Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

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[SgtMuhammed]

They are designed to operate in two separate combat environments. The Brad is designed to be able to slug it out toe to tow (pun intended) with BMPs and other light armor, with a secondary anti-armor role while transporting a small infantry squad.

The Stryker is more like the M113 in that it is primarily transport and light support for a full infantry squad. The infantry are supposed to be the primary fighters with the Stryker supporting where it can but any encounter with AT capable enemy armor is going to put the Stryker at a sever dissadvantage as it is not always possible to dismount the squad so that they are in position to deal with the armored threat. (Which is why I am a big advocate of putting Javelin mounts on the ICV Strykers.)

So if you need a bunch of grunts in a specific location that has a fairly low enemy armor threat then the Stryker's speed and range gives it the advantage. If, however, there is the threat of even light enemy armor then it is best to bring one of the big boys.

And before anyone starts, yes I know about the TOW and MGS Strykers but there will be times when every vehicle will have to fend for itself. This is not an if, this is a when. Right now the ICV Stryker cannot do this unless it gets lucky.

[Blackhorse]

Originally posted by AdamL:

What are the advantages tactically of the Stryker over the Bradley?

Advantages and disadvantages may change due to conditions.

In certain conditions, the STRYKER may have greater tactical mobility. Or it may have better RPG protection due to its slat armor. Or it may have better speed giving STRYKER units the ability to reposition faster. Or it may be quieter than the BFV. Or, the STRYKER may be able to continue depite losing a tire, whereas the BFV might not be able to continue due to losing a track. Or it may be the availability of supporting MGS fires or mortars at the STRYKER company level

[Bigduke6]

Read anything by Anna Politkovskaya. You should be able to goggle up something in translation. She's dead now (murdered) but while she was alive she chronicled what was happening in Chechnya systematically, and thoroughly.

You want the official Russian version, google up Russia Today.

The Russians have done nothing clever. To them, victory is more important than anything.

Democracy, domestic opinion, international opinion, human rights, basic human decency, you name it. Victory is more important.

Further, they define victory in very simple terms: the population is cowed, and Chechens loyal to Moscow are in charge.

This is not to say the insurgents are all gone, of course they're underground and probably doing just fine running organized crime activities (more often than not, I bet, with the Chechens that are in charge.) But the territory is under undisputed Russian control, and armed resistance to Russian rule is effectively crushed.

Originally posted by AdamL:

"There is no equivalent to the Green Zone or Helmand province, in Chechnya. The Russians are in control.

(It is worth pointing out that the Russians managed this success against an Islamic nation with one of the strongest warrior traditions in the world, in terrain hostile to armored vehicles, precision munitions, and substantial air support.) "

Since you know a fair bit about this, do you have specific recommendations for reading about how they accomplished that?

[Bigduke6]

Alone it won't. I'll quote doctrine (FM 3-21.31 The SBCT) again here.

The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) is designed to be a full spectrum, early entry combat force. It has utility in all operational environments against all projected future threats. It possesses significant utility for divisions and corps engaged in a major-theater war; however, the SBCT is optimized to meet the challenges of smaller-scale

contingencies.

Fair enough, although I would take serious issue with the word "optimized," if that is to be taken to mean "best, or even useful, solution for the small-scale contingency.

[Bigduke6]

This might have something to do with it:

Population

Chechnya - 1.1 Million

Iraq - 26.7 Million

Area

Chechnya - 15,300 km²

Iraq - 438,317 km²

Durn tootin'. I would say the lesson there is, pick your wars carefully.

[molotov_billy]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />This might have something to do with it:

Population

Chechnya - 1.1 Million

Iraq - 26.7 Million

Area

Chechnya - 15,300 km²

Iraq - 438,317 km²

Durn tootin'. I would say the lesson there is, pick your wars carefully. </font>

[Panzer76]

I have to agree, the Russians have for years, only showed their incompetence in Checnya. Only thing they are better at, is to use utter force, with no regards civiliance etc, which the US atleast *trys* to in Iraq.

End of the day, the sheer might of the russian forces, combined with their ruthless use of force and strategy, managed to subdue the rebels.

In no shape or form could this be seen as a "text book" reference on how to combat insurgents.

[Battlefront.com]

A very interesting discussion here. I will say, up front, that I've known Blackhorse for 7 years and have had the pleasure of meeting him twice while he was on active duty. I'm also privy to what he does for a living now. I personally think if Blackhorse was made Tzar of Iraq, with complete control of all political and military elements, I think everybody (except for corrupt corporations and individuals) would be better off. That's based on what I know about his character and insights into what is going on. I say this only to establish that anybody who would dismiss his views in favor of their own, without similar training and experience, probably doesn't know what he is talking about and is simply trying to scare off someone who does.

I say this NOT because BH needs me to defend him (he clearly does not), rather to confirm he is who he says he is and not some pretender with an Internet connection.

Moving along...

The Stryker concept is a positive step forward in the Army's post Cold War evolution. It is why we decided to devote CM:SF to its concept even before the very first Stryker Battalion was certified. Obviously we have been following developments since then quite carefully. Is it the best thing that could ever have been developed for the Army? No, but nothing ever is. However, as BH pointed out... the Army usually does far worse. Future Combat Systems (FCS) was mentioned here briefly and it is the sort of development approach that the Army doesn't need. A couple of successive real world implementations, like Stryker, would produce a far better result and at lower cost than a long running, bloated R&D program.

Steve

[James Bailey]

Question-

Did anyone take the time to read all of JasonC's 35 points? Reminds me of Martin Luther.

Being an old light fighter myself, I orginially thought the Stryker was an overpriced piece of sh*t. However after several years of talking to the guys that know - primarily NCOs on the front lines - I have taken a 180 degrees turn on the thing. The school-bus painted drab can take hits and keep its cargo "Charle Miking" it. Survivability is the key point here - forget all those other shortcomings.

Chris - glad to hear of your retirement! Are you Ready Reserve? Thinking about the Guard?

[Blackhorse]

James,

Long time! Glad to see you around.

Technically, I can be recalled anytime up to 65. I retired out of the Regular Army, so both the Ready Reserve and the Guard are out.

I was pretty much the same as you (except I was that 11th ACR Blackhorse and a heavy armor all the way, the answer is Abrams and Bradleys type as opposed to the light fighter type).

Then I too started talking to those that command STRYKER units and the soldiers and NCOs that fight the STRYKERS. I then went and saw them in action and talked more with soldiers and, Bob's your uncle, I too did a 180.

[ August 05, 2007, 01:55 PM: Message edited by: Blackhorse ]

[Battlefront.com]

An interesting note is that many of the soldiers whose units were converted into Stryker Brigades had Mech Infantry backgrounds. They were predisposed to hating the Strykers and said so. But after they used them for a while they did 180s like James and Blackhorse. I wouldn't be surprised if some of the former Bradley bound NCOs in Stryker units are now their biggest supporters. This isn't from some sort of flawed logic, rather from actual use of both platforms and surrounding formations. The people that say "I would rather be in a BFV than a Stryker" probably haven't been in both, or either.

Steve

[JasonC]

Adam - the Stryker is quieter, that is its only truly significant edge. The modernized commo stuff is obviously highly useful too, of course, but can be extended to other platforms easily. The same is true of things like slats vs. RPGs, which the Brad needs far less because it is much more heavily armored to begin with.

To be fair the Stryker also has better road speed, but there are very few situations in which that is significant, since the Brad is fair at it and time isn't scarce. It also can carry a couple of extra infantrymen per vehicle, making the ratio of dismounts to mounts somewhat higher.

These just aren't significant incremental abilities compared to its cost, and the alternatives that could have been readily fielded for far less, retaining greater deployability, etc. That includes both Marine like LAV forces, stripped Brads, M113 upgrades, etc. The gun version has also failed, pretty much (misses all deployability benchmarks e.g.), as have the expected operating cost savings.

I love the press release saying Strykers are great because it isn't Mogadishu when you have armor. Next they will explain that Strykers are great because it isn't Task Force Smith when you can KO a T-34 with a Javelin. And then that Strykers are great because it isn't Kasserine when you can defeat a Panzer III with fully networked sensors and guided missiles. And then that they are great because it isn't the Argonne when...

Low expectations. Ahmadinejad is not impressed.

[Bigduke6]

I have to agree, the Russians have for years, only showed their incompetence in Checnya. Only thing they are better at, is to use utter force, with no regards civiliance etc, which the US atleast *trys* to in Iraq.

End of the day, the sheer might of the russian forces, combined with their ruthless use of force and strategy, managed to subdue the rebels.

In no shape or form could this be seen as a "text book" reference on how to combat insurgents.

I could not disagree more. The Russians have, by most standards, won the war. If that is not an arguement for following a particular military strategy, then there is no such thing.

The army that got kicked out of Grozny is a very different army from the one that's in Chechnya right now. The first time, they went in with tanks and bmps. The second time, they went in with full combined arms, and afterwards they started building jails and police stations.

There a difference of ten or so years of combat experience (by US standards, the Russians are a bit more rigorous about what they define as a real shootin' war) between the 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars.

The Russians last I heard fielded about 100 - 140,000 Russian soldiers in Chechnya, and a substantial portion of them are not army but MVD - Interior Ministry troops. In other words cops.

There are very, very strong arguements that the way to defeat an insurgency, among other things, is to treat it like a police problem, not a military problem.

The Russians' use of arrests, interrogation, informers, and payoffs has produced success, and it has done so using far from cutting edge weapons.

Russian combat deaths are given at about 3,500 over the last eight years, and the Russian society will tolerate casualties.

Nor has the Russian application of force - except during the initial invasion - been full scale. There are no mass shootings, entire villages are not rounded up, houses are not leveled, fields are not torched, and there is little effort to stop corruption in the Russian military, and none in the Chechen society. Sure young Chechen men go to jail and never come back sometimes - but to characterize the Russian approach as mindless massive violence is wrong.

Rather, the whole Russian strategy has been to get the corrupt Chechen leadership on its side, and use secret police techniques honed over three centuries to track down Chechens who might think about resisting.

Since this strategy appears to have been successful, I disagree with Panzer. From my POV, the Russians have dealt with this insurgency very competently indeed.

To call them incompetent is to miss the whole point. They tried conventional arms, and couldn't make headway against irate warrior Muslims. Then they tried conventional arms followed by the KGB handbook chapter and verse, and that seems to have worked.

I bring this up because I think it speaks directly to the hole in the logic behind the Stryker, which is designed for a limited conflict where the heavy stuff for some reason wouldn't go. The Chechen conflict shows, that spiffy weapons systems do not win wars that include insurgency. Then you need something like the KGB on your side.

I challenge the arguement that the Stryker is a useful system, because as far as I can tell, in any limited conflict the Stryker is likely to be involved in, the money spent on one of those things would be better spent on bribes, intelligence, and falsifying how nasty one was being while one went about crushing the insurgency.

True, there may be a general war lite out there that will somehow accept Strykers, not be right for Bradleys, and at the same time never have an inurgency; and so for that particular and narrowly-defined war, of course, Strykers would be just boffo.

But right now, the Stryker isn't a square peg in round hole, it's a square peg when the game is chess.

By that same token, if your definition of military competency corresponds directly to how a given military - for instance the US - goes about its business, then certainly the Russians have been incompetent in Chechnya.

If however one defines military competence as the ability to make decisions leading to military victory - then give credit where credit is due. Ruthlessness gets results against insurgencies.

Strykers and superior target acquisition and situation awareness and battlefield multipliers and all those other spiffy terms sure sound spiffy, but sometimes, spiffy does not get results.

[Lee]

"Ahmadinejad is not impressed."

He better worry about the 2,000lb. bomb we (or Israel) are going to drop on his head, not getting attacked by Strykers.

[Battlefront.com]

JasonC,

the Stryker is quieter, that is its only truly significant edge.

Only if you don't look at any of its other advantages It has lower fuel consumption, lower maintaince requirements, has better self recovery capabilities, can survive several flat tires and still remain mobile, has a much smoother ride (i.e. less passenger fatigue), can carry more gear, can carry more soldiers, does not require crazy cross-loading proceedures, offers better eyeball situational awareness (i.e. not gizmo based) for both crew and passengers, and probably other things if I bothered to think about them or drag up one of the many discussions I've been a part of in the past.

Steve

[JasonC]

I don't doubt the men in Strykers like them - it is a more modern vehicle and I sure hope people managed to get some things right making them. The commo and situational awareness stuff ought to be far better than anything found on 20 year old equipment. But that is mostly a reason to upgrade old equipment with new sensors and comms etc.

Nor am I unappreciative of men hanging their butts out over there.

I am however, incensed at a whole set of men who have made their sweat so relatively unavailing, and have done so largely because they have been close minded ideologues about doctrine, covering their collective tails and pretending infallibility, while making one lousy call after another.

I don't even grudge the cost, which is frankly a pittance compared to the ongoing cost of war, or the incremental cost of a few avoidable causalties. It matters only because of the institutional culture issues it raises (because the facts were fudged to support prior conclusions e.g.).

The old heavy army has spent the last 20 years being called useless old dinosaur no-nothings by a lot of ideologues marching in lockstep to a Lind-esque maneuverist lighter-faster-more deployable drum. They saw most of the mistakes being made and said so, and were slapped down by an institutional culture of tail-covering denial and apologetic.

And now they are saying "we told you so". Because they did. They told you heavy armor was useful in combat, and then the military sent half the force over in light trucks. They told you tanks aren't useless in urban areas, and they aren't. They told Apsin that you need armor in Somalia, and the only stuff within 500 miles was a few Pakistanis with M113s who are kinda slow to waltz into thick firefights.

They told the guys going to Afghanistan that you need reach and heavy weapons, and watched in Anaconda as our guys had nothing between a 5.56mm SAW and an F-16 strike, and got cut up by mere MG bunkers.

They said "go large" in Iraq and the maneuverists said no, we can go small and baffle em with static on the command net, and they got a Mao rout but not a Mao annihilation. (Full credit for at least getting that much - which guess what, the lone heavy division did practically alone, with the air force).

They said robust all around combat power is always useful, that no plan survives contact, that war is friction, etc, and they were told it was all outdated and the old rules no longer apply because now we are faster lighter and more maneuver-ee. And it is nonsense, because here we still are 4 years in, and it isn't fast, and it isn't decided by momentary dislocation, and all the Lind-esque preachings the old school explain were horsehockey were and are horsehockey and have gotten us to the present lovely pass - and the same crew is still sitting there pretending the same infallibility.

Except a few of them now also go read up on guerilla something or other...

It ain't any way to run a railroad. We knew all this stuff, but we threw our collective brains out with the bathwater in the name of a largely imaginary modernization. Perhaps unfairly, the Stryker is a poster child for that process, because it was conceived developed and executed in that period and by much that same ideological procees.

Now we have the things, of course we will use them and learn what we can from them. But I would dearly appreciate it if any of those involved in the previous 2 decades of utter debacle would drop the infallibility act for 20 seconds, and admit that some of those who told you so, did.

[Battlefront.com]

BigDuke6,

I challenge the arguement that the Stryker is a useful system, because as far as I can tell, in any limited conflict the Stryker is likely to be involved in, the money spent on one of those things would be better spent on bribes, intelligence, and falsifying how nasty one was being while one went about crushing the insurgency.

That's a nonsense argument. You could also argue "the best way to win an insurgency is to not be the occupying force". True, but rather beside the point.

There is one, and only one, Stryker Brigade in Iraq at a given time (excepting deployment overlaps). Stryker Brigades are designed to give the overall commander a tool that none of the other formations provide. The other formations also are tools and they each provide things the others do not. It's combined arms, afterall.

And as others have said... when a nation can completely devote its military energy on one, small population in one small geographical region, which abuts the home turf, with a force that is unhindered by senses of morality or long term effects, an insurgency can be put down pretty thoroughly if the political will is there. The Russians have all these advantages in Chechnya, they did not have them in Afghanistan. The US does not have them in Vietnam or in Iraq. The political element is, however, the one that is most critical. And that is why I largely agree with BigDuke6's post, even though I find any linkage between it and Strykers not even tenious at best. These are two different discussions about two different things entirely.

Steve

[JasonC]

BF - sorry, half of that is sales brochure nonsense not borne out in the field. Maintenance costs are running 5 times projected, they don't self recover, sitch awareness by sensors is better than without and readily cloned, etc. And oh, they cost as much as M-1 tanks and in practice get to theater by Ro-Ro; they were supposed to cost a tenth what they do cost and to fly there.

[Battlefront.com]

JasonC,

I am however, incensed at a whole set of men who have made their sweat so relatively unavailing, and have done so largely because they have been close minded ideologues about doctrine, covering their collective tails and pretending infallibility, while making one lousy call after another.

So the E5s and E6s that for years were in Bradley units that now use Strykers, and find them to be on the whole superior, are what? Brainwashed? Bribed into silence? Stupid? Or simply unaware of your superior logic?

Steve

[JasonC]

BF - they aren't deciding US doctrine, or strategy, or how to fight the war in Iraq - but the incompetent ideologues who do, gave us the Stryker on the motto that light faster more deployable and maneuver-ee everything, would solve everything. And it doesn't, those ideologues were and are incompetent, and they pretend to be infallible, and I hope the disease is not catching and spreading into your software operation.

[Guardsman11b]

Originally posted by Angryson:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Guardsman11b:

I absolutely hate Strykers. Its probably because I am a light infantryman (Mountain) and not into the "Armored" aspect of modern warfare.

I know the basis of the American Forces is the Stryker, but I have put together a list of units, and vehicles for another release that I hope are included.

The up armored Humvee, with a 50. Cal and 49mm Mk. 19

Bradley Fighting Vehicle, added to all Mech US Army units

Regular Infantry units, with either a mix of M4s to M16s.

National Guard units, with M-60 support, and or 240G.

Airborne units (Ar Assault)

and If the engine can support it, other Helicopters, such as Blackhawks, Chinooks, and the Kiowa (actaully showing if you zoom out).

I don't like Strykers... heh

What do you guys think about those units?

Do you even own this game?

Almost all the stuff you asked for is already in-game.

If you want lightfighters just delete the Strykers from the MTOE in the editor. </font>

[JasonC]

If anyone still does not get the wider context, trace the history of the 2nd ACR.

It rocked in the first gulf war as a heavy force. Immediately afterward, it was stripped of its heavy armor to become a humvee based light force, meant to be rapidly deployable anywhere in the world within 48 hours. The idea was that modern sensors and missiles would make the armor that mattered so much as late as the first gulf war, a cold war curiousity and throwback, and the new mantra of faster lighter more maneuver-ee, would allow a gung ho enough unit in light trucks to act as an ACR.

This was profoundly bad idea, and is directly related to the success our enemies in Iraq had, lighting up our underarmored men with RPGs and IEDs.

After a stint in Iraq, the 2nd ACR rotated home, and is transitioning to a Stryker brigade. This is now touted as a great uparmoring that adds wonderful survivability to the force.

Um, who exactly had the brilliant idea of first getting them out of their M-1s and Brads and into hummers, again? Anybody going to admit that wasn't exactly the brightest call? Because about half the world said so at the time, and were told to shut up, when they weren't cashiered outright.

We spent 15 years and tens of billions developing our fighting doctrine and equipment to get ready for the next round, and after all of it, we are about half way back to having armor again - but nobody but nobody can be allowed to admit that any mistakes were made or any time lost.

The effort and money spent in the meantime could have had the entire Bradley fleet fitted out with high tech sensors and fully networked sitch awareness stuff. Or if you really wanted C-130 deployability (though it was a mistake to make it critical - we fight for years not hours) you could have used LAVs for mediums and Brads for heavies, all up-commo'ed etc.

Instead we worshipped deployability and lightness and pretended armor was a throwback and an irrelevancy, and then half reversed that for a few brigades because it was clearly nonsense. Without admitting any of the doctrine involved was even slightly questionable. The heavy army was meanwhile gutted like a sea-bass and its leaders put out to pasture.

[Blackhorse]

JasonC,

Wow.

You are Brilliant. You are a genius.

If you are so inclined to send me your resume, I will get it in front of the Chief of Staff of the US Army this week.

He needs your help.

Every officer and soldier, from lowly private first class to Lieutenant General, from the past twenty plus years screwed the pooch and you had the answers all along, if only they had asked.

And you know better now even as we continue to blunder our way blindly and aimlessly through Iraq.

That's some amazing ****.

So should we be upset with you for holding back and only posting these pearls on obscure game company forums, or should we expect to see you step up to the plate and contribute in some more tangible way to the success of our Nation during this war.

Sitting on the sidelines spewing crap and bigoted ideas only goes so far. How about walking the walk. Write a book, write an article for one of our many professional journals, or get a job where you can make a difference. Do something, anything to help.

Your talents are most definitely being wasted up there in MA.

[SgtMuhammed]

While I don't share Jason's loathing of the thing I do believe that the Stryker is being overrated because of the current situation. I have nothing against the Army aquiring all the armor it can in any form. As a former light squad leader I always felt that it was silly to expect to be able to make a multi kilometer approach march and be able to contribute anything to the modern battlefield.

Of course 11B's are going to love the thing, it has a lot more armor and is a better ride than the LPC and has all kinds of toys to play with. Infantry are the most effective when someone gets them to where they need to fight not when they have to fight to get to the battle in the first place. I would love the Stryker as well were I still in because it helps get rid of the danger of the approach march. Walking through a hostile area on the way to a fight leaves you drained before you ever get near the action. In the current situation the Stryker allows the infantry to get where they need to be in a hurry and in relative comfort.

To me though one of the big things is that the squad actually gets to get out and do something. Too often commanders rely on the firepower of the Brad, especially as they were chronically short of grunts to push out the back. Nothing is worse than sitting in the back of a metal box full of explosives that is drawing attention to itself by rocking off rounds with the 25mm. With the Stryker commanders have no choice but to deploy their infantry to accomplish the mission and any grunt feels better when he can grab a piece of dirt or fire back if things drop in the grease.

That being said, I still can't embrace the concept with a full heart. I have grave doubts about their ability to stand up to even modest armored opposition and their use as they are in this game I just don't see. They just don't have the punch to be line breakers, not when over half the vehicles lack any real means to defend themselves against hardened opponents. They definitely have a role but I just can't see them as the center piece.

To be honest I can't see a situation where they are superior to out current rapid deployment assets. The 82nd can be anywhere in the world in 48 hours and once the U.S. gets boots on the ground the entire situation will immediately change as every nation knows what will be brought to bear should the initial forces run into serious trouble. For instance the initial deployment during the 1st Gulf War would not have been any more effective had it been a Stryker brigade, not in the face of multiple Iraqi armored divisions. It was the threat of what would follow and the signal that the U.S. was willing to spill blood on the issue that stopped possible Iraqi action into Saudi Arabia. This would be the case in any deployment of U.S. ground forces.

I think they would have been better off trying to sell the Stryker as an upgrade to the light infantry than as a new novel concept for the Army.

Sorry for the rambling but it just kind of spilled out. Hope it made at least a little sense.