John Kettler

When brother George told me to watch Stukas of the Sea, I not unreasonably thought it had to do with Ju-87s against maritime targets. Oh, was I ever surprised! Instead, I was treated to the history, organization and combat use of the S-Boote, part of. which consisted of a bunch of interviews by various former commanders and an engineering officer as well. The footage was amazing and of really good quality. If inshore warfare by small craft is your thing and/or you play such games as Cruel Seas, you'll feel like you've attained nirvana. Wish there was a sequel of this gem, one that really got into combat actions which resulted in some 40 Knight's Crosses and a bunch of higher awards as well. There is a considerable amount of material even so, including what appear to be wartime animations showing S-Boot tactics.
 
Regards,

John Kettler

Not only is it huge (18 meters by 4 m), with a whopping 160 vessels, but the diorama is tied to a touch screen interactive system in which attendees can learn all about any vessel (name, function, where headed or came from, manning, armament if applicable, and more. Wish I had a whole photo series to post. The Roads of Texel constituted the hub of Dutch naval and mercantile power in the 16th Century.

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=7213523672021863&set=gm.2540328239434798
Regards,

John Kettler
 

Vacillator,

Much appreciate your kind words of support and hope!

George MC,

Phenomenal post! Is the whole things from scratch, or is the historical part from the scenario briefing? Either way, I think your post is one of the best I've ever read on the CM Forums.

Regards,

John Kettler

Completely missed seeing this, but am grateful not just for Michael's years of contributing to the Forums, but because two visits back to brother George and family in the Tacoma, Washington area, he and I got to meet him and visit briefly. We had tea and, as the Brits would say, biscuits in the common area, because his room was messed up from some repairs, if memory serves. May or may not have a pic of him from our visit. If I do, shall post it. He was charmed that I brought him a jar of genuine English lemon curd, which I thought someone who loved his tea would appreciate. 

Regards,

John Kettler

Completely missed seeing this, but am grateful not just for Michael's years of contributing to the Forums, but because two visits back to brother George and family in the Tacoma, Washington area, he and I got to meet him and visit briefly. We had tea and, as the Brits would say, biscuits in the common area, because his room was messed up from some repairs, if memory serves. May or may not have a pic of him from our visit. If I do, shall post it. He was charmed that I brought him a jar of genuine English lemon curd, which I thought someone who loved his tea would appreciate. 

Regards,

John Kettler

Though this isn't from Operation Bagration, it is nevertheless a highly useful video and offers some fascinating gaming possibilities. Has as considerable amount of Russian footage I'd never seen, much of which is IS-2s alive and dead.
 
Regards,

John Kettler

Though this isn't from Operation Bagration, it is nevertheless a highly useful video and offers some fascinating gaming possibilities. Has as considerable amount of Russian footage I'd never seen, much of which is IS-2s alive and dead.
 
Regards,

John Kettler

Marc_M,

Welcome aboard!

Can't speak to using LRAS in CMBS, but to use the real one, the carrier vehicle must have the hatch open iin front of which the LRAS is positioned. In CM terms, the vehicle must be Unbuttoned. The keyframe of the short video below shows exactly what I mean as far as crew exposure to use it. The video is for the far more capable LRAS3, but the fundamentals of the mounting and the display haven't changed. Both the device and display are on the roof, and there is no in-cabin remote display like what the M!A2 SEP V3 has from the CITV (Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer) aka Hunter Killer Sight. IN terms of basic capabilities, LRAS is supposed to be able to operate out as far as 70 km, but I do not know against what target. My suspicion, and reasonable expectation, is that it would be spot and identify as a tank a fully exposed tank. Obviously, PID Friend or Foe would be somewhat less than that, depending upon such things as the presence or absence of recognition enhancements, such as thermal panels. Do you know the range from your LRAS Hummer to your targets?
 
Regards,

John Kettler

Not only is it huge (18 meters by 4 m), with a whopping 160 vessels, but the diorama is tied to a touch screen interactive system in which attendees can learn all about any vessel (name, function, where headed or came from, manning, armament if applicable, and more. Wish I had a whole photo series to post. The Roads of Texel constituted the hub of Dutch naval and mercantile power in the 16th Century.

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=7213523672021863&set=gm.2540328239434798
Regards,

John Kettler
 

When brother George told me to watch Stukas of the Sea, I not unreasonably thought it had to do with Ju-87s against maritime targets. Oh, was I ever surprised! Instead, I was treated to the history, organization and combat use of the S-Boote, part of. which consisted of a bunch of interviews by various former commanders and an engineering officer as well. The footage was amazing and of really good quality. If inshore warfare by small craft is your thing and/or you play such games as Cruel Seas, you'll feel like you've attained nirvana. Wish there was a sequel of this gem, one that really got into combat actions which resulted in some 40 Knight's Crosses and a bunch of higher awards as well. There is a considerable amount of material even so, including what appear to be wartime animations showing S-Boot tactics.
 
Regards,

John Kettler

Completely missed seeing this, but am grateful not just for Michael's years of contributing to the Forums, but because two visits back to brother George and family in the Tacoma, Washington area, he and I got to meet him and visit briefly. We had tea and, as the Brits would say, biscuits in the common area, because his room was messed up from some repairs, if memory serves. May or may not have a pic of him from our visit. If I do, shall post it. He was charmed that I brought him a jar of genuine English lemon curd, which I thought someone who loved his tea would appreciate. 

Regards,

John Kettler

Completely missed seeing this, but am grateful not just for Michael's years of contributing to the Forums, but because two visits back to brother George and family in the Tacoma, Washington area, he and I got to meet him and visit briefly. We had tea and, as the Brits would say, biscuits in the common area, because his room was messed up from some repairs, if memory serves. May or may not have a pic of him from our visit. If I do, shall post it. He was charmed that I brought him a jar of genuine English lemon curd, which I thought someone who loved his tea would appreciate. 

Regards,

John Kettler

Completely missed seeing this, but am grateful not just for Michael's years of contributing to the Forums, but because two visits back to brother George and family in the Tacoma, Washington area, he and I got to meet him and visit briefly. We had tea and, as the Brits would say, biscuits in the common area, because his room was messed up from some repairs, if memory serves. May or may not have a pic of him from our visit. If I do, shall post it. He was charmed that I brought him a jar of genuine English lemon curd, which I thought someone who loved his tea would appreciate. 

Regards,

John Kettler

kohlenklau,

The (f) oops is traceable, I think, to my having FHO (Fremde Heeres Ost--Foreign Armies East, the Gehlen Organization) on the brain from reading Hitler's Nemesis by Walter Dunn. His book has scads of footnotes tied to various FHO studies, assessments, captured docs, etc.

Erwin,

No. It's captured French equipment. Hadn't seen this one before, but have seen a photo of a UE armed with a PaK-36. Here are several versions, the first two real field expedients!







Sgt.Squarehead,

Point taken. Had to rewrite that sentence several times, yet it still came out not quite right! In any event, here is a. clutch of captured UEs in what I believe to be their French warpaint, but hastily given crude Balkenkreuz markings.



Regards,

John Kettler

Seeing WW II AFVs in their period paint, especially camouflage, is failrly rare, but here's an exception. The German name for this critter is Armored MG Carrier--UE. the (f) is presumably to denote fremde, or foreign.



Regards,

John Kettler

Seeing WW II AFVs in their period paint, especially camouflage, is failrly rare, but here's an exception. The German name for this critter is Armored MG Carrier--UE. the (f) is presumably to denote fremde, or foreign.



Regards,

John Kettler

Here's a short video of Challenger 2s in the field with no extraneous sounds, just the tank sounds alone.  Though of no use now, it will be when we finally get the British.
 
Regards,

John Kettler

Here's a little Cold War tidbit that applies to the book we're discussing. The first indication western intelligence had of the T-64 was, of all things, a Red Army wargame manual acquired by an agent. In it, analysts noticed something intriguing. The wargame manual gave ratings to every weapon in the wargame, with the T-62 the baseline at 1.0. This T-64 was rated a whopping 1.5, this being the Red Army's own assessment of the potency of the new tank. This account is in the CIA T-64 and T-64B assessment in the CIA's FOIA Reading Room.Per Suvorov/Rezun, who was a participant in the military peep show extravaganza Operation Dnepr, the T-64 would've appeared in the operation. He and other fellow officers (everybody was an officer, to make sure everything was done superbly) saw the tanks and talked to the crews), but evidently there was a change of mind, and the T-64s were covered and sent back. During the Cold War, GSFG was re-equipped with the T-64 (have seen overhead imagery of both the early T-64 (115 mm gun) and the later 125 mm armed one at one or more GFSG tank units, but I don't know the date for that. What I do know is that at some point before March 24, 1985, the date Major Nicholson was shot and killed by a GSFG sentry, the T-80 had replaced it.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

I just ordered a copy. I will report back (as if anybody cares about my feedback).

Here's a little Cold War tidbit that applies to the book we're discussing. The first indication western intelligence had of the T-64 was, of all things, a Red Army wargame manual acquired by an agent. In it, analysts noticed something intriguing. The wargame manual gave ratings to every weapon in the wargame, with the T-62 the baseline at 1.0. This T-64 was rated a whopping 1.5, this being the Red Army's own assessment of the potency of the new tank. This account is in the CIA T-64 and T-64B assessment in the CIA's FOIA Reading Room.Per Suvorov/Rezun, who was a participant in the military peep show extravaganza Operation Dnepr, the T-64 would've appeared in the operation. He and other fellow officers (everybody was an officer, to make sure everything was done superbly) saw the tanks and talked to the crews), but evidently there was a change of mind, and the T-64s were covered and sent back. During the Cold War, GSFG was re-equipped with the T-64 (have seen overhead imagery of both the early T-64 (115 mm gun) and the later 125 mm armed one at one or more GFSG tank units, but I don't know the date for that. What I do know is that at some point before March 24, 1985, the date Major Nicholson was shot and killed by a GSFG sentry, the T-80 had replaced it.

Regards,

John Kettler

 

Jim Storr,

Haven't read your book, but am impressed with what you've said in this thread in response to issues raised. Would like to point out the Soviets were deadly serious in their war plans vs NATO. As a case in point, a sharp-eyed intelligence analyst was poring over a purloined Red Army combat exercise map and came to a shocking realization. The alleged area and the actual one depicted on the map didn't match. The sanitized map was really for Minden, FRG, and the combat exercise was an attack rehearsal. Read that myself in a SECRET plus intelligence journal during, I believe, the late 70s or early 80s. The analyst's find was both a cause for congratulation for him and dyspepsia for those read in about his deeply disturbing discovery. Other intelligence analysts discovered the Soviets had done meticulous map analysis to find all the terrain from which long range ATGM attacks could be made by ground units or attack helicopters, with pre-planned artillery and MRL concentrations on all of them. 

Other factors to consider include large scale Soviet use of jamming and broadband obscurants (absorbs light, IR and radar) in 1968 to screen the invasion of Czechoslovakia (confirmed by that guy I mentioned who had a CIA sponsor and who had done multiple "favors" for the Agency into denied areas, at least one resulting in a bullet-riddled exfil helicopter), Soviet identification of critical NATO AD facilities, nuclear weapon storage, POMCUS and plans to attack and neutralize same via Spetsnaz and other means, including persistent nerve agents, mask-breaking chemical agents to force unmasking for subsequent attack by nonpersistent agents such as AC (hydrogen cyanide), targeted attacks on NATO aircrews, to include BW sickeners apparently used successfully against nuke sub base at Faslane.

Something generally not mentioned in open source material I've seen is the Air Operation, which may be broadly though of as the aviation equivalent of a huge breakthrough attack on the ground, with the objective of knocking out the SAM defenses not only in the corridor but able to fire into the corridor, smashing the AD C3I,  the airbases, reserves, attacking critical sites and so on in the aerial equivalent of Liddell Hart's expanding torrent concept. The Air Operation was to be an all-out attack on NATO AD, so ruthless that the lead aircraft in were going to be those flown by trainees and specifically intended to draw SAM fire and exhaust NATO SAMs before the real attack arrived. The air operation would've had massive aerial jamming support and certainly would've used broadband obscurants as well. Speaking as someone who did extensive research into rapid runway repair and runway attack, I can tell you that in the lates 70s and early 80s the Soviets had highly effective dibber bombs for blowing up runways and both rockets and guided weapons capable of defeating the TAB V HAS (Hardened Aircraft Shelter) NATO had standardized. Have seen with my own eyes a satellite pic of a gaping hole blown into a full scale Soviet replica of a TAB V HAS by a 240 mm free rocket. Going the other direction, we concluded their HAS (think the ones Saddam Hussein had) was almost completely immune. Our assessment was that the best we could do against a closed shelter has maybe jam the door. By 1990, though, the US had the laser-guided I-2000, which was specifically designed to destroy hardened targets like the Soviet HAS.

Of particular note is that my nightmare scenario for conventional war in Europe was of Soviet gutting of NATO's long range antiarmor attrition strategy via broadband obscurants to eliminate most early kills/disablements, thus preventing crucial attrition of the attacker, leading to the terrifying specter of a close range knife fight by outnumbered NATO forces.

While these things do not, per se, directly affect the land battle, NATO was critically dependent on its air power, on a only a couple of AD C3I sites, on only a few POMCUS sites, and, I believe, one primary nuclear weapon storage facility and so on. IOW, NATO AD was highly brittle, with a linear SAM defense. In the mid 80s, with a colleague I did a SECRET plus threat laydown of every SAM site, C3I site, mobile SAM garrison, air base (including breakdown by number and type) and such for East Germany, and the whole country was one big interlocking SAM envelope, not some Maginot Line affair. And this was without factoring in overlapping coverage from other friendly countries.

Suvorov/Rezun is extremely controversial here, chiefly because of his arguments Stalin planned to attack Germany but was pre-empted by Hitler. What seems to be forgotten is that not only was he a T-55 Tank Company CO, but was also one not just for any Motorized Rifle Company in BTR-60 PBs, but practically the first Soviet unit into Prague in an attack coming out of the Carpathian Military District in which he later served in the GRU. As a Soviet Threat Analyst, I found his works about the Red Army and the GRU of such importance that I kept all of them in my office at work and referred to them frequently. And during my time on the job, I witnessed his to some outrageous claims about the true size of various Soviet mobiles SAMs, the TVDs and Soviet objectives should war break out become part and parcel of not just the Pentagon pubs Soviet Military Power and Russian Military Power but saw them reflected in the SECRET level figures, too. I also saw him successfully and effectively back his claims regarding. the BM-27, Vasilek and Baby Grad, too in an exchange on International Defense Review. there, he not only cited his sources but provided pen and ink sketches!

Regards,

John Kettler



 

Jim Storr,

Haven't read your book, but am impressed with what you've said in this thread in response to issues raised. Would like to point out the Soviets were deadly serious in their war plans vs NATO. As a case in point, a sharp-eyed intelligence analyst was poring over a purloined Red Army combat exercise map and came to a shocking realization. The alleged area and the actual one depicted on the map didn't match. The sanitized map was really for Minden, FRG, and the combat exercise was an attack rehearsal. Read that myself in a SECRET plus intelligence journal during, I believe, the late 70s or early 80s. The analyst's find was both a cause for congratulation for him and dyspepsia for those read in about his deeply disturbing discovery. Other intelligence analysts discovered the Soviets had done meticulous map analysis to find all the terrain from which long range ATGM attacks could be made by ground units or attack helicopters, with pre-planned artillery and MRL concentrations on all of them. 

Other factors to consider include large scale Soviet use of jamming and broadband obscurants (absorbs light, IR and radar) in 1968 to screen the invasion of Czechoslovakia (confirmed by that guy I mentioned who had a CIA sponsor and who had done multiple "favors" for the Agency into denied areas, at least one resulting in a bullet-riddled exfil helicopter), Soviet identification of critical NATO AD facilities, nuclear weapon storage, POMCUS and plans to attack and neutralize same via Spetsnaz and other means, including persistent nerve agents, mask-breaking chemical agents to force unmasking for subsequent attack by nonpersistent agents such as AC (hydrogen cyanide), targeted attacks on NATO aircrews, to include BW sickeners apparently used successfully against nuke sub base at Faslane.

Something generally not mentioned in open source material I've seen is the Air Operation, which may be broadly though of as the aviation equivalent of a huge breakthrough attack on the ground, with the objective of knocking out the SAM defenses not only in the corridor but able to fire into the corridor, smashing the AD C3I,  the airbases, reserves, attacking critical sites and so on in the aerial equivalent of Liddell Hart's expanding torrent concept. The Air Operation was to be an all-out attack on NATO AD, so ruthless that the lead aircraft in were going to be those flown by trainees and specifically intended to draw SAM fire and exhaust NATO SAMs before the real attack arrived. The air operation would've had massive aerial jamming support and certainly would've used broadband obscurants as well. Speaking as someone who did extensive research into rapid runway repair and runway attack, I can tell you that in the lates 70s and early 80s the Soviets had highly effective dibber bombs for blowing up runways and both rockets and guided weapons capable of defeating the TAB V HAS (Hardened Aircraft Shelter) NATO had standardized. Have seen with my own eyes a satellite pic of a gaping hole blown into a full scale Soviet replica of a TAB V HAS by a 240 mm free rocket. Going the other direction, we concluded their HAS (think the ones Saddam Hussein had) was almost completely immune. Our assessment was that the best we could do against a closed shelter has maybe jam the door. By 1990, though, the US had the laser-guided I-2000, which was specifically designed to destroy hardened targets like the Soviet HAS.

Of particular note is that my nightmare scenario for conventional war in Europe was of Soviet gutting of NATO's long range antiarmor attrition strategy via broadband obscurants to eliminate most early kills/disablements, thus preventing crucial attrition of the attacker, leading to the terrifying specter of a close range knife fight by outnumbered NATO forces.

While these things do not, per se, directly affect the land battle, NATO was critically dependent on its air power, on a only a couple of AD C3I sites, on only a few POMCUS sites, and, I believe, one primary nuclear weapon storage facility and so on. IOW, NATO AD was highly brittle, with a linear SAM defense. In the mid 80s, with a colleague I did a SECRET plus threat laydown of every SAM site, C3I site, mobile SAM garrison, air base (including breakdown by number and type) and such for East Germany, and the whole country was one big interlocking SAM envelope, not some Maginot Line affair. And this was without factoring in overlapping coverage from other friendly countries.

Suvorov/Rezun is extremely controversial here, chiefly because of his arguments Stalin planned to attack Germany but was pre-empted by Hitler. What seems to be forgotten is that not only was he a T-55 Tank Company CO, but was also one not just for any Motorized Rifle Company in BTR-60 PBs, but practically the first Soviet unit into Prague in an attack coming out of the Carpathian Military District in which he later served in the GRU. As a Soviet Threat Analyst, I found his works about the Red Army and the GRU of such importance that I kept all of them in my office at work and referred to them frequently. And during my time on the job, I witnessed his to some outrageous claims about the true size of various Soviet mobiles SAMs, the TVDs and Soviet objectives should war break out become part and parcel of not just the Pentagon pubs Soviet Military Power and Russian Military Power but saw them reflected in the SECRET level figures, too. I also saw him successfully and effectively back his claims regarding. the BM-27, Vasilek and Baby Grad, too in an exchange on International Defense Review. there, he not only cited his sources but provided pen and ink sketches!

Regards,

John Kettler



 

Sgt.Squarehead,

Maybe troop training is a cover story. Maybe what's really going on is technical intelligence study (and likely, testing), which is not unreasonable, given it's got lots of goodies on it, including Duplet/Nozh-2, Shtora and a Ukrainian made set of thermals in a hunter-killer sight for the TC. Additional value stems from the OPLOT-M being in Pakistani Army service.

Regards,

John Kettler 

Beondthegrave,

Here's the BRIXMIS documentary I saw. Didn't realize how long BRIXMIS ran before, but it started in 1946. Here's the link to a short article on the genesis and making of this historic documentary.
 
And here's informal BRIXMIS video recorded in 1988, informal in the sense it was personal, rather than operational in purpose but very much documenting Cold War reality for posterity.It was shot from a BRIXMIS vehicle. The video comments are fascinating.
 
Regards,

John Kettler

BFC et al.

Here is the crash course on firing limitations for the various models of TOW, going back to the ones of concern here. This is likely also of direct value to CMSF2 and CMBS. Not only does this below article at link address water obstacles, but high tension lines, which can electrocute the launch crew, wreck electronics or both, but such things as electrified rails, overhead trolley wires and other hazards. As far as the first two hazards are concerned, the name of the game is separation: Be as far away from them and as high above them as possible, consistent with mission and available terrain. The article has both illustrations and a nomogram. Ref water, the issue is clearly listed as electrical shorting of the guidance wires.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/23-34/Ch2.htm

On a related note, I made a quick call and spoke to brother George about firing TOW missiles through brush. He said the general practice was to avoid firing through anything that could snag the guidance wires but had no direct experience. He went on to note that the Bradley CFV was quite tall (was at Ft. Benning motor pool one day when visiting him long ago and got to see these houses on tracks snorting thunderously while emitting towering columns of exhaust)and  that when he was in Scouts they were set up on a hill and engaging targets on a hill across a valley, so brush wasn't an issue. He went on to say that it might well have been an issue for TOW ground mounts. To his statement I'd be inclined to add TOW jeeps as well.

Regards,

John Kettler