So are German forces "better" on average?

[Melchior]

What you both are saying is valid, but you are missing my point. The discussion here is which small unit will have the edge in most CB:N battles. The German or the American.

All I'm saying is that modeling those abstract quialities that I mentioned would be very hard for the CM engine, so we have to rely on the general categories of Veteran, Regular, Green etc, that we had in CMBO, and continue to have in CMSF. Then we factor in their weapons and terrain disposition and it gives us a rough rating of combat quality.

TBH the differences between German and American units by 1944 could probably be considered academic. Both Armies had a fond appreciation of the importance of good NCOs, flexible leadership, and arming as many men in the squad with as many rapid fire weapons as possible.

In short it basically should be a coin toss barring other factors. We're looking at two well trained, well equipped, modern Western Armies. Ze Germans weren't magic super soldiers and the Americans weren't scrappy underdogs.

[Nidan1]

OK answer me this.....do most of you agree that a decent human player of the CM series of games will beat the AI at least 90% of the time in most scenarios, once he or she has mastered the game mechanics, regardless of which side he plays.

Also take into consideration scenario design and whether or not a particular battle is heavily weighted toward one side or the other.

Computer modeling the characteristics of machines and projectiles is fairly easy, faithfully reproducing human actions and behavior is much more difficult...unless of course you are playing Jeopardy and not Combat Mission.

We can argue the real life historical differences between WW 2 small units from now until the cows come home. Trying to determine which side will have the advantage in a given computer simulation is another matter.

[Battlefront.com]

Well then, let's try to take a look at that if we can. Where do you propose that the Germans should have set up that second defense line and when should they have begun to retire to it?

Here's my problem... I'm a military strategist at heart. I'm also realist. These were two things completely lacking in the Third Reich hierarchy in general, but ESPECIALLY in 1944. So here's what I would have done...

When it was clear the Allies were on the continent and were there to stay, I'd have done a phased withdrawal to the 1940 borders after scorching as much earth as possible in my retreat (primarily ports and bridges). It would be an extremely risky move, but I think in the end it would have resulted in fewer losses than what actually happened.

On the Eastern Front I would have gone on the defensive after a consolidation in the Spring of 1943. Even if that hadn't happened, in 1944 I would have let go of the Baltics and shortened the lines considerably.

In the south I would have pulled up to the Alps and gradually withdrawn from the nasty Balkans mess.

HUGE political hit. HUGE economic hit. HUGE hit period. But with shorter lines, shorter logistics tail, and better defensive terrain... I think the Western Allies could have been talked into a some form of cease fire. I know, I know... the political leadership of the West said it was Unconditional Surrender, but I think after they got Europe liberated "on the cheap", the pile of bodies that would have formed along the German border would have made MANY think that it just wasn't worth it. In the East things would have been a lot rougher.

Of cours this is predicated on Hitler being dead. First, because that lunatic denied this sort of thing from happening even though it was advised. Second, nobody would have made peace with that nut still in power.

Anyway, this is just my pragmatic view. When the beaches were lost, so was France. It was only a matter of time. No amount of tactical success would have changed that outcome.

Steve

[Praetori]

So to get away from an historical analysis of the Normandy Campaign, and return to the original premise of this post, I would ask;

How would a computer model heroism, fear, human nature, etc, at the squad level without becoming so complicated as to make a game unplayable. These factors are also important in quantifying the effeciency of infantry units when modeling combat at low levels, i.e squad and company.

Lots of company sized battles in Normandy were probably won or lost more by individual initiative, courage and desperation, than by weapons, tactics or experience.

My humble opinion anyway.

The fews thing that I've felt missing from the CMx2 engine at time is that scared green units should IMO put less effective fire on the target while still burning through their ammo with speed ('nam style).

As it stands now you cannot control a panicked unit at all, then again it doesn't do a lot of firing either.

Another thing sorely missed is the command range/delay.

A squad with a panicked unexperienced platooncommander was and still is pretty useless as orders normally filter down from the platoon (initiative is something usually found on a higher commandlevel).

The last point is something that bugs me (but strictly from a realism point) as unexperienced or missing/killed commanders have on multiple occasions proven to paralyze subordinate units on the tactical level.

Simulating this would go a long way towards a more realistic game. Then again one could argue that the game would be a lot less fun to play with such a mechanic. On the other hand it would make snipers a lot more powerful in a heartbeat.

[vincere]

Which is exactly how we got the myth of Allied victory through superior numbers only. I mean, if the Germans were tactically superior, and yet lost massive numbers of men and material in the process of defending the best terrain one could hope for... well, must be the Allies just used more explosives. It couldn't possibly be anything more nuanced than that, could it?

Any unbiased look at the combat in Normandy shows that the terrain was more important than anything. When the Germans tried local counter attacks they were often bloodied pretty badly in the process. When they tried major operations they came off even worse.

Normandy was a meat grinder for both sides. Difference is, the Allies could afford the losses and the Germans couldn't. Plus, the Allies were trying to liberate and the Germans defend. In the end relative losses, time tables, etc. mean NOTHING if the ultimate objectives were not secured. It's like saying the Germans were superior because of their victories on the Eastern Front in 1941. Well, if the war ended there perhaps, but I seem to recall that the Germans lost the war. Correct me if I'm wrong

Steve

Normandy a meat grinder yes. Terrain being the single most imortant factor not so sure it does the topic justice.

If I recall correctly there's quite robust criticism of Epsom and Goodwood amongst others.

And there's analysis that the Brit command were sticky because they had one eye on manpower shortages, which were very acute at the sharp end.

The US had manpower pool in their nation; but for some reason (I think enconomy) they set themselves a limit of how many divisions they'd mobilise and pretty much stuck to it if I recall right. So it could be said the US way of war had a different emphasis by choice; which lead to a firepower emphasis.

The short answer is that there is no short answer. I doubt several Phds would solve it to everbodies satisfaction. Some problem is that there are still people hung up about Nazi worship; and still some actual Nazi worship, although thankfully not here much.

I would like to say that foriegn troops fighting for Germany were not necesarily inferior quality. I remember some discussion that Dutch troops were solid. And I knew a polish guy that fought for Germany; or put more acurately fought against the communists, and then later switched sides in Normandy and fought for the Allies. There was absolutely nothing inferior about his fighting ability or hardinous.

By the way; anybody else come across the notion that an average guys from rural areas make better soldiers than city slickers?

Re- Germany loosing the war-

whose economy is strongest; whose working conditions are better

edited: Some notion of putting the Soviets in a lower category. Let's not forget that thier operational doctrine radically improved and even they perceived manpower issues towards the end.

[Wrath of Dagon]

On the Eastern Front I would have gone on the defensive after a consolidation in the Spring of 1943.Steve

That was seriously considered, but finally rejected due to the expected political fallout with their allies. Plus a lot of the Germans still believed they could win (a German offensive had never been halted except in depth), and they did come pretty close, another reason being they did not have a completely accurate picture of the strength of the Soviet forces, like not knowing about the existence of the Steppe front.

[sburke]

Well am not sure about another AAR..those things are a lot of work and I wasn't the one doing all the screenshots!!

I will caveat my response of course. My personal opinion and only up to most recent builds as things continue to evolve. Also I get nervous on NDA issues so I will stay as safe as possible.

My opinion, infantry play is probably the single largest improvement to CMBN from CMx1. Not all the testers agree with me on this but here is my reasoning:

- In CMBN the infantry are in the center with the tanks and in some terrain take center stage over the tanks (as they should). Infantry are more lethal and more flexible than before. I think this is a good thing.

This does not mean CMBN has become an infantry-centric slugfest, if anything it has balanced the game out better allowing for wider options and outcomes. Particularly when you take into account the setting, namely traditional symmetric warfare.

Thanks, much appreciated impressions as well as the AAR. Now I have to find some other way to kill time for the next few weeks...sigh

[stikkypixie]

So to get away from an historical analysis of the Normandy Campaign, and return to the original premise of this post, I would ask;

How would a computer model heroism, fear, human nature, etc, at the squad level without becoming so complicated as to make a game unplayable. These factors are also important in quantifying the effeciency of infantry units when modeling combat at low levels, i.e squad and company.

Lots of company sized battles in Normandy were probably won or lost more by individual initiative, courage and desperation, than by weapons, tactics or experience.

My humble opinion anyway.

I'll give this a go.

The easiest way would be in my opinion to lump it all into one big variable as it is pointless to try to poorly model fear, heroism separately. You might as well toss them together and try to model their combined effect decently, especially if they affect more a less the same thing.

First you decide what heroism, fear, etc... might affect. Is it suppression level? Morale? After that you decide what factors might contribute to a unit displaying more or less heroism, fear. Volume of incoming fire? Command bonus? Sheer luck?

You try to determine the relationship between the two. Should everything be added up? Multiplied? Some weird mathematical function no-one's ever heard about?

Then you tweak the parameters of the mathematical function until you get a believable result. For example the mathematical function might give you a number that can serve as a probability of having some unit act heroically; and during the game you roll a dice so to speak and compare it with the odds.

Simple, no? Of course I have no idea how it is done, but this would be one viable approach.

[Battlefront.com]

If I recall correctly there's quite robust criticism of Epsom and Goodwood amongst others.

For sure. Cobra and others suffered from significant problems. The aforementioned accidental bombing of friendly lines was another serious flub because the ground commanders new it was going to happen and failed to get higher ups to keep the USAAF from doing it their way. Etc.

But once the beaches were lost, there pretty much is no scenario I can see where the Germans would have held France. None. Many German commanders felt this way in June, not to mention July. It's not surprising that some of the most significant "plotters" of the July assassination attempt on Hitler were Western Front officers. They knew what was going to happen.

By the way; anybody else come across the notion that an average guys from rural areas make better soldiers than city slickers?

Yes, this comes up quite frequently. There is some truth to certain aspects of it. The one discussed in relation to the US Army is that the guys from out in the country had more practical experience with heavy machinery than compared to the average urban dweller. That plus the high mechanization level of US agriculture probably gave the US forces an edge in keeping their vehicles running. Enough of an edge to make any sort of significant difference at a higher level? Eh... probably not.

One thing is pretty sure, though. You take an average urbanite and an average rural soldier, give them equal training, and drop them into a rural combat environment... my money is on the rural guy having a better chance of survival. Instead, stick the same two guys into an urban battle for their first fight and my money is on the urban guy. After a couple of months of both forms of combat, I'd say it would be even money.

Steve

[Melchior]

When it was clear the Allies were on the continent and were there to stay, I'd have done a phased withdrawal to the 1940 borders after scorching as much earth as possible in my retreat (primarily ports and bridges). It would be an extremely risky move, but I think in the end it would have resulted in fewer losses than what actually happened.

The Allies had pretty much done all that for you. The Western Allies actually had a lot of trouble keeping the logistics train moving fast because of all the bridges and rail yards the 8th Air Force had destroyed. As it was they couldn't capture an intact deep water port until Le Havre and even then their were no rail roads in good condition to keep a long line of constant supplies going. This resulted in things like the Red Ball Express which had mixed results at best and at worst wasted more fuel and supply than it delivered. The Allies were never really stretched for resources though, they were just kind of sad they couldn't catch retreating German units fast enough.

On the Eastern Front I would have gone on the defensive after a consolidation in the Spring of 1943. Even if that hadn't happened, in 1944 I would have let go of the Baltics and shortened the lines considerably.

Bear in mind that every time the Wehrmacht had tried to perform a gradual withdrawal the Russians always attacked with full force and it would then turn into a mass rout. The Soviets were obsessed with finding weak points in the German line and giving up sections of ground was often an obvious sign of a weakness. This was a major reason Hitler wasn't willing to let the 6th Army just up and withdraw from Stalingrad.

In the south I would have pulled up to the Alps and gradually withdrawn from the nasty Balkans mess.

HUGE political hit. HUGE economic hit. HUGE hit period. But with shorter lines, shorter logistics tail, and better defensive terrain... I think the Western Allies could have been talked into a some form of cease fire. I know, I know... the political leadership of the West said it was Unconditional Surrender, but I think after they got Europe liberated "on the cheap", the pile of bodies that would have formed along the German border would have made MANY think that it just wasn't worth it. In the East things would have been a lot rougher.

Holding the Balkans arguably allowed guys like Kesselring to hold out in Italy for as long as they did. Very, very successful delaying actions if ultimately fruitless.

Of cours this is predicated on Hitler being dead. First, because that lunatic denied this sort of thing from happening even though it was advised. Second, nobody would have made peace with that nut still in power.

Nobody in Germany was going to make peace as long as their were still 3.3 million soldiers ready to fight the Russians. Hitler dead is not going to be enough to satisfy the Allies either. They said they wanted the complete and total capitulation of Germany and nothing short of that was ever going to be acceptable. I don't buy the idea that the Allies would have changed their minds with mounting casualties. The Battle of the Bulge was an attempt to exploit that myth and not only did it fail to find such weakness, the Americans were actually happy to see the German Army expose itself in such a bold faced offensive. They considered it an opportunity!

Anyway, this is just my pragmatic view. When the beaches were lost, so was France. It was only a matter of time. No amount of tactical success would have changed that outcome.

Steve

True enough. Though it's not like holding the beaches was ever a realistic option either.

[Praetori]

So to get away from an historical analysis of the Normandy Campaign, and return to the original premise of this post, I would ask;

How would a computer model heroism, fear, human nature, etc, at the squad level without becoming so complicated as to make a game unplayable. These factors are also important in quantifying the effeciency of infantry units when modeling combat at low levels, i.e squad and company.

Lots of company sized battles in Normandy were probably won or lost more by individual initiative, courage and desperation, than by weapons, tactics or experience.

My humble opinion anyway.

Apart from what I wrote in my post on the previous page there are a few additional things that in theory could be modeled. In reality I'm not sure they'd add much to the great game that BF provides.

As it currently stands the units doesn't seem to react to the general state of the battlefield. The individual squads all consist of die hard ice-cold professionals. Even if the squad next to or in front of them gets blown to pieces they happily trod along their waypoints as if the screams of the dying had no effect on them.

Being fired upon or seeing comrades in other units killed causes no anger with resulting hotheaded behavior nor does the absence or death of a superior break down the initiative or maneuverability.

The fear of armored doom approaching is also non existent when the AT capabilities are scarce (I imagine a Javelin or two available would rather awaken bloodlust).

Nor does the feeling of superiority when friendly air or armor makes it appearance manifest itself.

Going back to the general state of the battlefield the individual squads doesn't seem to care much about if the assault or defense is going sideways.

Thats one of the main reasons why CM players can push the envelope of their pixeltruppen to superhuman feats of tactical prowess.

These are all little things that makes all the difference in the world in small scale tactical battles.

Whether modeling this would make a better game or not would probably get a different answer depending on whom you ask and how they wish to play. Me personally I wouldn't mind having something similar as an "option".

[sburke]

As it currently stands the units doesn't seem to react to the general state of the battlefield. The individual squads all consist of die hard ice-cold professionals. Even if the squad next to or in front of them gets blown to pieces they happily trod along their waypoints as if the screams of the dying had no effect on them.

Going back to the general state of the battlefield the individual squads doesn't seem to care much about if the assault or defense is going sideways.

Thats one of the main reasons why CM players can push the envelope of their pixeltruppen to superhuman feats of tactical prowess.

Agreed this would put a whole other dynamic on the battlefield and one I would be interested in except for one item. The realism factor of having soldiers react to the overall state of the battlefield implies they know the overall state of the battlefield. Say for example you have a 2 company assault on an objective and the two companies are out of direct contact. How do you decide when to allow for the impact on casualties to the two units. Do the pixeltruppen borg units sense their fellow pixeltruppen falling off the Net? So on the one hand, yeah I think this would be a really interesting addition to battlefield behavior and C&C, I am just not sure how you could really pull it off without it becoming just as artificial in the opposite direction. I think the only real way you can do this is pretty much include what BFC has- a force level VP item that requires the player to pay more attention to force protection. Just the humble opinion of someone who does not write code and isn't a math whiz.

[Vanir Ausf B]

"MG42: Better than the BAR." - Certainly

"Panzerfaust: Better than the Bazooka." - Not really do you mean Panzerschreck ?

Yes, meant Panzerschreck. My mistake.

"Panther: Better than any US tank other than the Pershing. Relatively common by German standards." - I am not sure sure about that but that does not really have anything to do with soldier v soldier or squad v squad

Why frame the debate so narrowly? The OP, who I was replying to, specified "company-battalion scale (i.e. CM scale) fights".

"Stug III: Better than any US tank destroyer primarily due to superior anti-infantry capability. Very common as well." The Stug was an Assault Gun and not really designed to be a tank killer as such, sure it ended up being in that role just as the American tank destroyers were not meant to fight infantry and thus did not have enough MG's. Where a TD will outclass a Stug every time is that the TD has a turret. But again not really relevant in squad v squad

It is relevant to the OP. I admit this is less of a slam dunk than the other weapons I listed.

"The M1 Garand is better than the K98" - The rate of aimed fire from the M1 is no greater than the K98, 1 round in 3 seconds. Sure un-aimed rapid fire was a bit more but un-aimed fire is not all that useful. The big difference was that there were more M1's on average, i.e. the squads were bigger.

I don't think this is remotely true. Others have already explained why.

[Melchior]

On a quality of design or manufacture the Garand and K98 were pretty much equal indeed. Maybe extra points for Mauser being able to produce the K98 in both number and quality.

The M1 Garand almost certainly was a better weapon than the K98 in a tactical sense though. Especially when one realizes quantity of firepower has often done more to secure victory than pin point marksmanship. The reality was most guys during the war couldn't hit a man sized target beyond 200m and within that it would often take some 30-40 rounds to still do that. The British liked to joke in the 18th Century it took a man's own weight in musket balls fired to actually kill him. Most bolt action rifles were gratuitously effective to ranges out over a kilometer and even the Garand was effective to 600-700 meters. Even a trained marksman has difficulty hitting targets at those ranges.

With this in mind, it's really not surprising that the US Army would equip their soldiers with a weapon that gave them the equivalent fire output of 3 bolt action rifles but in one weapon. They weren't the only ones to notice this either, as the Germans and Russians also pushed hard to widely employ semi automatic or automatic rifles for their forces.

[Vark]

It would be nice if units suffered adverse morale from non-kinetic events, especially maneuver. CM1 had the ability to cause units to surrender to AVF's if they overran a unit but they never retreated in the face of an armoured onslaught, even from the flank or rear. Similarly, units who see armour 'retreat' often assumed the worst was about to happen and would follow the armour, I don't want the CM1 cower reaction but would like a chance for an armoured unit to reinterpret a clearly suicidal order, rather like infantry did.

[Battlefront.com]

The Allies had pretty much done all that for you.

Yeah, but after they wiped out pretty much all the combat forces the Germans had in Normandy. That's my whole point. The commanders on the ground knew that they had to at least form a secondary defensive line along the Siene River, though chances are that wouldn't have held for very long.

Bear in mind that every time the Wehrmacht had tried to perform a gradual withdrawal the Russians always attacked with full force and it would then turn into a mass rout. The Soviets were obsessed with finding weak points in the German line and giving up sections of ground was often an obvious sign of a weakness. This was a major reason Hitler wasn't willing to let the 6th Army just up and withdraw from Stalingrad.

To use the current snarky terms kids these days toss about... "ooo... and how'd that work out for them?" Again, my point is that staying in place assured destruction and then a major withdrawal. So why not try for the withdrawal and minimize the destruction? Couldn't have turned out worse than it did. Plus, I think you're giving the Soviets too much credit and not enough credit to the Germans. They were very good with retrograde moves when they tried.

Holding the Balkans arguably allowed guys like Kesselring to hold out in Italy for as long as they did. Very, very successful delaying actions if ultimately fruitless.

My point. By 1944 they weren't delaying actions any more because Germany was under immediate threat from both east and west. Having their forces strung out an actively pinned down by Partisans served no purpose of any significance.

I don't buy the idea that the Allies would have changed their minds with mounting casualties. The Battle of the Bulge was an attempt to exploit that myth and not only did it fail to find such weakness, the Americans were actually happy to see the German Army expose itself in such a bold faced offensive. They considered it an opportunity!

Which is why the Germans should never have given it to them. They should have kept going with things like Hürtgen.

There's two things here. When the Allies were on the losing side of things saying "Total Surrender" as a motto was a great thing. Definitely got people fired up. But if the Allies had pretty much achieved their war aims of liberating everybody from Nazi rule, then it's a much harder sell to lose a million soldiers (1/4 dead) for little appreciable gain. That's the sort of casualties the Wester Allies could have expected through 1946 or so. The Soviets would also have lost millions and their manpower was starting to erode. If the Germans held on, and I think they could have, my guess is that public opinion would say:

"Hey, that madman is gone. The new leaders in Germany want to stop fighting. We just lost a million soldiers, for what? To stop the fighting?"

Don't underestimate how public opinion would have turned if the Germans offered a way out at acceptable terms (the Germans would have to surrender, disarm, etc.)

True enough. Though it's not like holding the beaches was ever a realistic option either.

As it was in June 1944? Yeah, not really likely. All the West Wall did was force the Western Allies to save up for a huge push instead of trying for a smaller one like at Dieppe.

Steve

[vincere]

Yes, this comes up quite frequently. There is some truth to certain aspects of it. The one discussed in relation to the US Army is that the guys from out in the country had more practical experience with heavy machinery than compared to the average urban dweller. That plus the high mechanization level of US agriculture probably gave the US forces an edge in keeping their vehicles running. Enough of an edge to make any sort of significant difference at a higher level? Eh... probably not.

One thing is pretty sure, though. You take an average urbanite and an average rural soldier, give them equal training, and drop them into a rural combat environment... my money is on the rural guy having a better chance of survival. Instead, stick the same two guys into an urban battle for their first fight and my money is on the urban guy. After a couple of months of both forms of combat, I'd say it would be even money.

Steve

Hmm.. that's a good point; never thought of it reversed. I have to admit I bought into some of the German tactical superiority idea; let's face it, it's hard not to when even modern Western Generals continue to refer to German principals. However, clearly it's a very mixed picture with an interplay of so many variables I'm at "the jury is out position now" thanks to this thread.

I also had at the back of my mind a quote I hear recently about old Prussia's military relationship to the state. When asked the reply was along the line of the state and the military are one and I wondered whether this was still having an impact on German military psyche. I honestly don't know enough about this so is a genuine "I wonder?".

One thing's for sure though; if we were to use a boxing analagy it's a good fight with both sides game, and in the early rounds the outcome uncertain. Yes the Allies had the fight bagged by the 2nd half but Germany wouldn't go down and still looked like it could get a TKO. And I guess that goes some way to making it a good period to wargame.

[The_Capt]

It would be nice if units suffered adverse morale from non-kinetic events, especially maneuver...

If you could model this accurately you would hold in your hands a license to print money. Accurate non-kintec effects measurement and prediction is THE problem of our time wrt modern military operations. Crack that one and you can buy Caribbean nation after they give you the Nobel prize.

[MikeyD]

I wonder how much of the much advertised German 'tactical superiority' was simply misguided cockiness. As was mentioned elsewhere, the Allied mullberry harbors got wrecked in a storm and the front went into a holding pattern for the better part of a month. The Germans opposite them must've been thinking "Hey, we're we're holding them back! We must be pretty good at this!" They try small scale incursions and the allies wisely avoid being flanked. The Germans think "Hey, they're giving up ground! We're tactial geniuses!" Then, when the fighting resumes they're crushed like bugs. :eek:

[LongLeftFlank]

I wonder how much of the much advertised German 'tactical superiority' was simply misguided cockiness.

There was probably a good bit of that too, especially in the SS and FJ units who viewed themselves as "crack" but were really composed mainly of young kids around a core of veterans who either encouraged them or kept quiet.

And the clumsy performance of some of the Allied forces in attack probably fed this idea at first; it's easier on defence, especially when you can sit in prepared positions and shoot and shell the enemy and watch his first and second waves break, laughing in relief at his discomfiture. Of course, once the Allied artillery starts plastering you, since the failed attempts have now revealed your MLR, the laughter rapidly dies away.

[Melchior]

To use the current snarky terms kids these days toss about... "ooo... and how'd that work out for them?" Again, my point is that staying in place assured destruction and then a major withdrawal. So why not try for the withdrawal and minimize the destruction? Couldn't have turned out worse than it did. Plus, I think you're giving the Soviets too much credit and not enough credit to the Germans. They were very good with retrograde moves when they tried.

Oh I totally agree that leaving 6th Army stuck in Stalingrad was a terrible idea. It's just that a lot of people think the sole reason they were left there was because of Hitler's ego and their was more to it than that. The OKW wasn't making decisions based soley on Hitler's demands. At least not until after he had more or less fired or replaced every good General after 1944. They had reasons for their decision, even if they were shaky.

My point. By 1944 they weren't delaying actions any more because Germany was under immediate threat from both east and west. Having their forces strung out an actively pinned down by Partisans served no purpose of any significance.

It does though if the Germans *are* the partisans. Northern Italy and the Netherlands were not liberated until after the surrender and both regions contained objectives that could have shortened the war if captured. Instead they remained bullwarks for relatively little expenditure on Germany's part.

Which is why the Germans should never have given it to them. They should have kept going with things like Hürtgen.

But the attrition defense strategy wasn't working either. It was obvious the Allies were planning to conduct an offensive operation by early 1945 once their supply lines caught up and their would be no hope of meeting it AND still having enough stuff to deal with the Russians. Of course by Operation Bagration Hitler had more or less given up on the Eastern Front and strongly believed a major victory in the West would lead to an Armistice. The Bulge proved him wrong, and like it or not he was not just going to wait for the West to attack him.

There's two things here. When the Allies were on the losing side of things saying "Total Surrender" as a motto was a great thing. Definitely got people fired up. But if the Allies had pretty much achieved their war aims of liberating everybody from Nazi rule, then it's a much harder sell to lose a million soldiers (1/4 dead) for little appreciable gain. That's the sort of casualties the Wester Allies could have expected through 1946 or so. The Soviets would also have lost millions and their manpower was starting to erode. If the Germans held on, and I think they could have, my guess is that public opinion would say:

"Hey, that madman is gone. The new leaders in Germany want to stop fighting. We just lost a million soldiers, for what? To stop the fighting?"

Yeah honestly. I might be getting subjective here but a lot of people felt that the whole reason WW2 happened was because the job wasn't finished in WW1.

Don't underestimate how public opinion would have turned if the Germans offered a way out at acceptable terms (the Germans would have to surrender, disarm, etc.)

I honestly doubt it would have changed much after the discovery of the major concentration camps.

As it was in June 1944? Yeah, not really likely. All the West Wall did was force the Western Allies to save up for a huge push instead of trying for a smaller one like at Dieppe.

Steve

Yup. I'm no fan of the belief that June 6th succeded just because Hitler took a nap. The reality was the Allies brought so much force to bear on D-Day their was basically no stopping them. Omaha Beach was an important objective but it was really the only landing zone that put up a serious fight. Their is also no evidence the defenders would have been able to hold out against the planned 2nd and 3rd landing waves.

[Battlefront.com]

Oh I totally agree that leaving 6th Army stuck in Stalingrad was a terrible idea. It's just that a lot of people think the sole reason they were left there was because of Hitler's ego and their was more to it than that. The OKW wasn't making decisions based soley on Hitler's demands.

True, 6th Army was pretty much doomed because the flanks weren't adequately secured. And that goes back to fighting an under resourced war with unrealistic objectives. If the Germans had just concentrated on slow, steady destruction of Soviet forces the war could have turned out different.

Whenever I played War In Russia with Case Blue I destroyed the forces in front of me, put up a solid infantry screen, then turned everything north to roll up the front. I usually would take out the Soviet's center before winter set in. And when winter set in I had nice, rested, dug in forces in sufficient number to repulse any attacks. Next season I would repeat by taking out a section of the front then moving to another section. I didn't take much ground, but I took enough. The more important thing was the Soviets had to rebuild a huge chunk of their forces every year while I did not.

Not to read too much into real war using a 1980s computer game, but the strategy is a sound one and it is based on the German's own principles as applied in 1941. Take out the enemy and you will eventually rule him. Take territory without taking out the enemy and you will not.

It does though if the Germans *are* the partisans. Northern Italy and the Netherlands were not liberated until after the surrender and both regions contained objectives that could have shortened the war if captured. Instead they remained bullwarks for relatively little expenditure on Germany's part.

They weren't bulwarks, they were irrelevant fronts. The Allies stopped being aggressive in Italy because the front was irrelevant. They never went into the Balkans because the Partisans there were doing just fine on their own. Netherlands held no strategic importance beyond the portions that were already secured. It's like saying it was useful for the Germans to hold Norway, even though the Red Army was in Berlin and shaking hands with the Americans on the Elbe. Typical example of trying to hold everything and winding up holding nothing.

But the attrition defense strategy wasn't working either. It was obvious the Allies were planning to conduct an offensive operation by early 1945 once their supply lines caught up and their would be no hope of meeting it AND still having enough stuff to deal with the Russians. Of course by Operation Bagration Hitler had more or less given up on the Eastern Front and strongly believed a major victory in the West would lead to an Armistice. The Bulge proved him wrong, and like it or not he was not just going to wait for the West to attack him.

The key was to not have squandered nearly 1 million well trained, well equipped forces in 1944 and to instead have them defending Germany proper in 1945. I just don't see how it's possible that the Germans would have done worse in 1945 if they had retained the cream of their military crop instead of it being laid to waste through short sighted, strategic blunders.

Yeah honestly. I might be getting subjective here but a lot of people felt that the whole reason WW2 happened was because the job wasn't finished in WW1.

When people are more concerned about the present than the past, the vision of the future can take a few odd twists and turns. Just like some idiots in the Allied ranks wanted to turn Germany into a agrarian society, completely forgetting it was that sort of behavior that set the stage for WW2. Or put another way, these morons thought "we got WW2 not because we were too harsh with Germany for WW1, rather it's because we weren't harsh enough". Thankfully those types lost the debate about what to do with Germany post war.

I honestly doubt it would have changed much after the discovery of the major concentration camps.

I don't think so. It would have flavored the surrender terms, but I don't think it would have done more than that.

Yup. I'm no fan of the belief that June 6th succeded just because Hitler took a nap. The reality was the Allies brought so much force to bear on D-Day their was basically no stopping them. Omaha Beach was an important objective but it was really the only landing zone that put up a serious fight. Their is also no evidence the defenders would have been able to hold out against the planned 2nd and 3rd landing waves.

When Germany lost the skies they lost the seas. The invasion was, as you say, going to succeed by sheer weight of numbers and determination. As it was I think the Germans did pretty well. They could have done much worse, but I don't think much better considering the reality of the times.

Steve

[stikkypixie]

Apart from what I wrote in my post on the previous page there are a few additional things that in theory could be modeled. In reality I'm not sure they'd add much to the great game that BF provides.

As it currently stands the units doesn't seem to react to the general state of the battlefield. The individual squads all consist of die hard ice-cold professionals. Even if the squad next to or in front of them gets blown to pieces they happily trod along their waypoints as if the screams of the dying had no effect on them.

I take it you haven't played CMSF? Because that is in already, if only by being out of C2 alone.

[Michael Emrys]

Computer modeling the characteristics of machines and projectiles is fairly easy, faithfully reproducing human actions and behavior is much more difficult...

I firmly believe we are agreed on that. This is where design becomes less of a science and more of an art. At least for now.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

When it was clear the Allies were on the continent and were there to stay, I'd have done a phased withdrawal to the 1940 borders after scorching as much earth as possible in my retreat (primarily ports and bridges). It would be an extremely risky move, but I think in the end it would have resulted in fewer losses than what actually happened.

On the Eastern Front I would have gone on the defensive after a consolidation in the Spring of 1943. Even if that hadn't happened, in 1944 I would have let go of the Baltics and shortened the lines considerably.

In the south I would have pulled up to the Alps and gradually withdrawn from the nasty Balkans mess.

HUGE political hit. HUGE economic hit. HUGE hit period. But with shorter lines, shorter logistics tail, and better defensive terrain... I think the Western Allies could have been talked into a some form of cease fire. I know, I know... the political leadership of the West said it was Unconditional Surrender, but I think after they got Europe liberated "on the cheap", the pile of bodies that would have formed along the German border would have made MANY think that it just wasn't worth it. In the East things would have been a lot rougher.

That might have worked. And the East might not have been that rough after all. Stalin was still offering peace as late as 1943 I believe. How long it would have lasted is another matter...

The problem, as you point out, was Hitler. His vision was all or nothing. Due to a really serious misreading of history, he believed that without a vast empire in the east, the German people were doomed anyway. His solution was to stake everything on an all-or-nothing war strategy. Either they win big or they lose everything. Well, we know how that one turned out.

Miichael