So are German forces "better" on average?

[Battlefront.com]

True, but during all that time they were steadily expanding the lodgment area and grinding the Germans down.

Which is exactly how we got the myth of Allied victory through superior numbers only. I mean, if the Germans were tactically superior, and yet lost massive numbers of men and material in the process of defending the best terrain one could hope for... well, must be the Allies just used more explosives. It couldn't possibly be anything more nuanced than that, could it?

Any unbiased look at the combat in Normandy shows that the terrain was more important than anything. When the Germans tried local counter attacks they were often bloodied pretty badly in the process. When they tried major operations they came off even worse.

Normandy was a meat grinder for both sides. Difference is, the Allies could afford the losses and the Germans couldn't. Plus, the Allies were trying to liberate and the Germans defend. In the end relative losses, time tables, etc. mean NOTHING if the ultimate objectives were not secured. It's like saying the Germans were superior because of their victories on the Eastern Front in 1941. Well, if the war ended there perhaps, but I seem to recall that the Germans lost the war. Correct me if I'm wrong

Steve

[JonS]

Apparently the Germans also won every battle between Stalingrad and Berlin, where they only sportingly surrendered due to a lack of ammunition.

Or sumfink

[Wiggum]

I know, for a attack you normaly (WWII) need a 3:1 advantage in numbers.

So you would expect the attacker to loose 3 times more man (simplified).

But although the terrain in Normandy was ideal to defend, the attacker can always inflict heavy casualities to the defender if he can put up enough firepower (Air/artillery).

Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Huertgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich by Douglas E. Nash could be interesting if you are interested in late war german small unit actions against the americans.

[Cogust]

Comparing relative investments of GDP doesn't mean a thing when you're nation's existence is at stake. The facts are the facts... German wartime production peaked in 1944 after a massive expansion in 1943. And they were short of material even then. So the notion that the German economy was fully focused on war prior to 1943 is demonstrably false. I mean, if you're running as fast as you can, how can you possibly run 50% faster? Either you're running at top speed or you're not.

But if you are already running your engine at a higher rpm than everybody else, aren't they then pushing the pedal even less even though they might have a larger engine? The germans mobilized even more after the reverses in front of Moscow, but they were even by then more mobilized than any other beliggerent except the Soviet Union (they caught up and passed the Soviets in 1944, but then they were fighting the entire world and had already lost the war in the east in 1942-3).

The german arms industry increased their output for the entire war and much can be attributed that it hadn't produced ANYTHING before 1933, so it was virtually starting from zero, and it takes time to build factories. It has less to do with making war on the cheap and more to do with starting from a very low point (there were quite a few crises in the german economy in the 20's and 30's).

What happened in 1943-4 'the armaments miracle' was partly that the german industry mobilized even more than before (they were expanding all the time), but also that it became more efficient, allocated more steel to the army and less to the navy and airforce and made good (and with good I mean evil) use of foreign labour.

You should read Tooze, it's a very good read that will give you new insights almost every page.

[JonS]

Tooze, it's a very good read that will give you new insights almost every page.

+1

(padding)

[Dr.Jones]

Seriously, I don't understand what the big hang up is with the Allies getting stuck up in the Hedgerow country. Yeah, the Allies had a tough time. Only a completely incompetent defender would have allowed the Allies to move quicker than they did, an the Germans weren't incompetent at the tactical level. However, they couldn't afford the cost for defending the terrain so tenaciously and higher up nobody recognized that Normandy was basically a holding action. They should have been setting up a new defensive line as soon as they realized they couldn't push the Allies into the ocean. But they didn't and therefore within one month the Germans lost France to the Allies, leaving behind a pile of bodies and equipment they could ill afford to lose.

Problem is that the Allies thought especially in the US, that they would roll over the Germans quickly , but they didn't, the political pressure was enormous on the allied generals to get a break out.

I must imagine what was probably total humiliation for army general to call Arnold and Harris for help them fight ground war .

br.

Dr.Jones

[Vanir Ausf B]

Getting back to the OP...

I've decided to take this issue, which has been alluded to many times, right up front.

Basically, in mid 1944 France, would you expect the Germans to win more company-battalion scale (i.e. CM scale) fights in which the odds are roughly even?

Put in CMBN terms, if you replayed Bois de Baugin or a simpler test scenario that alternately placed equivalent (I didn't say equal) US and German forces in each others' positions, would you achieve broadly similar results on average?

BFC has said repeatedly they don't model national characteristics (e.g. the "coolness under fire" or "quicker to break / quicker to rally" stuff of ASL notoriety).

But let me make a provocative prediction: I think CMBN German regular forces will prove to hold a slight but noticeable edge in June-Sept 1944, ceteris paribus, and that is consistent with the historical reality of the time. I believe the exact reasons why will be situation-specific, but consistent. I look forward to testing this hypothesis in the game.

Assuming we are talking numerically even forces rather than even purchase points, I think you are right. As you pointed out, CM doesn't specifically model national characteristics, focusing rather on the physical characteristics of the forces involved. This will tend to favor the Germans on a one-to-one basis because their weapons generally out-perform their US counterparts.

MG42: Better than the BAR.

Panzerfaust: Better than the Bazooka.

Panther: Better than any US tank other than the Pershing. Relatively common by German standards.

Stug III: Better than any US tank destroyer primarily due to superior anti-infantry capability. Very common as well.

The M1 Garand is better than the K98 and US arty should be somewhat more flexible and responsive, but that would usually not be enough to completely even the odds, IMO.

[Michael Emrys]

However, they couldn't afford the cost for defending the terrain so tenaciously and higher up nobody recognized that Normandy was basically a holding action. They should have been setting up a new defensive line as soon as they realized they couldn't push the Allies into the ocean.

Well then, let's try to take a look at that if we can. Where do you propose that the Germans should have set up that second defense line and when should they have begun to retire to it? I haven't walked the ground, which puts me at a real handicap, but from looking at the map it appears to me that Normandy has the best defensive terrain for a good long ways until you get to the Rhine. The next big defendable line after Normandy would be along the Seine to the east and the Loire to the south with Paris the anchor and hinge in the middle. If that's the line you choose, when do you begin to retire to it?

There are several pros and cons involved with that line. For one con, it is about ten times as long as the line they held in Normandy, thus requiring at least ten times as many men etc. to hold it. Those extra divisions are going to have to come from somewhere and that means pulled out of the south of France to man the Loire and from eastern France to man the Seine (but don't forget, up until at least the middle of July Abwehr and OKW are still convinced that the main Allied blow is going to land at the Pas de Calais). Another thing is that withdrawing from Normandy is not going to be a free ride either. Those same Jabos that made it hard to reinforce Normandy are now going to make it hard to get out. Plus, the bulk of the German army is marching on foot and drawn by horse and they are going to have tanks and motorized infantry breathing down their necks the whole way. The Germans were master of the delaying action, so they might get most of their forces away, but like I said, it won't be a free ride.

On the pro side, the Allied supply lines will be getting longer and more attenuated while the Germans will be falling back on theirs. But since this is exactly the kind of advance that the Allies had planned for, that might not have put them down very much at all. Another pro for the Germans is that while they might be thin on the ground defending the Seine-Loire line, the Allies face the same problem. If all this is happening in the last half of June instead of the first half of August, the Allied buildup has not proceeded nearly as far. Cherbourg has just been captured and will be unusable for at least another month. And the Allies are still reeling from The Storm and its aftereffects. Another pro would be if the Americans do as historically they did and split off one corps to try for Brest and the other west coast ports—and there really is no reason to suppose that they wouldn't—that further reduces their available strength on the ground. So it's reasonable to assume that the Allies would not bring full pressure against this new line right away.

But returning to the cons, the Germans would be surrendering a huge swatch of French territory to Allied occupation. This gives them (the Allies) a great deal of room to deploy and maneuver their forces, compared to the rather constricted historical lodgment. Most importantly, they now have ample room to create landing grounds to accept yet more aircraft close to the front where they will be even more of a problem to the Germans. It also means a larger French population for the Free French forces to conduct recruitment. This is especially important in the south of France. If the Germans evacuate the south of France two months early, the Free French begin recruiting two months earlier, and in the part of the country where the largest number of military aged men had fled.

Another problem with the Seine-Loire line is that once it is breached anywhere along its length, it can be rolled up, so once breached it is broken. And if it is breached in multiple places simultaneously, there is a grave danger of German forces being surrounded and destroyed. It might not go that way, but the danger certainly exists. And if the Allies concentrate their attacks along the Seine, which they are most likely to do anyway, any German forces west of Paris, along the Loire, are likely to be cut off, especially if by this time they have the US Sixth Army Group pressing up on them from the south. If that's the case, they would probably already be retiring to the east to avoid being bagged. In fact, it raises the question of whether the Loire would even be seriously held with major forces at all. And that in turn leaves the southern end of the Seine line hopefully anchored on some defensible ground around Nevers. This gives a much shorter line then the Seine-Loire line, but again gives up a lot of French territory without forcing the Allies to fight for it.

So the Germans have preserved some of their force, but the battle has moved closer to the borders of the Reich just when the weather is improving for the attacker. In this particular scenario it isn't clear to me that the situation for the Germans is better. It isn't necessarily much worse, but it isn't obviously better, at least to my eyes.

But that is just one scenario. I chose it to examine because it seemed to me the most obvious and likely. But there are doubtlessly others possible, Steve, so if you have one in mind, I'd love to hear about it. This is fun!

Michael

[Elmar Bijlsma]

Yeah, I agree with Emrys on this one.

Holding on to Normandy was bad but for the Germans in '44 all the options were rather horrid. This probably was the best of a bad bunch.

At least holding on to as much of France as they did delayed French military resurgence, worsened the Allied supply situation and seriously hindered the development of forward airbases.

[Magpie_Oz]

"MG42: Better than the BAR." - Certainly

"Panzerfaust: Better than the Bazooka." - Not really do you mean Panzerschreck ?

"Panther: Better than any US tank other than the Pershing. Relatively common by German standards." - I am not sure sure about that but that does not really have anything to do with soldier v soldier or squad v squad

"Stug III: Better than any US tank destroyer primarily due to superior anti-infantry capability. Very common as well." The Stug was an Assault Gun and not really designed to be a tank killer as such, sure it ended up being in that role just as the American tank destroyers were not meant to fight infantry and thus did not have enough MG's. Where a TD will outclass a Stug every time is that the TD has a turret. But again not really relevant in squad v squad

"The M1 Garand is better than the K98" - The rate of aimed fire from the M1 is no greater than the K98, 1 round in 3 seconds. Sure un-aimed rapid fire was a bit more but un-aimed fire is not all that useful. The big difference was that there were more M1's on average, i.e. the squads were bigger.

"and US arty should be somewhat more flexible and responsive," by far the biggest killer on the battlefield is the arty. American arty doctrine, the speed with which it could react, the amount of ammo they had and their accuracy was the US Army's greatest strength.

[Michael Emrys]

"Panzerfaust: Better than the Bazooka." - Not really do you mean Panzerschreck ?

The Panzerschreck was significantly better than the bazooka as far as penetration goes, but the Panzerfaust outdid them both. Granted, it had the shortest range of the three, but it could penetrate any armored vehicle on the field from almost any aspect.

Michael

[Vergeltungswaffe]

The rate of aimed fire from the M1 is no greater than the K98, 1 round in 3 seconds.

So, you think a typical German rifleman can jack that bolt and fire an aimed shot just as quickly as an American rifleman who just has to pull the trigger can? I think not...

Sure un-aimed rapid fire was a bit more but un-aimed fire is not all that useful.

Unaimed suppressive fire was a common activity for riflemen, and quite useful for allowing other friendly forces to move.

[Magpie_Oz]

The Panzerschreck was significantly better than the bazooka as far as penetration goes, but the Panzerfaust outdid them both. Granted, it had the shortest range of the three, but it could penetrate any armored vehicle on the field from almost any aspect.

Michael

Sure the penetration was greater but did that make it "better" I don't think so it was rather inaccurate compared to the other 2 and the shorter range made it great in towns but suicide in the fields.

[The_Capt]

Odd discussion really. I will weigh in on one of the fundamental building blocks of the whole debate...the infantry.

Like most things dealing with combat, the answer to questions like these is "depends". Even if you remove all of the soft factors from the equation (experience, leadership, morale training etc) and stick to hard factors the equation is still pretty big.

Terrain, weather and range play a very big part. In reality, rarely does the entire squad spot an enemy squad. Normally a few members spot and everyone simply follows the fire. Like tanks, squads need to spot and bring fire to bear onto a target. They need to do it faster then their opponent.

As they bring fire to bear they begin to supress the other squad, either thru inflicting cas or thru soft effects (shock, fear, mis-communication). Once supressed a squad normally cannot "self-unsupress". Rarely a single individual or leader can rally or do something extreme to turn the tide and get a squad level fire fight going the other way. But despite what the movies tell us these types of actions are rare.

Squads that get pinned, tend to stay pinned until one of two things happen; 1) They are subjected to more firepower and break/die or 2) They get relief and are subjected to lessening firepower at which time they can get it back together...again how fast is dependent on a lot of soft factors.

So in a standard German - US Infantry squad matchup.

Again the answer is "depends". If the Germans get first eyes and first shots off, they can deliver a steady (and deadly) volume of fire via the MG42. This can lead to very quick suppression of a US squad...under the right conditions.

Now the standard German infantry is also smaller (average 9 men) so it has less eyes to put out there so again terrain is very important.

The German squad also has invested the bulk of its firepower into a single weapon system, the MG 42. If that system is itself supressed the German squad is in serious trouble as the bolt action rifles they carry are woefully poorer at projecting bulk firepower.

The American squad on the other hand is larger (12 is the std number) so more eyes on the field and better chance to spot-first fire-first, again assuming terrain is working for them.

The squad has also been designed to spread its firepower out. The BAR is no MG 42. It is a solid weapon but does not put out as much as the MG 42 in terms of simple firepower.

The M1 can produce much higher firepower than the K98. I have heard the "aimed shots argument" before but trust me aimed shots are not what this is about. Remember the bulk of the squad in contact is going to fire as many shots as possible in the general area that the "rest of the guys are shooting at".

Don't believe me? Ask yourself why we don't carry bolt actions into the field today? As the rifle became the less dominant weapon on the battlefield it became more and more about supressing and fixing an opponent so something else could kill them...namely arty/mortars and in some case Direct Fire support. Small Arms became less and less about deadly high-stopping power aimed shots and more and more about "as many shots as possible" in a given area.

Add to this simple human nature. If you came under effective contact, trust me, you are not going to be waiting 3 seconds to take that second shot.

Based on all of this the US squad is also harder to supress as it does not rely on a single heavier weapon system to do the work.

I would say the German squad design is best employed on the defence in medium-long range engagements where they own the terrain and have time to pre-sight.

The US squad does very well on the offence at medium-close ranges where it can quickly supress an opponent.

On stricly hard factors on a bald ass plain at 300m I would still give the edge to the US squad but it is probably a thin edge. This edge is based on simple numbers and firepower being spread out. The German squad is still deadly but investing all of its firepower in one basket is very risky and at the end of the day it is smaller.

[sburke]

Problem is that the Allies thought especially in the US, that they would roll over the Germans quickly , but they didn't, the political pressure was enormous on the allied generals to get a break out.

I must imagine what was probably total humiliation for army general to call Arnold and Harris for help them fight ground war .

br.

Dr.Jones

I don't think anyone had a view they would rollover Axis forces easily. Considering the Mediterranean campaign, even Montgomery had to have learned something. Okay well maybe not Montgomery... Churchill for one was strenuously against Normandy and would have preferred a second front to be opened elsewhere with less risk. However once the meat grinder in Normandy started escalating casualty figures yes there was a lot of political pressure. Great Britain was scraping the bottom of the manpower pool and the US was already dealing with heavy losses in the Pacific War.

At the same time though the Landings themselves went far better than predicted and the meat grinder worked both ways. Once the German defense in Normandy collapsed, the US army showed what it could do with some maneuver room. When you think about it, Germany conquered France in 6 weeks in 1940 and all hailed the blitzkrieg war. The Allies in 1944 were able to make an amphibious landing in France against an entrenched enemy with years to prepare, fight through heavy defensive terrain and drive Germany from France in about 12 weeks (excluding some portion of the border). An extremely impressive performance no matter how you look at it. By September the Allied line was a lot further forward than predicted hence creating an unexpected logistical problem. I think here you see the beginnings of a bit of over confidence more than what preceded Normandy when the idea that the war would be over by Christmas began to proliferate.

As to political humiliation, not so sure there is anything to that. Am reading After D Day right now by Carafano. Very interesting, has some great descriptions of the breakout battles as well as a thorough review of the US army strengths and weaknesses. One may agree or disagree with what the author presents, but an interesting book nevertheless and one way to kill time till CMBN is out..... He goes into quite a bit of detail of the Cobra planning and comments Leigh Mallory being a former infantryman was all in favor of using the airforce in any way at all that could assist the ground troops. Other air commanders weren't so kind. The only comments regarding the feeling of the ground commanders comes up in their distrust of the use of bombers once they experienced the short drops. Even that though probably dissipated once they realized how well it disrupted the German ability to counter attack during the first critical days of Cobra.

[Dr.Jones]

sburke,

sure it was tactical air support which the army counted for air support not from "strategic" arm of air force. And as i read of the Cobra offensive the strategic bombers also wiped a few US units from the map.

br.

Dr.Jones

[sburke]

Odd discussion really. I will weigh in on one of the fundamental building blocks of the whole debate...the infantry.

Very interesting perspective. Am curious as a play tester with the new model for spotting and 1:1 infantry, how have you found the game to play out in straight infantry vs infantry fighting in the bocage with limited visibility and fields of fire? Have you found it better depicts actual combat and scouting abilities and therefore your ability to react to the enemy significantly differently? I know that in and of itself is probably a "duh of course" question but am interested if you have any game play experiences to relate that would expand on that. Heck maybe another AAR, yes we are a greedy lot. Reading about the Normandy campaign only seems to make the wait worse.

[sburke]

sburke,

sure it was tactical air support which the army counted for air support not from "strategic" arm of air force. And as i read of the Cobra offensive the strategic bombers also wiped a few US units from the map.

br.

Dr.Jones

true and after the experience of the short drops most ground commanders would not be too thrilled with a repeat, however to break the semi stalemate in Normandy I doubt any commander was so vain as to not prefer to bomb the hell out of the Axis defenders with whatever they had available than risk the lives of their men. On a side note there is also interesting material on how the unit commanders at regiment and below responded to the short drops. For those convinced that the US commanders lacked initiative, flexibility or authority compared to German commanders, it does present a differing opinion of US leadership after 2 months of "unlearning" what they had been taught in training.

The only dissension though that I know of on this issue actually came from the strategic air arm as they felt it was am improper use of their forces. Bradley seems to have actually (at least according to Carafano) disliked the strategic bombing campaign. "Killer Harris (Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris) was called the greatest friend Russia had, destroyed the fabric of Europe's middle class". He and the other theater commanders seemed to feel the Air force was a perfectly fine asset as "super heavy artillery".

[The_Capt]

Very interesting perspective. Am curious as a play tester with the new model for spotting and 1:1 infantry, how have you found the game to play out in straight infantry vs infantry fighting in the bocage with limited visibility and fields of fire? Have you found it better depicts actual combat and scouting abilities and therefore your ability to react to the enemy significantly differently? I know that in and of itself is probably a "duh of course" question but am interested if you have any game play experiences to relate that would expand on that. Heck maybe another AAR, yes we are a greedy lot. Reading about the Normandy campaign only seems to make the wait worse.

Well am not sure about another AAR..those things are a lot of work and I wasn't the one doing all the screenshots!!

I will caveat my response of course. My personal opinion and only up to most recent builds as things continue to evolve. Also I get nervous on NDA issues so I will stay as safe as possible.

My opinion, infantry play is probably the single largest improvement to CMBN from CMx1. Not all the testers agree with me on this but here is my reasoning:

- In CMx1 the infantry were very abstract. Three Charlie Browns representing anywhere from 9 to 15 guys. This compresses the overall "presence" of the infantry squad on the battlefield. Infantry are like ants, they get into everything and are damn near impossible to stamp out once the get under the floor boards. In CMx1 I did not get that.

- In CMx1, I personally felt infantry (perhaps due to abstraction) were added on to what was essentially a tank game. They had good play, don't get me wrong, but the game always felt (to me) like "let's do the tank duel and then we can sort out the infantry stuff"

- In CMBN there is much less abstraction. 1:1 is just that, 1:1. Now the ants and be ants. Spread em out, split them up and bring them back together. Harder to spot, harder to kill, especially in bocage country.

- In CMBN the infantry are in the center with the tanks and in some terrain take center stage over the tanks (as they should). Infantry are more lethal and more flexible than before. I think this is a good thing.

This does not mean CMBN has become an infantry-centric slugfest, if anything it has balanced the game out better allowing for wider options and outcomes. Particularly when you take into account the setting, namely traditional symmetric warfare.

[Nidan1]

So to get away from an historical analysis of the Normandy Campaign, and return to the original premise of this post, I would ask;

How would a computer model heroism, fear, human nature, etc, at the squad level without becoming so complicated as to make a game unplayable. These factors are also important in quantifying the effeciency of infantry units when modeling combat at low levels, i.e squad and company.

Lots of company sized battles in Normandy were probably won or lost more by individual initiative, courage and desperation, than by weapons, tactics or experience.

My humble opinion anyway.

[Michael Emrys]

Lots of company sized battles in Normandy were probably won or lost more by individual initiative, courage and desperation, than by weapons, tactics or experience.

I believe I will take issue with that. The things you mention are surely important, but without sound tactics inculcated and practiced until they become second nature in the stress of combat, all the rest can come to little avail. Indeed, desperation can as easily lead one to do something foolish and self-destructive. And experience is a nice thing to have, since it is what can clue you in that it's time to throw the rule book away and try something different.

Michael

[Dr.Jones]

Nidan1,

yep as Michael pointed out its not enough just look at the Japanes soldiers in Pacific, they had courage, they were desperate and had some initiative but a dumb headlong attack on machine gun defensive positions was not winning any battles

br.

Dr.Jones

[Nidan1]

What you both are saying is valid, but you are missing my point. The discussion here is which small unit will have the edge in most CB:N battles. The German or the American.

All I'm saying is that modeling those abstract quialities that I mentioned would be very hard for the CM engine, so we have to rely on the general categories of Veteran, Regular, Green etc, that we had in CMBO, and continue to have in CMSF. Then we factor in their weapons and terrain disposition and it gives us a rough rating of combat quality.

[Michael Emrys]

How would a computer model heroism, fear, human nature, etc, at the squad level without becoming so complicated as to make a game unplayable. These factors are also important in quantifying the effeciency of infantry units when modeling combat at low levels, i.e squad and company.

If I read you correctly, what you are asking is what specifically do you tell a computer to do so that it will correctly model such factors that are normally described as intangible and unquantifiable. That is indeed a toughie and I won't claim to know the answer.

But some things that spring to mind would include soldiers being slower or faster to spot and taking more or less time to identify correctly what they do see. Similarly, they might be slower or faster to bring enemy units under fire and the volume and duration of that fire might vary as well as its accuracy. Their likelihood to cower or break can vary as well as their readiness to rally.

I expect that BFC has already included some or all of these ideas in some fashion already, as well as some I do not mention.

Michael

[Melchior]

Nidan1,

yep as Michael pointed out its not enough just look at the Japanes soldiers in Pacific, they had courage, they were desperate and had some initiative but a dumb headlong attack on machine gun defensive positions was not winning any battles

br.

Dr.Jones

Bear in mind Japanese tactics were based on operations planned against the Chinese, who were even farther behind the Japanese on a tactical level.

The Japanese knew they were behind the West in equipment, but they had hoped to make up for it by using the Navy to secure distant regions of the Pacific, and then fortifying the hell out of those positions so they could somewhat mitigate the tech and manpower disparities. Guadalcanal was an ill thought out offensive campaign with an even more ill thought exit plan.

Up until that time though a combination of surprise and luck in previous ops had led the Japanese Army into believing it wasn't as far behind as it thought, and that sheer mass of force and the magic spirits of uber samurai or something would lead them to victory.