So are German forces "better" on average?

[LongLeftFlank]

I've decided to take this issue, which has been alluded to many times, right up front.

Basically, in mid 1944 France, would you expect the Germans to win more company-battalion scale (i.e. CM scale) fights in which the odds are roughly even?

Put in CMBN terms, if you replayed Bois de Baugin or a simpler test scenario that alternately placed equivalent (I didn't say equal) US and German forces in each others' positions, would you achieve broadly similar results on average?

BFC has said repeatedly they don't model national characteristics (e.g. the "coolness under fire" or "quicker to break / quicker to rally" stuff of ASL notoriety).

But let me make a provocative prediction: I think CMBN German regular forces will prove to hold a slight but noticeable edge in June-Sept 1944, ceteris paribus, and that is consistent with the historical reality of the time. I believe the exact reasons why will be situation-specific, but consistent. I look forward to testing this hypothesis in the game.

Oh, and I have no way of proving or disproving the historical reality decisively, and neither does anyone else. We can quote examples back and forth ad infinitum of course.

Let me add that in general I utterly detest fanbois who try to claim some kind of innate German martial superiority, i.e. that man for man, the Germans were somehow braver, tougher, more organized and smarter "on average" than their Allied counterparts -- whether we're talking about generals, captains, sergeants or privates. And that the Germans only lost battles when the odds were stacked massively against them and/or Hitler or some other scoundrel interfered with their freedom of action. Such notions are still widely believed among Germans today, and not a few others, and are quite simply rubbish, smacking of the same smug racism that lured Germany into disaster. By mid-war, the Third Reich faced civilizations: Russia, Britain and America whose inherent human talent and will to fight were demonstrably no less than its own.

But with that understood, in mid-1944, even with the German armies a shadow of their former selves (and even though too many veterans had fallen to Allied forces whose own skills had grown substantially), it seems to me the Germans continued to get better battlefield results on average out of the same or lesser resources, displaying an enviable combination of discipline (persistence) and resourcefulness (initiative). This is not to say they always came off best in any meeting engagement with equal forces; just that they seem to have better than coin-toss odds.

My hypothesis is that this performance edge is real (though not deterministic), but is also not a function of some ingrained German genius for warmaking or organization that exceeds that of the primitive Bolshevist Asiatics and bourgeois Anglo Saxons. It is instead a function of:

1. Desperation. On average, the consequences of a given tactical defeat are more dire for the Germans; if the line gives, there is nowhere safe to flee to, and few reserves to plug the breach. Also, so long as the potent German artillery remains on its grid, the situation isn't completely irretrievable. So savage counterattacks, exhausting night infiltrations and aggressive refortification of positions are all very much on the menu even against heavy odds, up until the point when the formation disintegrates.

In contrast, other than on D-Day itself, Allied troops could often afford to let tactical failure be an option, cutting their losses in the knowledge that fresh forces could take up the fight again the next day. So on average they might well be less motivated to take extraordinary measures and risks, except where their backs really were against the wall (e.g. surrounded). Exceptions abound, of course -- it isn't always so clear to soldiers on the ground that the overall situation is hopeless, and they may tip the scales of victory through their efforts. For want of a nail, all that....

2. Perhaps a dash of magical thinking, a common companion to desperation: the Fuhrer has promised us wonder weapons (little do we know they're just going to pointlessly kill more civilians in London, not GIs or Tommies). And you know, some of the ones we have now (like the 88s) are pretty damn good relative to the competition.

Your thoughts?

[ChrisND]

It also helps that they were on the defense in familiar territory.

[LongLeftFlank]

Well that's valid point; if we take it as given that the Germans are defender more than 50% of the time, then they have certain advantages that inhere in that position. So by definition you'd expect a defender to win most of the time at less than textbook 3:1 odds, which by definition isn't "equal".

I guess I'm trying to figure out whether, if the situation were somehow reversed (i.e. it's Americans defending against a German attack), you'd expect the same or different results. Not to the point where you have GIs and Shermans defending the Reich -- I mean at a tactical level.

[MikeyD]

The 'German tactic genius' was probably 70% due to their integral MG34/MG42s at squad level. The Allied equivalent would've been B.A.R. teams but they just don't possess the terror factor that the German MGs had. American did have the better rifle by a large margin, and they had more men per squad (which counts in these fights). They even had the more lethal hand grenade. But they also had a self-defeating casualty replacement system that could turn a veteran unit back into a green one after a couple of engagements.

[Gromit]

I would have to say Yes to your question LLF, the reason why I found in my copy of Truppenfuhrung. Doctrine, as James Corum points out in the foreward, was the difference from start to finish. I'll give you some examples quoted from the book.

"World War II is dramatic proof of the importance of operational and tactical doctrine in war. ... In the second half of the war, as the Wehrmacht was pushed back on all fronts and eventually defeated, the German Army repeatedly demonstrated great tactical and operational competence in fighting enemies who outnumbered it. Despite the evil nature of the regime that it served, it must be admitted that the German Army of World War II was, man for man, one of the most effective fighting forces ever seen."

"One of the strengths of German doctrine was the process by which it was created and adapted. German doctrine was less a product of individual genius than of extensive debate and discussion within the General Staff and a policy of testing doctrinal concepts against the experience of war and exercises. Doctrine was not sacrosanct, and the General Staff and army leadership had no problem discarding and adapting parts of Truppenfuhrung when necessary."

General Ludwig Beck, to whom the english translation is dedicated, confirmed this "thinking" in a speech on the 125th anniversary of the Kriegsakademie, 10 October 1935:

"Nothing could be more dangerous than to follow sudden inspirations, however intelligent or brilliant they may appear, without pursuing them to the logical conclusions, or to indulge in wishful thinking, however sincere our purposes. We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong enough in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates."

There are some specific examples in the book's Introduction that I will post if you are interested. They have to do with pushing responsibility for getting the job done down to the lowest levels of the rank structure and encouraging innovative command through individual judgement.

[LongLeftFlank]

Well as someone who works in a large asset-intensive company now, I can see how all that doctrine would lend itself to a well-oiled administration -- i.e. one able to get food and ammunition to the troops and fuel to the panzers in spite of horrific air attacks and other privations.

But is it, or are you, implying by extension that the German felds and gefreiters have the judgment and "intellect" to undertake actions in battle that Sergeant Rock and D-Day Dawson (his British counterpart) wouldn't?

And are Allied officers really more prone to "sudden inspiration" (i.e. execution of half baked ideas) or unable to "pursue them to logical conclusions"?

Sorry, that stuff all smacks of self-congratulatory German superiority to me, with fairly meaningless talk of "intellect" "character" and "nerve". And the disdain for "inspiration" (i.e. "clever" ideas that haven't gone through proper channels) is typical of the anti-Semitic ideology that went hand in hand with it.

Remember also, by 1944 the German junior-mid officer corps (company - regiment) that was truly steeped in the Prussian tradition and might have been able to translate some kind of intellectual jujitsu into battlefield miracles was largely dead, replaced by hastily trained former university students with little more experience than the American "Ninety Day Wonders" they opposed.

[finalcut]

You also need to remember that by this time in the War,the Germans had been fighting since 39,While the Americans had only been fighting since 42,so there is the experience to factor in.

[LongLeftFlank]

Except that 3 million or so of that 39-42 generation by now lay dead on the battlefields and many others invalid from wounds, or still in uniform but crippled psychologically. Again, not sure how much that extra experience really counted at this point in time in the line.

The awful US casualty replacement system MikeyD referred to might be a factor, making a large chunk of US squad headcount useless "wet-noses" with no motivation to perform or even show up in battle. While the Germans focused their tactics around the MGs who were either crewed by or supervised by the most experienced cadres they had.

Maybe that's a piece of the answer. But only a piece.

[MikeyD]

You notice that once the U.S. broke free of bocage country German 'tactical genius' pretty much evaporated. It soon became a matter of who could run faster, the pursued or the pursuer. What really saved them was as their logistics lines contracted ours lengthened. We ran about as far as we were able while they ran as far as they had to. Then it was back to stalemate again.

[Chops]

If the Luftwaffe would have made an appearance so that Allied aircraft did not dominate the skies over Normandy, the Germans would have kicked Allied arse all over the place, all the way back to the Atlantic.

The Allied air superiority and resulting overwhelming firepower from artillery, destroyed German reinforcements before they could even reach the front, and made it very difficult for them to manuever or sustain any sort of offensive or counter-attack.

There are numerous accounts of the Germans making substantial progress, only to be stopped in their tracks due to massive artillery and aerial attacks.

I find it amazing that the Germans were able to hold out as long as they did in Normandy.

So in summary, I would say "hell yeah" the German squad/platoon/company was better than the equivalent Allied unit due to better small unit tactics, leadership, and motivation.

[Magpie_Oz]

I agree that the integral MG42 was a leveller for the German squad but the BAR is not even remotely analogous to it. The BAR had too small a magazine and a fixed barrel which made it wholly inadequate for the fire support role. The true LMG for the Allies was the Bren gun in the British forces and even that did not compare to the firepower of the MG42.

Sure the M1 was a great rifle, had one myself once, but whether it was a telling factor over other infantry formations I am not so sure. The British army maintained the SMLE through out the war and performed equally well in infantry combat.

The hand grenade, that is just a difference in philosophy. The Germans used offensive hand grenades which basically means you can throw it farther than it can hurt you so do not need to seek cover. The US and British grenades tended to be defensive grenades with a larger lethal radius, requiring the thrower to take cover.

The big factors for me would be the larger squad size of the Americans and the exceptional supply line which is where the US excelled beyond all other combatants in WW2, still do in fact.

For me, "are German forces better on average ?" no.

The winners and losers were decided by factors beyond the match up of the individual infantryman which by 1944-45 was fairly indistinguishable.

"the German Army of World War II was, man for man, one of the most effective fighting forces ever seen." Is pure BS and someone would have to show me some solid proof of that that goes beyond hyperbole.

[LongLeftFlank]

You notice that once the U.S. broke free of bocage country German 'tactical genius' pretty much evaporated. It soon became a matter of who could run faster, the pursued or the pursuer. What really saved them was as their logistics lines contracted ours lengthened. We ran about as far as we were able while they ran as far as they had to. Then it was back to stalemate again.

Yes, but the odds were not for the most part "even" at that point in the vast majority of engagements around the Falaise pocket, although there were certainly cases of "the biter bit", where overextended or overconfident Allied troops found themselves cut off by a cunning German counterattack and forced to surrender.

Your point about the MGs providing some very fundamental tactical options not open to the Allies was an excellent one. I'd dare to add though that in a fluid tactical situation where the Germans can't set up their customary web of MG nests, minefields and pre-registered 81mm mortar targets, the staying power of chronically undermanned German infantry formations is likely to be somewhat LESS than even beat-up Allied forces in similar situations.

[MikeyD]

Lets remember a fair number of those Axis units were in fact mere children culled from the Hitler Youth or invalid units recuperating in France from the Russian front. They weren't eight feet tall blonde übermenchen. And they held out in Normandy basically from mid-June to mid-July. I've had milk in my fridge that has held out longer.

[LongLeftFlank]

And they held out in Normandy basically from mid-June to mid-July. I've had milk in my fridge that has held out longer.

LOL! That's almost sigline material!

[MikeyD]

I'm no specialist on the topic. At what point do you think the allies decided to stop pushing and simply hold the front stabile while they built up their forces for the massive Cobra breakout? I recall that they had decided to keep the Culin hedgecutter under wraps as a 'secret weapon' for the breakout. It's likely that the German ability to hold out for those last couple weeks was more the result of the allied decision to hold back than to any intrinsic German fighting superiority. Perhaps we could've cleared Normandy 2 weeks sooner, but with ten thousand additional casualties.

[Killkess]

Following guys like Matin van Crefeld "Fighting Power" or Trever N. Dupuy the germans had and kept an edge in actual combat until the end of the war. Basicly one can say that where fights actually happened (and were not decided by shere firepower) between troops the outcome was in favor of the german troops. And this regardless of beeing on the offense or defense.

[JonS]

At what point do you think the allies decided to stop pushing and simply hold the front stable while they built up their forces for the massive Cobra breakout?

The US southern front was essentially quiescent from about 10 June (maybe a few days later) through until early July so that all resources could be directed towards the capture of Cherbourg. This was particularly so after the great storm wrecked all pre-invasion buildup and supply dumping plans. It wasn't a choice - they simply didn't have the resources to push in all directions at once. UK operations were similarly reduced or delayed during the same period, for the same reasons. Op EPSOM, IIRC, was delayed for four or five days because of the storm.

[Bertram]

If the Luftwaffe would have made an appearance so that Allied aircraft did not dominate the skies over Normandy, the Germans would have kicked Allied arse all over the place, all the way back to the Atlantic.

The Allied air superiority and resulting overwhelming firepower from artillery, destroyed German reinforcements before they could even reach the front, and made it very difficult for them to manuever or sustain any sort of offensive or counter-attack.

There are numerous accounts of the Germans making substantial progress, only to be stopped in their tracks due to massive artillery and aerial attacks.

I find it amazing that the Germans were able to hold out as long as they did in Normandy.

So in summary, I would say "hell yeah" the German squad/platoon/company was better than the equivalent Allied unit due to better small unit tactics, leadership, and motivation.

Nuts

plus 6 characters (wouldn't McAuliffe have been pissed?)

[Elmar Bijlsma]

The calibre of German soldiery in 1944 varied too greatly to make any kind of comparison meaningful. Yes, if you exclude all the poor quality Ost/ear/stumach/wahatever battalions, the units consisting mostly out of children or those units who had already been given a thrashing elsewhere in the war, yes the Germans were maybe a bit better on average.

[c3k]

An interesting tidbit I picked up somewhere was that the average US soldier identified with his squadmates. He would fight and risk his life for them. The average German soldier identified with his company-mates. He would fight and risk his life for them.

The different level of cohesion had a part to play. As did the MG42 in each squad.

Ken

[Blackcat]

The calibre of German soldiery in 1944 varied too greatly to make any kind of comparison meaningful. Yes, if you exclude all the poor quality Ost/ear/stumach/wahatever battalions, the units consisting mostly out of children or those units who had already been given a thrashing elsewhere in the war, yes the Germans were maybe a bit better on average.

A bit better than who though? If you eliminate all the poor quality German troops in Normandy and then compare their best against a standard Brit, Canadian or American unit in the campaign are you actually making a fair comparison?

The overwhelming majority of allied troops in Normandy were green at the start and this was in some respects a good thing. As one US veteran said, "I did things on D-Day that I never would never try later on when I knew about combat". So some of the good results early in the campaign were quite probably achieved because allied forces were highly motivated but, relatvely, poorly skilled.

Remember too that the invasion divisions were very well trained in getting ashore and breaching the Atlantic wall, but far less well trained in what came next. However, war is an extreme example of Darwinian natural selection. Troops learned fast, at least those that survived did. That effect was, as has been mentioned, mitigated in the US army's appalling replacement system which undermined small unit cohesion and seemed to be designed to stop hard won lessons being passed on to new team members (the Brits did it a bit better, but had their own problems with manpower).

Finally, British, Dominion and Empire troops fought the German army on the ground in 1940 and from 41 onwards. I think any objective observer could find enough evidence from those campaigns to suggest that at the small unit tactical level (that modelled by CM) the German soldiers were innately superior. Even in May 1940 the regular British army stopped the Germans cold on several occassions; that was a campaign lost at the strategic and operational level not because the troops or equipment were inferior.

[Michael Emrys]

The calibre of German soldiery in 1944 varied too greatly to make any kind of comparison meaningful. Yes, if you exclude all the poor quality Ost/ear/stumach/wahatever battalions, the units consisting mostly out of children or those units who had already been given a thrashing elsewhere in the war, yes the Germans were maybe a bit better on average.

I think Elmar has said it best. By 1944 the German army (including for this argument also the SS) was a patchwork of nationalities and men of varying health and commitment that generalizations are very much weakened. At the beginning of Barbarossa it was probably man for man the smartest, most capable army in the world, but by the end of that year a critical fraction of those seasoned and confident veterans had been killed, captured, or invalided out, especially among the small unit leaders and NCOs. It would never achieve quite the same pitch again, even though the training schools would continue to turn out good junior officers and NCOs, they could never meet the demand.

The British suffered the handicap of a faulty doctrine. Although they made adjustments over the course of the war and certainly had their strengths, they never really caught up in that area. Their best officers were able to think outside the box and get away with it, but they were few and far between.

Likewise, the doctrine the US started out with was faulty and in the case of many formations their training was inadequate too. But by and large, they were more prepared to "learn on the job" and make changes to both. Consequently, they improved even as their enemies were deteriorating. So a green US division might start out losing fights against the Germans when first committed to battle, or winning but only at great expense. But by the end of the war, it might have learned its lessons and be the one making the Germans look like rubes.

So if you are going to make comparisons, you have to specify exactly who you are talking about and when.

Michael

[Lt Belenko]

Good stuff in this thread

T....But they also had a self-defeating casualty replacement system that could turn a veteran unit back into a green one after a couple of engagements.

Are you saying, in real life, a 6 man squad or 60 man company of vets is a better fighting force than a 10 man squad or 100 man company of 60%vet/40%green. I don't get it. Care to elaborate?

How did the other armies replace troops after extended combat?

[vincere]

Good stuff in this thread

Are you saying, in real life, a 6 man squad or 60 man company of vets is a better fighting force than a 10 man squad or 100 man company of 60%vet/40%green. I don't get it. Care to elaborate?

How did the other armies replace troops after extended combat?

I'm guessing it may be to do with how replacements were dumped in units without any time divoted to cementing cohesion. So maybe the replacements were FNGs like in Vietnam.

I can't recall for sure whether the Germans did it different; but vagauely recall them refiting major formations out of the line.

edited- it's a damned ineteresting question. No smoke without fire in my opinion. There persists this idea that they had an edge. I remember looking at this a while ago and "Combat Effectiveness in WW2" emphasised German objective orientated orders rather than higher commanders telling their subordinates how to do their jobs in a dynamic environment.

As for the supermen advocates. Yes some examples of very stiff fighting by SS units; but they took great losses in the process.

On a side note- What was they German Artillary arm like. We keep hearing how US arty won was so influential. But the Soviets were also giving them lesson after lesson in Arty so why didn't the Germans try to seek parity.

[Blackcat]

"I'm guessing it may be to do with how replacements were dumped in units without any time divoted to cementing cohesion. So maybe the replacements were FNGs like in Vietnam."

Yup, you got it. Unit cohesion is a great force multiplier, you fight for your mates, break that and the unit is far less effective than it could be.

"vagauely recall them refiting major formations out of the line."

Again spot on. The Brits did a similar thing but the US philosophy was once a division is commtted it stays committed, and filled up the gaps with the unit in place in the line. Not only did this not give a chance for the new guys to learn the hard-won lessons and build relationships but it offered little or no respite to the Vets, thus wearing them out quicker (unlike Vietnam there was no fixed tour for the PBI/tankers).

"emphasised German objective orientated orders rather than higher commanders telling their subordinates how to do their jobs in a dynamic environment."

Compared to the Russians maybe, but not with the Western Allies. Indeed sometimes the delegation of "How to do it" went too far with the Brits at least (an old problem, day 1 on The Somme wold have been less of a disaster if Haig had given Rawlinson less autonomy in the planning stage).

"As for the supermen advocates. Yes some examples of very stiff fighting by SS units; but they took great losses in the process."

Yup, and they got beat, by ordinary GI's and Squaddies.