.  However, Russia needs to punch through that line somewhere to be able to achieve whatever their goal is for this offensive.  For all we know they have their eyes on much bigger gains than what we've been talking about.  We can not rule out that our discussions have been far more pragmatic than the ones that went on in Moscow.

Either way, Ukraine needs to hold this line for the operation in Donetsk area to be won.  So from Ukraine's standpoint it effectively it doesn't matter if this is a feint or not.

Though it would be nice if Russia spends significant resources here, fails, and then has to pull back after the battle in Donetsk is over.  Real nice.

Steve

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6 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

This war might very well drag on for a couple of years. Contingency plans and options that enable Ukraine to win in these scenarios need to start moving now. If this would have started right away we would almost already be there now.

Already trained tank crew can switch equipment faster than "green crew". Training should take a month max. Lots of the maintenance could be done with western private contractors, especially in the "transition period".

EXACTLY!

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42 minutes ago, db_zero said:

On paper the Leopard1s appear hopelessly outdated and of limited use, but so were the Sherman’s used by the Israelis up until the 70s.

The people manning them mattered more than the specs on paper.

Yup, in the 70s - when Sherman's were a 4 decades old tech.

The leo1s are 6 decades and counting.

I know newer ones are better but still, it's a crappy 105mm on a slow chassis. Spend the money on pumas or equivalent, something modern. 

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If I had to pick one thing to supply Ukraine with it would be high resolution C4ISR support.  This appears to be one of the most lopsided information wars in history, and it needs to stay that way.

C4ISR that can render high resolution information, not only where the Russian's are but where they are likely going to be, up to and including remote support staffs in NATO HQs.  This means that the entire Russian system is visible in real time, all the time.  This will mean that UA targeting will be much more efficient, rendering a higher kills per munition ratio.  Their own manoeuvre will be well out ahead of Russian mass.  Critical nodes like Russian C2, logistics, arty and engineering are seen and targeted.   The UA can see the "time and place" for conventional c-attks as opposed to trying to feel for them.

This all creates a feedback loop to the strategic information/narrative war, which then reinforces the western support.

It is not so much the hardware at this point, it is the software.  I mean, of course we keep pushing munitions but major platform shifts are for after this war or unless this war last years, which I am not betting on.

Edited by The_Capt
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M1 tanks would pose some tricky political and logistical challenges. I think the calculation is it would be seen as a major escalation by Russia who already complained about the last arms shipment and a complete slaughter of the Russian army which the M1 could facilitate could lead to nukes being used.

Aside from the logistical challenges of fuel-which the M1 uses in prodigious quantity and ammo which is heavy and bulky, where would they come from in large quantities?

If we took the ones in storage in the US they would have to be railed to ports then loaded onto ships. That would take months. Airlifting them is hugely inefficient and the airlift capacity is probably already stretched.

 

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1 minute ago, Kinophile said:

Yup, in the 70s - when Sherman's were a 4 decades old tech.

The leo1s are 6 decades and counting.

I know newer ones are better but still, it's a crappy 105mm on a slow chassis. Spend the money on pumas or equivalent, something modern. 

1. The lead time on completely new modern AFVs is years. It might to come to that theoretically, but for now newbuilds are not a solution at all.

2. Some tanks are better then no tanks. Leo1 has better FCS than most Russian tanks and can do everything except fight them head-on. Long term solution is the M1s I think, but short term, if Germans weren't ****ing around, those Leo1s would be 3 weeks or so from entering combat. M1s will take months from now.

3. Ukrainians explicitly asked for Leo1 from German stock, I'd think that we might just listen to them on this.

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4 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

If I had to pick one thing to supply Ukraine with it would be high resolution C4ISR support.  This appears to be one of the most lopsided information wars in history, and it needs to stay that way.

C4ISR that can render high resolution information, not only where the Russian's are but where they are likely going to be, up to and including remote support staffs in NATO HQs.  This means that the entire Russian system is visible in real time, all the time.  This will mean that UA targeting will be much more efficient, rendering a higher kills per munition ratio.  Their own manoeuvre will be well out ahead of Russian mass.  Critical nodes like Russian C2, logistics, arty and engineering are seen and targeted.   The UA can see the "time and place" for conventional c-attks as opposed to trying to feel for them.

This all creates a feedback loop to the strategic information/narrative war, which then reinforces the western support.

It is not so much the hardware at this point, it is the software.  I mean, of course we keep pushing munitions but major platform shifts are for after this war or unless this war last years, which I am not betting on.

The Ukrainians have already been supplied with C4ISR before the conflict started. It’s just not been heavily publicized.

NATO has already stated they are providing Ukraine with info and intelligence and the C4ISR systems are designed to integrate with existing NATO assets.

Thats why the public announcement by NATO followed by the sinking of the Moskva the next day was interesting. The sea is a big space and finding a large ship isn’t an easy task.

It was known NATO was feeding intel and information but perhaps after the revelations of atrocities, more info got fed and the whole announcement and sinking of Moskva was also sending a message. 

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