How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[sburke]

38 minutes ago, dan/california said:

Well at a minimum they are faking this guy.

 

 

no way, they told this guy the real plan to post knowing the russians will think it is the fake plan, but the russians know the UA will know that they know so they obviously can't be giving the real plan!

 

 

[AlsatianFelix]

If Ukraine does decide to hold these Russian towns, will Russia take them back by leveling them with artillery?

[Carolus]

Meanwhile on the home front...

[Battlefront.com]

19 minutes ago, Carolus said:

Meanwhile on the home front...

Shoot man, that's like deciding to investigate Jeffery Dahmer as he's chewing on a Human leg and asking someone to pass him more mint jelly.

Anyway, couldn't happen to a nicer guy.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

OK, hopefully we can get back to talking about what is going on instead of getting heated about them.

Here's my take on what's going on.  Obviously heavy on speculation, but I feel it's at least reasonable.

1. Ukraine has been planning this for months.  Maybe not specifically where they would raid, but that they would raid.  This based on the fact that a) they could not do a significant offensive this year, b) they experienced how successful smaller raids across the border were, and c) they discovered how disruptive cross border raids can be when Russia did the same towards Kharkiv.
2. This is a raid, not an invasion.  When Russia quickly grabbed a relatively decent sized chunk of Ukraine in the Kharkiv offensive, I was one that cautioned people to not overestimate what it was or what it would achieve.  I am cautioning the same about this raid.  Unless it has a tipping point impact (and that is certainly possible), this is not a game changing event.  Expect that in a few days the dust will settle and Ukraine will withdraw voluntarily and victoriously.  See next point.
3. There is no way, none, that Russia will let Ukrainian forces stay on Russian territory.  The will instead throw waves and waves of meatsacks and glide bombs into the mix.  This might provide some positive results for Ukraine, similar to what it achieved on the left bank of the Dnepr, but ultimately it will not be sustainable.  Especially given Ukraine's chronic shortage of infantry.
4. This raid does not provide any evidence for the "maneuver warfare isn't dead" argument.  As someone noted above, WW1 had plenty of successful raids despite the fact that the majority experience was one of mass casualties achieving nothing.  What seems to be missed is how much effort it must have put into this for an outcome that is likely fairly limited in terms of impacting the whole war. 
5. Tactical successes that couldn't happen without direct national level strategic focus are the antithesis of maneuver warfare.  Maneuver warfare is supposed to be the inverse, where tactical elements are the ones that find and exploit the enemy's weaknesses.  Strategic level investment in a small scale raid is not sustainable. 

Importantly, we still don't really know what's going on besides that Russia was caught unprepared to deal with a very prepared Ukrainian force.

Whether the border was thinly or thickly defended isn't really the issue.  To me the important thing to note is that Ukraine came up with a recipe to exploit the conditions of this sector of front regardless of what was there.  Either they got got the recipe right for this one situation, or they got lucky.  We do not know which.

I suspect Ukraine discovered this sector of front was thinly defended and took explicit measures to ensure that, at least for a short period of time, Russia could not easily compensate once the raid started.  Scaring off aviation, screwing up communications, well planned tactical strikes on reinforcements, relying upon the defenders being poorly trained conscripts, working within Russia's traditionally slow decision loops, etc.

I have no doubt that this sector of front was marked on Russian maps as being heavily defended but was, due to a plethora of Russian reasons, not in fact that heavily defended.  I am willing to bet that the supporting arms, such as artillery and air defenses, that were available to this sector last year were drained away to nearly nothing this year.

Lastly, I suspect that Ukraine used some new EW equipment secretly provided to it by the West or developed in-house, or at the very least came up with a theoretical "EW D-Day" plan that we just saw used (in full) for the first time.  Note that RU sources have complained recently about Ukrainian EW capabilities having increased.  I don't think that is a coincidence.

Steve

[MikeyD]

If Ukraine's plan is to take and hold Russian property (of limited strategic value) I'm not too sure about their thought processes. If, on the other hand, their plan is to destroy the enemy they may have a pretty good shot at it. If I were someone in command I would consider driving some km inland then take a left (or right) turn, paralleling the Russian border defenses from the rear, then turn back to the border, trapping however many Russian formations in a sack with the Ukrainians to their rear. What immediately springs to mind is Carthage's victory at Cannae in 216 BC.

[Grigb]

2 hours ago, AlsatianFelix said:

If Ukraine does decide to hold these Russian towns, will Russia take them back by leveling them with artillery?

Yes

[Letter from Prague]

1 minute ago, Grigb said:

Yes

In fact they already did that when the Freedom of Russia legion took over some towns.

[Carolus]

7 minutes ago, Letter from Prague said:

In fact they already did that when the Freedom of Russia legion took over some towns.

If all you have is a hammer, villages begin to look like nails.

[Pete Wenman]

Thoughts on the UKR incursion from Mick Ryan 

and link to his substack article mentioned https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-battle-of-kursk-2024

 

 

Edited August 8 by Pete Wenman

[Fenris]

It makes sense to me to run in, make a ruckus, wait for RU to start moving units to counter and GTFO before they arrive in force (hopefully picking some off in transit).  Unless UKR have some hidden store of manpower I don't see anything else eventuating.  A feint is a perfectly good way to shake up both the units deployed along the front and the kremlin.  It wouldn't surprise me that the free RU units that were used the last two times no longer have the capacity to pull this kind of move off on this scale so now we're seeing UKR units do it.

 

 

 

[Grigb]

1 hour ago, Letter from Prague said:

In fact they already did that when the Freedom of Russia legion took over some towns.

Exactly

[Grigb]

RU report about UKR tactics (adjusted for better readability)

Quote

About tactics.

The AFU used a relatively new tactic when entering Kursk region. They use new type of units [called] "rangers" as well as new formations trained according to "rangers" tactics.

This tactic was recently tested in Kharkiv, and those who saw it reported it [to higher command]. But it didn't get any attention.

So, how it is done?

• First, the enemy in his friendly area routinely "clears"  the sky from our eyes, an airplane-type UAV [these are the long range UAVs that RU operational ISR is based on].
• Then, under the artillery barrage, he deploys the directed jamming equipment at almost the first line. Under the cover of directional jammers enemy launch a huge number of its UAVs. [For example] Mavics with a non-standard frequencies that shift when they are being jammed. Anti-drone guns and jammers are useless [not exactly true - RU army standard jamming guns and jammers are useless, not the proper ones].
• Under the incessant barrage of high-precision FPV that come in swarms, infantry teams move to our the positions. They enters and clear our empty destroyed trenches in small groups of 4-6 men [2 two or three man teams] under the cover of a UAVs.
• The Jamming "line" is brought forward and the arrangement is repeated.

A little later about the medicine. Stay tuned.

Let's digest it:

• RU ISR critically depend on long range drones (surprise, surprise!) 
• Jammers are extremely effective at dealing with standard battlefield drones (when done competently)
• Non standard drones are extremely effective at bypassing standard battlefield jammers

The last two points describe Drone-EW issue very well - both drones and jammers are effective at dealing with each other if your drone/EW specialists are competent enough to adapt to enemy equipment quicker then enemy drone/EW specialists can adapt to your equipment.

So, what's really new? Nothing except one thing - UKR managed to do what's need to be done on significantly bigger scale. Everything mentioned here was done by both sides on smaller scale. 

[Grigb]

RU started to admit Sudzha is under UKR control (most likely it was under UKR control from yesterday evening)

[Grigb]

RU Nat reports

Quote

Comrades! The situation is such that with its current success in the Kursk direction, the enemy is pulling apart not only our regular military forces and weapons, but also [RU Nat] volunteer resources aimed at helping the regular army. Our fire fighting teams are in dire need of comms, drones and EW devices...

 

[Beleg85]

Russian clips of Lancet hits on Ukrainian Marders; hungry for success, they put it in their major news outlet.

Geolocated to Sverdlikovo village, Kursk oblast. These vehicle could belong to one of paratrooper brigades (25th or 82nd) or 100 Mechanized Brigade. Perhaps other units use them too.

Edited August 8 by Beleg85

[hcrof]

14 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:

Russian clips of Lancet hits on Ukrainian Marders; hungry for success, they put it in their major news outlet.

Geolocated to Sverdlikovo village, Kursk oblast. These vehicle could belong to one of paratrooper brigades (25th or 82nd) or 100 Mechanized Brigade. Perhaps other units use them too.

Looks like some of that EW overmatch is over then. I suspect today will show little progress if Russia is able to get lots of drones in the air and working against Ukrainian forces. 

Now I guess we see if it was a raid or if the Ukrainians decide to dig in. 

[Grigb]

RU admits that VKS has issues with ISR targeting

Quote

Aviation has fulfilled its task of deterring the enemy and gaining time to regroup our forces and is now acting less intensively, but constantly... Bombers are now working much less, and the main aviation forces are [doing nothing but] ready to work. Aviation needs targets and objectives. We need specific coordinates. Hitting a single UAZ with Iskanders by the entire aviation group is fun, but stupid. No one will fly and look for a target by himself today. It's suicide.

UKR are silent because RU are completely blind. And the only way VKS can get targeting data now is from UKR public announcements of RU settlement captures. No announcement, no targets for VKS to smash. 

But what do I or RU Nats know! 

[Grigb]

RU Nats start to arrive at Kursk direction

Quote

I saw arraving reinforcements on the Kursk front. Kamaz trucks, Urals, vans. In the context of the massive use of fpv drones by the enemy, I would like to see a real organization consiting of "fire brigades". Groups on motorcycles and buggies with good communication are much more effective than a classical truck based column. Tree lines and forests near Kursk are dense, small groups with ATGMs and fpv drones would spill a lot of enemy blood.

I would like to emphasize that there are such groups, but I would like to see them in much larger numbers. The enemy is already trying to get control of the main roads with drones and hits cars far from the front line. Speed and mobility are the key to survival and efficiency. On the static front, we transferred everyone to motorcycles and buggies. We need to work out this tactic to stop breakthroughs.

 

Edited August 8 by Grigb

[Grigb]

RU member of long range UAV crew comments UKR video

Quote

Another video from the enemy about the defeat of our reconnaissance drone "ZALA" The fact is that the other side is aware of the consequences of presence of these drones in their rear. Therefore, specific units have appeared, which, in conjunction with the EW direction finding units, find such drones in the sky and send fpv to intercept them.

The key takeaway here is that RU long-range recon drones are extremely EW noisy. All RU impressive UAV-Iskander strikes targeted UKR units that either lacked detectors or became lazy and complacent.

This is all what you need to know about RU OTH strikes against mobile units.

[Kraft]

1 hour ago, Beleg85 said:

These vehicle could belong to one of paratrooper brigades (25th or 82nd) or 100 Mechanized Brigade

I heard that the 82nd is involved, with the 22nd mech

[Grigb]

RU Nat from that Avdiivka assault about Jammers

Quote

I don't know anything about the situation with Poddubny [RU propogandist who got hit by UKR FPV].

I saw information that the FPV hit the car.

Ukrainian channels reported that there was an jammer on the car. I don't know who made it or how it works. This is regarding question "tell me which jammer to use?". I won't tell.

The situation with jammers and FPV is in constant dynamics. Today you can put something on the vehicle and it would work. And then you drive along the front road, something fall off or shortened inside, and now you have a placebo, not an jammer.

You can ride for a month and everything works, and then a new enemy [FPV crew] comes, changes the [FPV] frequency and your jammer is again a placebo. There is no miracle solution. Only an integrated approach, which is absent in the [RU] army. And if you have already installed jammer, learn to diagnose it for operability with a spectrum analyzer, according to the stated suppression frequencies.

So, the reason why jammers are seems to be ineffective against drones is due to human (lack of basic EW skills) and organizational (lack of proper anti-drone organization that would monitor, asses and change jammers frequencies) challenges.

And no, autonomous drones would not do. Their effectives is greatly exaggerated. Future belongs to semi-autonomous drones that still can be jammed to reduce their effectiveness.

And counter-drones defense will be mix of jammers, guns and interceptor drones, plus passive measures (camo and hardening) 

[TheVulture]

The motivation for the Kursk attack/raid might as easily be political as military (much like the Russian attack a few months ago was). 

The story has become, over the last six months, Ukraine holding on while the US in particular was in internal deadlock over sending more support, and the Russians grinding forwards. Very slowly, but pretty much the only battlefield news in the last few months has been "Russia has finally taken village X after 2 months of fighting and advanced 300m", and that kind of thing. Not impressive, but when that's the only news, then the story created in people's minds is that Ukraine is struggling to hold on, even if it would take Russia a few centuries to reach the Dneipr at that rate.

So with the military support from the US on the upswing, and the arrival of F-16s in theatre, Ukraine might have felt the political pressure to generate some positive PR just to be and to say "this support is making a difference", and to get rid of the "Russia is slowly grinding forwards and Ukraine can't stop then" impression. A dramatic push in to Russia at an offensive rate far higher than Russia has been able manage changes the narrative and perceptions. Even if the eventual plan is to withdraw rather than hod the ground.

There can be other reasons too that aren't just battlefield strategy. Maybe they wanted to test how well a new combined arms drone/EW doctrine worked, and iron out the kinks against a relatively soft target. Or the ongoing "boil the frog" of slowly pushing Russia's escalation red lines further back. Or adding internal political pressure on Putin for his inability to stop cross border incursions. Or to take advantage of the recent rumoured purges inside the Russian defense ministry which might cause high level decision paralysis. 

Or, most likely, the operation was approved because it ticks multiple boxes of the above - much like with the Russian attack towers Kharkiv. It might not make the most sense from a purely wargame battlefield perspective, but serves multiple human and political purposes.

[Grigb]

Interesting tactical tidbit. There are reports from RU locals that they do not see any more UKR troops. However, any attempt at leaving the settlement in a car attracts small arms fire and/or FPV drone.

So, looks like UKR are using small infantry teams supported by small drone teams to control the settlements without committing significant forces to clear and occupy them.

It is very interesting because an armored column can bypass a lot of things by deploying just a bunch of infantry teams with drones neat it.

[Grigb]

Just now, Grigb said:

Interesting tactical tidbit. There are reports from RU locals that they do not see any more UKR troops. However, any attempt at leaving the settlement in a car attracts small arms fire and/or FPV drone.

So, looks like UKR are using small infantry teams supported by small drone teams to control the settlements without committing significant forces to clear and occupy them.

It is very interesting because an armored column can bypass a lot of things by deploying just a bunch of infantry teams with drones neat it.

BTW, the reports about who controls a settlement based just on actual presence of a troops on the streets are less reliable now.