How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[BeondTheGrave]

4 hours ago, Haiduk said:

@BeondTheGrave @OldSarge @G.I. Joe

And other, who asked about Neptune ASM

The missile R-360 of Neptune complex is not a version of Kh-35U, though has similar parameters. Yes, it has very similar hull, and initially since R&D works have started as far as in 2013 or earlier, the missile should be as  localized and upgraded analog of Kh-35. This gave to Russian propagandists a reason to claim "Stupid Ukrainians proud because could copy old Soviet missile ahahaha!", so far like their claims "BTR-4 is reworked BTR-70". Russians in own chauvinism believed that without Russia all industry in Ukraine completely declined and we can't develop nothing own, but upgrade USSR lagacy. But Soviet/Russian Kh-35 was really "long played" project, started as far as in 1977, first prelimilary design was ready only in 1983, brought to tests only in 1992 and adopted to service in 2003! And Kh-35U with some improvements, like coordinates transmittion via satellite, was adopted in 2015

Currently Russian navy use this missile in next versions: Kh-35 (AS-20) for planes and helicopters, Bal (SSC-6) - coastal missile complex, Uran (SS-N-25) - ship-bases missile complex

Turning back to Ukrainian R-360 - since 2013 the missile have changed at least homing heads (or even three) and many more. First test launches were in 2018, but despite on success, there were found many problems in homing, flight stability also sea-skimming mode had enough hight altitude of flight. In 2019 new tests with new homing head and some constructive changes were conducted, but anyway missile demanded many finalization works. Also there was main problem - previous launches were conducted with USA aid - they detected target and transmitted coordinates to launcher vehicle via own sattelite. Ukraine has been developed own targeting radar Mineral-U, but encountered with many R&D problems, so manufacturer tests were passed only in October 2021 and two radars has been preparing to state test program, but unknown either it was started before a war or not. So, in present time Mioneral-U is nor adopted, but probably can be used in test mode. So, the strike at "Admiral Essen" and  "Moskva" could be done both via US satellite and Mineral-U tergeting. 

Also results of test showed that the carrier of missile complex and radar, based on 8x8 KRAZ-7634NE has low reliability and because of bad financial situation on KRAZ plant, technological problems and inability to provide timely technical support and implement constructive changes, there was assumed a decision to change the carrier to Tatra T815 (Chech Republic). Both Mineral-U radars were produced on Tatra chassis, but crossing of RK-360MC on Tatra took some time, so first battalion of Neptune have to be operational in April 2022 only. To this time the unit, armed with this complex - 65th coastal missile battalion had on armament only one launcher on KRAZ chassis and support vehciles. There is unknown either was a missiles or not, because in 2021, when this battalion was established, there was an information he had only dummy of missiles and first real nissiles have to arrive also in 2022. So, this is one possible answer, why Neptunes have awake only now. First reason - they got a missiles only now, second reason - they could have very short number of missiles and kept its for case of enemy landing attempt n Odesa area. But since new missiles issued and UK/Norway offered own ASMs, they could fire free.   

So, about R-360 pararameters: 7 ... 280 km range, 150 kg warhead, velocity - 900 km/h, radar/satellite coordinates and targeting aquisitoin, seeker field of viev +/- 60 deg (even more than Harpoon), sea-skimming mode, seeking during maneuvering, EW protection, maximum range of launcher from the sea shore - 25 km

Composition of battalion:

Three batteries per 2 launchers: 6 launchers USPU-360 (each has 4 tubes of R-360), deployment time 15 minutes

Technical battery:

6 transport-loader vehicles TZM-360 (4 R-360 missiles on each), deployment time 10 minutes, reloading time 20 minutes

6 transport vehicles TM-360 (4 R-360 missiles on each)

1 mobile command post RKP-360, deployment time 10 minutes.

1 targeting radar (optional) Mineral-U

So one battalion should have 72 missiles. Full salvo in 24 missiles simultainously is possible.

First version of launcher USPU-360 on KRAZ-7634NE 

Serial version of launcher USPU-360 on Tatra T815

Transport-loader vehicle TZM-360 first version (KRAZ)

 

Serial versin of transport-loader vehcile TZM-360 (Tatra)

Transport vehicle TM-360 (KRAZ)

Transport vehcile TM-360 (Tatra), serial variant

Mobile command post RKP-360, first variant

Mobile command post RKP-360 (Tatra), serial variant

Mineral-U radar

Thanks Haiduk this is exactly what I was wondering. Yet another win for the Ukrainian domestic arms industry, which is slowly looking more and more like the Israeli did in the 20th century. Small enough nobody ever thinks of them, yet churning out quality product and in pretty significant volume. 

[Taranis]

13 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

More informatin came about this. BTG of 201st MB is operatinhg around Borova, Kharkiv oblast. This is estern bank of Oskol river.

Also became knowingly, units of 5th CAA of Far East military district (8-10 BTGs) already arrived and involved in fight. Ar least BTG, with elements of tank battalion of 218th tank regiment of 127th motor-rifle division was engaged by UKR 53rd mech.brigade, probably southern axis of JTO. Documents of 1st tank paltoon of 2nd tank company were captured

Thanks haiduk, you rock ! Amazing !

According to what I had searched the 127 MRD is composed of the 114 GMRR, 394 MRR and 218 TR.
In itself the 127 MRD is a developpement of the 59th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade.  In 2018, the 59 MRB had :

→ T-72BM x40 / T-72BK x1 / BMP-1 x120 /MT-LB x15 /BTR-80 x36 /BRDM-2 x4 / 2S3 Akatsiya x36.

The 114 GMRR was created from 70th Independent Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade. In 2018 too, the 70 GMRB had :

→ T-72B x40 / T-72BK x1 / MT-LB x159 / BTR-80 x11 / BRDM-2 x4 /BTR-80 x11 /BRDM-2 x4 / 2S19 Msta-S x36

[BeondTheGrave]

4 hours ago, The_Capt said:

This is why we need new folks, they keep us on point by (re)asking the central questions. So what happens next?

No idea.  I have ideas, opinions and what my instincts are saying but I really do not know.  In my thinking the main effort here is to create a mental framework that allows us to understand what we are seeing, when it happens.  As we confirm phenomenon a lot of other realities die quickly.  For example, we knew about 3-4 days into this war that it was not going to be quick because all the observable phenomenon killed that reality, it collapsed into unreality and fantasy.  

So what am I looking for now?

Strategically - The major shift and re-framing of strategic ends by Russia clearly signaled a change in negotiation position.  Ukraine's increasing strength in dictation of the terms they will accept was another signal.  We should keep an eye on this as it will continue to evolve; negotiation positions are directly tied to viable options (which I have gone on about at length) and as options spaces collapse or expand negotiation positions shift.  Further it is a sign of confidence in those options, we have seen Russia shift its negotiation position dramatically in this war: hard-medium-softer-hard.  That last "hard" negotiating position was the last we heard, likely because Putin thinks his current offensive options will give him what he needs now that the political ends have been conveniently reframed.  So for the strategic, track the options and negotiation positions.

Operationally - There is an indicator here that we have not discussed much but for what is coming will be important: decisions.  A "decision" in military terms seems simple on the surface but it is in fact very complex.  Basically a "decision" is the "death of alternatives" or a collapsing point of options.  Germans lost at Stalingrad, Russians won = German strategic offensive options die in the East...forever (insert ironic trombone sound).  This is primarily how conventional operational military planning thinks, in terms of lines of effort/operations that link "decisions" together in a linked framework that creates a successful outcome - victory (yay!).  These are what I refer to as "positive decisions".

However, in the wacky world of warfare, there are more than "positive decisions".  There are at least two, maybe three more types: null, negative and strange.  A null decision is basically a "non-decision" or an undecidable condition.  It can be generated and projected.  Ukrainian defence has been a master class in the projection of null-decisions onto an opponent; the Ukrainian approach has left the Russian military machine able to solve for X operationally.  The end result of all those unsolvable decision spaces, along with attrition, create positive decisions for the Ukrainian defence when the entire Russian operational offensive collapsed - so you can see how this can get complex fast.

Wait, there is more!  All human decisions are metastable, which is a fancy word for "semi-permanent but subject to review".  So it is possible to "undecide" something within human perception and cognition to very real effect.  For example, SOF's primary contribution to warfare is not primarily positive decision space, or even null -they contribute here but this is not home turf - they are at home in creating negative decision, or undeciding things.  Classic example is the SOE in WW2.  Its job was not to create positive decisions in Western Europe, it was to "undecide German victory and control" - in the minds of the home front in the UK, the populations in Europe and in the minds of the Germans themselves.  Through demonstration-thru-communication (e.g. raids) the SOE did a lot of damage to German reality in undeciding things.  I am not going to get into Strange but it speaks to a human ability to "remember the future" and relative rationality, but let's leave off that one.

So what? Well for the upcoming fight in the SE, I will be looking for decisions (all types) at the operational level.  The Russians need positive, the UA will likely project null and negative on that...right up to a moment when they think they can get positive ones of their own.  The playout of that decision space will be key in reading the operational flow of things.  Next question is "which ones", well that could fill a separate post but for the Russians is likely means a decisive use of mass to pull off this pincer movement they are lining up, and then resist the UA c-moves. However, we will likely see a lattice work of decisions form up, the shape of that will dictate how things are really going.

Tactical.  Steve covered off a lot of this already.  I will add:

- Russian Mass - will it start working again?  Because it has failed (erm) decisively, so far.   Is there a tipping point in this war where mass will still work?  I suspect yes, but can the Russians build it and project it effectively?  This includes some sort of re-invention of combined arms and joint integration, which Russia desperately needs to create any of those operational decisions I was talking about.

- Russian Fragility - A tactical warfighting unit, within a formation system is a complex beast.  It has redundancies built in but it takes years to build an effective tactical unit and minutes to destroy it.  The Russian war machine has been severely beat up.  Estimates are now circling 25% losses for the initial invasion force. Normally it would take months to re-constitute damage like this and Russia is going to make a run at fixing it in days/weeks.  This will mean the Russian machine going into this phase is more fragile than the first attempt.  What remains unknown is what offsets the Russians have been able to bring to bear for this, if any.

- Ukrainian Friction - What has been amazing to watch in this war is the Ukrainian ability to create and project friction.  This is a primary role in defence, along with attrition but the breadth and scope that Ukrainian defence has been able to project friction in all domains has been breathtaking. Ukrainian defence has been able to create friction across the entire length and breadth of the Russian offensive.   If they can keep that up tactically, they will likely simply grind this next Russian offensive to a halt.

- Ukrainian Mass - they have conventional mass in this fight but are using it judiciously.  I suspect the UA is waiting for its moment, and if it times it right, it will be spectacular.

Beyond these big ticket items, we should be looking out for shifts in equipment and vehicles.  More T90s (and T-14...everyone wants to see a tractor pull on that one) or T62s all start to show something.  Cannon fodder troops in front with the good ones in the back will likely be the order of march, massed dumb artillery fire across broad frontage with little precision.  All this sort of stuff adds up, along with mass surrenders and uncontrolled movements. 

Anyway, strap in because we should see at least a few more big muscle movements before this thing winds down, or falls apart on the Russian side.  How this goes will determine if a stalemate option is even on the table for Russia and what the end-game will look like.  I still consider this the "posturing for end-game" phase with Russia racing for some sort of stalemate and Ukraine not letting them.

Either way, we will be here doing this for the duration.

I just wanted to say that this is a fantastic analysis of where the war stands right now. Very much in agreement with all that youre saying in here. At some point we should all pitch in for a book. "Keyboard Warriors: A Metanalysis of the Russo-Ukrainian War Through Forum Posts" 

All joking aside, I've been out of things a few days thanks to a trip. As always its hard to get back into the swing of things, so this is a great reorienting post towards the current issues. Thanks. 

[Seedorf81]

Well, if Putin fired/arrested 20 generals for incompetence, after the MOSKVA-fiasco he most surely has to fire/arrest 20 admirals, I think. 

 

[altipueri]

CMBS Ukraine 2022 Scenario 1  The Coup  -  scenario ends 14 April 2022

Russia victory objectives:

1. Remove Zelensky
2. Install puppet administation
3. Occupy Ukraine east of Kiev
4. Occupy Ukraine west to Lvov

Russia score  =  0

---------------
CMBS Ukraine 2022  Scenario 2 The Pause  - scenario ends  31st May 2022

Russia victory objectives:

1. Putin still in power
2. Crimea still in Russian hands
3. South and East Ukraine "de-nazified"  (obliterated, massacred, etc..)
4. 100,000 Russian boots still in Ukraine   

5. Bonus objective: Germany still buying gas.

-----------

Any bets on Russian points at the scenario end?

[Battlefront.com]

45 minutes ago, kraze said:

They had a thousand of new cruise missiles at the ready, why would they need to stockpile anything?

This is an excellent point, Kraze, that hasn't been highlighted before as far as I can see.

An example of this (which dates me) is back in the old days here in the US when you couldn't purchase gasoline on Sundays or late at night with any regularity.  If on Saturday you had a half tank of gas, that would easily get you into mid next week. No need to stock up on gas because there's plenty for all anticipated needs.  What happens at 10pm Sunday night if you have a sudden need to drive someplace that requires a full tank of gas?  You start on your journey and hope you can figure out something before the tank runs empty.

This is an applicable analogy to where Russia is now.  It likely had enough weaponry on hand to last it years of low intensity combat with plenty of opportunities to restock well before running low.  But they instead found themselves in a situation where all existing stocks are strained and no easy way to replenish them.  Worse, it seems there's already more needed than there is supply.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

1 hour ago, MSBoxer said:

Regarding semiconductor chips.
Let's say that Russia is cut off from their typical chip supplier in Taiwan and turn to China to replicate and supply.
Now China would need to reverse engineer/design the chip for their production facility, or acquire the original design.  This could take months.

OK, so Russia gets lucky and China happens to have the original design files and they are compatible with their manufacturing tools.  It could still take up to 4 months for the precision lithography machines to complete one disk of dies (plate of multiple individual chips).

Yup!  See bolded and underlined bits above.

This is exactly why I've said from the beginning of this war that time is not on Russia's side.  Russia is running on empty NOW so things that take months to come about are not going to be helpful when it matters most.  Which is NOW.

Steve

[BeondTheGrave]

Sub Brief just did an analysis vid on the Moskva strike. Didn't see this posted anywhere else, so I'll drop it here. 

Hes smart, but his information is pretty limited to 'safe' western media, so his information re: the Neptune is not as up to date or accurate as what Haiduk posted. But an interesting perspective nonetheless. 

edit: just watched it through. His info on the Neptune isn't as good as Haiduk's and he doesn't really get into even reports of the attack. Pretty basic stuff tbh. But I'll leave it up incase someone wants a decent summary of the Moskva's capabilities and the basic nature of the attack. Shame he didn't get into any more analysis, Aaron is usually pretty good....

Edited April 14, 2022 by BeondTheGrave

[Haiduk]

About units of 36th marines brigade in Mariupol. There was information, that marines and some other forces, which held Azovmash plant, in result of operation could join with forces, held Azovstal plant and seaport (mainly Azov regiment).

Now became knowingly that in real Azovmash group had sharp debates inside what to do, because they almost hadn't ammunitin and food. So, these forces divided on three parts. All, who had no more moral forces to continue a fight, decided to stay on the place with wounded and surrender. Russians claimed yesterday they capture 1000 Ukrainan soldiers on Azovmash, but to this time was only one video with about 50 captured, including wounded.  

Other group, led by colonel Volodymyr Baraniuk, commander of 36th marines brigade, on 12th of April conducted desperate attempt to breakthrough to the northern directin to join our forces in JTO. Alas, his group during heave clashes and strikes from the air suffered losses and was dispersed. Some small groups probably continued to go out. Some soldiers were captured. There is no information about colonel Baraniuk. 

Here Russian aerial tracking of their column

Third group of several hundreds marimes and other forces breakthrugh to south and joined with Azovstal group. In own adress, commander of Azov Denys Prokopenko and acting comamnder of 36th marines brigade mayor Serhiy Volyna (he comamnded by one of marines battalions of 36th brigade) claim they will continue a fight and say that we shouldn't make heroes from those, who could fight, but decided to surrender.

 

[TheVulture]

According to the Odessa regional government,  the Moskva is still on fire. https://t.me/suspilneodesa/11739

Given all the conflicting claims, I think all we can reliably say its that it isn't underwater, but the extent of the damage isn't known, but was severe enough for them to abandon ship, at least while the fire was burning. 

[Endyamon]

Ciao / Hello

Does anybody have news about the 12km long convoy that left Transnistria some days ago?. Here in Italy all news spoke about it like if it was a game-changer for the war (Italian news and "military experts" like to insist that Russia in a super power able to defeat Ukraine...). So, does anyone know something?
Forza Ucraina

Grazie :)

[Battlefront.com]

43 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Interestning, that this tank battalion has obvious problems with personnel. On this page we can see from 57 names 19 or 20 belong not to 218th tank regiment, but to 114th, 143rd and 394th motor-rifle regiments and even from HQ of 127th division. Also battalion commander has a rank of captain and has a mayor like a deputy of armament under own subordination.  

Thanks for that info!

Many, many, many pages ago I made a detailed post about the differences between Russian BTGs in practice and Western Battle Groups (Brigades).  The most important point I made is that the problems Russia has with morale, leadership, and performance can be traced back to how they are handling their personnel assignments.

The captured tank battalion roster document shows how this is playing out at a very low level.  Nearly 30% of the personnel of the tank battalion are not organic to it.  They aren't even organic to the regiment!  They aren't even organic to just one other regiment, but three plus a HQ unit!  This is a total mess, and it shows on the battlefield.

This example underscores the Russian mentality towards Humans.  To Russia a soldier is a widget that can be hot-swapped without causing a decrease in combat effectiveness of the units involved.  No time needed to retrain and rebuild cohesion.  No Western force thinks this way, that's for sure.

Steve

[Haiduk]

1 minute ago, Endyamon said:

Ciao / Hello

Does anybody have news about the 12km long convoy that left Transnistria some days ago?. Here in Italy all news spoke about it like if it was a game-changer for the war (Italian news and "military experts" like to insist that Russia in a super power able to defeat Ukraine...). So, does anyone know something?
Forza Ucraina

Grazie

Hm... Single bridge through Dniestr was demolished in the first day of war. Where this convoy can drive? Probably this is distorted news about new column in Kharkiv oblast

[Kinophile]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

This is an excellent point, Kraze, that hasn't been highlighted before as far as I can see.

An example of this (which dates me) is back in the old days here in the US when you couldn't purchase gasoline on Sundays or late at night with any regularity.  If on Saturday you had a half tank of gas, that would easily get you into mid next week. No need to stock up on gas because there's plenty for all anticipated needs.  What happens at 10pm Sunday night if you have a sudden need to drive someplace that requires a full tank of gas?  You start on your journey and hope you can figure out something before the tank runs empty.

This is an applicable analogy to where Russia is now.  It likely had enough weaponry on hand to last it years of low intensity combat with plenty of opportunities to restock well before running low.  But they instead found themselves in a situation where all existing stocks are strained and no easy way to replenish them.  Worse, it seems there's already more needed than there is supply.

Steve

Just look at this!

160 strikes on Feb 24.

40 on April 12

A quarter of the offensive power.  Even more, look at the increasing gaps between the strikes - from weekend duration of 2 days to 3-4 days. This can only increase. It implies that the factories manufacturing the PGMs are unable to keep up with demand (durrr) but because this very, very quickly became an issue it also implies that the initial stockpile was even less than might have been expected.

On average about 20+ are delivered each monday.

If RUS fire off 160 (Feb 24th, a Thursday)+40 (Fri)+50 (Sat)+70 (Sun)+60 (Feb 28th, a Monday) but on April 1st, a Tuesday, RUS fire off 20 PGMs then it suggests that they've fired off a significant portion of your initial combat stockpile. 

RUS then pull in a bunch from their operational reserve (giving them a surge on March 7th), and giving their factories time to accumulate another large amount.

So RUS  attempt to keep up the fires tempo but annoyingly, the Ukies are still kicking and now RUS are burning through the operational reserve at an unnerving rate.

So now.. RUS must reach back into their strategic reserve to give their factories breathing space. But those factories have not ramped up production in any manner that actually matters. A slight increase sure, but not enough. So RUS delay deliveries so that when they do get delivery it's of an actually usable amount.

The trouble is, now RUS are not striking UKR infrastructure or VIP units for day after day after day. They went 5 days in the first week of April with no PGM strikes at all.

They could easily be stockpiling for the supposedly coming Donbass campaign, which is not great - UKR would get hit by a serious surge, possibly double the Wk 1 numbers, which is bad. But after that, if UKR can weather than initial storm, then RUS PGMs will be virtually non-existent.

TL/DR: Rus PGM pipeline is garbage, cannot keep up with demand with existing lines and is unable to expand production. They're stockpiling now for an offensive but will burn through that in the first week. After that, they're empty.

[BFCElvis]

17 hours ago, Aragorn2002 said:

Blah blah blah

I tried to send you a direct message but your mailbox is full. Please try to cool. KK?

[Endyamon]

Just now, Haiduk said:

Hm... Single bridge through Dniestr was demolished in the first day of war. Where this convoy can drive? Probably this is distorted news about new column in Kharkiv oblast

oh, no one here spoke about that bridge
I told you that Italian news are bad. Now you understand why
Thanks to you Haiduk and to all the members of this forum. You are all amazing in providing true analysis and informations about this war
 

[Battlefront.com]

5 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Hm... Single bridge through Dniestr was demolished in the first day of war. Where this convoy can drive? Probably this is distorted news about new column in Kharkiv oblast

Yes, I suspect the same thing.

The Russian forces in Transnistria are not large in number and are thought to be some of the worst soldiers in the Russian Army.  Definitely the good people on the Ukrainian side of the Transnistrian border do not have to worry about their washing machines and iPads or getting shot in the back of the head by the cowards taking them.

Steve

[chris talpas]

Someone had mentioned earlier it was interesting to see the naval aspects discussed.  I went over and visited the Matrix Games Command Modern Operations forum and found this:

https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=10201&t=382814

Refreshingly, like in other matters related this this war, this forum is leading the way in terms of both quality and timeliness of information.   THE CMO analysis at this moment lags behind.

Well done everyone!

[Battlefront.com]

Some more details on how Medvedchuk got out of custody and how he was captured:

https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/823905.html

Steve

[kraze]

20 minutes ago, TheVulture said:

According to the Odessa regional government,  the Moskva is still on fire. https://t.me/suspilneodesa/11739

Given all the conflicting claims, I think all we can reliably say its that it isn't underwater, but the extent of the damage isn't known, but was severe enough for them to abandon ship, at least while the fire was burning. 

Sinking such a ship is no small task - but it can be safely said at this point that it's in a state that can't be salvaged. It's done. Similarly to Saratov/Orsk. Doesn't need to be underwater if it's a floating useless husk that even in the best case scenario would require components Russia will not be able to get.

Edited April 14, 2022 by kraze

[LukeFF]

2 hours ago, sburke said:

Putin gave his troops 3 days worth of supply.  Why would he even have considered stockpiling chips?  And which chips?  They aren't universal.  I really wish folks would stop bandying around this expression as if they are a plug and play component that can be used in anything.  It hurts my brain.

As someone who worked for 3-plus years for a major semiconductor manufacturer and is friends with an engineer who's worked for said company for 20-plus years, I wholly concur. 

[chris talpas]

If the stories behind the tactics of using the drone to distract and fixate the most capable (but with significant blindspot) radar system are true, then that shows a supreme inside understanding of enemy unit technical weaknesses.  I am reminded of the scene in The Hunt for Red October, where Ryan and Mancuso are aboard the Red October and Ramius is directing Ryan to steer into the oncoming torpedo with Mancuso urging Ryan not to do it.  When the torpedo harmlessly impacts -Mancuso praises Ramius' insider knowledge using standard tactics against them -doing the unexpected.  I think a lot of planning went into this attack.  I also think it no coincidence that the commerative stamp was released shortly before this attack.

The creative choice of using a sacraficial drone to district and the choice of timing in rough seas which helped hide the sea skimmers shows real imagination and audacity [again common theme with the Ukrainians!].

 

Edited April 14, 2022 by chris talpas
typo

[Huba]

5 minutes ago, kraze said:

Sinking such a ship is no small task - but it can be safely said at this point that it's in a state that can't be salvaged. It's done. Similarly to Saratov/Orsk. Doesn't need to be underwater if it's a floating useless husk that even in the best case scenario would require components Russia will not be able to get.

Does Russia have a dry dock and other facilities large enough to try to make repairs on such a warship ( assuming very unlikely case that it can be done in 2 years time let's say)?

Edit: OK, answered myself, they could do it in Sevastopol according to Wiki, at least as far as dry dock is concerned.

Edited April 14, 2022 by Huba

[Battlefront.com]

Images of the "1000" Ukrainian Marines that surrendered in Mariupol.  For sure it looks to be a large number, but 1000 + the 500 that tried to break out to the north + 300 that got down to Azov positions would mean that that Russia has basically caused no casualties for the Marines since the attack started.  That doesn't sound very realistic, does it?

https://southfront.org/1000-ukrainian-soldiers-surrendered-in-mariupol-afu-counterattacks-in-kharkiv/

Be forewarned that the above is a link to one of the worst Russian propaganda stinkholes on the Internet.

Steve

[LukeFF]

2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

I'd bet you everything I own that they did not.  In fact, there were reports BEFORE the war that they were having difficulties sourcing chips just like everybody else.

Steve

That's a really good point - if major industrial corporations (say, auto manufacturers) had/have a hard time sourcing chips, then Russia is no exception. I know the company I used to work for that I referenced above can't build chips fast enough for their customers.