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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?


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5 minutes ago, Grey_Fox said:

The story with this is that allegedly A couple of Ukrainians soldiers were left behind (presumably after a failed attack?) and a drone was sent to find them. They had taken cover in a crater until nightfall where they were rescued:

https://vid.pr0gramm.com/2022/03/18/8e18fb6bc7303f44.mp4

This is Russians or separs. White bandages

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3 minutes ago, Haiduk said:

Other video of towing damaged Russian helicopters from Chornonaivka airfield - 1 Mi-24/35, 1 Mi-8AMTSh, 2 Mi-28N, 1 unknown (end of video).

Background sound is a meme track of popular comic TV-show "The village of fools"

 

I wonder how long they can tow them before there is a failure in one of the helicopter's wheels/axles. Such systems have design tolerances for such things as weight and heat (friction).  For a helicopter wheel the design assumptions might not include prolonged towing.  Then again, Russia might have taken such situations into account when designing the wheels/axles.

Steve

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Can read only if you pay them money.  :(

My continued concern is that unless Putin is removed by internal dissenters he may still get a win out of this situation.  In the past I noted that if the Russian forces simply sit tight and hold onto what they have captured, that would make Ukraine a non-viable nation.

What military power has Ukraine got to attack with to remove the Russians?  If Ukraine needs a 3:1 ratio to be successful, they probably can only attack one Russian enclave at a time.  That would almost certainly require weakening their forces elsewhere - opening opportunities for Russian attacks there. 

In addition, the Russians may have advantages playing defense.  Can Ukraine endure/replace the losses that attacking will surely result in?  What will the effect be on the Ukrainian population/morale when their casualties rise dramatically?  

One can visualize a potential successful Russian strategy as akin to a boa constrictor.  Anytime Ukraine shows weakness, the Russians will tighten their grip and nibble away at the Ukrainian carcass.

Putin may also be making a reasonably good gamble that the west's attention span is limited.  How long before the west gets "bored" with this new TV war show?  In addition, I read that the new Covid strain is resulting in a virus comeback in Europe.  (Despite EU lifting all travel restrictions as they are desperate for US tourists, the US still requires a covid test 24 hours b4 one gets on a plane to the US.) 

Give this potential Russian strategy a couple of months...  If Covid again becomes serious, add in soaring energy prices.  Europe's populations may well get "distracted".

Our only hope re ending a longterm standoff in Ukraine is for Putin to be removed.  

 

Edited by Erwin
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In addition, IIRC Russia is bring in troops from the far east, ie: Mongolia.  It would not be surprising if hidden amongst those troops are many Chinese military advisors/observers (all ID's removed for plausible deniability of course) keen to see how the west may function in a war when China makes its move vs Taiwan.  

That is another reason why NATO and specifically the US probably would not want to get too involved in Ukraine lest it reveal our own military technology and other secrets to the Chinese.

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I'm sure this article was posted here a little while ago, but I think it is worth reposting:

https://newlinesmag.com/first-person/putins-killing-machine-that-isnt-working/

There's a lot in it (much of it unverifiable, of course), but the organization that produced it does appear to be credible.  So, with those caveats in mind, two tidbits that I found particularly interesting:

One way Russia might be meeting it's food supply needs is by relabeling canned pet food as rations:

Quote

Low morale stems from the second big reason for failure: Russia’s high command doesn’t give a damn about its people. It cares only about money. It is corrupt.

Let’s move on to the dog food. Russian soldiers eat the best possible nutritious rations of any military, so long as it’s dog food. You can get a flavor of what’s going wrong on the ground in Ukraine from a story Reuters ran 11 years ago. The news agency reported ex-Maj. Igor Matveyev saying: “It’s embarrassing to say, but soldiers here were fed dog food. It was fed to them as stew.” The tins of dog food were covered up with labels reading “premium quality beef.”

True?  Well... does anybody think this sounds UNtrue?  It doesn't to me, not at all.  Just like when body armor produced for Ukrainians by a Ukrainian company in 2014 turned out to be a foam insert inside a camouflage carrier.  Some people are all about the money.

Next one is a great example of (probably) the most common form of corruption within any military:

Quote

The Ukrainians have found abandoned Russian army vehicles with food rations with “eat by” dates from seven years ago. What is so gloriously ironic is that the man responsible is one of the Kremlin’s favorite gangster cronies, Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin’s Chef.” With close ties to Russian military intelligence, the GRU, Prigozhin, an ex-convict in Soviet times, has run troll farms and the murderous mercenary unit, the Wagner Group, named after Hitler’s favorite composer. His empire has taken over 90% of the business of supplying food to the Russian army. The Ukrainians have released several videos of starving Russian soldiers scavenging for food. And that’s down to Prigozhin and his boss.

Investigative journalist Christo Grozev has tweeted, “While Russian soldiers are starving and breaking into Ukrainians’ homes begging for bread, Prigozhin’s ‘not for sale’ military food rations have flooded Russia’s ebay-like sites at $3 a can.”

Corruption is killing Russia’s killing machine.

In this scam the military purchases X and someone sells it for Y.  Cost of goods to the seller is $0, so after taking care of direct expenses (including spreading bribe money around) there's still much profit to be made.  *ALL* militaries suffer from this to some extent or another. 

I remember back in the 1980s when the US military employed a whole bunch of civilian vehicles (COTS) prior to Humvees.  I was told, first hand, about all the parts that were ordered by motor pool mechanics that were sold to civilians for their own vehicles (same vehicles, less the Olive Drab, Gray, or Blue paint).  This happened in a country that actively discourages and punishes corruption.  Imagine how much of this must go on in a country where corruption is endemic and normal?

Steve

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FWIW when my parents arrived in the west as WW2 refugees, they were eating cans of cat food as they thought it was simply inexpensive "canned fish".    It sounds disgusting.  But apparently it was quite healthy and enjoyable - until some months later they found out what it was.  Have read complaints about MRE's that make them sound far worse.  So,in itself, being made to disgusting MRE's or pet food or doesn't mean the war is lost or won.

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2 hours ago, keas66 said:

There are people dying on both sides of this conflict in horrible , painful ways . One thing to keep in mind  while we watch from afar  from 10,000ft . I'm trying to avoid the death porn  as much as I can .

We wouldn't have such videos if that guy chose to stay home instead of getting in the tank and coming here to kill us.

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5 hours ago, BeondTheGrave said:

Aggressive.

He refers to the history of Brandenburg, trying to make the point that Brandenburg was forced to chose between becoming a naval power and becoming a land power. This is part of his larger argument that, for reasons of court politics, Russia failed to develop a clear focus in land power primacy, and so this explains why it is today struggling. He argues that Prussia abandoned its naval power colonial aspirations in the 18th century to become a "land power max" country. Setting aside the rather burdensome video metaphor, this is pretty roundly wrong and ignores nearly 100 years of the countries history which led to this choice. Brandenburg was devastated by the 30yrs War, it had been forced to repeatedly 'pick sides' at the point of a pike as its military was not powerful enough to preserve the country from outside threats. This, not the failure of any maritime policy, led to the rise of Brandenburg as a land power. Robert Citino, in his book (which is not a textbook, and is very much worth the read) highlights that this initial choice for security transformed after the union with Prussia into a question for a land corridor. Excellence in Prussian arms was developed as early as the Scanian of 1678  in which the Prussian army famously mounted sleds and conducted a rapid winter march from its quarters into the depths of Swedish occupied Germany. So dramatic, and important, was this to the Prussian ethos that Heinz Guderian himself said the campaign was one of his inspirations for his ideas. 

Anyway I dispute even the basic premise of this 'naval max or land max' analysis. Is too brutish. The US is the preeminent global land, sea, and air power. Dont think most countries would challenge that really, except China. Who is currently a major land power trying to go to sea. And of course the British had the RN in the early 20th century. The British Army in 1938 was right up there with the German in terms of modernization, thought it was small. And nobody remembers that the British also had the largest volunteer army in the world, the British Army in India had almost 3.5mil volunteers in 1945. More even than the US. Lots of people like to talk about the German system, but really the British were probably still the worlds leading power right before WWII, they had the biggest and best navy, the biggest army, and one of the best motorized cores as well. 

Later, the poster discusses the history of Soviet maritime strategy. But its also pretty off, to be honest. Documents are quite clear really that Stalin wanted, after WWII, to build a navy which he thought would be able to challenge the RN and USN for control of the seas. But, just as important, Stalin saw the navy as a prestige tool. Some have tried to explain the Second World War, especially the war in Asia, as having been driven in part by the unequal distribution of battleship allotments in the interwar naval treaties. While I dont think he thought in those exact terms, Stalin felt that capital ships equated to great power status on some level and so he wanted them built. The plans were laid out and IIRC the keels of several ships were laid, but Stalin's death interrupted this program. Khrushchev diverted those resources both into the Army and into civilian programs. But his successor, Brezhnev, rebuilt some of the naval program. While the technology had changed, many of the motivations were the same. Brezhnev, especially after 1968, tried to rehabilitate the USSR to the rest of the world. He introduce a global strategy which aimed to turn decolonizing and decolonized nations over to the USSR and defeat the west this way. Prestige and good relations are important to that, and nothing says good relations like a port visit. Building up the navy also gave the USSR the ability to participate more directly in global crises, ala 1973 and the Yom Kippur War. And of course it would have checked Khrushchev's biggest failure: the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is also the era of admiral Gorchakov, the Soviet submarine theorist. Westerners love him because he thinks like we do about naval power and wanted the USSR to do what we would have, fight a third battle of the Atlantic. But Gorchakov is really actually a marginal figure in the USSR's military establishment. Its critical to see the revived Soviet Navy in the context of what it was meant to do. 1) it had to secure the SLBM bastions in the White Sea and around the Artic ice cap. 2) It had to protect the USSR's long coastlines from both subsurface and naval aviation threats, a big fear was a rapid USN deep penetration raid against USSR nuclear facilities or, of course, the SSBNs. Something BTW the USN practiced and was very good at. 3) Only once these two were done would the navy be permitted to move onto an offensive footing and operate along traditional lines. Which is to say never, as the new US maritime strategy of the 70s and 80s called for projecting power against the Soviet coasts in a way that would have never allowed for the security required to satisfy 1&2. More importantly, the basic defensive mission of the Navy was important in that it did not detract from the Army's offensive mission in central Europe. That is, the Navy was always the branch getting leftovers, not dictating the whole pie. It was assumed that what was at sea would be destroyed (so better have it take a shot at a carrier at least!) Once war was declared reserves, safe in the bastions, would be parceled out to accomplish the three missions as befitted the strategic and operational situation in central & norther Europe. 

And then we get into more minor things, like the fact that he calls the Russian operational theory Blitzkrieg. Its not. They grew from the same root, Cold War or even modern Deep Battle is very different than the modern form of the blitz practiced by western nations. 

Like I said, the person seems to have a strong understanding of Putin and his court, but his use of history is pretty clumsy. Worse yet this makes some of the analysis suspect because a big part of his argument in the thread that was first linked is based on this idea that Russia has a historical tendency of overdiversification of arms. Except, historically, thats not really true. So it kind of leaves him out there twisting in the wind with some of these conclusions. 

Also do we really need to worship all our sources as heroes? Just because Col M served once and said some things people like doesn't mean his word is inviolate forever. Just because someone published a book you like doesn't meant this time theyre right by default. Just because a guy on twitter says one thing you like doesn't make it a personal attack if someone else disagrees. I dont like a lot of the things I read, and if I didn't complain I'd hardly be a Grognard now would I? 🤣 Judge somebody by their words and ideas on a case by case basis. Does what they say pass the smell test? Does it fit into the other information youre reading? Is this person mainstream on this issue or are they are bucking the orthodox, if so why? Is it to be contrarian, or because theyre crazy, or dumb, or are they on to something truly different? You can even apply the same test to me! Im an asshole and surely most of the dumb things I say will wither under a critical gaze, but better to be critical than to accept the things I say whole cloth. After all I could be a crazyperson. 

Many thanks for the monograph, very interesting. 

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@Haiduk you mentioned previously that the relatively rapid Russian success by their Crimean forces was due to/helped  by local UKR incompetence and possibly treason. 

This article gives a more mundane reason - better logistics and initial  basing/supply.

https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/injured-ukraine-civilians-vow-to-fight-on/

(scroll down to 6th paragraph from top)

I'm curious, do you think this could be reason? Simply a better organized, led Russian force? 

 

 

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18 minutes ago, sburke said:

So few facts, so much projection in modern "sprint to publish" journalism. Photo in the article calls out burning BTR-4E as a destroyed Russian apc.

Not that I'm arguing against the other contents of the article re:putin. Just lamenting...

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Ukr 10th mountain-assault brigade liberates some village in Kyiv oblast. I can't identify what exactly, this brigade hold positions approx on the administrative boudary of Kyiv and Zhytomyr oblast. There is no any info about warfare in that area except sevaral videos of 10th brigade without detalis. Local twttetrs write, as if Russians tried to cross Teterev river in Piskivka village in order to advance deeply west in Zhytomyr oblast, but about week of their attempts cost them many losses. 

 

 

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Just now, Homo_Ferricus said:

So few facts, so much projection in modern "sprint to publish" journalism. Photo in the article calls out burning BTR-4E as a destroyed Russian apc.

Not that I'm arguing against the other contents of the article re:putin. Just lamenting...

The bit about the purge is backed by bellingcat , that was all I really focused on.

Not sure what you are referring to there.  Calling a burned out BTR with a Z on it a Russian APC is wrong because?

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4 minutes ago, sburke said:

The bit about the purge is backed by bellingcat , that was all I really focused on.

Not sure what you are referring to there.  Calling a burned out BTR with a Z on it a Russian APC is wrong because?

It’s a burning Ukrainian BTR-4E with abandoned Russian Tigrs behind it.

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6 minutes ago, Kinophile said:

@Haiduk you mentioned previously that the relatively rapid Russian success by their Crimean forces was due to/helped  by local UKR incompetence and possibly treason. 

This article gives a more mundane reason - better logistics and initial  basing/supply.

Russian 58th CAA really had much experience and probably more smart command, but anyway Russians crossed the isthmus and occupied Kherson oblsat almost without seriuos resistance until reached Oleshki and Kherson, where we could delay them for several days.  Though before a war there were many manuevers how we will repell Russian attack from Crimea. Smerch and Grads, artilelry strikes, tank counter-attacks with Su-25 support. Where was that all? Why territorial defense units didn't get the weapon? 

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1 minute ago, Haiduk said:

Russian 58th CAA really had much experience and probably more smart command, but anyway Russians crossed the isthmus and occupied Kherson oblsat almost without seriuos resistance until reached Oleshki and Kherson, where we could delay them for several days.  Though before a war there were many manuevers how we will repell Russian attack from Crimea. Smerch and Grads, artilelry strikes, tank counter-attacks with Su-25 support. Where was that all? Why territorial defense units didn't get the weapon? 

Yep, I wondered this too; my impression was that the UKR units in the area were above par. You mentioned before that one of the better UKR units was in maneuvers/exercises and was caught out of cohesion by the assault. Bit of a daft time to go do exercises, considering the recent tension then.

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