How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[dan/california]

20 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

A promising commander put in charge of a crisis, not given the resources he needs to succeed BUT given the expectations of success, could be a good thing for Ukraine long term if he fails in the eyes of Putin.  Blame has to go somewhere and the Kremlin will push it outward instead of looking inward.

Steve

It is a time honored way to reduce the threat of overly ambitious subordinates. Of course every so often said ambitious subordinate repays the favor with a bit of window tossing. At any rate I bet someone gets to try and learn to fly relatively soon.

[MikeyD]

I'm curious about what happened to our earlier theorizing (just last week) about the death of maneuver warfare? What were we missing at the time or what are we missing now? Hapless's attached PDF (up above) partially addresses it on page 47, though it states that Ukraine currently lacks the EW capability to 'deconflict' drone use sufficiently to return to maneuver warfare. May I suggest one factor in play is the fluid front. Ukraine has seized, by one estimate, 1,000 square km of Russia. The typical suicide drone has a range of... what, 10km or less? With no established front line its a matter of luck whether you're going to blindly encounter an enemy while flying a drone around. Especially an operator new to the area who doesn't recognize what he's flying over.

[dan/california]

1 hour ago, MikeyD said:

I'm curious about what happened to our earlier theorizing (just last week) about the death of maneuver warfare? What were we missing at the time or what are we missing now? Hapless's attached PDF (up above) partially addresses it on page 47, though it states that Ukraine currently lacks the EW capability to 'deconflict' drone use sufficiently to return to maneuver warfare. May I suggest one factor in play is the fluid front. Ukraine has seized, by one estimate, 1,000 square km of Russia. The typical suicide drone has a range of... what, 10km or less? With no established front line its a matter of luck whether you're going to blindly encounter an enemy while flying a drone around. Especially an operator new to the area who doesn't recognize what he's flying over.

It met an older doctrine "hit them where they ain't". Apparently if you get that one right, and their reserves consists of poor bleeped fools being hauled off of training grounds with only half of the three weeks of training. they were supposed to get, maneuver still works.

[alison]

From my amateur perspective, this operation is textbook "go where your enemy isn't". I suppose you could make a case that maneuver warfare is a fancy name for doing just that. Whether it qualifies as formal maneuver probably depends on how much you actually had to gain from exploiting the gap. Could you win a war by maxing out all your territorial gains in the places your enemy isn't? In a computer game probably not, assuming the enemy is focusing their defenses on areas of direct value to their war economy and/or political power. But in the real world, perhaps it will do enough psychological damage or bring enough of a morale boost to impact the outcome. That remains to be seen.

[Battlefront.com]

2 hours ago, MikeyD said:

I'm curious about what happened to our earlier theorizing (just last week) about the death of maneuver warfare? What were we missing at the time or what are we missing now? Hapless's attached PDF (up above) partially addresses it on page 47, though it states that Ukraine currently lacks the EW capability to 'deconflict' drone use sufficiently to return to maneuver warfare. May I suggest one factor in play is the fluid front. Ukraine has seized, by one estimate, 1,000 square km of Russia. The typical suicide drone has a range of... what, 10km or less? With no established front line its a matter of luck whether you're going to blindly encounter an enemy while flying a drone around. Especially an operator new to the area who doesn't recognize what he's flying over.

We discussed this quite a bit over the past couple dozen pages.  Maneuver warfare always works when the enemy is weak, as Alison pointed out.  The biggest reason this attack/raid/whatever worked is because Ukraine made the decision to attack where conditions were favorable and then spent considerable effort making them more favorable (see post above about nets).  Also, on the scale of maneuver warfare this is quite small and, from a military standpoint relevant to this specific war, not in-and-itself very significant.

It would be like a column of supply trucks making it to the front somewhere off to the side and declaring that logistics are no longer an endangered species.  Context is king!

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

We discussed this quite a bit over the past couple dozen pages.  Maneuver warfare always works when the enemy is weak, as Alison pointed out.  The biggest reason this attack/raid/whatever worked is because Ukraine made the decision to attack where conditions were favorable and then spent considerable effort making them more favorable (see post above about nets).  Also, on the scale of maneuver warfare this is quite small and, from a military standpoint relevant to this specific war, not in-and-itself very significant.

It would be like a column of supply trucks making it to the front somewhere off to the side and declaring that logistics are no longer an endangered species.  Context is king!

Steve

While the scale of the attacking elements are modest, we are up to potentially 1000 square miles of taken territory. Its an insane territory grab at this point. Obviously a better question would be the sustainability of these gains in the next few weeks. I really dont think we can call it a raid at this point given the width and extend of penetration, or the duration of the op. 

[kimbosbread]

I wonder if you create a buffer zone with big hexacopters salting the earth. You can already plant trees and other things in nice patterns from the air; what about dropping salt? Could be completely autonomous.

[Battlefront.com]

10 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

While the scale of the attacking elements are modest, we are up to potentially 1000 square miles of taken territory. Its an insane territory grab at this point.

You can grab a lot of terrain very quickly if there's nobody there to stop you.  Or those that are can't do more than put up limited resistance.  Again, the key factor here is that Ukraine chose a place that was particularly vulnerable.  The things that have made this a success were as much, if not more, to the organization of the operation rather than the actual execution. 

This same force, with this same level of planning, and with the same execution would likely have failed miserably anywhere on the frontlines within Ukraine.  Anywhere.

10 minutes ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

 I really dont think we can call it a raid at this point given the width and extend of penetration, or the duration of the op. 

I keep posting the definition of a raid.  I don't want to do it again, but you can look it up yourself and note that the amount of time spent on the operation does not determine if it is a raid or not.  Neither does the scale.  What determines a raid is, more than anything else, the intention to hold the ground taken after the operational expansion is complete.  We do not know if that is the case yet, so you should be patient and wait to make a determination later.

Also, there is the possibility that it was intended to be a raid and it went so much better than expected that a decision was made to change to keep what was taken.

Again, you don't know so you should not presume to know.

Steve

[FancyCat]

Quote

The Ukrainian 40th Tactical Aviation Brigade “Ghosts” introduced what is quite possibly one of the best MiG-29 Fulcrum combat liveries fielded. All black air superiority with Ukrainian flag IFF markings, and the brigade’s ghost nose art. 

https://t.me/UkrAirForce/2639

 

[Holien]

What do you do if you have an excess of Dragons without riders?

Quote

A US senator suggested inviting American F-16 pilots to fight on the side of Ukraine following negotiations with Zelenskyi

He stated that retired F-16 pilots who want to fight for freedom can be hired by Ukraine.

https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1823075378614968679

Edited August 13 by Holien

[paxromana]

40 minutes ago, Holien said:

What do you do if you have an excess of Dragons without riders?

https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1823075378614968679

AVG, just don't get captured!

[Grigb]

5 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

This same force, with this same level of planning, and with the same execution would likely have failed miserably anywhere on the frontlines within Ukraine.  Anywhere.

I strongly dispute that. The similar force in the Donetsk region would have substantial success overcoming Russian defenses several kilometers deep in hours. However, the overall effect would be limited because the remainder of the UKR army lacks comparable EW capabilities and cannot support it. 

Moving front line back for several km in few hours would look like Blitzkrieg but will have negligible overal effect. Well, it would have a negative overall effect since other UKR units without the same EW capabilities would be forced to defend unprepared terrain against RU counterattacks.

[Lethaface]

17 minutes ago, Grigb said:

I strongly dispute that. The similar force in the Donetsk region would have substantial success overcoming Russian defenses several kilometers deep in hours. However, the overall effect would be limited because the remainder of the UKR army lacks comparable EW capabilities and cannot support it. 

Moving front line back for several km in few hours would look like Blitzkrieg but will have negligible overal effect. Well, it would have a negative overall effect since other UKR units without the same EW capabilities would be forced to defend unprepared terrain against RU counterattacks.

I don't know. 

Imo it would be more like introducing another brigade or two to the grinder, in this case veteran troops. At the main front for a large part people are defending from trenches/bunkers and have to survive through shellings by whatever RU can lob at them in between defending against meat/iron attacks. Given Russia has been able to 'streamline' their logistics for introducing more meat and bombs into this front, I think it's wise to try and see how much up to speed are the other parts of the front, including EW. 

Does RU have enough EW to spoof GPS across the whole front? Etc

Ukraine doesn't want to do a battle of attrition on Russia's condition imo, so opening new area's where the situation is still up in the air seems wise.

[Holien]

43 minutes ago, paxromana said:

AVG, just don't get captured!

I think with the current air war that is unlikely but never say never.

Pilot misjudgement can never be taken out of the loop.

After all pilots tend to enjoy adrenaline...

[hcrof]

11 hours ago, Hapless said:

Don't have to read this right now, but looks promising.
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War_final.pdf

 

Interesting read and well argued, although I disagree with some of their conclusions. 

I agree that offensives should be smaller and the current success in Kursk is a good example of that. But I don't see how their suggestion of relying on counter attacks is a good idea for 2 reasons:

1 it is highly contingent on what your opponent is doing and you end up reacting to them. And if they know that is how you fight they will not give you an opportunity.

2 I don't think the authors go far enough with the idea that traditional mass stops being more effective above a certain threshold but supporting elements can still be massed just fine. You need a minimum amount of combat power in your maneuver elements but more than that results in higher casualties and slower movement rather than increased effect on the enemy. The key is supporting elements such as ISR, drones and artillery - that is where you need mass! If you are counter attacking into your enemies offensive their front line troops are likely to be weak but their supporting elements will be less degraded - why attack where your enemy is strong? 

[chuckdyke]

Russia at some point must be running out of competent generals. To survive under Putin, you need to be successful. Ukraine it will come up in the next two weeks or so will they try to occupy Russian territories? To withdraw maybe more difficult than the initial attack. 

[Beleg85]

11 minutes ago, chuckdyke said:

Russia at some point must be running out of competent generals. To survive under Putin, you need to be successful. Ukraine it will come up in the next two weeks or so will they try to occupy Russian territories? To withdraw maybe more difficult than the initial attack. 

To survive under Putin, one need to be first and foremost loyal. It's not difficult and actually demands only connections and lack of spine. Effectiveness and popularity are dangerous (Prig's case) because it can go with ambitions. 

Dyumin is interesting example as there was some kind of obsession on behalf of Western journalists some time ago to view him as Putin's successor; in my view, quite prematurely. So in theory it could be some additional test for the future. But truth to be told, we know nothing certain about Kremlin's internal rochades.

[Grigb]

Quick update (unfortunately without map) 

• Due to Tea Leaves I am leaning toward claims that RU abandoned Korenevo. However they seems to be firmly holding Glushkovo (51.342749, 34.632340) and attempting to counter attack from there toward Snagost (probably to cut UKR group in Korenevo).
• Due to Tea Leaves I am becoming confident RU abandoned  Kromskiye Byki but fighting is happening between Kromskiye Byki and Vasilyevka (51.596652, 35.252374)
• BTW UKR photo at Lgov sign most likely is fake (RU signs there seems to be of different design). Anyway RU most likely firmly control approaches to Lgov.
• Due to Tea Leaves I asses Bolshoye Soldatskoye is firmly in RU hands. 
• Due to Tea Leaves I asses there is a battle at Belitsa and Giri. RU are counter attacking toward Giri from Belya direction and also attempting to flank from Zabuzhevka (50.965865, 35.483106).
• I strongly suspects  that at least RU logistics rely on Yandex Navigator. I mean anywhere close to front line RU traffic makes no sense from civilian point of view but very logical from military point of view. As soon as something is abandoned next day you see flanking tentacle growing where previously there was no civilian traffic. 

[Sgt Joch]

You think they are reading this forum…

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war

Edited August 13 by Sgt Joch

[Grigb]

1 minute ago, Beleg85 said:

Dyumin is interesting example as there was some kind of obsession on behalf of Western journalists some time ago to view him as Putin's successor; in my view, quite prematurely. 

I think obsession was cause by buzz from RU Nats. At that time they were buzzing with joy over Dyumin rumors. Looks like journalists just believed in that buzz. 

[The_Capt]

16 hours ago, Grigb said:

I strongly dispute that. The similar force in the Donetsk region would have substantial success overcoming Russian defenses several kilometers deep in hours. However, the overall effect would be limited because the remainder of the UKR army lacks comparable EW capabilities and cannot support it. 

Moving front line back for several km in few hours would look like Blitzkrieg but will have negligible overal effect. Well, it would have a negative overall effect since other UKR units without the same EW capabilities would be forced to defend unprepared terrain against RU counterattacks.

We have zero proof of this.  In fact we have counter proof in last summers UA offensive.  The minefields in the south are in defensive belts and are much more heavily manned. In the south RA ISR is far more resourced as are c-move forces.

The UA basically bounced into a nearly empty frontier about 250kms from any major front line.  Before we start thinking that this is a major shift in this war, let’s all keep that in mind.  Further, we are coming up on a week in and while the UA is still playing merry hob in the backfield this offensive has not translated into a breakout.  We have UA mobile elements creating all sorts of hell for the RA all over the place but we are not seeing major UA formations going for deeper strategic objectives.  This is likely a combination of things but the UA clearly understands that over extension is very dangerous given the environment.

Of course the fundamental disagreement we have in this is ISR.  If you believe that RA ISR is all tactical UAS then effective EW will create blind spots that can be exploited anywhere.  I do not believe this and am supported by numerous sources, including pre-war assessments. RA ISR is layered from tactical to strategic. EW is not going to stop airborne ISR platforms or space based.  Nor will it stop ground radars.  So concentrations in areas of stronger RA ISR concentrations run the risk of early detection and c-moves and strike.

So what.  Well the UA went where the RA had weaker forces and ISR.  And we even know that there the RA likely knew of the force build up but failed to respond.

An Bde attack like this down south would have likely been seen and countered with high losses for the UA, with very little gains…that is why they did not do it there.

Edited August 14 by The_Capt

[The_Capt]

52 minutes ago, hcrof said:

Interesting read and well argued, although I disagree with some of their conclusions. 

I agree that offensives should be smaller and the current success in Kursk is a good example of that. But I don't see how their suggestion of relying on counter attacks is a good idea for 2 reasons:

1 it is highly contingent on what your opponent is doing and you end up reacting to them. And if they know that is how you fight they will not give you an opportunity.

2 I don't think the authors go far enough with the idea that traditional mass stops being more effective above a certain threshold but supporting elements can still be massed just fine. You need a minimum amount of combat power in your maneuver elements but more than that results in higher casualties and slower movement rather than increased effect on the enemy. The key is supporting elements such as ISR, drones and artillery - that is where you need mass! If you are counter attacking into your enemies offensive their front line troops are likely to be weak but their supporting elements will be less degraded - why attack where your enemy is strong? 

I am just going through it and also have a couple issues.  While it advocates closer ISR and deep fires integration, they miss the point that we have shifted from a “manoeuvre to fire” to a “fire to manoeuvre” reality.  They clearly describe the Tactical Recon Complex, which is absolutely true but miss the larger C4 ISR architectures those tactical complexes plug into.  Again, the risk is seeing this war solely through a social media lens - we see a bunch of small drones doing stuff enough times and that becomes the whole picture.  This is micro-masking which is the inverse of what we saw at the beginning of this war which was macro-masking.

But that all said, it is an excellent piece and everyone should give it a look.

Edited August 13 by The_Capt

[Maciej Zwolinski]

10 hours ago, MikeyD said:

I'm curious about what happened to our earlier theorizing (just last week) about the death of maneuver warfare? What were we missing at the time or what are we missing now?

I still think that the maneuver is more dead than alive and Kursk attack does not disprove the hypothesis. Basically, the Kursk attack is made in a secondary, weakly defended direction. If you can maneuvre only in a secondary direction, which the enemy did not choose to defend, then  the maneuver cannot be decisive. 

[The_Capt]

I will follow up on the ISW piece with an example:

This is on page 49 on "Penetrating an Enemy Tactical Recon Strike Complex".  At first blush this makes perfect sense - establish a big EW bubble, drop enemy tac ISR from the sky, suppress in depth and breach/exploit. But here is the problem:

- This cannot solve for standoff enemy ISR. Even RA drones have hi resolution LOS of 10-15kms so that is one large EW bubble to begin with.  Higher altitude larger drones and manned AC can stand off tens, even hundreds of kms and provide high resolution ISR (RA less so but not zero).

- Stand off ISR means effective and precise enemy strike.  In the diagram above they have essentially written that off with that lone box that says "Blue suppress Red's TRSC components in the rear."  Given that the "rear" for a HIMARs or Glide Bomb system can be up to several hundred kms that is one helluva rear area suppression requirement for a tactical breach. 

- Standoff ISR and even tactical ISR pre-breach can see 10s of km behind our own lines.  So that nice neat blue force build up in that pic can take hours to marshal, stage and get across the start line.  Once moving it is also a big signature.  So that means the enemy has time to reposition.  Here deception, decoys and whatever we can do to blind and spoof become central.  For example, EW does nothing for manned ATGM teams capable of precision strikes at 3-5kms via LOS.  Those teams need to be queued by all that ISR, once they are all the EW in the world will not protect that breach attempt.

- This is not about EW superiority, it is about fires superiority.  That system above will work if the Blue side has a complex that can basically spot and eliminate anything that even whiffs Red Team going back kms.

- None of this solves for good old fashion stuff like HUMINT.  People with cellphones can blow this entire operation.

- Finally, let's say you breach the mine belt and achieve breakthrough...now what?  As you advance the enemy is going to reestablish the TRSC on your own LOC as you advance.  Or you need to have a secure LOC corridor 10s of kms wide...that is not sustainable.

So while this will (debatably) offer a tactical manoeuvre option, it does not solve the operational problem.  Evidence of this is happening in Kursk right now.  The UA does not appear interested in deep thunder runs.  Likely because the risk is too high for being eventually cut off.

As I read deeper into this report I can say that it is one of the best articulations of the problem we have seen.  The solutions, however, do not entirely follow through to my mind.  And as we see fully autonomous systems on the horizon, pinning this whole thing on EW is dangerous.

[The_Capt]

15 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

I still think that the maneuver is more dead than alive and Kursk attack does not disprove the hypothesis. Basically, the Kursk attack is made in a secondary, weakly defended direction. If you can maneuvre only in a secondary direction, which the enemy did not choose to defend, then  the maneuver cannot be decisive. 

Pretty much this.  I do not want to downplay what Ukraine pulled off here. This operation has and will deliver political and even operational effects.  It was boldy done and appears to really be ruining Russia's day, which is never a bad thing.

But it is not likely strategically decisive in itself.  At least not yet.  The ground taken does not constitute a strategically decisive gain.  Russia still has freedom of manouevre within its own borders and can continue to prosecute this war.  Now it may trigger some dilemmas for the RA and they will lose offensive imitative, which is not small.

This operation looks very strategically "undeciding".  It has undecided the status quo of an entirely new front, which can be quite potent.  We will have to see if it translates into strategic effects - how much combat power will the RA have top bleed off from elsewhere to re-secure, how much will the UA have to as well?  Will Russia need to do another mobilization to try to go back on the offensive (my guess is no, this attack is too small, but we will see).

There are also serious risks for Ukraine in all this as well.  They could lose well trained and equipped forces they cannot easily replace. Especially if they dig in and try and hold on.