Russian army under equipped?

[VladimirTarasov]

And there goes the discussion.

[Sublime]

Interesting you didnt feel that way when discussing the US election. This at least has to do with the theatre of war of the game.

[sburke]

1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:

And there goes the discussion.

? Not sure what that is in reference to.  Not like this thread has been on topic to the OP in quite a few pages.

[Battlefront.com]

My observation is that the discussion runs into problems when an unsupportable Russian held belief is successfully challenged by someone taking the opposite position.  Or as we call it in the West, "a discussion"

Seriously though, here's the problem in a nutshell...

Russia is in a really bad spot.  Russia has the two most financially draining parts of Ukraine; one under illegal annexation, the other under illegal military occupation.  This means Russia has to pay for these territories both in terms of money and in terms of political pain (which has economic pain included).  What does it have to show for it?  Some rah-rah propaganda which is already wearing thin and long term is definitely not worth the costs the Russian state is suffering.

The original war aims of Russia (continued exploitation of Ukraine) are unobtainable unless something dramatic changes.  What would that look like?

1.  Status quo.  Donbas remains a frozen conflict of some sort until an unknown opportunity drops into Russia's lap AND they are able to exploit it to result in forcing Ukraine to do what it wants.

2.  Oblige Ukraine to "cry uncle" through the application of economic/political force.

3.  Oblige Ukraine to "cry uncle" trough the application of military force.

#1 is not a sustainable solution.  Ukraine continues to rid itself of Russian influence and capabilities to keep it from obtaining rule of law.  It's slow, uneven, and hard work... but it is pretty clear that Ukraine will not go back to it's former slave state status.  On the other hand, Russia is paying all the bills for maintaining both Crimea and Donbas.  It also has to keep spending very large amounts of money to both keep the war going in Donbas but also to prevent it's byproducts (like illegal weapons) spilling over into Russia.  Of course Ukraine has major expenses as well, but at least Ukraine is getting something out of it.  Specifically a better military and more reasons to become a better governed state.  Status quo, long term, is a losing strategy for Russia.

#2 seems to have already run its course.  Ukraine has shown ZERO signs of caving into Russia's ridiculous plans to keep major influence in Ukrainian governance by forcing it to accept a "federated" solution (as defined by Russia, of course).  The West has not been intimidated into letting Russia do what it wants, as it did with Georgia, so that's not working either.  Economic pressure hasn't worked either and could be said to have backfired by hurting Russia more than it has hurt Ukraine.  Therefore, political/economic pressure is not likely to get Russia what it wants.

#3 is the only method left to Russia to keep Ukraine a servant state.  But how viable is that?  Well, there's the conversation that for some reason is having problems.  I'll try and restart it (not that I think it ever ended).

I am asking anybody, Russian posters included, to sketch out a military scenario that winds up producing conditions which force the Ukrainian government to "throw in the towel".  So far I'm the only one that's attempted to do this.  The three options are:

1.  Limited action within the ATO area aimed at causing significant damage to the ATO forces and gaining more ground than currently held by Russia.  Force needed = 50k-75k.  Time needed = 2-3 months.

2.  Larger action to destroy ATO forces and take enough non-Donbas territory so quickly that in shock Ukraine decides to surrender instead of fully mobilize and fight back.  Forces needed = 100k-150k.  Time needed = 4-6 months.

3.  Huge action which destroys most of Ukraine's standing military, takes over huge chunks of territory, and threatens Kiev itself.  Ukraine surrenders because it fears it will cease to exist as a nation state if it does not.  Forces needed = 200k-250k + additional 100k occupation force (not necessarily military).  Time needed = forever.

#1 is very difficult because it requires Russia to concentrate huge forces in a very small area, quickly, and with minimal disruption from the combat hardened, dug in, highly motivated Ukrainian forces of the ATO.  Still, it could be done if Russia was willing to risk the possibility of an immediate and major military defeat and further political fallout from the West.

#2 is also difficult because it requires most of what #1 is about, but on a much larger geographical scale.  That means many more troops, though not as densely packed.  Being spread out has its own problems, especially if Ukraine doesn't quickly surrender.

#3 is a pipe dream.  Russia could only take out the Ukrainian armed forces, as a whole, if it committed several hundred thousand forces.  Not all at once, of course, but they'd have to be allocated to the offensive and fed in as territory was taken.  While certainly possible in theory, it is doubtful that Russians have the will to support such a large war.  Especially Ukraine doesn't surrender and Russia is now faced with a Chechen War situation on someone else's soil without even the slightest real justification for it.  Especially since continued control requires full time military occupation and (likely) counter insurgency operations FOREVER.

As I've argued, Ukraine has been fighting Russia for more than 2 years and has not given up even when things were really bad.  The thought that Ukraine would be easily forced to surrender now is lunacy.  There is no evidence to support such a position.  In fact, there's more evidence to suggest that in a test of national will and resolve that Russia would be the one to crumble and not Ukraine.

Fortunately, I think Putin is well aware that he has no viable military options and therefore won't do anything on a large scale.  I'm not even sure what Putin would be willing to do when (not if) Ukraine goes on a general offensive.  That's a topic for a different discussion   The point is that of the two countries, Ukraine has a very clear and very necessary reason to fight Russia while Russia has no real reason to fight Ukraine.  The make-believe reasons that Russian media puts into the heads of Russians won't be enough to keep Russians motivated after the first couple thousand dead and wounded come back from the front with no end in sight.

Russia has put itself in this position and I'm still not sure how it will get itself out. I don't even think Putin knows.  In fact, I'm sure he doesn't.

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

9 hours ago, Sublime said:

Interesting you didnt feel that way when discussing the US election. This at least has to do with the theatre of war of the game.

Yeah it did have to do with the theatre of the game until we have guys posting politics about what czars supposedly did or soviets supposedly did to Ukraine, or until the dude is posting stuff about Putin bots. 

[Sublime]

Still you participated in those conversations and then brought up the US presidential election id say you.re in no position to complain about thread changing topics.

And actually centuries of Tsarist influence the the SU actions have quite a bit to do with current events. See basically your neighbors are sick to death of you guys meddling. Since its been that way for centuries and since Stalin had millions of dead Ukrainians blood on his hands BEFORE the German invasion, considering that Ukr partisans thought Vatutin was a good target in 1944 when memories of Nazi occupation were especially fresh.... this all has to do with how Russia and Ukraine got here actually. There is absolutely zero the US pres campaign has to do with Ukr except rhetoric and Russians tryong to meddle (habit?) In our elections by hacking the DNC.  This threads been around months and was derailed within days of its creation if you ask me.

Is it wrong that I take an odd glee at the predicament the Russians have put themselves in especially because whenever i think of it I also think about how Russians (that Ive met online, ive met a couple in real life and they were westernized )are usually the first ones to sling mud and gloat over the pain and agony of my generation being used as toy soldiers to fight foreverwars that they have little say in. They do have some say but noone coulda predicted 9/11 and the resulting impact in the US which was like a magically teleported head of angry we want war steam into our national conciousness. You had to be here to get it.

By the way tell your SVR propaganda overseers Americans dont like headlines like "Russia trying to influence US elections?" And that whole thing backfired.

Edited July 31, 2016 by Sublime

[Battlefront.com]

OK, now we are starting to get off the path.  This should be about Russia's military forces, it's ability to use them, and likely outcomes of further war against Ukraine.  Russia's general lack of regard for the rule of law and fair treatment of its neighbors over the centuries is too broad of a topic, though of course that is the heart of why there is a conflict in the first place.  The Russian state divides people (and therefore governments) as either subjects to be ruled/exploited or rivals to be challenged/thwarted.  There is no concept of someone (or government) being either a peer or superior to Russia.  Obviously that makes conflicts like Ukraine inevitable.

For those of you who pay attention to discussions like these you will note a pattern.  When a factual discussion eventual gets to a point of concluding that Russia is not as strong as Russians perceive, there is an attempt to stop the conversation through distraction.  Try to talk about what is going on in Donbas and the next thing you know we're right back to conspiracy theories about how Nulland's cookies were the reason for Ukraine breaking away from Russia's orbit, which obligates others to point out that it's more likely hundreds of years of Russian abuse of the Ukrainian people.  The discussion is then declared "off topic" and the uncomfortable turths that were being discussed are lost.

The tactic is used time and again because it is effective.  Since the old saying of "it takes two to tango" is applicable here, let's attempt to not get derailed by things which are definitely off topic.  OK?  In case anybody has lost sight of the topic it is this:

What is Russia's realistic military capacity (i.e. are we under/over modeling it) in a war against Ukraine.

The latest part of that discussion is examining various scenarios for Russia attempting to settle Donbas/Ukraine problem militarily.  So far I'm the only one that is attempting to talk specific scenarios with specific force structures, which makes it difficult to have a meaningful conversation.  Please either discuss the scenarios I've come up with or create new ones to consider.  But above all, let's try and not get distracted away from the topic since the attempts to distract are an indication that we're finally getting somewhere.

Steve

[Peter Cairns]

Steve,

My scenario which I think is unlikely but realistic, is that Russia already knows that all it can ever hope to hold is those areas where half or more of the population are Russian and from this to except pressure on the Ukraine politically and economically to keep it weak or indeed dependant.

In this respect Russia even if it had the military means to take them couldn't hope to hold any more of Ukraine as the provinces to the west are no more that 25% Russian and that falls rapidly as you move towards Kiev.

It also means that you could see argue that the territory it's proxies now control is bigger than it can hope to retain in the long term, consisting of a high value high Russian industrial region in the East and the more diverse less populated areas to the West.

So for me Phase two of Black Sea takes place in 2019-20 after the current game and a year of two of stalemate and involves a reinforced rearmed Ukraine trying to take back everything short of Crimea. Phase one is taking the Russian minority buffer areas and has the Current black sea Ukrainian TOE augmented by modern western systems like Javelin and UAV's plus some added long Storied nation surplus like old turkish M60A1's ( ulterior motive is that it opens the way for scenarios for 70's to 90's Arab Israeli scenario's).

This phase actually is more like Shock Force in that the Ukrainians would be mostly fighting a proxy Russian "Free Ukrainian" army than the Russians itself. The next stage is where the advancing Ukrainian forces enter that majority Russian region to the East a week as it is militarily and economically the Russian army is forced to intervene openly deploying it's latest equipment ( with the proviso that BF has enough reliable information to model things like the T-14 & T-15 without guesswork!)

In a way this turns Black Sea on it's head because this is a Ukrainian offensive not a Russian one, which stays hypothetical while incorporating elements from the real life situation. It's not true but is true to life if you like.

Peter.

 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

I simply brought up the historical misdeeds in the context of fighting a counter-insurgency.  In Iraq we had people who would cite stuff done by anyone not Arab going back hundreds of years as totally legitimate reasons why they should blow up a market place.  There's a lot of bad blood that exists between Ukrainians and Russians, and even given the force numbers cited I do not believe they would be enough to successfully secure the Russian rear areas, and further Russian retaliation and COIN tactics are inadequate to deal with even a fairly modest insurgency, which would likely increase the level of resistance to the degree that Russian war aims are entirely unobtainable.

So the shorter version of my previous posts being:

1. Russian invaders will almost certainly trigger an insurgent type uprising.
2. The Ukraine is a good place to be if you're an insurgent, it has the supplies, the anti-Russian sentiment, and a lot of places to operate from.
3. Russian forces are not technically good at COIN operations
4. Russian forces are not adequate in strength to both attack deep enough into the Ukraine to achieve mission success, AND secure rear areas.
5. Historical Russian treatment of restive populations virtually ensures war crimes, international outcry, and likely third and fourth order effects beyond the value of even a total Russian success on the battlefield.

I'm just baffled at the "easy war" narrative.  Going into the Ukraine in strength in a declared war and thinking it'll be anything clean cut or fast is like looking at someone with cancer, pulling out your trusty pen knife and announcing you're going to conduct surgery.  The Russian military is adequate at applying force.  It's wholly inadequate at much of anything else.  

[sburke]

5 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Yeah it did have to do with the theatre of the game until we have guys posting politics about what czars supposedly did or soviets supposedly did to Ukraine, or until the dude is posting stuff about Putin bots. 

Let's keep this respectful- it is Mr. Dude please.

As to the Putin bot comment, it is factual that the Russian gov't runs an organization that's sole purpose is to confuse and alter public debate on the internet.  There has even been a lawsuit in Russia over the pay.  The point is that those efforts will fail in the face of the reality that is people's lives.

Getting back to the point if Russia attempts a large scale military adventure and gets bogged down in a bloody conflict the already existing fault lines in Russian public opinion will crack.  Not much different than what happened in the US over Vietnam or Iraq or in Russia over Afghanistan.  A costly unpopular war is always a bad thing.  Having that in a situation where there are real economic issues not being addressed just compounds it.

Mr Dude out.

[VladimirTarasov]

@Sublime you're history is off, and I have no overseers or anything... Do you think I'm a Putin "bot"... That's gotta be the most offensive thing I've read on here. 

@sburke when I said dude I didn't mean to insult you.

on topic: I am sure an insurgency will happen in Ukraine, that is why I was saying Russia's goals in such a war would be to destroy Ukraine's military, and force a treaty on their side as quick as possible. If Ukraine does not sit at the treaty table after having their military smashed in the ATO, that wont matter as long as Russia has completed its military goal. I dont think Russia would need the economical burden of taking over the vast spaces of Ukraine for nothing in return. 

So as I've said since the start, Russia would instead of occupying Ukraine, have powerful short goals. And the only way Russia would invade Ukraine is if another Ukrainian offensive is launched onto DPR/LPR. So in essence, a Russian counter offensive. 

[panzersaurkrautwerfer]

36 minutes ago, VladimirTarasov said:

@Sublime you're history is off, and I have no overseers or anything... Do you think I'm a Putin "bot"... That's gotta be the most offensive thing I've read on here. 

@sburke when I said dude I didn't mean to insult you.

on topic: I am sure an insurgency will happen in Ukraine, that is why I was saying Russia's goals in such a war would be to destroy Ukraine's military, and force a treaty on their side as quick as possible. If Ukraine does not sit at the treaty table after having their military smashed in the ATO, that wont matter as long as Russia has completed its military goal. I dont think Russia would need the economical burden of taking over the vast spaces of Ukraine for nothing in return. 

So as I've said since the start, Russia would instead of occupying Ukraine, have powerful short goals. And the only way Russia would invade Ukraine is if another Ukrainian offensive is launched onto DPR/LPR. So in essence, a Russian counter offensive. 

Here's the thing though, why would the Ukraine allow its military to be smashed?  They too sat through the Georgian war and likely took some notes.  Forcing Russia to commit to a pursuit deep in the Ukraine plays to their strengths, and also places Russia in a position that if it fails to totally and utterly destroy the Ukrainian military, which is likely beyond Russia's capabilities even in favorable circumstances, that the issue will simply be revisited at some later date.  

More likely than not Russia would commit forces, they'd chase a Ukrainian force deeper across hostile territory.  Casualties rack up, victory is illusive, Russian soldiers start dying in new and interesting ways not accounted for in previous planning, and a smart Russian leader declares "victory" and retreats back to the status pre-invasion, with the Ukrainians parked outside the silly little "republics" while a dumb one doubles down and rides Russia to ruin.  There's no likely winning play, and there's certainly no quick victory.  

[VladimirTarasov]

8 minutes ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

Here's the thing though, why would the Ukraine allow its military to be smashed?  They too sat through the Georgian war and likely took some notes.  Forcing Russia to commit to a pursuit deep in the Ukraine plays to their strengths, and also places Russia in a position that if it fails to totally and utterly destroy the Ukrainian military, which is likely beyond Russia's capabilities even in favorable circumstances, that the issue will simply be revisited at some later date.  

More likely than not Russia would commit forces, they'd chase a Ukrainian force deeper across hostile territory.  Casualties rack up, victory is illusive, Russian soldiers start dying in new and interesting ways not accounted for in previous planning, and a smart Russian leader declares "victory" and retreats back to the status pre-invasion, with the Ukrainians parked outside the silly little "republics" while a dumb one doubles down and rides Russia to ruin.  There's no likely winning play, and there's certainly no quick victory.  

Let me be more clear, I dont mean Russia will destroy all of the UAF, how ever, let me give you a scenario so we can be very statistic, and argue in better detail.

Ok ATO 3.0 right, usual obvious UAF advantage in numbers and equipment against the militias. Say dashes all across the borders. At this point, Russia assigns forces from the southern and western military districts to launch a counter offensive in full force. Obviously the tactical air superiority will be apparent right away. Steve  I think said UAF has 50-70K forces in the ATO vicinity. Let's say, 50K of these forces thrust into Donbas, now Donbas militias have a 30 thousand active force, with also reserves. Ukraine will obviously not smash right through, they dont have the needed air superiority to achieve rapid conventional advances. 

Now if Russia deploys forces in the similar amount to the ATO, Russia together with the Donbas militias will outnumber this offensive. Sure nothing crazy but Ukraine being on the offense puts them into trouble. If the Russian army was able to smash a Ukrainian offensive as recent as 2015, in limited capabilities, I am more than sure with aerial superiority, full active forces together with the militias will be more than enough to destroy this ATO operation. Now assuming 2015 is to be taking as a reference if the UAF withdraw from the operation, Russia will be able to pursue these forces, even in a limited offensive, be it an air campaign or combined warfare operations and if Russia can inflict damage further thats a victory on its own. And this is the most justified scenario possible, if Russia goes into Ukraine for any other reason, other than defending Donbas that would be political suicide. 

[Sublime]

@VladimirTarasov I wasnt actually serious though as others mentioned the SVR does have people whose job is really to troll forums.  Even if you were I wouldnt be serious - youd never admit it and I could never prove it. as far as most insulting thing how about this - ill apologize when you admit Putin is a dictator and Russia invaded the Ukraine, in the Crimea and Donbass, lied about using cluster munitions in Syria, and largely ignored ISIS to pursue Assads war aims despite stating otherwise during the Syrian adventure.

[Sublime]

ps Im always highly amused when I read a news article at Russian dismay at this or that countrys neo Nazi movements or backlash and retrograde movements back to nationalism when historys perhaps most vicious dictator ever is currently revered in Russia and openly pined for by people in the streets during surveys and opinion polls and to date is Russias current most popular leader. Not most popular during his reign as you could say with the Nazis perhaps, but AFTER histories judgement. I really actually think Im the one whose in the wrong in this little tiff with @vlad because I really liked Russian history etc until Russia started getting aggressive and cold war esque the last few years and now its actually sometimes hard for me to feel the same interest or even want to play russians as much in games anymore. and thats completely my issue not his I will admit, I just kind of feeel like the wool was pulled from my eyes and I really dont like what I see vis a vis the Russian people insomuch as I know the Russian people which is to say the Russian state and people online - which is also to say almost not at all.

if someone judged america by its foreign policy alone and internet people as well i wouldnt be surprised at all at negative points

[Battlefront.com]

7 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

I simply brought up the historical misdeeds in the context of fighting a counter-insurgency.

Looks like I should have been more specific about what was getting us off topic!  What you wrote about the counter insurgency issues that Russia faces is 100% relevant to our discussion.  Though if nobody can come up with a plausible scenario where Russia's armed forces would even get to that point... then it's kinda irrelevant

7 hours ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:

I'm just baffled at the "easy war" narrative.  Going into the Ukraine in strength in a declared war and thinking it'll be anything clean cut or fast is like looking at someone with cancer, pulling out your trusty pen knife and announcing you're going to conduct surgery.  The Russian military is adequate at applying force.  It's wholly inadequate at much of anything else.  

Absolutely.  And was pointed out a while ago, militarily Russia lost the Second Chechen War.  Or more generously it could be stated that it never had to finish it because of the deal with Kadyrov (which IMHO is a long term loss for Russia).  In part because the Russian people probably wouldn't have supported another long term counter insurgency even on its home turf.  In Ukraine?  Forget about it.  Russia could start to level cities and massacre civilians as it did in the Caucuses, but it wouldn't work.  Least of all because that would trigger significant NATO assistance to Ukraine which would, in turn, hasten an end to the conflict.

Steve

[VladimirTarasov]

1 hour ago, Sublime said:

@VladimirTarasov I wasnt actually serious though as others mentioned the SVR does have people whose job is really to troll forums.  Even if you were I wouldnt be serious - youd never admit it and I could never prove it. as far as most insulting thing how about this - ill apologize when you admit Putin is a dictator and Russia invaded the Ukraine, in the Crimea and Donbass, lied about using cluster munitions in Syria, and largely ignored ISIS to pursue Assads war aims despite stating otherwise during the Syrian adventure.

Let's not go that route please. I would be more than happy to counter these claims how ever thats an automatic lock of a thread where regular discussions were happening... 

[VladimirTarasov]

1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:

Absolutely.  And was pointed out a while ago, militarily Russia lost the Second Chechen War.  Or more generously it could be stated that it never had to finish it because of the deal with Kadyrov (which IMHO is a long term loss for Russia).  In part because the Russian people probably wouldn't have supported another long term counter insurgency even on its home turf.  In Ukraine?  Forget about it.  Russia could start to level cities and massacre civilians as it did in the Caucuses, but it wouldn't work.  Least of all because that would trigger significant NATO assistance to Ukraine which would, in turn, hasten an end to the conflict.

Steve

Steve sir... That was the most out rageous claim about history on this chat.... You are saying we lost the Second Chechen war??? Militarily too??? In Chechnya there's no chance of any terrorist factions forming anymore because of our military success, the second even a small terrorist group goes active in a small village, FSB and MVD units are all over it and its game over by the day. I mean sure, Russia isn't going to be happy facing a Ukrainian insurgency in event of a war, how ever there can be solutions to it, effective or not. But going by this standard since Russia is occupying Crimea, where is the insurgency? Did I miss the IEDs flinging a squad ontop of a BTR across the street? 

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, Sublime said:

@VladimirTarasov I wasnt actually serious though as others mentioned the SVR does have people whose job is really to troll forums.  Even if you were I wouldnt be serious - youd never admit it and I could never prove it. as far as most insulting thing how about this - ill apologize when you admit Putin is a dictator and Russia invaded the Ukraine, in the Crimea and Donbass, lied about using cluster munitions in Syria, and largely ignored ISIS to pursue Assads war aims despite stating otherwise during the Syrian adventure.

Sublime... you're the one derailing this thread.  If you can't stick to the topic then please stop posting.  I won't ask again as nicely.

2 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:

Let me be more clear, I dont mean Russia will destroy all of the UAF, how ever, let me give you a scenario so we can be very statistic, and argue in better detail.

Now we're getting somewhere

If you are talking about a scenario where Russia could keep its foot in Ukraine's East, there are definitely scenarios for that which could work.  Shot term and at great risk to Russia, but still viable.  However, this is very different than strategically getting Ukraine back under Moscow's thumb.

Let's look at your "prolonging the suffering, but not solving anything" scenario...

Quote

Ok ATO 3.0 right, usual obvious UAF advantage in numbers and equipment against the militias. Say dashes all across the borders. At this point, Russia assigns forces from the southern and western military districts to launch a counter offensive in full force. Obviously the tactical air superiority will be apparent right away. Steve  I think said UAF has 50-70K forces in the ATO vicinity. Let's say, 50K of these forces thrust into Donbas, now Donbas militias have a 30 thousand active force, with also reserves.

Sure, I can go along with that.

Quote

Ukraine will obviously not smash right through, they dont have the needed air superiority to achieve rapid conventional advances. 

I agree that Ukraine isn't likely to attack along every inch of front simultaneously.  However, it doesn't need to.  It also doesn't need to move very fast either.  I'll get into that below.

Quote

Now if Russia deploys forces in the similar amount to the ATO, Russia together with the Donbas militias will outnumber this offensive. Sure nothing crazy but Ukraine being on the offense puts them into trouble.

First, the combat potential of the true militias is extremely low.  Cannon fodder and ghosts for the most part.  For sure there are some competent militia units, but for the most part the DPR/LPR has always relied upon regular Russian forces when things get very hot.  Which is to say that whatever the militia headcount is the amount that could be of much use to Russian forces is quite low.  I'll be generous and say 10,000.

Ukraine's offensive is likely to be fairly cautious at first.  It would select a few critical spots and hit them very hard, with modest expansion.  It would let the militias try to counter attack and would smash them to pieces in the process.  This would hasten the decline of the fighting potential of the starting force dramatically.

As soon as Russia saw the attack developing it would face one of two decisions:

1.  Intervene fairly openly and with significant force in order to defeat the Ukrainian offensive

2.  Continue Russia's previous 2.5 years of activity by feeding in only the bare minimum at one time and try to claim it isn't

You have laid out a case for #1, so I will stick with that premise.

Quote

If the Russian army was able to smash a Ukrainian offensive as recent as 2015, in limited capabilities, I am more than sure with aerial superiority, full active forces together with the militias will be more than enough to destroy this ATO operation.

It might be enough to arrest forward progress by Ukrainian forces, yes.  But destroy Ukraine's military or nation state?  Not remotely likely.

I think the best result would be Russia stopping the forward motion of the offensive and pushing back enough that Ukraine faces a decision to either commit more forces or to sue for peace.  In the event that Ukraine moves up reinforcements to keep the fighting up, Russia would be obligated to do the same.  If Ukraine sues for peace then Russia would weigh the risks of further military activity with the gains.

Quote

Now assuming 2015 is to be taking as a reference if the UAF withdraw from the operation, Russia will be able to pursue these forces, even in a limited offensive, be it an air campaign or combined warfare operations and if Russia can inflict damage further thats a victory on its own.

Looking at the 2014 Russian counter offensive, we saw that Russia made a calculation late in August.  From my perspective Russia concluded two things:

1.  Its immediate goals of keeping the proxy states alive was acheived

2.  Further military activity was unlikely to produce gains worth the risks

From my perspective Russia did not make the progress it expected in several parts of the counter offensive.  It was now at the critical stage of the offensive where the attacker (in this case Russia) has to decide if the risk of further advance is worth the potential costs.  The Soviets learned this the hard way with each of its major operations, including Bagration.  Except for that one the Soviet Union very nearly "snatched defeat from the jaws of victory".  Meaning, they should have stopped sooner than they did because they handed Germany opportunities to smash their forces very badly (1941/42 winter offensive, 1942/43 winter offensive, 1944 summer offensive in particular).

In all of the conflicts in which Russia took pieces of neighboring states the Russian leadership was careful to pay attention to their history of over extension.  As soon as Russia thinks it has achieved a point of diminishing returns on gains it stops.  Especially if it experienced unexpected setbacks as it did in Georgia and Ukraine 2014.

What this means is that it is very unlikely that Russia would do more than stop a Ukrainian offensive and perhaps push back a little bit.  This means, as it was in 2014, that the bulk of the Ukrainian forces would be left intact.

Quote

And this is the most justified scenario possible, if Russia goes into Ukraine for any other reason, other than defending Donbas that would be political suicide. 

Justified?  No, there's no scenario where Russian aggression in Ukraine is justified.  Not since February 2014, not now, not in the future.  Ukraine has a right to not be a slave state to Russia and Russia, sooner or later, will have to recognize that fact.  But that aside, there is a major political cost to an overt Russian assault in Ukraine.

I am convinced that in the backrooms of Minsk and other capitals that Russia and the West came to a sort of agreement.  The agreement was that NATO's non-interference would be proportional to Russia's interference.  If Russia decides to escalate the conflict by an outright invasion, NATO would respond in ways it has not responded so far.  Yes, the West has a lot of things it can do without resorting to putting its troops into Ukraine.  Putin is not stupid so he knows this to be fact.

Again, we have to ask the question... what would Russia gain by pushing hard in Ukraine?  What would it potentially lose?  The potential gain is almost nothing over the current status quo vs. the real possibility of a collapse of the Putin Russian state (or at least the straw that breaks the camel's back).  Again, I think Putin is very aware of this and even fears it.

Here's how I see a Ukrainian offensive playing out...

1.  Ukraine would go on a limited offensive to gain something tangible, but not tax its forces too much.  It would then wait to see how Russia responds.

2.  Russia would likely respond with BMGs as it has done in the past.  It would try to arrest the Ukrainian offensive, nothing more.

3.  Ukraine would relish the opportunity to attack the Russian BMGs to the extent possible.  This would be situationally dependent, but it is probable that in at least one or two spots Russia forces would come off with significant casualties.

4.  Depending on how things go Ukraine might decide it's got what it needs for the short term and stops.  However, it might see opportunities for more activities that would not expose it to disproportional risk, and so it is probable that in a few spots Ukraine would keep up with limited offensive activity for a little while.

5.  Ukraine would then sit tight and wait for another opportunity to attack weeks, months, or even a year later.

This is one possibility.  Another possibility is that Ukraine decides to go full out and Russia decides it isn't going to stop it, just make it as bloody as possible.  In the end Ukraine would retake the Donbas and Russia would be through with it.  This would saddle Ukraine with a HUGE financial and social distraction on top of all its other problems.  At the same time it would release Russia from responsibility and costs of keeping Donbas for itself.  My opinion is this is the only viable way for Putin to "resolve" the Donbas problem he created.

Steve

[Sublime]

Do you ever see any scenarios where the Ukraine just lets the Donbass go long term? And if not the Crimea is lost obviously. What made the Ukr give Crimea relatively easily - appeasemenr syndrome a la Hitler and the Rhineland etc? Or was it knowledge Russsia took Crimea way more seriously as a prize?

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, Sublime said:

Do you ever see any scenarios where the Ukraine just lets the Donbass go long term?

It is an option, of course.  Ukraine could decide to simply cede the territory and, in effect, kick the Russian head territory out of Ukraine.  This would really put the screws to Russia because it, and it alone, would be responsible for it.  And unlike the criminal enterprise it created and supports in Moldova, this one is right on its border.  It would be a horror show for Russia.  However, it seems politically unlikely within Ukraine.

In any case, effectively the territory is Russia's in the practical sense, yet Ukraine still has a claim to it if it wants it back.  For Ukraine it is kinda the best of both worlds (politically), which is why Russia wants to dump Donbas as soon as possible.

Quote

And if not the Crimea is lost obviously.

Crimea is lost until either the Crimeans or Russia decide otherwise.  There is no practical way for Ukraine to retake it militarily or politically.

Quote

What made the Ukr give Crimea relatively easily - appeasemenr syndrome a la Hitler and the Rhineland etc? Or was it knowledge Russsia took Crimea way more seriously as a prize?

This is off topic, but Russia wanted Ukraine to oppose the invasion.  Russia would have claimed Ukraine was fighting Crimeans and gone in to support "Humanitarian concerns".  This is a very time honored Russian ploy and Ukraine was wise to it right from the start.  Instead it ordered its forces to stay on base and allowed them to be repeatedly attacked by Russian and Russian proxy forces without response to show the world that Russia was the aggressor not Ukraine.  It was a gusty move that paid off big time for Ukraine.

Steve

[John Kettler]

Since the likelihood of a Ukraine insurgency has been mentioned in reference to a Russian invasion of Ukraine, I believe a bit of history is relevant. Here's what one (1) Ukrainian resistance group, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, did to the Russians after WW II.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Insurgent_Army

"In 1951 CIA covert operations chief Frank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas affiliated with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the period after the end of World War II. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of Ukrainian nationalists during the period 1944-1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks.^[101] Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against the UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents.^[102]

Additionally, the Wiki notes

"The UPA's leader, Roman Shukhevych, was killed during an ambush near Lviv on March 5, 1950. Although sporadic UPA activity continued until the mid-1950s, after Shukhevich's death the UPA rapidly lost its fighting capability. An assessment of UPA manpower by Soviet authorities on 17 April 1952 claimed that UPA/OUN had only 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. The UPA's last commander, Vasyl Kuk, was captured on May 24, 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent groups, according to a report by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished by the beginning of 1956".^[95]

NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters^[96] are known to have committed atrocities against the civilian population in order to discredit the UPA.^[97] Among these NKVD units were those composed of former UPA fighters working for the NKVD.^[98] The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) recently published information about 150 such special groups consisting of 1,800 people operated until 1954.^[99]"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Philby

In the latter stages, the Russians were not only doing the above horrors, but had infiltrated the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and were also using turned captives therefrom. Finally, I would point out it took this long  took place in what could fairly be termed almost benign foreign intervention conditions, in that Russian mole Kim Philby was a very high level agent in place, in MI6, all through the War and until July 1951, when he resigned, lest he be forced to do so. As Chief of the Anti-Soviet Section of MI6, Philby was responsible for the deaths of hundreds of agents sent behind the Iron Curtain.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

 

[MikeyD]

Its still my contention that Russia's original aim was to secure the entire rail corridor down the length of south eastern Ukraine to supply Crimea. That's why Donbas was so important to them, the railheads. But all the surprise and audacity in the world could not eliminate the roadblock that is Mariupol. If they had succeeded in taking Mariupol by surprise or by intrigue they would no doubt then have sprinted the 200 km to Melitopol then down to goose-neck land bridge attaching Crimea to the mainland. That is assuming the Ukraine invasion was driven by rational military objectives. Because Donbas alone is not exactly much of a prize.

Edited August 1, 2016 by MikeyD

[ikalugin]

And I would return to my original work. My points was that the attack on Ukraine can happen with little to no preparation. It appears that the stuff I need to show:

- peacetime locaiton of relevant Russian (and Donbas) forces on unit (formation) by unit (formation) basis, their strength and training and not the vague manpower figures.

- speed with which those units can be brought to bear with relevant evidence (ie data from exercises, relevant calculations)

- locations of relevant Ukrainian forces on uniit by unit basis, their strength and training and not the vague manpower figures.

- possible operational scenarios with depths, force ratios, playthroughs and what not.

Did I miss anything?

p.s. the reason why I plan to do force comparisons bases on units vs manpower is because manpower is not representative of the combat power - 10k people with 3333 mosins does not have the same combat power as a modern motorised rifle division.

p.p.s. the final product may take form of a hypotheoretical scenario with the names (and a number of other details) changed, to avoid legal prosecution.

Edited August 1, 2016 by ikalugin

[John Kettler]

ikalugin,

The classic Russian attack scenario of the Cold War at the strategic level envisioned not a bolt out of the blue, but a sudden strike after the crisis appeared to be over. Not only would this be traumatic on a bunch of fronts, but it would catch the foe in a degraded state because of all the ginned up for war wear and tear on machines and personnel. You are right in that there have been several attacks by Russia in which, to preserve surprise, there was no general mobilization or shifting of forces. One such was Afghanistan. another was Czechoslovakia. I believe your investigation of such an attack scenario into Ukraine would be most worthwhile and insight producing. Don't mind telling you the host of snap inspection combat readiness drills and live fire exercises Russia conducts make me quite nervous, for that is an excellent posture from which to execute a sudden attack across the border. As for avoiding legal prosecution, look on the bright side. At least Russian soap production figures are no longer a State secret! Wasn't that way during the Cold War.

Regards,

John Kettler