JonS

I fondly(?) recall a former member here ripping into SPR because the chin straps on the para's helmets were wrong for that time period
 
It was at that point that I realised that wargamers complaining about war movies usually aren't actually complaining about the movie, they're just using it as a strawman against which to display their own superior knowledge of 70-year-old arcana. Yay them, I guess.

I fondly(?) recall a former member here ripping into SPR because the chin straps on the para's helmets were wrong for that time period
 
It was at that point that I realised that wargamers complaining about war movies usually aren't actually complaining about the movie, they're just using it as a strawman against which to display their own superior knowledge of 70-year-old arcana. Yay them, I guess.

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-7#entry1440462
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-7#entry1441254
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-8#entry1441938
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-9#entry1442801
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-10#entry1443370
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-12#entry1446224

'Set-Piece' (or deliberate) attack is at the grand-tactical/operational level, not strategic - mainly because you don't bother about battles at the strategic level, you're worried about campaigns. Op COBRA and Op QUEEN were both set piece battles. Basically, the idea is to take the time to get all your ducks in a row before the battle starts. That means arranging the fire support, conducting battle-specific training, organising units into assault - 2nd echelon - reserve, and positioning them accordingly, preparing and delivering orders down to a very low level (ie, the corps commander prepares and presents orders to his divisional commanders, who then derive and prepare their own orders and present them to their regimental commanders, who then prepare and present their orders to the battalion commanders, who prepare and present their orders to the company commanders, who prepare and present their own orders to their platoon commanders, who prepare and present orders to their squad commanders, who brief/present orders to their squads), distribution of aerial photos and maps with intel overlays, stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, and specific stores that might be needed (such as bridging material), etc. Then the whole thing kicks off at a specific time according to the designated H-hour, with all the various parts moving in a coordinated fashion and thus maxmising the  leverage that combined arms brings to the battlefield, as well as any other specific advantages that the attacker might have (such as better training, or comms, or intel, or night vision gear, or fire support, etc.)
 
There are loads of examples of set piece battles from Korea, as well as some from Vietnam. The opening ground phase of Op DESERT STORM was a set piece too, especially the USMC assault straight up the guts into Kuwait. Crossings of major rivers are often set-piece, mainly because of the pronounced advantages the defender enjoys and the need to bring up bridging stores.
 
The downside of set-piece is that they can take a while to set up, and thus generally give the defender more time to prepare his defence and/or divine exactly where the boot is going to fall and prepare appropriately. Often once a front has settled down for a while, a set-piece is appropriate because the defender will have thoroughly prepared his defence, and the attacker is not required to press the tempo by attacking ASAP. Surpirse can be tricky to accomplish in a set-piece, but on the other hand the time taken to tee-up a set piece means that a comprehensive deception plan can be prepared and enacted, to generate a very high degree of surprise - Op DESERT STORM is a great example here. Saddam knew the Coalition forces were coming, and he knew down to the day when they'd be coming. But he had no idea where they'd be coming, and was soundly thrashed in part because of that surprise.
 
There isn't really a sharp split between meeting engagements, hasty attacks, and deliberate/set-piece attacks. The boundaries between them are quite fluid depending on the specific circumstances. An operation can also transition quickly between the three - Op COBRA, for example, started as a deliberate/set-piece and stayed that way for 2-3 days. After that there was a short period of hasty attacks, then it transitioned again to meeting engagements as the Americans made a clean break through the complete depth of the German's prepared defences. Sometime later it transitioned again to a hasty attack by the Germans at Mortain.

'Set-Piece' (or deliberate) attack is at the grand-tactical/operational level, not strategic - mainly because you don't bother about battles at the strategic level, you're worried about campaigns. Op COBRA and Op QUEEN were both set piece battles. Basically, the idea is to take the time to get all your ducks in a row before the battle starts. That means arranging the fire support, conducting battle-specific training, organising units into assault - 2nd echelon - reserve, and positioning them accordingly, preparing and delivering orders down to a very low level (ie, the corps commander prepares and presents orders to his divisional commanders, who then derive and prepare their own orders and present them to their regimental commanders, who then prepare and present their orders to the battalion commanders, who prepare and present their orders to the company commanders, who prepare and present their own orders to their platoon commanders, who prepare and present orders to their squad commanders, who brief/present orders to their squads), distribution of aerial photos and maps with intel overlays, stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, and specific stores that might be needed (such as bridging material), etc. Then the whole thing kicks off at a specific time according to the designated H-hour, with all the various parts moving in a coordinated fashion and thus maxmising the  leverage that combined arms brings to the battlefield, as well as any other specific advantages that the attacker might have (such as better training, or comms, or intel, or night vision gear, or fire support, etc.)
 
There are loads of examples of set piece battles from Korea, as well as some from Vietnam. The opening ground phase of Op DESERT STORM was a set piece too, especially the USMC assault straight up the guts into Kuwait. Crossings of major rivers are often set-piece, mainly because of the pronounced advantages the defender enjoys and the need to bring up bridging stores.
 
The downside of set-piece is that they can take a while to set up, and thus generally give the defender more time to prepare his defence and/or divine exactly where the boot is going to fall and prepare appropriately. Often once a front has settled down for a while, a set-piece is appropriate because the defender will have thoroughly prepared his defence, and the attacker is not required to press the tempo by attacking ASAP. Surpirse can be tricky to accomplish in a set-piece, but on the other hand the time taken to tee-up a set piece means that a comprehensive deception plan can be prepared and enacted, to generate a very high degree of surprise - Op DESERT STORM is a great example here. Saddam knew the Coalition forces were coming, and he knew down to the day when they'd be coming. But he had no idea where they'd be coming, and was soundly thrashed in part because of that surprise.
 
There isn't really a sharp split between meeting engagements, hasty attacks, and deliberate/set-piece attacks. The boundaries between them are quite fluid depending on the specific circumstances. An operation can also transition quickly between the three - Op COBRA, for example, started as a deliberate/set-piece and stayed that way for 2-3 days. After that there was a short period of hasty attacks, then it transitioned again to meeting engagements as the Americans made a clean break through the complete depth of the German's prepared defences. Sometime later it transitioned again to a hasty attack by the Germans at Mortain.

'Set-Piece' (or deliberate) attack is at the grand-tactical/operational level, not strategic - mainly because you don't bother about battles at the strategic level, you're worried about campaigns. Op COBRA and Op QUEEN were both set piece battles. Basically, the idea is to take the time to get all your ducks in a row before the battle starts. That means arranging the fire support, conducting battle-specific training, organising units into assault - 2nd echelon - reserve, and positioning them accordingly, preparing and delivering orders down to a very low level (ie, the corps commander prepares and presents orders to his divisional commanders, who then derive and prepare their own orders and present them to their regimental commanders, who then prepare and present their orders to the battalion commanders, who prepare and present their orders to the company commanders, who prepare and present their own orders to their platoon commanders, who prepare and present orders to their squad commanders, who brief/present orders to their squads), distribution of aerial photos and maps with intel overlays, stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, and specific stores that might be needed (such as bridging material), etc. Then the whole thing kicks off at a specific time according to the designated H-hour, with all the various parts moving in a coordinated fashion and thus maxmising the  leverage that combined arms brings to the battlefield, as well as any other specific advantages that the attacker might have (such as better training, or comms, or intel, or night vision gear, or fire support, etc.)
 
There are loads of examples of set piece battles from Korea, as well as some from Vietnam. The opening ground phase of Op DESERT STORM was a set piece too, especially the USMC assault straight up the guts into Kuwait. Crossings of major rivers are often set-piece, mainly because of the pronounced advantages the defender enjoys and the need to bring up bridging stores.
 
The downside of set-piece is that they can take a while to set up, and thus generally give the defender more time to prepare his defence and/or divine exactly where the boot is going to fall and prepare appropriately. Often once a front has settled down for a while, a set-piece is appropriate because the defender will have thoroughly prepared his defence, and the attacker is not required to press the tempo by attacking ASAP. Surpirse can be tricky to accomplish in a set-piece, but on the other hand the time taken to tee-up a set piece means that a comprehensive deception plan can be prepared and enacted, to generate a very high degree of surprise - Op DESERT STORM is a great example here. Saddam knew the Coalition forces were coming, and he knew down to the day when they'd be coming. But he had no idea where they'd be coming, and was soundly thrashed in part because of that surprise.
 
There isn't really a sharp split between meeting engagements, hasty attacks, and deliberate/set-piece attacks. The boundaries between them are quite fluid depending on the specific circumstances. An operation can also transition quickly between the three - Op COBRA, for example, started as a deliberate/set-piece and stayed that way for 2-3 days. After that there was a short period of hasty attacks, then it transitioned again to meeting engagements as the Americans made a clean break through the complete depth of the German's prepared defences. Sometime later it transitioned again to a hasty attack by the Germans at Mortain.

'Set-Piece' (or deliberate) attack is at the grand-tactical/operational level, not strategic - mainly because you don't bother about battles at the strategic level, you're worried about campaigns. Op COBRA and Op QUEEN were both set piece battles. Basically, the idea is to take the time to get all your ducks in a row before the battle starts. That means arranging the fire support, conducting battle-specific training, organising units into assault - 2nd echelon - reserve, and positioning them accordingly, preparing and delivering orders down to a very low level (ie, the corps commander prepares and presents orders to his divisional commanders, who then derive and prepare their own orders and present them to their regimental commanders, who then prepare and present their orders to the battalion commanders, who prepare and present their orders to the company commanders, who prepare and present their own orders to their platoon commanders, who prepare and present orders to their squad commanders, who brief/present orders to their squads), distribution of aerial photos and maps with intel overlays, stockpiling of ammunition, fuel, and specific stores that might be needed (such as bridging material), etc. Then the whole thing kicks off at a specific time according to the designated H-hour, with all the various parts moving in a coordinated fashion and thus maxmising the  leverage that combined arms brings to the battlefield, as well as any other specific advantages that the attacker might have (such as better training, or comms, or intel, or night vision gear, or fire support, etc.)
 
There are loads of examples of set piece battles from Korea, as well as some from Vietnam. The opening ground phase of Op DESERT STORM was a set piece too, especially the USMC assault straight up the guts into Kuwait. Crossings of major rivers are often set-piece, mainly because of the pronounced advantages the defender enjoys and the need to bring up bridging stores.
 
The downside of set-piece is that they can take a while to set up, and thus generally give the defender more time to prepare his defence and/or divine exactly where the boot is going to fall and prepare appropriately. Often once a front has settled down for a while, a set-piece is appropriate because the defender will have thoroughly prepared his defence, and the attacker is not required to press the tempo by attacking ASAP. Surpirse can be tricky to accomplish in a set-piece, but on the other hand the time taken to tee-up a set piece means that a comprehensive deception plan can be prepared and enacted, to generate a very high degree of surprise - Op DESERT STORM is a great example here. Saddam knew the Coalition forces were coming, and he knew down to the day when they'd be coming. But he had no idea where they'd be coming, and was soundly thrashed in part because of that surprise.
 
There isn't really a sharp split between meeting engagements, hasty attacks, and deliberate/set-piece attacks. The boundaries between them are quite fluid depending on the specific circumstances. An operation can also transition quickly between the three - Op COBRA, for example, started as a deliberate/set-piece and stayed that way for 2-3 days. After that there was a short period of hasty attacks, then it transitioned again to meeting engagements as the Americans made a clean break through the complete depth of the German's prepared defences. Sometime later it transitioned again to a hasty attack by the Germans at Mortain.

OrBat for 716 Inf Div on 6 Jun 1944

716. Inf.-Div. (bo) (7 K.V.A.-H1-K.V.A. Caen) [1]
Gefechtsstand – Caen

Kdr: Generalleutnant Wilhelm Richter
Ia: Major i.G. Bachus
Ib: Major Wolf
Ic: Major d.R. Wiegmann
IIa: Major Heintze

K.V.-Gr. Riva-Bella
* K.V.U.-Gr. Orne
K.V.U.-Gr. Lion-sur-Mer
K.V.-Gr. Courseulles
K.V.U.-Gr. Seulles
K.V.U.-Gr. Normandie

Inf.-Div.-Nachr.-Abtl. 716
* Kdr.: Major Werner Liedloff
Nachschub-Btl. 716
Verwaltungs-Btl. 716
Sanitäts-Btl. 716
Veterinär-Kp. 716

Gren.-Regt. 726 (attached to 352. Inf.-Div.)

Gren.-Regt. 736
* Gefechtsstand – Colleville-sur-Orne (WN 17)
* Kdr.: Oberst Ludwig Krug
* Adjutant: Josef Grüne
I. Btl.
* Gefechtsstand – Ouistreham (WN 14)
* 1. Kp. – Stützpunkt Franceville West (WN 05)
* 2. Kp. – Stützpunktgruppe 08 (Riva Bella)
* 3. Kp. – WN 03 and 04 (Franceville Plage)
* 4. Kp. – Ouistreham-Val WN 09 (Reserve)
II. Btl.
* Gefechtsstand – Tailleville (WN 23)
* Kdr.: Hauptmann Deptolla
* 5. Kp. – Bernières (WN 28, 28a) – St.-Aubin (WN 27)
* 6. Kp. – Stp. Courseulles (WN 29, 30, 31)
* 7. Kp. – Graye-sur-Mer, La Rivière
* 8. Kp. – Tailleville-Tombette (in reserve behind Bernières)
III. Btl.
Gefechtsstand – Cresserons
* Kdr.: Major Pipor
* 9. Kp. – Langrune-Luc (WN 24, 26)
* 10. Kp. – Lion-Hermanville (WN 18, 20, 20a, 21)
* 11. Kp. – in reserve behind Luc-sur-Mer (WN 25)
* 12. Kp. – in reserve at Douvres-la-Délivrande (WN 22)
IV./Gren.-Regt. 736 (Ost-Btl. 642) [2]
* Gefechtsstand – Amfreville
* Kdr.: Hauptmann Heinz Plate
* 1. Kp. – Stützpunkt Franceville (Ost WN 02)
* 3. Kp. – Hermanville (WN 19)
* 4. Kp. – Bavent
14. (Pz.Jg.) Kp. (six 5cm m.Pak and three 7.5cm s.Pak, static beach defenses)

Ost-Btl. 441 [3]
*Gefechtsstand – Crépon (northeast of Bayeux)
* 1. Kp. – Vaux (north of Bayeux)
* 2. Kp. – Reviers
* 3. Kp. – Meuvaines (northeast of Bayeux)
* 4. Kp. – Ver-sur-Mer (northeast of Bayeux)

Art.-Regt. 1716
* Gefechtsstand – Unknown
* Kdr.: Oberstleutnant Helmut Knüppe
I. Abtl.
* Gefechtsstand – Colomby
* 1. Bttr. – Merville (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
* 2. Bttr. – WN 16 (Colleville-sur-Orne) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
* 3. Bttr. – Bréville (northeast of Caen) (four 7.5cm FK 16 n.A.) [4]
* 4. Bttr. – WN 12 (Ouistreham “Water Tower Battery”) (four 15cm s.F.H. 414 (f))
* 10. Bttr. – 4 kilometers northeast of Bayeux (four 15cm s.F.H. 414 (f))
II. Abtl.
* Gefechtsstand – Crépon
* 5. Bttr. – WN 35b (Crépon) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
* 6. Bttr. – WN 32 (la Mare-Fontaine) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
* 7. Bttr. – WN 28a (Bény-sur-Mer) (four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t))
III. Abtl. (attached to 352. Inf.-Div.)

Pz.Jg.-Abtl. 716
* Gefechtsstand – Biéville
* Kdr.: Oberleutnant Kurt Kaergel
* 1. (Sfl.) Kp. – Biéville (ten 7.5cm s.Pak Sfl. Auf Lorraine Schlepper)
* 2. (Pz.Jg.-bo) Kp. – Reviers (nine 7.5cm and three 8.8cm s.Pak) [5]
* 3. (Flak) Kp. – Anisy (one Züg was east of the Orne 1 kilometer west of Sallenelles) [6]

s.Art.-Abtl. 989 (t-mot) (est. 400)
* Gefechtsstand – Reviers (east of Bayeux)
* 1. Bttr. – Basly (four 12.2cm s.F.H. 396 (r.))
* 2. Bttr. – Amblie (four 12.2cm s.F.H. 396 (r.))
* 3. Bttr. – Creully (four 12.2cm s.F.H. 396 (r.))

H.K.A.-Abtl. 1260
* Gefechtsstand – Ryes (south of Arromanches)
* 1. Bttr. – St. Aubin-d’Arquenay (Ouistreham) (six 15.5cm K 420 (f))
* 2. Bttr. – Pointe du Hoc (six 15.5cm K 420 (f))
* 3. Bttr. – WN 35a (Mont Fleury) (four 12.2cm K 390 (r.))

MKB Longues – WN 48 (four 15cm TbtsK C/36) (attached)

[1] Strength as of 1 May was 7,771, possibly not including HiWi. The division did not have a Feld-Ers.-Btl. or Füs.-Btl. organized. The division began to withdraw soon after the invasion and by 1 July began moving to join 19. Armee on the French Riviera. By 20 July it was assigned to IV L.W.-Feld-K. relieving 272 Inf.-Div.
[2] 2. Kp. was disbanded due to lack of strength on 30 May. It had been at Amfreville with the battalion headquarters and is occasionally shown there.
[3] Attached to Gren.-Regt. 736.
[4] Other sources indicate these were four 10cm le.F.H. 14/19 (t)).
[5] The guns were deployed on the low ridge overlooking the beaches from St. Aubin to La Riviere.
[6] The company had 12 2cm mobile guns, probably truck mounted self-propelled pieces. There were also 20 2cm and six 7.5cm (f) static antiaircraft guns in the division zone. The 2cm guns were scattered among the various WN, while the 7.5cm guns were south of Bernieres.

http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-7#entry1440462
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-7#entry1441254
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-8#entry1441938
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-9#entry1442801
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-10#entry1443370
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/109190-the-sheriff-of-oosterbeek-%E2%80%93-a-scenario-design-daraar/page-12#entry1446224

Nod to Gunner for the HHGTTG reference.

FWIW, IMO, narratives of actions are largely irrelevant. What you need are sources that allow you to create the map, and to get the respective forces in the right start and positions at the start point you chose. What happens after that - i.e., the conduct of the battle - is up to the players, NOT the scenario designer.

Will AeroGavins be in the base game or will we have to wait for an expansion?

But here in lies the problem: exposure to more people is not what Steve is objecting to. So, if people keep railing that BF is ignoring a large market they are missing the main point. It is the inability to control the way *his* product is sold the concerns *his* business. So, if he takes the leap and the loss of control hurts their profit margin and the magic of more exposure does not make up the difference then he loses *his* lively hood. As far as I can tell two things need to be satisfied for Steve to reconsider (of course that is up to him not me):
Some hard facts about how this larger number of gamers will actually result in more people who want to play CM. Remember just repeating things like "but its x million people", "more exposure means more sales", or anything else like that does not count. That is not an argument and it does not help your position. You can say totally unsupported things all you like but it does not make them true. Go find some actual evidentiary support for those statements (Hint probably need to conduct market research, including focus groups etc.) Some clarity that Valve does not behave like a retail store. Steve has said they were hurt by (or at least disappointed with) other retail partner's actions in the past. Valve looks just like an old retail store from what Steve can see (*). Valve makes its game developers sign NDA agreements so there is no way to find out things that might reassure Steve (or not). Sadly this is not something that you, Steam advocates, can do much about because it is Valve’s policies. I recommend you go and share your passion about getting CM onto Steam with Valve and tell them that this is a problem they should fix. * Note: this part makes me laugh. So many people keep saying senseless stuff like "BF should join the modern age" but it sure looks to me like Valve has a very 1980s retail store type business model. Sure it is dressed up with the latest tech but if the terms and conditions have not changed then I it seems to me Steam is the one stuck in the 1980s.

Am I missing something?  That article looked like a shallow summary of this thread and offered no additional info on how great it would be on steam.  Absolutely no offense intended @astano BTW.
 
I am still scanning through the comments in case there is value there - so far not really.  I have to admit I don't understand peoples' position who insist they will only buy games via steam. 
 
Then again people often look at me strangely when I explain my position that I will not buy subscription software.  I respect your decision - it is yours.  I don't expect Adobe will change their position to only offer subscription licensing for some of their software though.  The key is respect. Adobe and I disagree and I have told them so - once.  I respect their decision and that is that.  They respected me by taking me off their mailing list

Realism is a loaded word. It's use is to be avoided because the connotations could mean anything, but often boil down to "what I want to see". 

It was an excellent movie. You guys just don't understand the genre.
A war movie is not a documentary, it's a genre - one aspect of the genre is try and condense the extreme experiences of many men into one narrative. Endings are often unrealistic - this, too is part of the genre - it's like Wagnerian opera or something. An abstraction.
 
The ending was unrealistic, but brilliant. This was the concept of the movie - the fury, the destructive maelstrom that was the last days of WWII. It conveyed it brilliantly. Realistically at first, then with increasingly surreal chaos.
 
It wasn't a documentary - it was a war movie, and a brilliant one.

SeinfeldRules,
 
I used to work for Hughes MSG (Missile Systems Group), Canoga Park, and a sister organization, Hughes GSG (Ground Systems Group), was in Fullerton. GSG made both the TPQ-36 and TPQ-37 radars. We used to have Thursday afternoon tech briefs, sometimes classified, and one such was from GSG tech experts for the Firefinders. Using Los Angles City Hall as a thought model, we were told that enemy fire could not only be localized to City Hall, but a specific corner of the building. Additionally, we were told that with a dedicated battery, counterfire could be backplotted (backplotting done practically as soon as projectile cleared radar mask) and en route to the enemy before the hostile round even landed.During the Cold War, Russian doctrinal pubs specifically planned around taking NATO counterfire in four minutes. 
 
Regards,
 
John Kettler

Badger - if I can be so bold as to give my thoughts, although I'm sure Jon will be along later.
 
From an AI plan perspective think about what the AI editor will allow you to do and understand it's limitations and requirements. It cannot match the actions of a human player, and so don't try to do so.
 
Key points about the AI editor.
 
16 groups is the current max available 
It's main action is one of movement, triggered either by the clock or the new triggers now in game (terrain objective or AI order)
Different speeds of movement are available which effect the likelihood of an AI unit to fire on the enemy.
 
(For a small scale action you might be able to have each squad and/or vehicle in its own AI group, for larger scenarios this is not possible)
 
You can therefore have a plan that moves units, but only to where you tell them to go and when you tell them to go, and to be more or less likely to open fire dependent on the move command they are given.
 
Note you can also change the attack posture of a stationary unit, by setting a unit up with a hide command, then having it stay in the same location but switching to a fire command via a trigger or the clock. This will create a fairly decent ambush if judged correctly.
 
Link these together and you start to get a feel for how to get the AI acting as you might like.
 
In defence a forward unit might have a hide command, which changes to an ambush command when activated by a terrain objective, and then have a subsequent move command (dash to the rear maybe) triggered by another terrain objective or the clock. 
 
This movement to the rear then might trigger a second friendly unit to either move forward (counter attack), drop a hide command (covering fire or a second ambush), move to the rear (further withdrawal) or whatever else.
 
The trick though is for the movement plans you give the AI to make sense given the likely player actions. Triggers makes this easier than the old method of working purely off the clock, but it's still as much art as it is science.
 
Set up simple AI manoeuvres in the editor and then watch them play out in scenario author mode. One of my litmus tests for the AI on attack is to see whether the attack can be successful against me as the player, but on the basis I issue no commands. If it can't beat me on that basis it certainly won't beat me if I am giving my force orders.
 
Watching the AI attack over and over again in the same scenario (in scenario author mode to start with) does give you a really good idea of how it interprets the orders given in the editor and how terrain types can affect them. This allows you to get a feel for how an AI plan will then pan out. 
 
AI defence is often about finding good positions for key weapon systems, as there is no point setting an ATG somewhere with poor LOS. There is also however no point putting it somewhere with  such good LOS that every enemy unit can also see it. Spend time finding those perfect keyhole positions
 
I'll stop here and let Jon chime in
 
P

That's right. Paraphrasing Steve (I think) : Realistic, well conceived battles are one-sided, boring affairs. An 'interesting' battle results from errors in planning or reconnaissance. Or sheer desperation. No commander ever sought an interesting battle. The list of scenarios in every CM game constitutes more or less a compendium of mistakes.
 
Discuss.

Battles:
 
1. Over the river and through the woods...
2. Toehold
3. Hard Cider
4. New guests to the party
5. Mauskrieg!
6. The Daring Gamble

He is in there, he is just so well camouflaged the game can't find him.

As a member of the post war generation I can tell you that the American attempts to get rid of both national socialism and nationalism in Germany were more than succesfull. As an example, the german NPD, a party that follows the tradition of the NSDAP (Even though they call themselve National democrats, opposed to national socialists. Otherwise they would be prohibited) only received 1.3 percent in the last federal election (You have to get at least five percent to enter parliament). Something like military parades doesn't exist in the Bundeswehr. Other militarys try to build up a fighting spirit, by promoting a long and successfull history. If you'd try to place the Bundeswehr in line with the Germand Army of WW1 or worse the Reichswehr you'd be called a Nazi. You are not allowed to show Nazi-symbols without educational effect. Denying the holocaust can lead to a prison sentence of up to five years, etc.
 
 
Yeah. After WW2 west Germany followed a policy of only hunting the "big fish". Policemen, judges, etc. put on a new uniform and kept working unless they actively promoted national socialism- otherwise you'd have to imprison most germans, and that's not how you build a nation.
 
However, while the older generation didn't start shouting "this is what I did in WW2 and it was bad", the next generation asked "what did you do". It became a major problem when students realised that many of the old national socialists were still working, and they actively protested against the, in their opinion authoritarian, state. Western Germany saw and sees itself as the nation that is responsible for everything that happened and acts upon that knowledge. As an example you can look at the German-Israeli relations.
 
In eastern Germany things were a little bit different. Since eastern germany itself was a dictature they often followed nazi traditions (which is something they would never have admitted). The Stasi (short for Staatssicherheit, which translates to federal security. It was the east- german intelligence service.) is often seen as a spiritual successor to the GeStaPo (Geheime Staatspolizei, translates to secret federal police. One of the intelligence services of Nazi germany), and was even more powerful. And since eastern germany didn't see itself as a followup to the Reich but as something completely new and detatched there never was a major workup in society. In the east one authoritarian regime was destroyed and a new one was build up.
 
That link you provided was interesting. If you look at the description
"Winner of the prestigious peace award at the Film festival of the independent film in Osnabrück Germany,"
you can see how the German society handles its past.

While I don't disagree with your sentiment, it's worse than that. People want everything in the game to function how they think it would in real life, without considering all the factors and assuming that because one factor doesn't behave, in-game, how they imagine it would, that the whole model is broken, when, in fact, their whole assumed modality for the system is pretty much hokum.