How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sburke]

21 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Our old buddy Igor Bezler is back in Ukraine.  Wouldn't it be nice if he left in a box, a really small box of all they could find left of him.

 

fixed that for ya

[Battlefront.com]

4 minutes ago, sburke said:

fixed that for ya

You're more charitable than I am.

I wonder if Brez is there to do any fighting or just there to look like he's doing fighting.

Steve

[Kinophile]

3 hours ago, panzermartin said:

I see a pattern of Russians attacking at night or is it my idea. This probably to reduce the effect of drones and AT infantry assets perhaps.

Also their air force less prone to shoulder launched AA missiles. 

I assume tis because they have better thermals  (well, more of them) than the UKR armor/mech. I don't know how UKR are now, but in CMBS its a real problem as UKR v RUS. Avoiding long range spotting by RUS tanks is a big part of my "maneuvering" as UKR. I just get nailed so fast, its incredibly dispiriting ( I havent used oplots/BMs in a long time, just seems silly).

Funnily enough, I'd gotten to the point of avoiding moving heavies until later in the fight, when I sorta knew sightlines and oppo placements and using them as infantry killers, not Tank v tank. I used ATGMs for that.

 

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

I assume tis because they have better thermals  (well, more of them) than the UKR armor/mech. I don't know how UKR are now, but in CMBS its a real problem as UKR v RUS. Avoiding long range spotting by RUS tanks is a big part of my "maneuvering" as UKR. I just get nailed so fast, its incredibly dispiriting ( I havent used oplots/BMs in a long time, just seems silly).

Funnily enough, I'd gotten to the point of avoiding moving heavies until later in the fight, when I sorta knew sightlines and oppo placements and using them as infantry killers, not Tank v tank. I used ATGMs for that.

 

Given the large number of Javelins the UKR have now, and reportedly a lot of other infantry night vision gear I wonder is this makes sense, or is just another doctrine they are not flexible enough to change. I would think nighttime would be much worse for the infantry screen they don't have enough of anyway.

[Battlefront.com]

Here's a problem with the concept of Putin trying to claim a win without totally destroying Ukraine.  There seems to be more voices coming out, even within his own political and media puppets, that this is a much bigger conflict than even "war".  To some, it's now a "holy war":

Quote

A Russian politician and member of Putin’s ruling party says on national TV that the country is fighing a “holy war” in Ukraine, “a fight between good and evil.”

https://euroweeklynews.com/2022/04/18/we-are-fighting-a-holy-war-says-russian-politician/

This sentiment, if it is allowed to gain sway over the brainwashed masses, is going to complicate Putin's options.

Steve

[sross112]

15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

Here's a problem with the concept of Putin trying to claim a win without totally destroying Ukraine.  There seems to be more voices coming out, even within his own political and media puppets, that this is a much bigger conflict than even "war".  To some, it's now a "holy war":

https://euroweeklynews.com/2022/04/18/we-are-fighting-a-holy-war-says-russian-politician/

This sentiment, if it is allowed to gain sway over the brainwashed masses, is going to complicate Putin's options.

Steve

Well he does have the good vs evil part right, but seems confused on who is representing which side. 

[Battlefront.com]

For those of you who are still puzzling over Putin's screw up to invade Ukraine, I found this very good summary of really how badly played this was.  It's a good discussion generally, but I have it queued up to this specific point:

"Here's the irony, up to the point when the first tank crossed the border, Putin was winning".  The speaker, Mark Galeotti, then goes on to outline why.  This is why so many, myself included, were so surprised that he started the war.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

I just remembered to check for the ISW report.  My F5 skills are clearly lacking.  Anyhoo, guess what they think of this offensive?

Quote

The Russian offensive in the east is unlikely to be dramatically more successful than previous Russian offensives, but Russian forces may be able to wear down Ukrainian defenders or achieve limited gains. Russian forces did not take the operational pause that was likely necessary to reconstitute and properly integrate damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine into operations in eastern Ukraine. As we have assessed previously, Russian forces withdrawn from around Kyiv and going back to fight in Donbas have, at best, been patched up and filled out with soldiers from other damaged units, and the Russian military has few, if any, cohesive units not previously deployed to Ukraine to funnel into new operations.1 Frequent reports of disastrously low Russian morale and continuing logistics challenges indicate the effective combat power of Russian units in eastern Ukraine is a fraction of their on-paper strength in numbers of battalion tactical groups (BTGs). Russian forces may certainly be able to wear down Ukrainian positions in eastern Ukraine through the heavy concentration of firepower and sheer weight of numbers, but likely at a high cost. A sudden and dramatic Russian offensive success remains highly unlikely, however, and Ukrainian tactical losses would not spell the end of the campaign in eastern Ukraine, much less the war as a whole.

As always, lots of good stuff to read in this update:

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18

Steve

[BlackMoria]

Good video of night fighting.  Ukrainian forces unleashing hell on Russian attackers.  

https://imgur.com/gallery/1yl9rvP

 

[danfrodo]

15 minutes ago, BlackMoria said:

Good video of night fighting.  Ukrainian forces unleashing hell on Russian attackers.  

https://imgur.com/gallery/1yl9rvP

 

I hope that is from tonite in Ukraine.  Looks like the defenders were not neutralized by russian artillery.  what a firefight! 

[dan/california]

7 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

I hope that is from tonite in Ukraine.  Looks like the defenders were not neutralized by russian artillery.  what a firefight! 

They didn't seem to feel short of ammunition either.

[Machor]

19 hours ago, panzermartin said:

Indeed the news are not confirmed, although they are still circulating in major news sites. I won't be surprised if this happens in future though given the increasingly russian influx. And we shouldn't trust russian words right? 

Honestly, about the NATO bases in Turkey , whatever I have read indicates a nearly idle situation and I haven't heard any major operation from Incirlik, contrasted to the past years which was very active. A lot has changed since. The Syria campaign, the coup against Erdogan with many in Turkey blaming some degree US involvement. The epicenter of US operations has shifted towards Greece with the new Alexandroupoli base and existing Suda Bay base. https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_us-military-base-turkey-has-uncertain-future/6180061.html

On the 1974 while you are correct, it was practically a pretext like what caused Russia to intervene in Donbas, though people here would prefer the word invasion. That doesn't change though the impression that Turkey has the attitude to act on its own against international law and its own alliances and getting away with it. Whatever measures the West took they simply weren't enough to punish Turkey for killing and displacing thousands of people and occupying 40% of the island for half a century now. It's an ongoing disgrace if you ask me. 

Ps. I want to add that I'd love one day all this hostility would belong to the past. We are very close as people. I have turkish friends that have fled the country because of Erdogan. Like in case of Russia there are mainly poor, rural areas that are mainly feeding support to the regime. 

Will try to keep OT minimum and relate to Ukraine wherever relevant:

RE: Russia and Turkey
As I posted before, after killing 37 Turkish soldiers in Idlib in February 2020, Russia will not be able to normalize relations with Turkey without something truly major. In the very least, considering they required Erdoğan to apologize publicly and pay tens of millions of dollars as compensation for shooting down the Su-24 in 2015, there would need to be some sort of public performance by Putin. Even then, going back to an earlier post, there would remain the question of how Russia could offer to replace Turkey's strategic partnership with Ukraine, which is more than two decades old, going back to the secularist governments before Erdoğan (The Oplot was going to become Turkey's first national MBT as the Yatagan, which didn't happen because Russia refused to sell the license for the APS). Even Erdoğan's son-in-law, Bayraktar - Yes, THAT Bayraktar - is counting on Ukrainian deliveries of engines for his future drones. Even if the Russians were to offer: "Let's build Su-57, T-14, and S-500 together," it means little without a history of mutual trust.

RE: Cyprus
I have no intention of belittling the suffering of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and would like to thickly underline that Turkish Cypriots have their own, distinct identity. They are overwhelmingly secular, Westernized, and highly educated. They would, if anything, look down on the religious fanatic types who support Erdoğan, and would likely be quite unhappy if Turkey wanted to annex them - in this sense, their case is very different from Donbas. Another example of the difference is that the previous president of Northern Cyprus, Mustafa Akıncı, publicly and vocally criticized Turkey's operations against the YPG in Syria.
I refer to Turkey's military 'intervention' in Cyprus because it had the right to do so, as per the Treaty of Guarantee. In fact, Turkey approached the other guarantor, Britain, to launch a joint operation, but the British said they would only defend their own bases; many Turkish Cypriots who were cut off from the Turkish military saved their lives by finding refuge in the British bases. I firmly believe that had Britain taken part in the operation, the outcome would have been better for all the parties involved. The legality of Turkey's operation became questionable with its second stage, though the truly long-term problems that hinder a resolution result from policies enacted by Turkey's own military junta after 1980.
As I wrote on the forum years ago, I think it was a huge mistake that Greek Cypriots were told to vote 'no' in the 2004 Annan referendum - when Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' - with the expectation that a better 'deal' for reunifying the island would become possible as Turkey strove for EU membership. Had the referendum passed, there would now have been already a new generation of Cypriots who had grown up in a united country. It is a lesson that Ukraine should heed with regard to negotiating its occupied territories: Gaining control of the territory should top all other considerations of concessions.

[Fenris]

I have a feeling that's old footage from a training exercise, not current events.

[sross112]

30 minutes ago, BlackMoria said:

Good video of night fighting.  Ukrainian forces unleashing hell on Russian attackers.  

https://imgur.com/gallery/1yl9rvP

 

That looks a lot like a training range. One way fire, safety NCO's walking nonchalantly in between vehicles and no supporting fires coming from anywhere else. Not saying it is, it just looks a lot like a night shoot on a one way range.

[Machor]

17 hours ago, photon said:

Grognard escalation:

When revolutionary changes happen, we look for ways to obscure them. This is, I think, an example.

The difference between ships at anchor and ships on the move *seemed significant* to contemporary military theorists in the same way that it's tempting now to say, "well, the Russians are bad at mechanized warfare". That's a factor that *obscures* a revolutionary change in tactics and operations. It turns out that whether capital ships are at anchor or not, they are terribly vulnerable to the combination of dive and torpedo bombers and to hammer and anvil tactics.

Everything materially needed for attacks of the sort the Repulse and Prince of Wales suffered was in place in 1940 for every major power. The British had the Beaufort and Swordfish, the Americans the Catalina and Devastator, the Germans the Ju-88 and Ju-87, the Japanese the G3M and Kate and Val. And most of those were products of the mid 1930s, so we can see that navies are contemplating and wargaming the sort of operation that sunk the Repulse and PoW for at least half a decade before it happened. In contrast to what that book argues, *most* major powers (maybe not the Italians and Soviets) could execute an operation like the sinking of the Repulse. The Germans rendered HMS Illustrious combat ineffective with similar aerial tactics about a year *before* the sinking of the Repulse despite the Illustrious having CAP overhead.

What the book you cite is pointing to is a difference in quantity, not quality. That is, between late 1940 and early 1942 we moved from *some* land based aerodromes projecting no-go zones for enemy shipping to essentially *all* land based aerodromes projecting that same no-go zone (and the no-go zones growing larger as the tactics and weapons employed by land based bombers caught up to their range). A British or American admiral proposing an operation involving major capital ships without air support in late 1943 would be laughed out of the room. When the Japanese actually undertook such operations, they were (without exception) suicidal.

To bring home the comparison to what we're seeing now, we're in that transitional period where it probably is suicidal to engage in mechanized operations without a snow-globe like anti-ISR bubble surrounding your force. No one has *developed* that snow-globe-like anti-ISR bubble yet, so we're in an interim period like the period between, say Coral Sea and Philippine Sea. At least one side in the conflict can project power in this new way (maybe both? we haven't seen Ukraine present mass to be targeted yet). Neither side (I don't think) has developed a plausible defense against the new way of projecting combat power. The USN eventually came up with one; the combination of excellent radar, picket destroyers, CAP, and the CIC. I think some of the discussion here is about what that looks like on land.

I searched for contrarian takes for kicks, and was able to find some striking accounts, though the author himself is not advancing a contrarian agenda. The first from Osprey's US Navy Carrier Aircraft vs IJN Yamato Class Battleships by Mark Stille (pp. 72-3):

"The strikes on the First Diversion Attack Force in October 1944 represented the
largest air–sea battle in history up to that point. The 29 ships of Kurita’s force were
subjected to a series of attacks by 259 carrier aircraft. For the loss of 18 aircraft, the
US Navy sank Musashi, torpedoed the heavy cruiser Myoko and forced it back to base,
and inflicted minor bomb damage on three other battleships. Clearly this was an
American victory, but several issues deserve to be examined more closely.

The most obvious conclusion was that Musashi showed itself to be able to absorb
amazing punishment in excess of what its designers called for. Even after the first three
attacks, Musashi could have returned to port. The fourth attack, when it was virtually
unprotected and unable to maneuver, was the ship’s death knell. No other warship in
history had taken as much damage – at least 11 and as many as 15 torpedoes and 16
bomb hits, plus many near misses. No other ship then afloat could have survived this
type of punishment.

Secondly, Japanese antiaircraft defenses were ineffective. Only 6.9 percent of the US Navy aircraft
attacking the heaviest concentration of IJN antiaircraft batteries of the entire war were lost. The Type 3
antiaircraft shell designed for the 18.1in. gun was totally ineffective. For doctrinal reasons, the Type 89
5in. guns were used on a limited basis only. This left the main defense to the inaccurate and light 25mm weapons.

From another perspective, the 250+ sorties mounted by TF 38 against the First Diversion Attack
Force bought the US Navy a relatively poor return. In this respect, Musashi performed a valuable service to the
Japanese plan, since most of the carrier air group attacks of October 24 were focused on a single target.

...
The effect was that Musashi absorbed the bulk of the strikes launched by TF 38 that
day. While it was getting pounded under the waves, the other primary Japanese ships
of the First Diversionary Attack Force suffered little damage. Yamato and Nagato
received two bombs each and the battleship Haruna easily withstood five near misses,
and all three were able to remain in formation."

And from US Navy Ships vs Japanese Attack Aircraft by Mark Stille (pp. 72, 76):

"Concurrent with the efforts of its carrier force, the IJNAF’s land-based air force
fought its own war for the control of the airspace over Guadalcanal and the waters
around the island. The great majority of the sorties flown by bombers from Rabaul
were devoted to attacking the airfield on Guadalcanal, but on occasion they were
directed to attack maritime targets. The IJNAF attempted on several occasions to find
and attack the US Navy carriers operating near Guadalcanal but they were never
successful in this regard.
Large convoys off Lunga Point were considered lucrative targets, and the IJNAF’s
“Betty” land-based bombers conducted three large-scale attacks against them. Two of
these strikes were made with torpedoes, and thus required the G4Ms to attack at low
altitude to penetrate the fighter screen and launch their weapons at the transport ships.
This meant that even the short-ranged 20mm guns on the American escorts and
transports were now deadly.
Each of the three attacks ended in disaster for the IJNAF, with 38 of 66 attacking
G4Ms being lost in return for a transport and a destroyer sunk and a transport, a
destroyer, and a heavy cruiser damaged. These losses showed how vulnerable landbased bombers were while conducting torpedo attacks during daylight against well-defended targets. Indeed, the attrition was so high in terms of aircraft lost that they were among the last daylight torpedo attacks undertaken by Japanese land-based
medium bombers in World War II.

...

On November 1, 173 carrier aircraft arrived at Rabaul. The following day, 100 of
them attacked a US Navy force of four light cruisers and eight destroyers. The ships
had little in the way of friendly fighter support during the opening part of the battle,
but they were all new and boasted multiple 5in./38, 40mm, and 20mm batteries
paired with the latest fire control. The ships assumed an antiaircraft formation and
began engaging the approaching Japanese at 14,000 yards with 5in./38 guns. The task
force was well-handled, unlike the dive-bombers, which attacked in an erratic fashion.
Gunners claimed 17 shot down, and in return the IJNAF was only able to place two
hits on the stern of the USS Montpelier (CL-57), which caused little damage.

...

On November 11 the IJNAF was able to launch a full strike against an American
carrier force attacking Rabaul. The latter, Task Group 50.3, consisted of the fleet
carriers USS Essex (CV-9) and USS Bunker Hill (CV-17), the light carrier USS
Independence (CVL-22) and a weak screen of only nine destroyers. After the carrier
aircraft struck naval targets in Rabaul in the morning, they braced for the expected
counterattack. The Japanese assault was comprised of 67 fighters escorting 27 D3A2
and 14 B5N2s, followed by some G4Ms. American fighter interception was ineffective
until the dive-bombers began their attacks, so it came down to the antiaircraft fire
from the three carriers grouped together in a 2,000-yard circle, with the destroyers in
a second circle at 4,000 yards from the formation center. Bunker Hill was the main
Japanese target. All three carriers were near missed by the 20 dive-bombers that
attacked, only three of which escaped. The B5N2s followed, and all 14 were shot
down without recording any success."

The conclusion I am drawing is that when we focus in on a 'revolution,' it is fuzzy and we see expected changes occasionally swinging back.

[Machor]

Moskva's sinking video (same moments as we saw in the pictures):

 

[The_MonkeyKing]

Could Leo1 become the main "lend-lease" tank to Ukraine? There are tons and tons of them available in the west. There must be uniformity in the heavy weapons supplied to Ukraine or it will be a logistical circus out there. So my view is M113 and Leo1 should become the main weapons of the Ukrainian military..

Main question here is how does the Ukraine T-64 APFSDS ammo compare to best Leo1 APFSDS ammo available? According to my quick amateur research 3BM42 is the main Ukraine APFSDS ammo at the moment. Penetration similar to best 105mm ammo available. But these both will still struggle with Russian modern armor frontally. Still clearly "good enough".

So the tank is clearly good enough, there are lot of them and their logistics available to the west, they are "bad" enough to hand over without losing wests own capabilities.

[Combatintman]

On to the ground piece regarding these new developments around Izyum and Keminna.

• AA1:  Izyum-Kramatorsk.  Reasonable manoeuvre terrain, pockets Slovyansk.
• AA2:  Izyum Slovyansk.  Poor manoeuvre terrain which forces the attacker into a frontal assault on Slovyansk.  I have already assessed that the drive to the city could consume at least 2-3 BTGs and an attack on the city will require 4-5 BTGs.
• AA3:  Keminna-Slovyansk.  I haven't analysed this in detail yet, but I don't need to spend hours cross-hatching a map to see that of all of the AAs, this is probably the worst for manoevre and it is impossible to avoid a fight for Lyman should the Ukrainians choose to contest it.  That will consume at least 3-4 BTGs then there is the water and woods obstacle between Lyman and Slovyansk.  Then Slovyansk itself.  True to form it appears that Russia has chosen the least favourable/most difficult AA if Slovyansk is the target.
• AA4:  Severodonetsk-Kramatorsk.  Reasonable manoeuvre terrain which pockets Slovyansk.

Personally I would be going with a COA to pocket Slovyansk by aiming at Kramatorsk along AAs 1 and 4.

Still chipping away at the terrain analysis - here is the latest map army file:

BAE.milxlyz

Map Army link:

MilitaryMap - Plan your Mission

[chuckdyke]

T64 has more punch and the Leo has inferior armour. The Leo will be suitable for defensive warfare. You look at two months before they become available. 

[Battlefront.com]

2 minutes ago, Combatintman said:

True to form it appears that Russia has chosen the least favourable/most difficult AA if Slovyansk is the target.

I think this might have more to do with the rushed nature of the operation.  Obviously this is all speculation, but here goes anyway...

Russia has been trying to break the Ukrainian defenses since the start of the war and whatever gains they made, most of them were early and due to forces coming from Russia above Luhansk and from the south out of Crimea.  Whatever gains were made between these two points have been hard fought and relatively small.  The lines have not shifted in any significant way in weeks, despite constant company or larger sized assaults.

I think Russia decided that it should attack where it felt were the line could be breached with the most ease or perhaps certainty within the allowed for timeframe (we're still operating on the theory that May 9th is important).  Better to get through the line and have a hope of making something out of it rather than banging on Ukraine's door for a week and finding it still won't move.

Therefore, it is possible that AA3 was chosen as the initial attack because it was deemed the most likely to produce immediate positive results, not because it was strategically the best place to attack.

One question on my mind is if Ukraine is going to try and withdraw its forces east of Izyum, or if they intend to hold in place and wait to be relieved?  Or is it possible they have already withdrawn those forces after the successful counter attacks over the weekend?  Certainly hitting a possible pursuit force hard and then withdrawing is a solid plan.

Steve

[sross112]

14 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

Could Leo1 become the main "lend-lease" tank to Ukraine? There are tons and tons of them available in the west. There must be uniformity in the heavy weapons supplied to Ukraine or it will be a logistical circus out there. So my view is M113 and Leo1 should become the main weapons of the Ukrainian military..

Main question here is how does the Ukraine T-64 APFSDS ammo compare to best Leo1 APFSDS ammo available? According to my quick amateur research 3BM42 is the main Ukraine APFSDS ammo at the moment. Penetration similar to best 105mm ammo available. But these both will still struggle with Russian modern armor frontally. Still clearly "good enough".

So the tank is clearly good enough, there are lot of them and their logistics available to the west, they are "bad" enough to hand over without losing wests own capabilities.

Leo 1's are pretty obsolete and probably shouldn't be used to spearhead attacks. Granted an old tank is better than no tank so if they could get them to Ukraine I'm sure they could be put to use. Once this war is over they could be used for some reserve brigades or training but my opinion is the UA needs to upgrade to something that outclasses the RA. I'd vote for the M1A2 or Leo 2A6. M1 would actually probably be a better choice since Poland is going to those. Then you have a friendly neighbor to share training, maintenance and stockpiles with. 

[Combatintman]

3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

I think this might have more to do with the rushed nature of the operation.  Obviously this is all speculation, but here goes anyway...

Russia has been trying to break the Ukrainian defenses since the start of the war and whatever gains they made, most of them were early and due to forces coming from Russia above Luhansk and from the south out of Crimea.  Whatever gains were made between these two points have been hard fought and relatively small.  The lines have not shifted in any significant way in weeks, despite constant company or larger sized assaults.

I think Russia decided that it should attack where it felt were the line could be breached with the most ease or perhaps certainty within the allowed for timeframe (we're still operating on the theory that May 9th is important).  Better to get through the line and have a hope of making something out of it rather than banging on Ukraine's door for a week and finding it still won't move.

Therefore, it is possible that AA3 was chosen as the initial attack because it was deemed the most likely to produce immediate positive results, not because it was strategically the best place to attack.

One question on my mind is if Ukraine is going to try and withdraw its forces east of Izyum, or if they intend to hold in place and wait to be relieved?  Or is it possible they have already withdrawn those forces after the successful counter attacks over the weekend?  Certainly hitting a possible pursuit force hard and then withdrawing is a solid plan.

Steve

Yep - those were my thoughts on AA3 - it has the easiest starting position.

[Battlefront.com]

Hey, well at least Putin achieved his goal of intimidating Finland.  Right?

 

[sross112]

1 minute ago, Combatintman said:

Yep - those were my thoughts on AA3 - it has the easiest starting position.

I know you guys are really smart but  I think you are overlooking the operational benefits to this route. Looking at Combatintman's map it is the roughest route with the most forest. Rough Terrain and Forest = Less Agricultural land = Less tractors = Less operational losses. In order to keep the loss of equipment to a minimum they have selected the least tractor friendly terrain to conduct their assault!!  

[chuckdyke]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

Hey, well at least Putin achieved his goal of intimidating Finland.  Right?

 

He succeeded in intimidating NATO. Aspiring for membership has the potential of seeing your country destroyed. Like Ukraine fighting for NATO till the last Ukrainian. For NATO time to call Putin's bluff, invade Belorussia would be a good start.