Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

[JonS]

Are 200 LAV-IIIs as good as 130 Bradleys?

[JasonC]

Tail coverers cover tails, they do not think. Not part of the MOS, above his pay grade, etc.

It never ceases to amaze how they always think their being responsible for a bad call magically makes it unbad.

"But I really helped decide this". Ok, don't go bragging about it if it was dumb as rocks, and if it isn't, that was all you needed to establish in the first place.

There is a reason ipse dixit is a notorious fallacy. It doesn't settle anything, it just begs the question.

[ August 06, 2007, 09:52 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[jomni]

Originally posted by StrykerPSG:

The SBCTwas never intended as an initial entry force for medium-high intensity conflicts.

So that's why I sucked in the 1st mission of the campaign.

[StrykerPSG]

Jason and Jon,

I want to say you both bring quite the fight to the table of counter points opposed to the Stryker. Hell, would make great lawyers indeed. I truly hesitated to enter into the thread because I know how hot a topic this vehicle has been since inception. But I would do a dis-service to my fallen Warriors to not stand up for the vehicle and the SBCT as a whole. It was never my intention to enter into a huge debate, just defend the honor of those fallen who believed in the vehicle and the BDE's capabilities. I can say, without pause, never have I had the privelege of serving with so many brave young Warriors as I have had since serving at Lewis.

The vehicle has it's faults, but so did the M1, M2, M113, M151 and even the HMMMV. I was also an advocate for at least one vehicle per platoon with a 25mm as a support by fire vehicle. But, for now, the .50 cal is mch better suited for the built up area then a 25mm ever could be, that is if we are looking to minimize collateral damage.

I also think both of you relentlessly refuse to see any vision but your own as well, which also makes you unapproachable, so, I throw in my olive branch and just wanted to bring at least a user opinion to the plate versus the uninformed believe everything we read types that browse through here. Ultimately, I feel flattered that BF has greatly represented the SBCT's, and even if a bit buggy, still very playable to me.

[Blackhorse]

1SG,

Thanks for your post and thanks for your service.

Jon and Jason,

Here's a serving STRYKER soldier with whom you can talk about actual operational and tactical experiences and you guys attack him. You guys seem to be getting offended by certain remarks he made.

Dang it guys, not everyone can post perfect, inoffensive messages every time. Jon, get over it already. He didn't know.

1SG,

JonS was/is NZ Army. He was involved in East Timor and has extensive experience in a successful counter-insurgency. I believe he's chuffed that you assumed less and that you went on the offensive against him by asking what he had done lately. Credit where credit is due, Jon has actually done a lot lately.

Anyhow, it's late. Take care all.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by StrykerPSG:

It was never my intention to enter into a huge debate, just defend the honor of those fallen who believed in the vehicle and the BDE's capabilities.

Invoking the memory of dead soldiers is usually called "emotional blackmail" when done in an inappropriate context. No one was besmirching anyone's personal honour, so please leave silliness like this out of what was an interesting conversation. The dead don't need you to defend them; particularly since no one is attacking them personally to begin with. This is simply a weak attempt at gaining high moral ground without investing any intellectual capital.

[StrykerPSG]

Well, Jon, as to be expected from an arrogant American 1SG, I did assume that you probably didn't know much about counter-insurgency and Uncle Sam doesn't pay me enough to always be nice. So, what I'm saying is I do apologize. I would be honored to enter into a professional debate anytime. Just next time I will not enter into one so deeply heated.

For what it's worth, we are (SBCT) one of the most sought after units in theater, and yes, even by the HBCT's. So, history will tell all and in the end, the vehicle will be found to have indeed been a noble mount, even if conceived in deception and politics.

Thanks Black Horse and also, thank you for your service as well. You present quite the arguement as well.

[StrykerPSG]

Wow! All the armchair generals come out in full force to attack me when I try to let the subject lie. Ultimately, I defend their honor each day and did not pull out the blackmail card, but it is tied to how strongly I feel not only for the vehicle but the BDE it is designed around. The right forum, perhaps to some no, to me, yes.

PS, I agree, it was becoming rather good, but no one was willing to concede their viewpoints.

[JasonC]

We are not uninformed. We are highly informed. You are not any more informed than anyone here. You just have less appreciation for the analysis of others, while pretending otherwise.

It is not like any of this is hard to be honest about. A rational person defending Strykers would argue in quite another manner.

"We thought rapidly deployability would be critical because we expected wars to be short and brutal, we didn't see a 4 year long counter insurgency mission coming". Why would that be hard to admit?

"We thought heavy wouldn't work in cities. It does, we misjudged that. But dismounts are useful for security missions and we are doing a lot of those". Why would that be hard?

"We thought C-130 transportability would matter more than 14.5mm or RPG defense; when it didn't work out that way we uparmored and deployability suffered. But at least we got a handle on the threat from militia level irregulars and that means we are ready for the security mission".

"We thought they would be a lot cheaper to maintain than they are. New weapons teeth, maybe we can get it down in the future".

"The better commo and sitch awareness stuff is working as advertized. Let's extend it to other components of the force instead of pretending it is a reason to prefer Strykers forever".

Or take the comment about 50 cals rather than 25s, made into a virtue as supposedly so much more discriminate. Um, it took the people running this sim less than a week to discover that the way Stryker infantry can fight in cities is to blow the living heck out of enemy occupied locations with Javelins at ranges up to a kilometer. Whereas being really, really discriminate about it is a good way to lose.

The ROEs don't come down from Mount Olympus, they reflect the present doctrinal difficulty. They are part of the maneuver Sun Tsu ethos that best of all is to win without fighting. This is a pleasant thought but it does not work in practice. "But it is vital for maintaining popularity and political support". Is it? How is that working out for you? Are you sure that really, really long indecisive wars are more popular?

Or take realistic appraisals of the role of medium vs. heavy. We had a discussion here weeks ago about the kind of role the BCT would actually have in something like the Syria contingency (though frankly I consider that a euphemism for we-all-know-who). BCT boosters were still trying to peddle the Lind-esque maneuver-ee independent slashing attack mantra. But it is transparent nonsense, no sensible theater commander would choose that use for them. Those are heavy missions, under strong air.

BCTs would get secondary ones - sweep this wide area that is expected to be relatively undefended, or follow and police up after this corps, or secure the bypassed bits using dismount strength in cities and patrol range, etc. Instead of just admitting that the thing is the analog of a German motorized division circa 1939-41, or a Russian second line, it has to be presented as some comic book hero in a maneuver fantasy.

And if you look at half of those missions and the more important and aggressive half, you will find an old heavy pattern ACR is a better design for doing them. Less so for the security and mop up missions, sure. "We are good at mopping up and policing aftermaths" isn't a catchy slogan, I guess. Yet an honest history of their development would admit that Bosnia style policing was very much on people's minds when they were selected.

Why do we never get this fallible, honest assessment of shifting goals and adapting doctrine and missed old benchmarks, compensated by this or that improvisation or stronger suit?

Because the transformation process itself created an institutional culture of pretended infallibility and ideological "modernism", which lives off of unfounded slander of past methods. Which as already mentioned isn't any way to run a railroad. And which is deeply implicated in our present doctrinal mismatch, between what everybody said we were going to rebuild the force to do, and what we actually do.

What we actually do is a heck of a lot closer to the old school than the new admits, and had to be dragged there kicking and screaming, and the failure to admit this is *deeply* resented.

[Wisbech_lad]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by StrykerPSG:

What did you do for the history books of your country today or even yesterday?

I helped free a county from a foreign invasion and give it a good shot at a properous and democratic future. But I haven't written a manual so you win, I guess.

</font>

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Splinty]

We are not uninformed. We are highly informed. You are not any more informed than anyone here. You just have less appreciation for the analysis of others, while pretending otherwise.

I would like how you "armchair experts" get off telling people who are or have recently been in a war zone how uninformed or wrong they are. It seems to me StrykerPSG or Blackhorse have 10 times the operational and personal experience you have and have laid their lives on the line for it to boot. JonS this isn't directed at you BTW. JasonC in particular, how much ahve you risked for your admitly large fund of "theoretical" knowledge?

[Guest Guest]

deleted per user request

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Splinty:

We are not uninformed. We are highly informed. You are not any more informed than anyone here. You just have less appreciation for the analysis of others, while pretending otherwise.

I would like how you "armchair experts" get off telling people who are or have recently been in a war zone how uninformed or wrong they are. It seems to me StrykerPSG or Blackhorse have 10 times the operational and personal experience you have and have laid their lives on the line for it to boot. JonS this isn't directed at you BTW. JasonC in particular, how much ahve you risked for your admitly large fund of "theoretical" knowledge?

That's a non-sensical argument. John Keegan, David Bercuson and a host of other respected military historians and analysts never served in war, many never in the military at all, and yet they are considered experts in their field. You don't have to stand picquet in the shadow of Little Round Top to write about Gettysburg, understand what was important about the day, figure out who lost, and why.

[SgtMuhammed]

Guys,

Can we stuff our penises back in our pants, we're all men. This was a nice if a little sharp debate about a valid issue. Let's not let it slip into a simple name calling comparison of equipment sizes.

James

[Lindan]

Reminds me a bit about the discussions regarding the Sherman vs. the Pershing in WW2. The guys actually doing the fighting vs. Panthers and other late-war nasties were not quite as fond of the Sherman as the general staff in the USA...

But now back to the topic at hand (to which I can add nothing, unfortunately).

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Lindan:

Reminds me a bit about the discussions regarding the Sherman vs. the Pershing in WW2. The guys actually doing the fighting vs. Panthers and other late-war nasties were not quite as fond of the Sherman as the general staff in the USA...

But now back to the topic at hand (to which I can add nothing, unfortunately).

Users in the field hated the Sten Gun; described it as dangerous and useless and nicknamed it "the plumber's nightmare." The official Canadian Army position was that problems with jamming and accidental discharge were primarily to user error; the reports are online. It can work either way. I've talked to one vet - a DCM holder - who loved the Sten. Like the original poster here, there are always dissenting opinions.

[SgtMuhammed]

Hey, lots of guys think the M9 is a POS. Personally I love it.

[James Bailey]

Originally posted by StrykerPSG:

I was also an advocate for at least one vehicle per platoon with a 25mm as a support by fire vehicle. But, for now, the .50 cal is mch better suited for the built up area then a 25mm ever could be, that is if we are looking to minimize collateral damage.

Thanks for the comments StrykerPSG. Good stuff. What turned me in favor of the Stryker was conversions with senior NCOs that have fought in the damn thing and *unanimously* they all agreed it is helping us win fights and keep guys alive and as such a huge step forward.

Why was the 25mm SBF idea not pursued? That turret has wide range of fire options - 5.56mm pin, 7.62mm coax, and the 25mm ass-kicker. I get the 50cal as a good compromise but I don't understand why a compromise was necessary. I did talk to many Canadians in Afghanistan, and they loved that turret and thought us mad for dropping it. EAs are huge and Co-Lat damage restrictions less in Afghanistan compared to Iraq, so some caveats must be mentioned here.

Finally, thanks for your service.

[Blackhorse]

I will try.

I’m not even sure where to start, so I’ll just begin in the beginning. Forgive me, but I must ramble. I also want to provide some context.

I Love the 80s

Back in the mid 80s, when the Bangles were on top of the charts and MTV still had the Headbangers Ball, life in the Army was great. Lieutenants could go out and train whenever and wherever they wanted. Ronald Reagan was President, the Soviets were our enemy and everything was a-ok. We had $$, we had spare parts, we had awesome, awesome training such as the NTC, We had Abrams, we had Bradleys, we had Apaches, and the old M113s and M60A3s, and Cobra gunships were in the process of being phased out; the technological leap from those old platforms to the new ones was incredible. The new stuff rocked, the old stuff was...well…in young Lieutenants eyes, paleolithic. We had, it seemed, everything, including a new doctrine called Air-Land Battle. It was the product of several years work on the part of General Don Starry, who was heavily influenced by General William Dupuy. It was great. For Armor guys it was like being on top of the food chain. We were the “Combat Arm of Decision”!

(I provide this link for anyone’s further reading on the matter: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/may-jun/romjue.html )

Then in 1989, we watched as the Germans fulfilled President Reagan’s 1987 urging to Gorbachev to “tear down this wall” and the long expected Soviet enemy and the dreaded possibility of Airland battle on the soil of Europe began disappearing before our very eyes. Within a year, the old nemesis was gone, and the Cold War was over. For seasoned Lieutenants, times were indeed becoming interesting.

Nirvana- the 90s

Meanwhile, the United States was doing its part to no longer be a part of the Cold War. Congress enacted a Drawdown plan for the Army to take the Army from 18 Divisions, down to 14 by sometime around 1993.

Saddam decided to invade Kuwait in the summer and we had the Gulf War. Young Captains gained valuable experience and were presented with tactical problems that while similar to the old Cold War style of warfare were also wildly different. The Nation dealt with Iraq, and afterward, the drawdown continued. VII Corps, the Corps HQ for Desert Storm, disappeared, as did 3AD, 2AD, 5ID, and 7 ID, and the 197th Bde, the 195th Bde and 2ACR.

Then in 1993 The SECDEF conducted a review and implemented the plan to take the Army from the remaining 14 Divisions, down even further to 10. This was no easy task, as we had soldiers for 14 Divisions.

The Army came up with Voluntary Separation Initiatives (VSI) and Soldier Separation Bonuses (SSB). The former was voluntary; the latter the equivalent of a pink slip. During this time, as the Army drew down to 10 Division, the officer corps went from:

106,877 officers to roughly 80,000. Captains saw several good mates go and the slightest blemish on a record was means for separation. It was truly hack and slash, despite General Sullivans reassurances of “No more Task Force Smiths”. Many a fine officer cashiered out to work in the civilian sectors and those that survived in the Army counted their blessings that “there but the grace go I.” Times were strange indeed and it definitly smelled like teen spirit.

At the end of the drawdown, the Army had gone from 780,000 soldiers to roughly 480,000 soldiers. Along the way it had eliminated 8 of its 18 Divisions. The Army stood at 10 Divisions, 1 ACR, and one 1 LCR or in Bde terms, 30 Brigades. Captains who had served in the 11th ACR were crushed. Their favorite unit was nothing more than part of Army history now. Times sort of sucked.

Meanwhile, the optempo of the Army was increasing. There was a new sheriff in town and he and his deputies liked to use the military just as much as the previous guys. The problem was, there was less of the military to use. Significantly less. The challenge then became for senior leaders (both military and civilian) to meet the challenges while at the same time making use of all Army forces. The Army couldn’t tap the 10th Mountain Division everytime it needed a Light Infantry unit for a mission (82nd and 101st were off-limits due to being in the Rapid Reaction mode, and the 25th was on stand-by for Korea). Thus, the Army needed to change how it fought. The Cold War influenced Air-land Battle Doctrine no longer applied to the post Cold War era.

And so senior leaders went to work trying to determine how best to use and structure our Army for what they thought future conflict would look like.

I don’t for a second believe anyone of them showed up at work with the intention of screwing the pooch or to make bad judgement calls. Decisions that were made during this time were made with the belief that those were the right decisions.

In the late 90s General Shinseki shared his vision of how to handle the new Contemporary Operating Environment and the vision of the STRYKER was born. Additionally, the concept of transformation was designed to provide the Army flexibility. The Brigades, did in fact become somewhat ACRis in structure. Each is now self sustainable. The result is that the 10 Division Army of 30 Brigades has gone to a 10 Division Army of 44 Brigades.

Y2K

The millennium bug passed with nary a freeze up and Junior Majors were busy training and preparing for whatever was in store. Nobody expected 9/11 and Bn S3s watched in horror as TV images depicted a nightmare.

Then things got, as President Merkin Muffley says to Premier Kissov “Kind of Crazy, you know crazy crazy”.

I’ve repeatedly mentioned the book Cobra II as s a book to read. You are correct Adam, it doesn’t depict certain aspects of the military in a good light. That is precisely why I recommend people read it. If people want insights into the decision making (or more precisely lack of it), for the War with Iraq, then look no further than Cobra II.

Meanwhile, the discussion concerning the STRYKER is innocently started by 11b and here we are.

In direct response to JasonC then (Hell yes it’s taken a long time to get to this point, but like I said, I wanted to provide context.) And, by the way, if anyone is insulted or feels talked down to or that I’ve condescended or ubered , please don’t be; that was not my intent at all and any such outcome is inadvertent.

"We thought rapidly deployability would be critical because we expected wars to be short and brutal, we didn't see a 4 year long counter insurgency mission coming". Why would that be hard to admit?

I think its obvious from the way the civilian leadership and the military decision makers have handled this war that none of them saw the insurgency coming. They are trying to deal with it now, but it’s not easy. General Petraeus is a very sharp and brilliant guy.

"We thought heavy wouldn't work in cities. It does, we misjudged that. But dismounts are useful for security missions and we are doing a lot of those". Why would that be hard?

I personally never thought that, so I cannot admit to it. I’ve always thought heavy would work in cities.

"We thought C-130 transportability would matter more than 14.5mm or RPG defense; when it didn't work out that way we uparmored and deployability suffered. But at least we got a handle on the threat from militia level irregulars and that means we are ready for the security mission".

I never thought that so won’t admit to it. I’ve always thought it screwey that we’ve tied a vehicle of the future to an airframe developed in the 50s.

"We thought they would be a lot cheaper to maintain than they are. New weapons teeth, maybe we can get it down in the future".

Nothing to disagree with there.

"The better commo and sitch awareness stuff is working as advertized. Let's extend it to other components of the force instead of pretending it is a reason to prefer Strykers forever".

That is happening. It’s not easy to take new technology and simply kludge it on a vehicle. There are ergonomic issues, power issues, all sorts of issues that need to be worked on. There are people working on it.

Or take the comment about 50 cals rather than 25s, made into a virtue as supposedly so much more discriminate. Um, it took the people running this sim less than a week to discover that the way Stryker infantry can fight in cities is to blow the living heck out of enemy occupied locations with Javelins at ranges up to a kilometer. Whereas being really, really discriminate about it is a good way to lose.

Ok. I’ve nothing to say to that.

The ROEs don't come down from Mount Olympus, they reflect the present doctrinal difficulty. They are part of the maneuver Sun Tsu ethos that best of all is to win without fighting. This is a pleasant thought but it does not work in practice. "But it is vital for maintaining popularity and political support". Is it? How is that working out for you? Are you sure that really, really long indecisive wars are more popular?

OK. Again, not much to say to that.

Or take realistic appraisals of the role of medium vs. heavy. We had a discussion here weeks ago about the kind of role the BCT would actually have in something like the Syria contingency (though frankly I consider that a euphemism for we-all-know-who). BCT boosters were still trying to peddle the Lind-esque maneuver-ee independent slashing attack mantra. But it is transparent nonsense, no sensible theater commander would choose that use for them. Those are heavy missions, under strong air.

Who is to say what the future holds. None of us can predict the future, otherwise we would have predicted the insurgency. I mostly agree, but I’ll never say never.

BCTs would get secondary ones - sweep this wide area that is expected to be relatively undefended, or follow and police up after this corps, or secure the bypassed bits using dismount strength in cities and patrol range, etc. Instead of just admitting that the thing is the analog of a German motorized division circa 1939-41, or a Russian second line, it has to be presented as some comic book hero in a maneuver fantasy.

Ok. Nothing more to say.

And if you look at half of those missions and the more important and aggressive half, you will find an old heavy pattern ACR is a better design for doing them. Less so for the security and mop up missions, sure. "We are good at mopping up and policing aftermaths" isn't a catchy slogan, I guess. Yet an honest history of their development would admit that Bosnia style policing was very much on people's minds when they were selected.

The BCTs today are in fact very much like the ACRs of days gone by (only 1 of which remains today…the 3ACR). Bosnia probably had a huge role in helping to drive and influence the SBCT. We have 44 active Bdes, 6 of which are SBCTs. We have 20 active HBCTs. We have 8 Active Infantry BCTs, We have 10 Active Airborne BCTs. All of them are modular and self sufficient like the ACR.

In the Reserve Component (includes Guard) we have 1 SBCT, 10 HBCTs, and 23 IBCTs.

That is our Army. All modular and all very very similar to the ACR, minus the proprietary ACR equipment.

Why do we never get this fallible, honest assessment of shifting goals and adapting doctrine and missed old benchmarks, compensated by this or that improvisation or stronger suit?

Because the transformation process itself created an institutional culture of pretended infallibility and ideological "modernism", which lives off of unfounded slander of past methods. Which as already mentioned isn't any way to run a railroad. And which is deeply implicated in our present doctrinal mismatch, between what everybody said we were going to rebuild the force to do, and what we actually do.

This is why I wanted to provide context.

What we actually do is a heck of a lot closer to the old school than the new admits, and had to be dragged there kicking and screaming, and the failure to admit this is *deeply* resented.

I agree. Old School never went away, and shouldn’t go away any time soon.

So there you have it.

Allons and Good Luck.

[ August 07, 2007, 10:10 AM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

[Becket]

Originally posted by jomni:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by StrykerPSG:

The SBCTwas never intended as an initial entry force for medium-high intensity conflicts.

So that's why I sucked in the 1st mission of the campaign. </font>

[MikeyD]

"Why was the 25mm SBF idea not pursued?"

If memory serves, Stryker had to jump through a LOT of hoops to get approved. A major stumbling block was the vehicle's weight. Before being accepted the prototype had to go on a MAJOR weight loss program. For example I believe those big bins on the hullside are lightweight plastic! Stryker would never make its weight goals with a turret and 25mm gun.

Of course all this concern about weight was BEFORE the thickened MEXAS tiles and additional upper armor and slat cage. Stryker's passed its upper weight limit a looooong time ago!

Oh, and another thought. At least originally (don't know these days) Stryker ammo stowage was all external in an effort to increase survivability. A 25mm gun implies internal ammo stowage. Just a thought.

[average]

It seems to me the more you hate the styker becauses its not heavy, the less experience you've had of operating heavy formations.

JasonC, have you really though about how hard it is to maintain a tracked AFV doing convoy runs ? What about the damage they do to the roads?

I think BFC have an interesting idea in terms of the employment of SCBT.

The idea that superior mobility wins battles is not some wierd fantasy, it goes to concentration of force and freedom of action, both of which you wants lots of in order to achieve tatical victories.

During OIF (and I'm not expert and I wasn't there), it seems the Marine Corps, 82nd and 101st all manage to conduct manoeuvre warfare to disrupt, dislocate and ultimately overcome Iraqi defences (although they must have been blessed to get away with so few casualaties).

As far as I am aware, the Marines had M1's, Lavs, AAV7's, lots of Humveees and some trucks. Nothing you wouldn't find or attach into a SCBT in a convetional environment, except the Syrkers are better than AAV7s, Humvees and any sort of truck.

The 101st and 82nd didn't even have the Lavs and AAV7s, or the M1s for the most part. Just Humvees,trucks, helos. All of which are not as well protected or armed as the Styrker.

From my armchair, the arguements for wheelies are really quite compelling from a logistical through to an operational level. It is no good having armour if you can't take it with you, spend all your time fixing it, don't have any roads left after operating it and carry such a limited number of dismounts you end up parking AFV's in intersections to try and control your AO.

My final thoughts are that given heavy formations are hard to deploy, cost a lot, and don't contribute much to operations other than warfare (and high and medium spectrum stuff at that), the slander of the wheeled platforms is because the tankies realise that accountants can't tell the difference between Styrkers and Bradleys, except the Bradleys cost more and carry less grunts, and given the Styrker has the MGS, then isn't that sort of similiar to an M1A2 SEP. Maybe if you really paint it black, the Syrkers might not be seen as able to replace the heavy kit. What would really keep me awake if I was an up and coming US Army LT-COL would be my cold war Bradleys and M1's being shagged after Iraq.

We all know different roles, but if you have to make some cutbacks to pay for ill considered adventures, and the last war you fought was an insurgency, then budget cuts and force restructures can't be far behind.

[ August 07, 2007, 07:42 AM: Message edited by: average ]

[Guardsman11b]

Originally posted by StrykerPSG:

Well 11B, I suppose you could use your newly found Montgomery GI Bill and make better statements for all.

Well, I am perfectly capable of making better statements, but yet you fail to still realize one key word in my last message. Opinion. It is my opinion that the Stryker is crap. Why? cause I have more experience in other fields, and don't need some armored school bus to take me to battle. Again, my opinion. It is my O P I N I O N, that the Stryker is huge, and enemy forces will see it coming. I don't know about you, but I just do not wish to be seen ahead of time, by the enemy.

That is my opinion. You can keep your Stryker if you love it so much. I honestly do not care. My unit is upgrading to Air Assault anyway soon, and we will not need your Strykers, like we do not need them now. We have better things to do than sit on our asses during hostile action.

You may not like my opinions, and you do not have to, but its my Freedom of Speech, and all the facts and petty insults you may throw at me, will mean **** to me.

By the way, the GI Bill is already going to good use, especially when I am studying Criminal Justice and Law.

But hey, thanks for your Opinions and Comments, StrykerPSG, and stay safe bud.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

Originally posted by MikeyD:

We're emphasizing "Stryker Stryker Stryker" but there's a whole class of vehicles, including Marine LAVs, Canadian LAV-IIIs, Iraqi stretched M1117s, and a new Polish(?) infantry carrier AC in Iraqi hands that looks pretty spiffy. The only substantial difference I can see between Stryker and these other vehicles is its heavy (both figuratively and literally) emphasis on protection. Okay, there's the fancy electronics too but that should be transferrable from platform to platform.

that Polish APC / IFV is Finnish Patria AMV, though i thought Poles used it only in Afghanistan and Lebanon.

yeah, fancy electronics are transferrable from platform to platform, e.g. AMV's FCS is more advanced than that of Stryker. what comes to armor, the markings in the pic below are from RPG and 14.5mm hits. as a bonus, it's running a 30mm gun.