So are German forces "better" on average?

[RogCBrand]

Yes they do, but in those days, not so much on indoor plumbing. Digging latrines would have been a common activity for soldiers. For country dwellers it would be something they would be more familiar with. It is a little (very little) known fact that the German defeat before Moscow was due to their inability to find public restrooms. Barbarossa was planned on reaching Moscow before the soldiers had need of restrooms. The offensive collapsed when the soldiers had to wander off looking for acceptable public facilities.

This is also the root cause of the failure of French strategy in 1940, the French assumed the Germans would not be able to transit the Ardennes fast enough and would be denied proper rest room access. A major failing of German planning through 1940-1944 was in not preparing hidden rest rooms in the Ardennes to support the Bulge offensive.

On the other hand city dwellers were far more familiar with indoor plumbing and tended to get picked up by the engineering units as the demands after D Day for proper rest rooms exceeded allied planning.

Plumbers would continue to show their critical role in history during Watergate and later during the 2008 US presidential campaign.

LOL! So, perhaps the name "Battle of the Bulge" had more to do with the Germans having to hold it?

[umlaut]

Imagine a CM scenario where your orders, intel and force goals doesn't add up to anything near the real picture. You're to take and defend a junction against armored forces approaching only to find that the enemy armor is behind you and that a battalion of hostile engineers and FlaK have just consolidated their positions where you planned to stage your precious towed AT assets.

Well, that could in fact be a very interesting - and probably rather realistic - starting off point for a scenario, don´t you think?

[MikeyD]

Back starting around the Brit module, I suppose, the scenario guys agreed amongst themselves to impose a moritorium on purposefully deceptive scenario instructions. There was nothing strictly wrong with surprising the player but they tended to annoy the players if overused. so intel may be spotty in the orders or even non-existant, but rarely is it deliberately misleading now.

By the same token, starting in the NATO module you may have noticed a sharp drop-off of buildings with lots of windows & balconies. Nothing wrong with lots of windows & balconies per se, but but players would curse those darned balconies, and scenario designers would curse those darned window banks on every facade. With experience comes wisdom.

[Vark]

Interesting reading, it suggests that cultural differences should perhaps be modelled in a WWII game. Grossman certainly believed that the brutalisation of the German soldiers, by the Nazis, made them more likely to shoot to kill, not demonstrate, and therefore might be a factor in their superior performance in combat.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13141495

[Erik Springelkamp]

Interesting reading, it suggests that cultural differences should perhaps be modelled in a WWII game. Grossman certainly believed that the brutalisation of the German soldiers, by the Nazis, made them more likely to shoot to kill, not demonstrate, and therefore might be a factor in their superior performance in combat.

Grossman was a great writer, but he also became a senior player of the official Soviet propaganda machine.

[Vark]

Grossman was a great writer, but he also became a senior player of the official Soviet propaganda machine.

This guy, really?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave_Grossman_(author)

[Erik Springelkamp]

This guy, really?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dave_Grossman_(author)

Ah, misunderstanding.

I was thinking of this guy:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Grossman

And of course like all people of some importance in the Soviet Union his story is complex.

[Vark]

Sorry, my fault should have made myself clearer, if you have not read, "On Killing" I recommend it.

[Erik Springelkamp]

Sorry, my fault should have made myself clearer, if you have not read, "On Killing" I recommend it.

And I recommend 'Life and Fate' by Vasili.

In Russia they call it the 'War and Peace' of the 20th century, treating the battle of Stalingrad instead of Napoleon's Moscow campaign, but in fact, like 'War and Peace', treating life in its totality.

[Vark]

Hell, I've already got to read 20 odd titles, now I will have to make that 20 odd plus!

[Narsus]

National politics played a role for the allies in Normandy also, you had an American over a Brit over more Americans and Brits.

I don't think the Germans fought so savagely in Normandy because they were fanatical (at least not most of them), but had more to do with their strategic position in France and not having the forces to fight the Allies numerically superior forces on a wide front, Normandy was their bottle neck... It ending up being a two edged blade once they discovered they couldnt move without heavy losses from all the air power. Either driving the allies to the sea as hoped or retreating was pretty out of the question.

My own opinion is the German fighting force at Normandy was a better fighting force pound for pound, the last really as after this you see more often than not piecemeal units and poorly trained conscripts.

Why they were better I cannot say with too much confidence... I would add also about the advantage of terrain that the Bocage was bad tank country, and with many German tanks having superior range it cannot be said the Bocage was completely for the defender.

[JonS]

My own opinion is the German fighting force at Normandy was a better fighting force pound for pound, the last really as after this you see more often than not piecemeal units and poorly trained conscripts.

You are, of course, entitled to your opinion. However you need to square your opinion with the uncomfortable fact that everytime the Germans attempted an operational-level counter attack they totally had their asses handed to them. Every. Single. Time. Similarly, almost every time they tried a tactical counter attack they had their asses handed to them. OTOH, Almost every time the Allies tried an operational level attack they succeeded.

tl;dr: The Germans were very good defensively, but hopeless offensively. The Allies were even better defensively, and good enough offensively.

[Narsus]

Hmmm, I can see your point, we all know who won The Allies also had air superiority and more Artillery. Kinda hard to mount an effective attack if you can't contest the skies. Even up the teams (this was a hypothetical question) and I think the country's forces that has been training and fighting all over Europe for the previous 7 years would be the better fighting force.

The Allies were a great force and by the end of the war I have no doubt they could have went toe to toe with the Wehrmacht on their best day, but the Allies paid a very heavy price for having so many factors in their favor at Normandy.

[ChrisND]

The Allies also had air superiority and more Artillery. Kinda hard to mount an effective attack if you can't contest the skies. Even up the teams (this was a hypothetical question) and I think the country's forces that has been training and fighting all over Europe for the previous 7 years would be the better fighting force.

And during many parts of the Bulge?

[JonS]

The Allies also had air superiority and more Artillery. Kinda hard to mount an effective attack if you can't contest the skies.

Which just goes to show that, pound for pound, the Allies bought - and brought - better pounds

Even up the teams (this was a hypothetical question) and I think the country's forces that has been training and fighting all over Europe for the previous 7 years would be the better fighting force

No, what you mean is "well, if I remove all the Allies advantages and keep all the German's advantages, then the Germans had the better force." Which might be true, but as they say; if my aunt had balls, she'd be my uncle

[Narsus]

JonS- LMAO, fair enough.

Normal Dude, I can't say as much about the Bulge but that the Germans were so afraid of Allied air power they launched their attack in the dead of winter. Their goals were very high, makes you wonder if they respected the Allies as much as they should have, or what these goal would even have accomplished. They had to know the Russians were going to be cruel masters, you'd think they would have welcomed us with a parade not panzers.

[OBJ]

Reading Evans, aircraft production figures;

'US '42 - 48,000; '43 - 86,000; '44 - 114,000

Sov '40 -21,000; '43 - 37,000

Brit '40 - 15,000; '41 - 20,000; '42 23,000; '43 - 35,000; '44 - 47,000

Ger '40 - 10,000; '41 - 11,000; '42 - 15,000;'43 - 26,000; '44 - 40,000

Similar ratios for tanks

So the Germans were outnumbered roughly 5 to one, had their operational orders read by their enemies before they could issue them (Enigma), still managed to be on the strategic offensive into '42, then lasted for three more years on the defensive.

They must have been doing something right, don't you think?

Perhaps it was their incredibly effective use of hampstertruppen.

[Battlefront.com]

Ah... well, you need to keep relative things in mind. The Germans weren't necessarily better than the Allies, but they weren't crud either. If they were then they would have lost the war quicker.

The Germans did OK up until 1942 for two primary reasons:

1. The Western Allies were building up their forces and the Soviets hadn't rebuilt yet

2. Their short term planning and lack of pragmatism wasn't fatal yet

One should also look at how long the American Army was in the war. They STARTED fighting in 1942 with a force that was materially and organizationally equivalent to the Germans in the mid 1930s. Yet in 2 short years the US Army was strategically and operationally superior to the Germans at ANY TIME in its history *and* it was fighting two wars on opposite sides of the Earth.

I've always been impressed with the fighting qualities of the German forces. But over the last 20 years of study I've come to understand it in context. Context shows they had systemic problems which didn't matter too much when they went up against 2nd and 3rd rate militaries, but mattered a lot when the forces they fought when the odds were more even or tipped against them.

Steve

[Michael Emrys]

...you'd think they would have welcomed us with a parade not panzers.

They fought on because Hitler and the other German top leaders knew they were going to end up at the ends of ropes no matter who they surrendered to.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

So the Germans were outnumbered roughly 5 to one, had their operational orders read by their enemies before they could issue them (Enigma), still managed to be on the strategic offensive into '42, then lasted for three more years on the defensive.

They must have been doing something right, don't you think?

No one was denying that they were very determined and skillful fighters; that was not the question. They still lost the war and they lost the war because in the areas that counted they came off second best, and in this particular war second best won no prizes.

Michael

[Destraex1]

It sounds like everybody here is argueing about different things.

Are we talking about the entire german army on a:

a) Economic level

technological level

c) strategic level

d) operational level

e) tactical level

What exactly does German forces mean?

[BloodyBucket]

Strictly anecdotal thoughts from my late father, a WWII BAR gunner in the 28th ID. I interviewed him about his experiences in Normandy, the Hurtgen Forest and the Ardennes on tape, and I came at the interview partly from the background of a wargamer familiar with the Germans had better small unit tactics argument.

IIRC he thought German had an advantage with their light machine gun, especially on the defense on the small unit level that was only partially made up for by the Garand. He had a soft spot for the BAR but didn't think it measured up to the MG34/42, and the only reason they didn't use captured ones was they were "mortar magnets" and drew fire almost instantly from any nearby US soldiers and supporting arms.

He also believed that the German methods for absorbing replacements and selecting officers produced better results than the US system. He held the US replacement system in particular disdain, saying "it wasn't designed by combat guys, and treated people as parts". He credited his own survival to random luck and being mentored by a WWI veteran NCO, who "actually tried to teach us something".

He thought all the small unit German advantages were more than offset by air and artillery support, when available.

He also thought that the quality of the units they'd face varied a lot, and the Germans were tougher on the defense than when attacking, in that when they defended against German attacks they often "mowed them down". He also thought that the Germans probably thought the same about Americans, and that in fact much of Infantry tactics boiled down to being willing to trade lives for real estate.

He seemed pretty cynical about the whole thing.

[JSj]

It sounds like everybody here is argueing about different things.

Are we talking about the entire german army on a:

a) Economic level

technological level

c) strategic level

d) operational level

e) tactical level

What exactly does German forces mean?

The German superiority was on the tactical level. Without this advantage, there is no way they could have kept the allies confined in the Normandy area for two and a half months, despite being massively outnumbered, outgunned and with very limited resources.

[Battlefront.com]

So the best possible defensive terrain played no role in holding up the Americans? Hmmm... then I guess it was coincidence that within a few weeks of breaking out of the Hedgerows the German armies in France were destroyed and France nearly completely liberated?

Steve

[JSj]

In open terrain, the German tanks and AT guns, especially the Panther, Tiger and the 88:s, had a great advantage because of longer range and (for the tanks) better armour. So the terrain were probably more advantageous to the allies than the Germans.

And yes, the breakout had nothing to do with the terrain. By this time the Germans, who could provide only very few reinforcements to their troops in Normandy, had become so few that they simply could not hold on any more.