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Hi all, I am a new account on this forum, but I have been reading this thread every day for the past couple months after getting referred to it from elsewhere. This thread, the daily ISW reports and Perun's videos are my primary sources for keeping track of what's going on in this war and why. Thank you everyone for the great contributions.
My account took a couple days to get approved, so this comment is out-of-date relative to the comment I wanted to respond to, but there have been several times the topic of China came up so I thought it would be worth posting anyway. I hope it's still interesting to someone. If not, please scroll past, I don't want to distract too much from the excellent analysis you all are sharing.
This is an area where I have a personal interest and some first-hand experience, having lived in China for several years.
I don't think it is very helpful to describe China (or any authoritarian country) as merely left wing or right wing, in particular when that statement comes from partisans in a democratic country. All too often there is a cynical incentive to try to associate the policies of the authoritarian regime with opposing political factions in the democratic system. I think it's better to assess the policies on their own.
Xi has overseen several socially conservative policies - for example broadcast restrictions on media featuring tattoos, piercings, effeminate men, same-sex relations and so on. But this is only part of a larger scale censorship effort that has also seen arrests of local citizen reporters and foreign media not only blocked at the Great Firewall but also pushed out of reporting from inside the country at all. He also spearheaded a popular anti-corruption campaign that coincidentally targeted all the senior party officials that might stand against him. And, of course, he removed term limits and will likely get a third term in the upcoming national congress. These are suspiciously autocratic moves, which is worrying in a country that since Deng has at least made a pretense of winding back the power of figureheads and trying to build more of a loyalty to the party as an abstract entity.
Xi has also allowed a populist rise of nationalism, xenophobia and Islamophobia, and he has put a strong emphasis on increasing national security and modernizing the military. One aspect of this was a revision to the national defense law that expanded the justifications for military actions, and placed more power into a military commission headed up by Xi.
On the other hand, in the past few years the party has also strengthened government controls over business. Notably it halted the IPO of Ant Financial, often portrayed overseas as a punishment for Jack Ma (co-founder of Alibaba) commenting on excessive regulation, but more likely just because the party wasn't happy that some of these tech giants are a threat to its power. Since then it has also been using anti-monopoly guidelines and other means to regulate major players in industries such as finance, tech and education. It's also hit several high-profile individuals for tax evasion, and for a brief period the official messaging seemed to be that speculation on real estate and the pursuit of excessive wealth was inappropriate, although that seems to have been tempered somewhat due to the COVID-related economic slowdown.
But a key point running through all of these policies is this: 党政军民学，东西南北中，党是领导一切的 - government, military, society and education - east, west, south, north and center - the party leads everything. And who leads the party? Recently the phrase "with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core" has become more common in the state media. This political structure isn't comparable to democratic countries where there is no singular authority and it's normal to have spirited and open debates on the issues.
I think the main thing to take away from Chinese politics under Xi is not to figure out if he represents a version of the left or the right in a democratic country, but to understand that his primary motivation is to ensure that the party retains control over every aspect of society. All policies are designed with that goal in mind. In my opinion Xi does have generally nationalist and socially conservative views, but I think he is also mindful that wealth inequality can lead to unrest and the downfall of the party, and that would be the ultimate sin.
TLDR: what Steve said
On how this affects the war in Ukraine - both the state media apparatus and the prevailing chatter on social media (which is ultimately shaped by what the state chooses not to censor) is solidly in the camp of this war somehow being a result of NATO expansion and American hegemony. I don't think there is an easy way for the party to publicly roll back its support for Putin. The issue will probably just remain in the current limbo, with the party simply claiming to remain neutral or impartial.
On what it portends for Taiwan - it's definitely useful for the party to study and learn from this war, but I don't think it will have an impact on its timeline for taking Taiwan. The party has enough problems with zero-COVID and a teetering economy right now - I don't think it is in a position to fast-track any actions. I suspect we might see some more signaling after Xi is confirmed for a third term (second half of this year) and then after the 2024 presidential election in Taiwan, which is likely to be the first where 18-20 year olds can vote (referendum on that later this year). Either way, it's interesting to see how the party has built up the mythology of Taiwan as a wayward little brother who is temporarily misguided and will someday return to the fold. That has benefits in that it creates popular support for "unification", but it might also make a full-blown invasion unpopular. Annexation is surely off the table now, after the PR disaster of Hong Kong 2019. A naval blockade is often suggested as a way to strangle the island, but that might only strengthen its people's resolve. I think if the party is to succeed in its designs on Taiwan, it will need Putin's failed "take the capital in 3 days" strategy to actually work. I would be very interested in a wargame that tackles this scenario.
Anyway, back to my lurking hole, and thanks again for the fantastic thread.

Heavy loss for Ukrainian aviation. Colonel Ihor Bezday, deputy commander of Naval aviation got lost in Mi-14 with 5 crewmen - helicopter was shot down by Russian fighter jet. 
In past he was a commander of 10th Maritime aviation brigade, in March 2014 he managed to organize dare escape of almost whole working helicopters and planes of brigade (Mi-14, Ka-27, An-26) from blocked Saky airfield in Crimea
I wonder, what was a need for such level and experience officer to participate in sortie... Submarine search? Or search&resque mission over the sea? This loss as such heavy for our aviation as the death on 25th of Feb of colonel Oleksandr Oksashchenko - brilliant pilot-instructor of Su-27, which taught whole generation of pilots. 

Absolutely. Still, I work in Film/Tv. That footage wasn't faked and threadmill walking is instantly recognizable to an experienced 1st A.D.

So it has been a awhile, time for another assessment signpost I think.
So as I have gone on about, I am a fan of Options Based Warfare, particularly as a tool at the strategic level; however, it links closely to the Operational level as well - although operational level is more obsessed with "decision", and tactical will always be about capability and effects.  These are inter-link concepts, another way to think about it:

Or another way to think of it - in the linear model (of which I am not a fan):

An options based view takes the position that historically the side that can sustain or expand its effective strategic options while compressing those of an opponent will likely win the war.  I challenge people to find a counter-example to this and I have yet to hear one.  We have plenty examples of desperate tactical actions where the victor was down to that last one option and somehow pulls it off (e.g. Chamberlain's charge at Little Round Top), which makes for great movies; however, real warfare is a brutal and grinding business that cares little for human drama.  The harsh reality is that if you are in a war where your effective options are collapsing while your opponents are not, you need to re-assess cause the news "ain't good".
So what of this war?  Well, we have steadily watch Ukraine sustain and expand their options-sets which appear to include:
- Offensives around Kharkiv.
- Increased pressure on Kherson.
- Increased attacks and pressure at Russian SLOCs, even in Russia itself.
- Continued denial swaths of the Black Sea.
- Rapidly expanding strategic sustainment and support options from the West.
I am sure I have forgotten some.  Ukraine, has got a lot of effective strategic options right now.  Operationally they have significant freedom of manoeuvre and are attacking along the Russian positions with pretty much impunity as Russia has still failed to establish operational pre-conditions.  Strategically, they are ready to fight long or short.  They can continue to hit targets within Russia and they are getting more and more capability everyday.  Even the UAF appears to have made a resurgence in the last few days.
Russia: news not so good.  My assessment is that Russia is basically down to two "effective" options left - withdraw, reload and try again later OR, push as much dumb mass at the current lines and try for the long defensive and hope attrition impacts Ukrainian will. All other options Russia had on 23 Feb, have collapsed to these two "best of bad".  My point being is that I suspect Russia is rapidly coming to the point, or are already there, where strategic or operational offensive action is off the table. These tepid strained pushes from Izyum and around Lyman are doing pretty much as well as expected - uncoordinated, costly and slow.  Once Ukraine masses enough c-artillery and logistics (operational deep strike) capability, this whole Russian offensive will be over and the best they can do is stuff the front line with scared kids, poorly equipped, worse trained and with next to zero unit cohesion.  
In order to turn this around Russia needs strategic options, and it basically spent them all.  For example, a major offensive out of Belarus towards Lviv to effectively cut off western support was an option on 23 Feb, it is no longer viable in the least.  The lesson here is that options are built entirely on opportunity power, and once you have spent that...well time to start learning to live with defeat.  And I do not care if Russia can muster another 200k troops to push into the Donbas, the days of dismounted unsupported infantry being able to create options is also pretty much over.  The critical path will be UA ammunition to kill them all and I am pretty sure the west has got that one covered.
Finally, "what about tac nukes?".  Well it has been discussed a lot here and elsewhere.  The question to my mind is "are tac nukes an effective option".  We always have ineffective options, or terrible ones - in universe built on chaos we will always have an infinite amount of "bad options".  Tactical nuclear weapons are tailor made for this situation: when you are all outta other options.  
I frankly do not know what the Russian calculus is on the use of WMDs at the operational level right now.  They are way past doctrine and legality, so this will come likely come down to, "will it work?"  Most tactical nuclear weapons can do a lot of damage to a few kilometers but these are pretty big frontages we are talking about, so Russia would need to use a lot of them, to have a very good idea exactly where to hit the UA.  It is not like Russia can simply fire off 2 or 3 and declare victory.
Then Russia has to be concerned about more direct western intervention in Ukraine as a result.  The release of tactical nuclear weapons could see a western response that removes what is left of the Black Sea Fleet in an afternoon, NATO troops securing western Ukraine and Kyiv, freeing up every UA member down South and East - and what Putin likely fears most, western airpower.
Anyway, I still do not think WMDs are a likely option but that may come down to "will they wont' they, and will we?" in the end.  Regardless, if phase 2 of this war was "posturing for endgame", I suspect we may be coming to "endgame" shortly, unless something very unexpected happens.  My bet is that the endgame will be Russian's trying to dig in and hold what they have, while the Ukrainian military figures out what offence looks like - given the successes around Kharkiv, I am thinking they already have a pretty good idea.  
 
 

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

While Steve might have a point about why the Democratic Party erected all those monuments to Confederate Generals - seems plausible to me - I think it's also fair to point out that the Confederate Flag as well as other references to monuments to Confederate Generals have evolved somewhat over time to represent generalized 'Southern Pride' for many who live in the south as shown below

There are also many monuments located at the various battlefields dedicated to both Union and Confederate soldiers and units.  You can't hardly walk 50 yards at Gettysburg without bumping into a monument to someone.  I just wanted to toss that out there because there are a lot of people from other countries, and they might not see the full context.

A great shot of Javelin, visible across it's full flight path, in top attack mode:
 

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

I much preferred this thread when it was discussing the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.