Strykers...and Why I thank god I am not Stryker Infantry

[Guardsman11b]

SO yeah, before we detour to far off the original topic, the main thing i am looking for is the ability to have American mobile units without the Stryker.

Light units, such as the National Guard, where only the Hummers are used, Someone mentioned here before that National Guard are not an invasion force, but yet, during the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, there were many National Guard and Reserve units activated, and were apart of the long ass convoy that rolled up MSR Tampa. Come on, how cool would it be too see a convoy of Hummers, all having ma deuces mounted on top, rolling down an MSR, working their targets?

It would also be nice, to see in another version the addition of the Iraqi Army. Although worthless as **** (my opinion) still be a good ally (cannon fodder).

in any way, I just would like to see a bit more flexibility with selecting units, and inter changing the parts.

Thanks.

Please, pardon my language.

[ August 05, 2007, 07:17 PM: Message edited by: Guardsman11b ]

[Jenka]

Sirs,

I am at best a dilatant in military tactics (for some reason the armed forces didn’t want to take a asthmatic in the 80s ). I’m trying to see if I have drawn the correct lessons from this thread.

JasonC seems to be arguing that the Stryker is the poster childe for what he sees as a failed Strategic doctrine. That the proper conduct of a war would have been fought to the destruction of not just the ability of the enemy to fight but their will as well, because he finds the strategic thinking to be flawed he does not see any use to the vehicle either operationally or tactically.

Blackhorse and others are arguing that the SBCT provides a good rapid reaction force that a commander can use operationally and tactically to move between widely separated battles and to bring a large number of dismounted infantry to the fight where a HBCT would have problems because the road march is too long for the tracked vehicles to reliably transverse. They point out that the vehicle is popular with the actual users because of its user friendly capabilities and it’s ability to take the occasional hit.

I think that’s where the disconnect is. Jason C is arguing Strategy while Blackhorse and others (who have actual experience with the operational and tactical use of strikers) are arguing that there is a valid Operational and Tactical role for the units.

The striker seems to me to be a lot like half tracks in WW2. In fact a Striker Battalion sounds to me to be a lot like a Panzer grenadier Battalion. There are Machinegun armed armored vehicles designed to deliver a full squad of infantry to the battle field. There are specialty variations to provide organic fire support, communications, and other support roles. Strikers seem to fill the role of WW2 halftracks in a formation that largely relies of the power of the infantry to fight not its vehicles.

I only use the WW2 reference because that is the period of history that I have spent the most time studying.

[jomni]

Nice analogy between Strykers and Halftracks.

[Huntarr]

Originally posted by sgtgoody (esq):

To be honest I can't see a situation where they are superior to out current rapid deployment assets. The 82nd can be anywhere in the world in 48 hours and once the U.S. gets boots on the ground the entire situation will immediately change as every nation knows what will be brought to bear should the initial forces run into serious trouble. For instance the initial deployment during the 1st Gulf War would not have been any more effective had it been a Stryker brigade, not in the face of multiple Iraqi armored divisions. It was the threat of what would follow and the signal that the U.S. was willing to spill blood on the issue that stopped possible Iraqi action into Saudi Arabia. This would be the case in any deployment of U.S. ground forces.

Um, are you saying that Iraq during the Gulf War was to afraid of moving into Saudi Arabia once the U.S. had boots on the ground?

There was this "little" incident called The Battle of Khafji in '91. I was there, trust me the Iraqi's weren't out for a sunday cruise.

[ August 05, 2007, 08:27 PM: Message edited by: Huntarr ]

[Jenka]

Hurm, I’ve been thinking. If a striker Bn is roughly the same as a Panzer grenadier Bn. They have Infantry and light armored vehicles in support, they have Integral anti-tank (ATGM in the Stryker, ATG in the PZG). They have integral fire support (MGS in Striker, Sd kfz 251/9 in PZG, mortar carriers in both) they seem very similar indeed.

No one would argue that a PZG BN would be unable to either attack or defend on its own. Much of the offensive work of a ww2 armored division would be handled by the PZG or equivalent supported by elements of the PZ/tank regiment.

HBCT’s seem more like Armored Regiments than Mech inf. They have 2 BN of heavy tanks and a BN of light tanks (BFV) with tank riders under armor. Bradleys have been described elsewhere as proof against anything but ATGM or main gun fire, while in return capable of killing anything that moves on the battlefield. This sounds more like a light tank than a infantry carrier. With a 6 man squad inside that sounds more like tank riders instead of a serious force of infantry.

Am I completely off my rocker for drawing these comparisons?

[ August 05, 2007, 10:22 PM: Message edited by: Jenka ]

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

But right now, the Stryker isn't a square peg in round hole, it's a square peg when the game is chess.

Best point of this entire thread (although I've enjoyed reading it).

[jomni]

Originally posted by Jenka:

With a 6 man squad inside that sounds more like tank riders instead of a serious force of infantry.

Yeah how will a Bradley team fare in urban combat?

[JasonC]

Jenka - sure, but then a panzer division had this business end called a panzer regiment, and what with that and the panzerjaegers, brought a large number of true AFVs to the party. The PzGdrs were meant to work with, and did work with, actual tanks. There was a battalion sized unit of full AFVs for every two battalions of infantry (most of which was trucked incidentally).

The US meanwhile used one tank battalion per armored infantry battalion.

The ratios you get with those options are the ratios of AFVs to mech infantry in the current US heavy forces, pretty much.

But no full AFVs to 3 battalions of mech infantry is different - it is actually less armor than a Panzer grenadier division sported. (Which Marines have).

Is there a role for a pure "motorized infantry division" - or brigade - under light armor? Sure you can use them. With modern missiles and modern firepower arms and US tech, they can work a lot better than they would have in the past, against heavy opponents.

But also understand, we are in no way tank limited, as they were back then. We decide purely on the basis of the unit capabilities we think we need. (I mean, we have thousands of all types of the heavy stuff, more than we can man really).

I've no doubt that any fully equipped US brigade can do all sorts of useful stuff. And one with light armor can do some things a lot better than a pure light force, meant to move by chopper. Security missions for example.

I don't think security missions are rapid deployment missions. And I don't think even urban combat missions mean you don't want armor. (If it is real combat, you want armor, full stop).

I don't disagree with your characterization of the discussion, either. They are talking about much more tactical uses of a new system, I am talking about the strategic rational originally given for the whole change in forces it is a part of, which I see as less than fully successful in practice.

[JasonC]

jomni - we don't have to speculate, we know. Bradley teams kicked ass and took names in urban combat.

[Barleyman]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

The army that got kicked out of Grozny is a very different army from the one that's in Chechnya right now. The first time, they went in with tanks and bmps. The second time, they went in with full combined arms, and afterwards they started building jails and police stations.

As far as I have understood, that's not true. During the second Chechenyan conflict they again went into Grozny with armored units and subsequently got massacred by the light infantry with RPGs.

However, second time around one of the commanders had a clue and he sent in an infantry division (or equivalent) after the initial failure. Those guys took the city block by block, as you'd expect, assisted by generous helping of levelling the city by arty and direct fire. 125mm HE grenade is *nasty* hitting a stacked apartment complex if you do not have to worry about collateral damage.

Most of the atrocities have been committed by the local death squads after the initial military op was over. They have lovely culture of kidnapping and demanding ransom on both insurgent and goverment side. Assasination of the "president" changed nothing, power even did stay on the family.

Not recommended as a vacation spot. I think even red cross and other guys pulled out of there.

[Wisbech_lad]

Well, I am waiting for the patch before playing again. Main thing I have learnt about Strykers:

WTF haven't they all got 40mm AGL? That thing is nasty...

[Bigduke6]

Im sure you can see the differance between the US apporch to civiliance casualties, and the russian one. There is a considerable gray area between the two. To say that Russains werent that bad because they werent slaughtering civiliances wholesale, is.. well... a rather medival look on things.

I am talking about what it seems to take when a large Christian power attempts to control a smaller Muslim country by force. I am not making a moral judgement. The issue is what works, and what doesn't work.

The US approach, in thumbnail form, is lavish resouces, maximum technology, all the latest weapons, and protect your soldiers' lives at all costs. Its attitude towards the culture it is attempting to dominate is, essentially: give them democracy, and let them rule themselves.

A very obvious, if small, example of that tech-friendly approach is the Stryker, which is a very expensive battle vehicle that moves a squad of very expensive infantry around the Muslim country the Christian country is trying to control by force.

That approach minimizes some things the Russians think are important for a scenario like that, particularly the use of secret police tactics and the creation of bully boys of your own to do your dirty work; plus critically the political will to back it all up.

It is worth recalling, that the average Russian troop presence in Chechnya is around 100 thousand even if you take police units into account, and perhaps more importantly there is not much of a general effort by the Russian army, these days, to seek out terrorists/bandits/insurgents and destroy them.

The assertion that Russia has won in Chechnya because Russia is big and Chechya is small is silly: In the First Chechen War, the Russians lost. This is the Second Chechen War, and to all appearances the Russians have won.

There is not, as there is in Iraq, an ongoing emphasis on patrolling in vehicles to demonstrate that really, the occupying army is in control. Most of the Russian troops just guard things, if it comes to an assault mission there are better-trained (sometimes, extremely well-trained) infantry for that.

The emphasis is on intelligence and spy work, understanding the local culture, speaking the language, and enforcing the peace. There are no discussions about which clan should have more sway in the democratic Republic of Ichkeria. The assumption is that Chechens cannot govern themselves, and so Russians will govern them with as much force as it takes.

And there is a direct pay-off to creating a police state: the murder rate plummets, safety on the streets increases, and for most people - who just want to get on with their lives, they want nothing to do with the insurgents or the occupiers - life improves because it is physically safer.

There is nothing clumsy about any of this. The technique is calculated brutality, intelligent application of terror, and unbending political will.

Ironically, "medieval" is just about the last word one would use to describe the Russian approach in Chechnya. It is subtle, ruthless, and sophisticated. And more importantly, it is successful.

By comparison, the theory overpriced infantry practically unable to sustain casualties, in overpriced wheeled APCs with lots of bells and whistles, could contribute materially to the effort of a large Christian country to control a small Muslim country, is at least primitive. If not delusional.

[SgtMuhammed]

Originally posted by Guardsman11b:

Come on, how cool would it be too see a convoy of Hummers, all having ma deuces mounted on top, rolling down an MSR, working their targets?

It would look real cool right up to the point where a platoon of BMP's sets the column aflame with a couple bursts of autocannon fire. The M2 is nice but it isn't the god gun that people often assume it to be.

[Bigduke6]

Steve,

At the risk of continuing and so beating into shapeless pulp your inoffensive metaphor, how much use is a hammer or a pliers, when you're trying to cook an omlette?

Your point about how Strykers are small portion of all the resources committed to the war is of course valid. I'll be among the first to point out there are resource commitments to the war that are more senseless than Strykers. (Like, for instance, practically everything having to do with the Navy, and a whole lot of the Air Force.)

Certainly in the war in which the Stryker finds itself, there is some use to having a vehicle that can resist the cheapo AT weapons, and keep a squad of infantry relatively safe and so the casualty count down. Better than a deuce-and-a-half, sure, I'll give you that.

But you have to ask the question, is this the right tool for the jobs that are likely to be at hand? In the present case, I suspect (don't know, I'm guessing here) even you would agree that the money spent on the Strykers, would be better spent on bribes, spies, and maybe tax rebates to the American voters so they would feel happier about their own personal lives, and so be willing to support a longer-term war.

Sure, the Stryker is much better than Bradley for road patrols and happy troopies and maintenance - but what if road patrols and happy troops and reduced maintenance bills don't do jack towards winning the war?

After all, the invasion went pretty durn well without Strykers. It's this occupation business that's the hard part, and frankly, I see resources spent on putting Stryker infantry into an occupation as wasted resources.

My objection is, not only can that force contribute little to winning the war, but its very existence skews the decision process, and so the strategic options considered, away from approaches that would contribute more (spies etc.) towards winning the war.

Stryker is a new weapons system, it looks cool, and unsurprisingly it has a new entrenched sub-culture in the military with careers depending on the force's continued existence, and being seen as necessary, which in turn sucks more tax money into a force I don't think we need.

I think the national interest would be better served with all those Strykers never bought, and the soldiers that ride in them turned into civilians contributing to the economy's growth. With the the money saved and tax income increased, the resources should get spent on spies and bribes.

Same deal operationally and tactically - we have these spiffy vehicles, better get out and do road patrols with them. If it turns out they aren't good for the mission at hand, don't consider whether the mission makes sense. Instead, the policy is spend more money (RPG slats, extra armor, etc.) making the vehicle "better". I say that's more cash down the drain.

If however the vehicles didn't exist, and more money was, perhaps the people responsible for fighting the war would think harder about either (a) bribing our way to victory after learning a whole lot of Arabic or ( telling the civilian leadership straight up this isn't going to work.

But as it is, there is this brand-new Stryker force, and alot of bureaucratic incentive to declare the force successful in the only war we've got - an incentive which I say could well work against the national interest.

To repeat, maybe someday there will be a war involving the US that will allow Strykers, exclude Bradleys, and not involve an insurgency.

But as far as I can tell, we've spent an awful lot of money on a very narrow and improbable contingency.

[SgtMuhammed]

Originally posted by Huntarr:

Um, are you saying that Iraq during the Gulf War was to afraid of moving into Saudi Arabia once the U.S. had boots on the ground?

There was this "little" incident called The Battle of Khafji in '91. I was there, trust me the Iraqi's weren't out for a sunday cruise.

Khafji was a tactical incursion not an invasion attempt. I'm not saying that they didn't fight but the threat of an actual invasion of Saudi Arabia was over once American troops were on the ground. Or do you seriously believe that the 82nd and a handful of aircraft presented such an obstical that the Iraqis were afraid to mess with them. Remember Khafji happened after the fighting already started.

[Drusus]

Nice counterclaim Bigduke. Because Russia did lose to a small country once, the size doesn't matter. Or what are you trying to say?

Anyhow, claiming that the US doesn't use bully boys of their own isn't correct as far as I can tell. Of course there is no official material about this, but what do you think people like James Steele (Google it...) are (were?) doing there?

[Bigduke6]

Drusus,

I'm not trying to make an arguement about size or force ratios one way or another, except to say that in the Russian experience, police state tactics and the willingness to use them is what allowed them to reassert control over Chechnya, most of the time in most of the places. Sure combined arms and lots of high explosives had their moment, but for the guys in the Kremlin, what did the trick was the traditional KGB approach. Not spiffy weapons systems, not using a ridiculously expensive army the must drain the Russian economy, and certainly not by creating a democracy in Ichkeria.

To me, all that is a strong arguement against deploying a lot of Strykers in a place like Iraq - but as you can see not every one on this board buys that arguement.

As to the US allegedly not using bully boys, you make a fair comment but I would say that's the exception that proves the rule. Mostly, the Americans are trying to be the good guys.

[Guardsman11b]

Originally posted by sgtgoody (esq):

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Guardsman11b:

Come on, how cool would it be too see a convoy of Hummers, all having ma deuces mounted on top, rolling down an MSR, working their targets?

It would look real cool right up to the point where a platoon of BMP's sets the column aflame with a couple bursts of autocannon fire. The M2 is nice but it isn't the god gun that people often assume it to be. </font>

[James Bailey]

BigDuke-

You oppose the war, that is fine. But that doesn't mean you should be throwing our soldiers away, which is what you do if we don't have the Stryker. The reality is that there are hundreds of soldiers breathing today thanks to the Stryker. There are thousands who still have their arms and legs all attached thanks to the Stryker. These are facts, not theories.

It has moved the light force away from being light on survivability (the Humvee is not a combat platform - we learned that in Somalia and that hasn't changed after adding a few tons of steel).

My only regret on the Stryker is that we (1) don't have more of them, and (2)didn't have them sooner. We could have cut the KIA rate in half and the WIA rate in 1/3d if we had. I personally know two KIAs in Afghanistan that would have been with us today if they had been in a Stryker.

Also, it is not just the US Army that is benefitting. Talk to some Canadians. They do things with their LAV-III bn in Afghanistan that the US light bns can't dream of doing in our Humvee gun trucks. The Canadians are damn fine infantryman, and their LAV-III has been a huge combat multipler on their light-fighting skills.

(BTW - great thread. Really enjoying reading all the different view points. Kudos!)

[B00M$LANG]

Originally posted by James Bailey:

BigDuke-

You oppose the war, that is fine. But that doesn't mean you should be throwing our soldiers away, which is what you do if we don't have the Stryker. The reality is that there are hundreds of soldiers breathing today thanks to the Stryker. There are thousands who still have their arms and legs all attached thanks to the Stryker. These are facts, not theories.

It has moved the light force away from being light on survivability (the Humvee is not a combat platform - we learned that in Somalia and that hasn't changed after adding a few tons of steel).

My only regret on the Stryker is that we (1) don't have more of them, and (2)didn't have them sooner. We could have cut the KIA rate in half and the WIA rate in 1/3d if we had. I personally know two KIAs in Afghanistan that would have been with us today if they had been in a Stryker.

Also, it is not just the US Army that is benefitting. Talk to some Canadians. They do things with their LAV-III bn in Afghanistan that the US light bns can't dream of doing in our Humvee gun trucks. The Canadians are damn fine infantryman, and their LAV-III has been a huge combat multipler on their light-fighting skills.

(BTW - great thread. Really enjoying reading all the different view points. Kudos!)

Imagine a nice 25mm gun turret on an MRAP!!

[molotov_billy]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

It is worth recalling, that the average Russian troop presence in Chechnya is around 100 thousand

An absolutely overpowering presence if you consider that the population of the country is now no more than 800,000 (15 percent of the population now dead.)

The equivalent occupation force in Iraq would be three million men.

[ August 06, 2007, 10:19 AM: Message edited by: molotov_billy ]

[molotov_billy]

Originally posted by Bigduke6:

Russian combat deaths are given at about 3,500 over the last eight years, and the Russian society will tolerate casualties.

The actual number is between 20,000 and 40,000 combat deaths between the two wars. Where you get 3500, I don't know. Not even Russian claims are that low.

The rest of it is absurdist fantasy, ignoring the fact that none of the police, spy, bribery nonsense doesn't work until the major insurgent force has been defeated. It took nearly a decade for the Russians to do that in a tiny country equivalent in population to the state of Rhode Island.

They only had to kill a fifth of the population and displace half of the rest to do so. A success story if there ever was one, for sure.

[Omenowl]

How many bridges in around the world can support a Bradley compared to how many for an abrams or a stryker? It seems you have to include the combat engineers or take very long detours if the bridge can not support.

[SgtMuhammed]

If it will support an Abrams it will support either of the other two.

[Omenowl]

I was interested in the percentages. For example if an abrams is supported by 10% of the bridges, a bradly by 60% and an Stryker by 90% this is a huge difference betweeen 2-3%, 30% and 50% respectively.